HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

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PREFACE

THE last twenty years have seen a renaissance of Hegel scholarship in Britain and the United States, and we are now beginning to witness some of the clarity and analytical rigour characteristic of modern Kant studies being directed at Hegel's texts. Surprisingly though, little of such quality has been specifically concentrated on the relationship between the two master-builders of German idealism even though Hegel's criticisms of Kant are fertile philosophical ground. Most of the perennial problems of western philosophy are there: the nature and scope of knowledge; the possibility of metaphysics; relations between mental and physical, subjective and objective, individual and social, freedom and necessity; issues in politics and history, ethics, and aesthetics. The present work is designed to meet this deficiency by pitting Hegel against Kant over almost the entire range of their mutual interests. None of the contributors is concerned to reconstruct the chronology of Hegel's changing attitude to Kant. Each of us addresses a philosophical issue or cluster of issues and adjudicates between the two protagonists.

I have arranged the papers to follow the order of topics as they arise in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and *The Critique of Judgement* respectively. My Introduction is a discussion of the major texts in which Hegel's criticisms of Kant are focused. Only two papers have been published before: the ones by Professor Walsh. I am therefore most grateful to the Cambridge University Press and to Professor A. Phillips Griffiths, editor of the Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, for permission to reprint 'Kant as Seen by Hegel' from *Idealism Past and Present*, edited by Godfrey Vesey. I am equally grateful to Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann GmbH, Bonn, and Professor Gerhard Funke of the Johannes Gutenberg University at Mainz for permission to reprint 'The Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason' from *Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Mainz, 1981. Professor Joseph Flay of the Pennsylvania State University very kindly allowed me to use part of his excellent bibliography from *Hegel and the History of Philosophy*, Proceedings of the 1972 Hegel Society of America Conference, edited by J. O'Malley, K. Algozin, and F. Weiss. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, generously permitted reprinting of part of the same, and it is included in the Gregg edition by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Works of Kant:

CF	*The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. M. J. Gregor, New York, 1979.
CJ	*The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1969.
CPR	*Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London and Basingstoke, 1978.
CPrR	*Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. L. White Beck, Indianapolis, 1956.
Diss.	*Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space*, trans. J. Handyside, Chicago, 1929.
G	*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, ed. K. Vorlander, Hamburg, 1965.
GS	*Gesammelte Schriften*, Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1902, 1968.
KoH	*Kant on History*, ed. L. White Beck, Indianapolis, 1963.
KPW	*Kant's Political Writings*, trans. H. B. Nisbett, ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge, 1971.
KPrV	*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, ed. K. Vorlander, Hamburg, 1974.
KRV	*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. I. Heidemann, Stuttgart, 1980.
MS	*The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton, London, 1965.
P	*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic*, a revision of the Carus translation with an introduction by Lewis White Beck, New York, 1950.
We	*Werke*, Berlin, 1968.

Works of Hegel:

D	*The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, an English translation of Hegel's *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie*, prepared and edited by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany, 1977.
E	*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, ed. K. L. Michelet, Heidelberg, 1817, 1827, and 1830. Posthumous edn., 1842, ed. K. L. Michelet.
Enc.	*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, ed. F. Nicolin and Otto Poggeler, Hamburg, 1969.
FK	*Faith and Knowledge*, trans. W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany, 1977.
GRP	*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg, 1967.
HA	*Lecteurs on Aesthetics*, Berlin, 1842, trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford, 1975.
HPW	*Hegel's Political Writings*, ed. Z. Pelczynski, Oxford, 1964.
HPS	*Politische Schriften*, Nachwort von J. Habermas, Frankfurt am Main, 1966.
JLMN	*Jenenser Logik Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie*, a manuscript of 1804–5.

JR	*Jenaer Realphilosophie*, a lecture manuscript of 1805–6.
LHP	*Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. H. Haldane and F. H. Simson, London, 1974.
LL	*Hegel's Logic, Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. W. Wallace, Oxford, 1978.
NL	*Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, its Place in Moral Philosophy and its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law* (1802–3), trans. T. M. Knox, Philadelphia, 1975.
Phen.	*Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford, 1977.
PHG	*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg, 1952.
Phil.	*The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, New York, 1956.
PM	*Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford, 1971.
SEL & FPS	*System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox, Albany, 1979.
SL	*Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, London, 1969.
SoL	*Science of Logic*, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, 2 vols., London, 1929.
SW	*Sämtliche Werke*, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. H. Glockner, Stuttgart, 1967.
W	*Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main, 1970.
WH	*Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes, Cambridge, 1975.

INTRODUCTION

THIS introduction is a discussion of the three texts in which Hegel's critique of Kant is concentrated. They are, in order of treatment here and of publication: *Faith and Knowledge* (1802), the so-called *Lesser Logic* or Part I of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), and Volume iii of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1827–30). In each case Hegel devotes a section solely to Kant's critical philosophy. In FK this is the first of three main divisions of the book and is called 'Kantian Philosophy' (FK 67). In *LL* it is Section II of Chapter IV and forms one of two sorts of philosophy Hegel considers under the heading 'Second Attitude of Thought Objectivity' (*LL* 60). The first is empiricism and the second, which is the one we are concerned with, is called 'The Critical Philosophy' (*LL* 65). Finally, in *LHP* iii the chapter called 'Kant' is sandwiched between those dealing with Jacobi and Fichte in the third and final part of the book which Hegel calls 'Recent German Philosophy'. On top of this there are scattered references to Kant throughout the Hegelian corpus: the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) contains only a few references to Kant but much of the Preface, Introduction, and the chapter called 'Reason', for example, can be read as a reply to Kant. *The Science of Logic* (1812–16), *The Berlin Phenomenology* (1830), and the *Introduction to the Lectures on Aesthetics* (1927–30) each contains a short chapter or chapters on Kant. Added to these are remarks in the *Philosophy of Mind* (1817) and *Philosophy of Right* (1821).[1] The detection of unacknowledged allusions to Kant's thought in these books is made much easier by familiarity with FK, *LL* and *LHP* iii. In treating each of these I propose to follow the order of Hegel's text. Very broadly—but most apparently in *LHP* iii—Hegel discusses Kant's critical writings in the order in which he wrote them: *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *Critique of Judgement* (1790). One advantage of this is that Hegel's treatment is problem by problem or issue by issue, so we can witness Hegel's metaphysic pitted against Kant's critical philosophy over the central questions of philosophy. Each of the contributors to the body of this book has chosen an issue that seems to him of particular interest and importance and tries to evaluate the relative strengths of Kant and Hegel in deciding it. I hope here to make intelligible the main texts upon which they rely.

[1] See *Phen.* 1–79, 139–262; *SL* 178–84, 190–9, 204–12, 223–4, 234–8; G. W. F. Hegel, *The Berlin Phenomenology*, trans. M. J. Petry, Dordrecht, 1981, *passim* but especially 11–15, 23, 29, 35, 43. For interesting historical and philosophical remarks on the mature Hegel's attitude to Kant see Petry's Introduction, especially 13, 15, 19, 20, 24–6, 28, 30, 36, 38, 40, 54, 59, 60–1, 66, 69, 71, 76, 79, 83, 91. In *Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics; Being the Introduction to the Berlin Aesthetics Lectures of the 1820's* trans. T. M. Knox, ed. C. Karelis, Oxford, 1979, see 56–61. In PM see 53, 156, 161, 186, 198, and 226. In *PR* see 20, 23, 28, 33, 36, 58, 62, 89–90, 159, 213, 253, 262, and 295.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

Understanding the title of FK in German, *Glauben und Wissen*, involves acquaintance with two central tenets of Hegel's critique of Kant. *Glauben* is usually translated as 'faith' but *Glauben* is also the ordinary German word meaning 'belief'.[2] A terrible mistake of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is to make the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the reality of freedom objects of mere faith, not knowledge. Kant drastically underestimates the power of reason according to Hegel for whom complete knowledge of reality as a whole is possible. 'Faith' captures this criticism. Allied to this is Hegel's persistent complaint that Kant's philosophy does not contain knowledge, only belief. Hegel thinks no aspect of reality is in principle closed to rational inquiry so it is a severe limitation of the critical philosophy to conclude we can only know the world as it appears to us, or as we believe it to be, never as it really is in itself. This is the force of 'belief'.

Both charges are present in the opening pages of FK Section A. Hegel says the 'essence' of Kant's philosophy is critical idealism (*kritischer Idealismus*) and its two principles are subjectivity (*Subjektivität*) and formal thinking (*formale Denken*) (W ii 301). The *essence* (*Wesen*) of *x* is what *x* really is, so *x*'s essential properties are those which *x* could not lack yet remain what it is, or more weakly, remain the sort of thing it is. By acknowledging Kant's philosophy as 'critical' Hegel is doing at least two things. Firstly, he is saying that Kant is trying to discover the limits to the powers of reason. Secondly, he recognizes that Kant's inquiry is not a first-order one into what is, but a second order one into the possibility of ontology and metaphysics. In saying Kant's thought is idealism, Hegel generally means that for Kant reality is partially mentally constructed; the imposition of the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories make reality what it is for us. More specifically he is praising Kant for exhibiting the mutual dependence of concept (*Begriff*) (W ii 303, FK 68) and intuition (*Anschauung*) (W ii 303, FK 68). This is why he says 'The Kantian philosophy has the merit of being idealism' (FK 68) ('die Kantische Philosophie hat das Verdienst, Idealismus zu sein', W ii 303). We need to read this against a distinction Hegel makes between 'Subjective Idealism' and 'Absolute Idealism'.[3] Subjective idealism—and Kant's philosophy is a clear example according to Hegel—depicts reality only from the point of view of the perceiving human subject, it never grasps

[2] On this point of translation see Harris's introductory remarks to FK. I have made only a very few departures from Cerf and Harris's translation of *Glauben und Wissen*. Most notably I have translated *Verstand* as 'understanding' and not as their 'intellect'. 'Intellect' seems to me not to capture the Kantian thesis that knowledge can only be of possible items of experience. Also, Norman Kemp Smith set a precedent with 'understanding' in *CPR*. Departures might be philosophically misleading. I have not altered the (rather imprecise) translations in *LL* and *LHP*.

[3] On subjective idealism see *LL* 67 ff. On Absolute Idealism see *LL* 52, 223 ff. In *Phen.* contrast the shapes of knowing under 'consciousness' (46–103) with 'Absolute Knowing' (479–93). For illuminating discussion of what Absolute Idealism is see Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge, 1975, 109–10, 242, and 271. For the distinction as made out by Hegel see *LL* 73 z.

the truth about the whole. Absolute idealism, in contrast, is the truth about the ultimately spiritual nature of reality as it really is in itself, including the perspectives of human subjects. Kant's thinking never achieves this 'absolute objectivity' (FK 67) (*absolute Objectivität*, W ii 302). Hegel thinks there is just one sort of philosophy which does and this, of course, is his own.

Hegel praises Kant to the degree that the three *Critiques* anticipate Absolute Idealism, chastises him in so far as they fall short. Hegel allows that Kant invented the distinction between reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*) but alleges he missed the opportunity to engage in true philosophy, by confining knowledge to the understanding. In the final third of *CPR* and in the second and third *Critiques* Kant has discovered the correct subject matter of philosophy: the whole in so far as it is truly free, divine, subject, substance, good, and beautiful; but 'when the Kantian philosophy happens upon Ideas in its normal course it deals with them as mere possibilities of thought and as transcendent concepts lacking all reality and soon drops them again as mere empty thoughts' (FK 67) '. . . sonst aber gerät sie als auf bloße Möglichkeiten des Denkens und aller Realität entbehrende überschwengliche Begriffe öfters in ihrem Wege beiläufig auf Ideen, welche sie bald genug als bloße leere Gedanken wieder fallenläßt' (W ii 302). In the 'Transcendental Dialectic' Kant depicts a sort of reasoning that for Hegel reflects the structure of reality. For Kant, though, dialectic is the 'logic of illusion' (CPR 99), 'Logik des Scheins' (KRV A61, B86) and only the understanding yields knowledge. This is part of what Hegel has in mind when he says Kant is constrained by 'formal thinking' (FK 67). The thinking of the understanding (*Verstehen*) is formal because its content is confined to possible objects of experience and these, according to Hegel, are not thought through their essential relations to one another by Kant. Dialectical thinking in contrast is 'concrete', because in this sort of reason (*Vernunft*) objects cannot be considered in abstraction from their essential relations to one another. Thus Hegel repeatedly calls Kant an 'empiricist' or a 'philosopher of the understanding' and says that in common with that of the empiricists, his thinking is 'abstract'.

There are two other important senses in which Kant's thinking is allegedly 'formal' or 'abstract'. Philosophy's 'sole content' (FK 67) (*alleiniger Inhalt*, W ii 302) for Hegel is God. God, though, is *Geist* or the World Spirit, not the transcendent creator of reality of traditional Christianity. Hegel remained a Christian but his pantheistic conception is far removed from his professed Protestant orthodoxy.[4] *Geist* is not the cause of what is, he is what is. But what 'what is' is is to be understood as ultimately spiritual, rational and free. So philosophy's subject matter is the essential properties of the whole. In so far as Kant slides back from *Vernunft* into *Verstand* his thinking lacks philo-

[4] The relationship between God and *Geist*, and the question of whether Hegel is a pantheist, is a tremendously contentious issue in Hegel scholarship. I think the relationship is numerical identity, and that Hegel is a pantheist, though I don't argue for these conclusions here. On the debate see: Peter Singer, *Hegel*, Oxford, 1983, 81–2, and Robert G. Whitemore 'Hegel as Panentheist' *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. ix (1960), 134–64.

sophical content—it is abstract or formal. Secondly, as we shall see, Hegel says Kant's ethics are equally formal or without content. He means by this that the categorical imperative is not the answer, nor can it generate any answer to the question 'What ought I to do?' but it can only express the formal requirement that my actions be consistent when universalized. This remark about the ethics is connected with the metaphysics of *Geist* because Hegel thinks true goodness is spiritual.

It is characteristic of the thinking of the understanding that it is riddled with dualisms: mind and body, freedom and necessity, self and other, universal and particular, individual and social, finite and infinite, simple and composite, good and evil. It is the role of dialectic to exhibit the mutual dependence of these concepts semantically, psychologically and, Hegel would say, ontologically. Once again, in so far as Kant approaches this technique he is praised; in so far as he rejects it his thought is judged inadequate. For example we can now understand Hegel's commending Kant's thought for being idealism on a new level: 'Weil nun die Philosophie in der absoluten Identität weder das eine der Entgegengesetzten noch das andere in seiner Abstraktion von dem anderen für sich seiend anerkennt, sondern die höchst Idee indifferent gegen beides und jedes einzeln betrachtet nichts ist, ist sie Idealismus' (W ii 302–3). 'Philosophy is idealism because it does not acknowledge either one of the opposites as existing for itself in its abstraction from the other. The supreme Idea is indifferent against both; and each of the opposites, considered singly, is nothing' (FK 68). Absolute Idealism—the truth—is established dialetically. Kant's idealism is an improvement on, say, Berkeley's because it contains, in spite of itself, some dialectical reasoning but it is inadequate when measured against Hegel's because the 'Idea' is present in it only in a confused way. We need to understand three interrelated Hegelian concepts to make sense of this. *Geist* is the World Spirit, the whole as it really is: *Geist* as subject has posited physical reality or *Nature* as the object through which it comes to know itself. Its goal is to recognize itself fully and thus become what it really is. History —and human beings are the sole agents of this process—is the World Spirit's growth in self-knowledge. The *Concept* is reality's knowledge of itself. Finally the *Idea* is the World Spirit or *Geist* in so far as it expresses and knows itself through the Concept in Nature. Hegel tends to try to assimilate Kant's 'ideas of Reason' to the Idea, Kant's categories to the Concept. When he says Kant is confused he usually means Kant did not adopt this metaphysical picture.

Hegel tries to persuade us that Kant is an empiricist by drawing parallels with the philosophy of Locke; for example, Hegel quotes (FK 68–9, W ii 303–4) from the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke's project is to 'take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and to see (to) what things they were adapted' and Hegel says this is just Kant's project; 'an investigation of the finite understanding' (FK 69) 'der Betrachtung des endlichen Verstandes einschränkt' (W ii 304). The finite understanding does not realize that concepts depend on their opposites and so is incapable of producing 'syntheses'—new concepts subsuming the opposed thoughts as two

aspects of a new larger whole. In particular, the finite understanding of Locke and Kant relies upon a notion of infinity which is merely opposed to 'finitude'. *Vernunft* reveals a new higher and real infinity which is the synthesis or union of both finite and infinite. It is in this dialectical sense that the whole is infinite. *Geist's* infinity is the unity of the understanding's finitude and infinity. Knowledge of the infiite is the goal of philosophy according to Hegel, but Locke and Kant confine its scope to a conservative inspection of the powers of reason. Such critiques form a legitimate part of philosophy for Hegel but should not exhaust it.

Hegel concedes that Kant's philosophy was in at least one sense a radical departure from the empiricism of Locke and Hume—he allowed a class of propositions which could be coherently classed as both synthetic and a priori. Hegel attempts (FK 69–70, W ii 304–5) a succinct account of how synthetic a priori propositions are possible for Kant. This is, that space and time are transcendentally ideal and that the categories are imposed on the content of experience jointly guarantee that we will fundamentally experience the world as we think it to be. In particular the world will conform to the synthetic propositions of Euclidian geometry and Newtonian physics a priori because its being Euclidian and Newtonian is due to our having just those forms of intuition and just that categorical framework we do possess. The details of Kant's account, though, are submerged by Hegel's enthusiasm for what he thinks are two anticipations of dialectical reasoning. In the concept of a synthetic a priori proposition Hegel identifies something like his own doctrine of the identity of universal and particular: 'In dem synthetischen Urteil Subjekt und Prädikat, jenes das Besondere, dieses das Allgemeine, jenes in der Form des Seins, dies in der Form des Denkens,—dieses Ungleichartige zugleich a priori d.h. absolut identisch ist' (*W* ii 304), 'Subject and predicate of the synthetic judgement are identical in the *a priori* way. That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical' (FK 69). For Hegel it is not possible to think of something without thinking of it as a certain sort of thing. We can neither think nor perceive objects in their bare particularity or uniqueness.[5] It follows that there exists an 'identity' of form and content. It isn't possible to answer the question 'Does *x* exist?' without it also in principle being possible to provide an answer to 'What is *x*?', where that answer will specify the sort of object *x* is. Hegel here has said that the subject specifies the particular, and that the predicate is the universal under which it is thought.

This identity of universal and particular rests on two other 'identities' Hegel discovers in Kant. The first is the 'original synthetic unity' (FK 70), 'ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit' (W ii 305), the second is the unity of the forms of intuition with the categories. The unity of consciousness is called 'original' because it makes possible both the 'productive imagination' (FK 70), *pro-*

[5] For two separate arguments for this conclusion see *Phen.*, 'Introduction', 46–8, and 'Sense Certainty; Or The "This" and "Meaning"', 64–5.

duktive Einbildungskraft (*W* ii 305), and the 'understanding' (FK 70), *Verstand* (*W* ii 305). Indeed, it is Kant's view that the unity of consciousness is a precondition for there being any experience at all. Hegel favours particularly the mutual dependence of concept and intuition in Kant. This is not only another near anticipation of the doctrine of form and content but suggests that, 'die Kantischen Formen der Anschauung und die Formen des Denkens gar nicht als besondere isolierte Vermögen auseinanderliegen, wie man es sich gewöhnlich vorstellt' (*W* ii 305), 'the Kantian forms of intuition and the forms of thought cannot be kept apart at all as the particular isolated faculties they are usually represented as' (FK 70). Hegel certainly has in mind the famous claim of Kant that, 'Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind' (KRV A51, B75), 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (CPR 93).

In reading these pages of FK we should bear in mind Hegel's distinction between three sorts of thinking: (a) the 'abstract' thinking of the understanding, (b) dialectical reason, and (c) 'speculation'.[6] Dialectic exhibits the mutual dependence of opposed concepts but speculative thinking produces new syntheses—complex concepts that designate antithetical concepts both in their unity and their opposition. Thus Hegel is crediting Kant with genuine philosophical thinking when he says 'die produktive Einbildungskraft . . . eine wahrhaft spekulative Idee ist' (*W* ii 306), 'productive imagination is a truly speculative idea' (FK 71). It effects the synthesis of concept and intuition. The *original* synthesis—Kant's original unity of apperception[7]—is also truly speculative because it makes possible the distinction between subject and object. The relational nature of experience, between perceiver and perceived, ego and manifold, subject and object, presupposes this 'absolute and original identity of self-consciousness' (FK 71), 'absolute, ursprüngliche Identität des SelbstbewuBtseins' (*W* ii 306). Absolute knowing in Hegel and original synthesis in Kant each make dualisms possible. One of these dualisms is 'als Glieder des Gegensatzes: Subjekt und Prädikat' (*W* ii 307), 'subject and predicate as terms of the antithesis' (FK 72), in synthetic a priori propositions. Hegel warns us that the productive imagination should not itself be construed on this relational model: it is itself what makes the subject–object structure of experience possible.

[6] For this distinction and a reasonably clear explanation of what dialectic is, see *LL* 113–22, VI, 'Logic Further Defined and Divided'. Although Hegel calls these forms of thinking 'logic' they should in no way be confused or associated with either Aristotelean logic or modern formal logic. For Hegel logic is the demonstration of dependencies between the most general categories, or universals. On this see M. J. Petry, 'Hegel's Criticism of the Ethics of Kant and Fichte' in L. S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (eds.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Action*, New Jersey, 1983, 130. For a critical survey of recent work on dialectic see Stephen Priest, 'Hegel's Dialectic', *The Bulletin of the Hegel Society*, No. 8, Autumn/Winter 1983, pp. 1–5.

[7] The original unity of apperception is the formal identity of self-consciousness which, in Kant's view, is a condition for experience. For a discussion of Kant's uses of 'apperception' see Stephen Priest, 'Descartes, Kant and Self-Consciousness', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 31 No. 125, Oct 1981.

It follows from what Hegel says that he has collapsed the original unity of apperception and the transcendental imagination into one another. As he reads Kant they are the same 'faculty'. Then, quite staggeringly from a purely Kantian point of view, Hegel says: 'Diese Einbildungskraft ist . . . nichts anderes als die Vernunft selbst' (W ii 308), 'the imagination is nothing but reason itself (FK 73). He certainly does not mean the empirical imagination—he is still talking about the transcendental imagination. What he means I think is this: one function of the transcendental imagination in the critical philosophy is just that of reason (*Vernunft*) in Hegel's metaphysics; the synthesis of conceptual oppositions. The differences we might feel tempted to point out to Hegel: for example that the transcendental imagination 'schematizes' the categories just to make empirical knowledge possible while 'reason' includes alleged forms of speculation Kant would have found extravagant and vacuous —Hegel would have accounted for these by saying Kant's philosophy is psychologistic, individualistic, empirical, and constrained by the abstractions of *Verstand*. The transcendental imagination is reason as it must appear to a Kantian qua Kantian. It is: 'Nur Vernunft als erscheinend in der Sphäre des empirischen Bewußtseins' (W ii 308), 'only reason as it appears in the sphere of empirical consciousness' (FK 73). Only the dialectic he shuns could show Kant 'das der Ansich des empirischen Bewußtseins die Vernunft selbst ist' (W ii 308), 'that the in-itself of empirical consciousness is reason itself' (FK 73). As with freedom and spirituality, so with reason; Kant's philosophy has the correct subject matter but does not recognize it for what it really is.

This series of criticisms rests on Hegel's rejection of transcendental idealism. Kant never really frees himself from his Cartesian first person *starting* point,[8] so overestimates the psychological construction of reality. For Hegel order is cosmic teleology and cannot merely rest on what he takes to be the contingency of human psychology, 'die Welt ein in sich Zerfallendes ist, das erst durch die Wohltat des Selbstbewußtseins der verständigen Menschen einen objektiven Zusammenhang und Halt, Substantialität, Vielheit, und sogar Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit erhält' (W ii 309), 'the world is in itself falling to pieces, and only gets objective coherence and support, substantiality, multiplicity, even actuality and possibility, through the good offices of human self-consciousness and understanding' (FK 74). The contingency here is twofold: although there are human beings, there might not have been. Also, the conceptual scheme those existing human beings in fact possess might have been radically different. Hegel, though, thinks reality is necessarily ordered, and necessarily has just the order it has. So, although persons are the perspectives of *Geist* in his own metaphysics he still thinks it unwarranted anthropomorphism that the order of the universe should be ' eine objektive Bestimmtheit, welche der Mensch hinsieht und hinauswirft' (W ii 308), 'an objective determinateness that is man's own perspective and projection' (FK 74). For this reason he suggests we rename transcendental idealism (*transzendentaler Idealismus*) 'psychological

[8] For Kant's 'Cartesian' starting point see Robert C. Solomon, 'Hegel's Epistemology' in Michael Inwood (ed.), Hegel, Oxford, 1985.

idealism' (*psychologischer Idealismus*)(FK 75, W ii 310–1). His own Absolute Idealism will reveal the teleology of Geist's self-realization in history, the *Logic* (SL) being the explication of what is implicit in the Concept, the whole's conception of itself.

One false entailment of transcendental idealism is 'daß die Dinge an sich und die Empfindungen ohne objektive Bestimmtheit sind' (W ii 310), 'that the things in themselves and the sensations are without objective determinateness' (FK 74). Hegel repeatedly denies that there has to be a gulf or difference between reality as it appears to us, and as it really is in itself. Sometimes this takes the form of rejecting an alleged ontological distinction between phenomena and noumena but sometimes he allows there are things in themselves but then says we can know what they are like. Hegel's doctrine of the identity of form and content does not permit him the postulation of indeterminate objects, so, for Hegel, that some object exists cannot be all that is true of it. The verdict on transcendental idealism is that, rather like Locke's Empiricism, it can only investigate the relationships between subject and object: I do not know what I am really like in myself, I do not know what the objects of the external world are really like in themselves. I can only inspect the structures of dependence between the two, 'Der kritische Idealismus bestande demnach in nichts als in dem formalen Wissen, daß Subjekt und die Dinge oder daß Nicht—Ich jedes für sich existieren' (W ii 310), 'It would seem then, as if critical idealism consisted in nothing but the formal knowledge that the subject and the things or the non-Ego exist each for itself' (FK 75). The identity of subject and object is only 'formal' (FK 75) (*formale Identität*, W ii 310) in Kant. He has grasped the grammatical point that there is no experience without an experiencer (subject) or experienced (object) but has given no content to either, nor the relation between them. In saying Kant has not specified the content of experience, I think Hegel means he has not engaged in phenomenology of the sort found in *Phen.*, because in one important sense Kant evidently has specified the content of experience: he has said it is empirical. He has also isolated in the categories certain features that, allegedly, any possible object of our experience must possess, but, despite this, he has not distinguished the varieties of forms of consciousness as they appear to themselves. The nearest he comes to phenomenology is in the 'system of the principles of judgement' (FK 75) ('System der Grundsätze der Urteilskraft', W ii 311). Hegel even concedes that this is 'true idealism' (FK 75), (*wahrer Idealismus*, W ii 311), because it is dialectical: for example, cause and effect stand in a necessary dialectical relation. If some event E is the cause of some further event E1 then E1 is the effect of E. I should say though this is because 'cause' means something like 'event with an effect' and 'effect' 'caused event' but Hegel thinks the dialectical dependence is ontological—between causes and effects—not just conceptual—between 'cause' and 'effect'. For him this dependence between logical truth and ontological necessity is itself mutual. Kant's philosophy, though, is 'subjective' and 'psychological' because the only necessary relation the list of categories has is to human

psychology: they just dictate what the world must be like for us, from our subjective point of view. This is what he means when he says, 'Auf diese Weise wird also die Objektivität der Kategorien in der Erfahrung und die Notwendigkeit diese Verhältnisse selbst wieder etwas Zufälliges und ein Subjektives' (W ii 313), 'In this way then, the objectivity of the categories in experience and the necessity of these relations become once more something contingent and subjective' (FK 77). Because we are prisoners of our conceptual scheme and this scheme only reveals appearance and not reality, knowledge is denied us.

Hegel has an argument designed to show this Kantian picture cannot be correct. The first premiss is that 'Die Dinge, wie sie durch den Verstand erkannt werden, sind nur Erscheinungen, nichts an sich' (W ii 313), 'The things, as they are cognized by the understanding, are only appearances. They are nothing in themselves' (FK 77). Hegel says this premiss is true (*ganz wahrhaftes*, W ii 315). The second premiss and conclusion are, 'der unmittelbare SchluB aber ist, daß auch ein Verstand, der nur Erscheinungen und ein Nichts-an-sich erkennt, selbst Erscheinung und nichts an sich ist' (W ii 313), 'the obvious conclusion, however, is that an understanding which has cognizance only of appearances and of nothing in itself, is itself only appearance and is nothing in itself' (*FK* 77). Some object *x* may exist 'in itself' (*an-sich*) if the existence of some other object, *y*, is not a necessary condition for *x*'s existence. Hegel's argument is valid if we assume all understanding is understanding *of* something, all cognizance cognizance *of* something. Then any mental faculty exhibiting this intentionality will not exist in itself, if this entails 'in abstraction from its intentional object'. Hegel would no doubt accept this, but he wants to establish a much more ambitious conclusion here. He thinks that from the fact that the understanding does not exist in itself there must exist a second faculty of *reason* (*Vernunft*) which does exist in itself. From the fact that the understanding only reveals appearances there must be another faculty which yields knowledge. This is an invalid inference as it stands. All that follows is the rather weaker conclusion that we must have a concept of reality to understand 'appearance'. Even *so*, the onus is on the Kantian to show this semantic contrast is obtained in the absence of any knowledge of reality. If this is not possible then Hegel's conclusion does go through. Because Hegel thinks the argument valid and the conclusion true he thinks this is a terrible mistake, 'daß aber der Verstand das Absolute des menschlichen Geistes ist, darüber scheint Kant nie ein leiser Zweifel aufgestiegen zu sein, sondern der Verstand ist die absolut fixierte unüberwindliche Endlichkeit der menschlichen Vernunft' (*W* ii 313), 'Yet Kant never seems to have had the slightest doubt that the understanding is the absolute of the human spirit. The understanding is (for him) the absolute immovable, inseparable finitude of human reason' (FK 77). One severe consequence is that Kant does not obtain adequate solutions to philosophical problems. Hegel gives as an example (W ii 313–4, FK 77–8), the 'mind–body problem'. This is really a cluster of problems but Hegel is aware of two at least in this passage. One

is, are there two substances, one physical and the other mental? The other is, if so, what is the relationship between these two? (Could it, for example, be causal in either or both directions?) Hegel thinks Kant is right to hold that the problem (in either form) is only made possible by the difference between a subjective and an objective point of view on the person. Kant stops short of exhibiting the dialectical interdependence between 'mental' and 'physical', though, and regards it as a mere conjecture that mind and body may be different only in appearance yet identical at the level of things in themselves. Kant 'diesen Gedanken für den bloßen Einfall eines Vielleichts und nicht für einen vernünftigen hält' (W ii 314), 'regards this thought as a chance idea about a maybe and not as a rational thought at all' (FK 78).

Almost as serious in Hegel's terms is Kant's failure to recognize that a complete description of the understanding requires both dialectic and speculation. This is because 'Innerhalb ist also der Verstand, insofern in ihm selbst Allgemeines und Besonderes eins sind, eine spekulative Idee und soll eine spekulative Idee sein' (W ii 314), 'Inwardly the understanding is, and should be, a speculative idea, inasmuch as universal and particular are one in it' (FK 78). Had Kant thought through the reciprocal dependence of concept and intuition he would have established the doctrine of 'universal in particular', the correct account of the relation according to Hegel.

Hegel's conclusion about the understanding in FK is that 'in ihm ein absolutes Sein des Gegensatzes ist' (W ii 316), 'there is an absolute being of the antithesis in it' (FK 79). The understanding just is the faculty that thinks in oppositions: subject–object, mind–body, category–intuition, universal–particular. Only dialectic and speculation can produce syntheses, and the closest anticipation of this in Kant's concept of the understanding is his triadic arrangement of the categories. The third in each list of three is the synthesis of the first two: 'In diese Triplizität ist allein der Keim des Spekulativen gelegt' (W ii 316), 'The germ of speculation lies in this triplicity alone' (FK 80).

Having, he thinks, shown the limitations of Kant's account of the understanding, Hegel directs his criticism to the critical concept of reason. Hegel notes that reason for Kant is just the understanding considered in abstraction from its only legitimate subject matter (FK 80, W ii 317). When Hegel says that 'Kant diese leere Einheit mit Recht zu einem bloß regulativen, nicht zu einem konstitutiven . . . Prinzip macht' (W ii 317), 'Kant is quite correct in making this empty unity a merely regulative and not a constitutive principle' (FK 80), he means right on Kant's terms, not his own. Reason for Hegel is constitutive, not regulative, but he recognizes Kant's consistency in denying that pure reason can be informative if there are no metaphysical objects. One very appropriate content for reason that Hegel thinks Kant *should* have seized upon is the intuitive understanding (*anschauender Verstand* W ii 316): 'Die reinere Idee . . . eines Verstandes, der zugleich aposteriorisch ist, die Idee der absoluten Mitte eines anschauenden Verstandes' (W ii 316), 'the purer idea of an understanding that is at the same time a posteriori, the idea of an intuitive understanding as the absolute middle' (FK 80). This, though, would have

required the recognition of the dialectical interdependence of category and intuition as two aspects of a single continuum, something Kant frequently comes close to but never accepts.

An adverse consequence of the vacuousness (*Leerheit*, W ii 317) of reason is that Kant will be unable to give his ethics a content. Hegel argues that there is an irreconcilable tension between the projects of the first two *Critiques*: reason must be regulative for the CPR but constitutive for the *Critique of Practical Reason*, but it cannot be both. In particular Hegel thinks a 'contradiction' (*Widerspruch*, W ii 318) obtains between two of Kant's claims about reason. On the one hand, reason's only appropriate subject matter is the objects of possible experience. Hegel says this implies Kant's epistemology contains no conception of reason as truly infinite, but only as constrained by a finite empirical employment. It cannot be used to know the whole. On the other hand, for his moral philosophy, Kant needs a concept of reason as freedom (*als Freiheit*, W ii 318). Freedom though, properly understood, is infinite in the sense of 'unconstrained', it is 'absolute spontaneity and autonomy' (FK 81), ('absolute Spontaneität und Autonomie', W ii 318). If we accept Hegel's metaphysical claim that freedom and reason are in the last resort 'identical' and are prepared to stretch the semantics of 'infinite', then Kant's view as thus represented can be made to yield a contradiction: reason is both infinite and not infinite. Hegel uses 'contradiction' loosely, though, and often means by it 'inconsistency'. Here he claims to have discovered a 'real inconsistency' (*reale Inkonsequenz*, W ii 318) in Kant's thought. He means by this two claims which cannot be true simultaneously.

Hegel deals next with what he calls the 'polemical side' (*polemische Seite*, W ii 319, FK 82) of Kant's critique of reason. This is the *Paralogisms* (CPR 327–83, KRV B399–B432) which are given a summary treatment in a single paragraph (FK 82–3, W ii 319). Kant's demonstrations that the categories (*Verstandesbegriffe*, W ii 319) do not apply to the subject, and his introduction of the noumenal self lead to two metaphysical mistakes according to Hegel. Firstly, what is predicated of Spirit (*Geist*, W ii 319) is 'die abstrakte Form der Endlichkeit selbst' (W ii 319), 'the abstract form of finitude itself' (FK 83). To allow this we need to accept the two Hegelian theses that *Geist* is conscious as human subjectivity, and *Geist* is infinite in the all pervading sense of synthesis of infinity and finitude. Secondly, although it is to Kant's credit that he rejected the idea of a soul-thing (*Seelending*, W ii 319) because, according to Hegel, mind–body dualism is false, to replace it with a noumenal self is to erect a new barrier to *Geist's* rational self-knowledge. Kant has replaced the ego as 'dogmatic object' (FK 83) (*dogmatisch objektiv* W ii 319) by the ego as 'dogmatic subject' (FK 83) (*dogmatisch subjektiv* W ii 319).

Hegel's treatment of the Antinomies is more detailed, in particular he has several major criticisms of the Mathematical Antinomies. These are: that Kant did not succeed in dissolving the conflict (FK 84) because 'er die Endlichkeit selbst nicht aufgehoben hat (W ii 320), 'he did not suspend

finitude itself' (FK 84). Hegel means Kant did not abdicate the dualistic thinking of the understanding for the synthesizing powers of reason. Instead Kant made the conflict into something subjective ('er den Widerstreit zu etwas Subjektiven machte', W ii 320) and so allowed it to remain as a propensity of human thinking. This in turn rests on the mistake of thinking transcendental idealism true, according to Hegel (FK 84, W ii 320). This is an obstacle to recognizing the conflict as ontological, not just conceptual, and also causes the 'middle' (*Mitte*, W ii 320) to go unrecognized. The concept of the 'middle' of two antithetical concepts allows each to be thought as an aspect of a larger whole, or relationship, of which they are opposite poles. Most disastrously of all, Kant has missed the opportunity to engage in genuine dialectical reasoning: the sort of thinking that provides the whole's self-knowledge, 'Die Vernunft erscheint rein bloß von ihrer negativen Seite, als aufhebend die Reflexion, aber sie selbst in ihrer eigentümlichen Gestalt tritt nicht hervor' (W ii 320), 'Reason appears pure only in its negative aspect, as suspension or reflection. It does not appear in its own proper shape' (FK 84).

It is the Dynamical Antinomies, though, which force Kant to reveal the 'absolute dualism of (t)his philosophy' (FK 84) (*absoluter Dualismus dieser Philosophie* (W ii 320). Hegel's paradoxical verdict on the contradiction between freedom and necessity ('Freiheit und Notwendigkeit', W ii 320) is that Kant 'hebt den Wiederstreit dadurch, daß sie ihn absolut macht' (W ii 320), 'removes the conflict by making it absolute' (FK 84). What he means is that Kant's claim that persons are phenomenally determined yet noumenally free does not show that a person's actions may be simultaneously and coherently characterized using both predicates. Far from it, freedom and necessity are now 'absolutely heterogeneous' (FK 84) ('absolut ungleichartig', W ii 320) and 'without communion at all' (FK 84), ('außer aller Gemeinschaft', W ii 320), so the classic problem of simultaneously applying the two predicates in a way that is mutually consistent is left unresolved. It is only by the adoption of what Hegel regards as the two-worlds ontology that Kant avoids the conflict: 'sie ganz außer aller Gemainschaft gedacht widerstreiten sie sich nicht' (W ii 320), 'when they are thought without any communion at all (freedom and necessity) do not conflict' (FK 84). The same bifurcations facilitate Kant's 'critique of speculative theology' (FK 85), ('Kritik der spekulativen Theologie', W ii 321). As we shall see, Hegel thinks Kant has the wrong concept of God and this is derived from misreadings of Descartes and a naïve acquaintance with the history of philosophy generally. In fact 'Kant überhaupt eine Unwissenheit mit philosophischen Systemen und Mangel an eine rein historische Notiz ginge, besonders in den Widerlegungen derselben zeigte' (W ii 321), 'Altogether—especially in his refutations—Kant showed a pervasive ignorance of philosophical systems and a lack of any information about them that went beyond purely historical data' (FK 85).

Hegel next discusses what he considers to be 'the most interesting point in the Kantian system' (FK 85), ('der interessanteste Punkt des Kantischen

Systems', W ii 322). This is 'reflecting judgement' (*FK* 86), ('reflektierende Urteilskraft', *W* ii 322), and introduces Hegel's discussion of the *Critique of Judgement*. Reflecting judgement is the synthesis of each of two pairs of oppositions: 'the empirical manifold' (FK 85) ('empirisch Manigfaltige ', *W* ii 322) and the 'absolute abstract unity' (FK 85) ('absolute abstrakte Einheit', *W* ii 322); the concept of nature (*Naturbegriff*, *W* ii 322) and the concept of freedom (*Freiheitsbegriff*, *W* ii 322). Reflecting judgement is the 'middle' (*Mitte*, *W* ii 322) between these oppositions, a term Hegel takes from the Critique of Judgement. These two syntheses are effected by reflecting judgement in particular but Hegel is fully aware that Kant's view is that judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal (*CJ* 18). Hegel does not spell out why he thinks Kant has succeeded in relaxing the tension within each dualism. I think Hegelian reasons can be reconstructed but first we need to be clear what the dualisms are. The 'empirical manifold' is just Kant's manifold of experience (*Mannigfaltiges KRV* A99, *CPR* 131). The 'absolute abstract unity' is Kant's understanding (*Verstand*) considered in abstraction from but as a condition for experience. Hegel thinks the relation between manifold and unity of understanding is dialectical both in the sense that each makes the other possible and each 'determines' the other: that is, each in very different ways makes the other what it is. The antithesis between freedom and nature exists because nature operates in accordance with natural necessity, while the rational subject is free. The clue to the alleged syntheses is, I think, the unity of universal and particular. Hegel understands the application of the categories to the contents of experience as the subsumption of particulars under universals. That accounts for the first dualism because the objects of experience that result must be described using general terms (sortals) and particular terms (definite descriptions, proper names). To see why Kant has allegedly shown the mutual dependence of libertarianism and determinism we need to note that Kant distinguishes *reflecting* judgement from *determinant* judgement. In determinant judgement the particular x is judged to be F by subsumption under some universal 'F'. But in reflecting judgement 'the particular is given . . .' but 'the universal has to be found for it' (*CJ* 18). This entails that determinant judgement is in a sense tied down but reflecting judgement is free. (I think Cerf and Harris's present participle translation of *reflektierende Urteilskraft* captures this freedom much better than Meredith's 'reflective judgement' in *CJ*.[9]) Reflecting judging is a kind of choosing—a choosing of how to find nature intelligible. The choice of which universal under which to subsume a particular constitutes an object of judgement, which in this sense exists as a result of a synthesis of freedom and nature.

Despite his interest in reflecting judgement Hegel sees several severe limitations in Kant's account of it. For example, he says it is 'nicht eine Region für die Erkenntnis' (*W* ii 322), 'not a region accessible to cognition' (FK 86). He means by this that Kant has not established the necessity of this sort of judge-

[9] Cerf and Harris have 'reflecting judgement'. (See for example FK 86.)

ment by dialectic; that is, by showing the inconsistency and incompleteness of his own account without it. But Hegel is requiring of Kant something he could never concede: that knowing, to count as such, must be purely rational. This is why he says, '. . . sondern nur die Seite ihrer Erscheinung, nicht aber deren Grund, die Vernunft, wird hervorgerufen, als Gedanke anerkannt, aber alle Realität für die Erkenntnis ihr abgesprochen' (W ii 322), 'Only the aspect in which it is appearance is called forth and not its ground which is reason. It is acknowledged as thought, but with respect to cognition all reality is denied to it' (FK 85). 'Cognition' here must not be understood as an act of the understanding but of reason.[10] 'Thought' must not be understood as an act of reason but of the understanding. If Kant were to accept this, in Hegel's view, then he would see that there is really no need to postulate reflecting judgement at all because dialectic effects the syntheses. It is reason that relates universal and particular in judgement or grounds the grammatical dependence between subject and predicate, and reason, in the last resort, is wholly free for Hegel. He calls the relation between subject and predicate 'identity' in its dialectical sense: *x* and *y* are identical if they make each other possible, and can therefore be viewed as two aspects of some new whole. Here the particular object designated by the grammatical subject is subsumed under the universal which the predicate expresses. The subject matter or content of the judgement is expressed by the synthesis of its terms. So when Hegel uses 'identical' in this sense it should not be confused with the homonym in formal logic: 'diese Identität aber, welche allein die wahre und alleinige Vernunft ist, ist nach Kant nicht für die Vernunft, sondern nur für reflektierende Urteilskraft' (W ii 322), 'this identity is the one and only true reason. Yet according to Kant it belongs only to the reflecting judgement; it is nothing for reason' (FK 86). But when he says reason effects the syntheses, not reflecting judgement, he intends *ist* as the 'is' of (numerical) identity, so reason is just that faculty that effects syntheses. Hegel thinks Kant has failed to complete his own philosophical thinking by refusing to recognize reason is genuinely dialectical. Hegel knows Kant has the concept of philosophical problems as contradictions from his reading of the last third of KRV, and although he has not recognized that he used reason to do it, Kant has demonstrated 'die Identität des Natur- und Freiheitsbegriffs' (W ii 323), 'the identity of the concepts of nature and freedom' (FK 87). Hegel thinks Kant is a dialectician *malgré lui* and the 'Transcendental Dialectic' is a refusal to make fully explicit the rational methods of the critical philosophy, especially as required by the conclusions of the third *Critique*.

Another opportunity to effect fully rational syntheses is supposedly lost in Kant's elucidation of the concept of beauty. Hegel says beauty is the Idea 'as experienced' (FK 87), (*als der erfahrenen*, W ii 323). The Idea (*Idee*) is the realization of the Concept in Nature and the unity of the oppositions between

[10] The term Cerf and Harris (In FK) and Wallace (in *LL*) often translate as 'cognition' is 'Erkenntnis', which is ordinary German for 'knowledge'. Their policy has the advantage that 'cognition', like 'Erkenntnis', admits of a plural while 'knowledge' does not.

the two, so, he is discovering two partial anticipations of this own system when he says: 'die Form der Entgegensetzung des Anschauens und des Begriffs wegfällt' (*W* ii 323), 'the form of opposition between intuition and concept falls away' (FK 87), and allows 'der Schönheit als Identität des Natur- und Freiheitsbegriffs' (*W* ii 324), 'beauty . . . as the identity of the concepts of nature and freedom' (FK 87–8). They are only partial because Kant's account is mitigated by two recurrent faults in his thinking. The first is, 'findet sich . . . die Idee der Vernunft auf eine mehr oder weniger formale Weise ausgesprochen' (*W* ii 322), 'one finds the Idea of Reason expressed in a more or less formal fashion' (*FK* 86). The content of the Ideas of Reason is the whole for Hegel and they should be deployed dialectically not 'formally', so Kant's refusal to engage in metaphysics denies them their subject matter. Seccondly, Kant's phenomena–noumena distinction is an obstacle to any truly dialectical or speculative account of beauty. Correctly described, beauty for Hegel requires an intuition of the 'absoluter Identität das Sinnliche und Übersinnliche' (*W* ii 323), 'absolute identity of the sensuous and the supersensuous' (FK 87). But even if we do not construe the phenomena–noumena distinction as an ontological one, Kant cannot allow an 'intuition' of the relation between the two, even if that relation is 'identity': 'ein für allemal zum Grunde gelegten Gegensätze der Übersinnlichen liegt' (*W* ii 324), 'the . . . antithesis of the supersensuous and the sensuous is made basic once for all' (FK 88). Reason is fixed in a 'rigid opposition' (FK 88), 'unverückten Entgegensetzung' (*W* ii 324). The result of this is that beauty—like reason itself—is turned into 'something finite and subjective' (FK 88) ('etwas Endliches und Subjektives', *W* ii 324). A possible mode of insight into the metaphysical structure of the whole is reduced to a psychological relation between the individual and the aesthetic object.

Because the appreciation of beauty requires a free imagination in harmony with the understanding (FK 86, *W* ii 322), Hegel thinks that 'Ungeachtet Kant selbst in der Schönheit eine andere Anschauung als die Sinnliche' (*W* ii 328), 'Kant himself recognized in the beautiful an intuition other than the sensuous' (FK 91). Not only did he grasp 'the substratum of nature' (FK 91), 'das Substrat der Natur' (*W* ii 328), as 'intelligible' (FK 91) but recognized it to be 'rational and identical with all reason' (FK 91), 'vernünftig und als identisch mit aller Vernunft' (*W* ii 328). Hegel finds it difficult to comprehend how Kant could have fallen short of his own conception of the rational progress of the Idea given that he had so many of the ingredients of the complete concept of beauty, and, in particular, as he seems to have conceded that the separation of concept and intuition exists only within a form of cognition that was finite and subjective.

These thoughts lead Hegel to consider the second half of CJ, the 'Critique of Teleological Judgment'.[11] The concept Hegel seizes upon as the nearest approximation to genuinely speculative thought is the 'intuitive understand-

[11] The role of teleology in Hegel's system cannot be appreciated in abstraction from his philosophy of history and politics. For this see *Phil.*, and Taylor (op. cit.) especially p. 365 ff.

ing' (FK 88 ff.), ('intuitiver Verstand', W ii 324 ff.). This is a hypothetical faculty for Kant in which what is thought does not differ from what is experienced. He explicitly says human beings do not have it. Hegel though favours the actual postulation of such a faculty because it re-establishes the sensory intellectual continuum. It is also the ground of (i.e. what makes possible) the following oppositions: 'possibility and actuality' (FK 88) ('Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit', FK 324), 'concepts' and 'sensuous intuitions' (FK 324) ('Begriffe' . . . and 'sinnliche Anschauungen', W ii 324), 'universals' and 'particulars' (FK 324) ('Allgemeines' and 'Besonderes', W ii 324), 'parts' and 'whole' ('Teile' and 'Ganzes', W ii 325). Hegel next identifies the intuitive understanding with the transcendental imagination. This is an assimilation Kant would have resisted because the transcendental imagination is a faculty we really possess, indeed, one that makes our actual experience possible. Hegel has already (see page 23) assimilated the transcendental imagination to the original unity of apperception. Now a third Kantian faculty is collapsed into the previous two. His motivation, I think, is again dialectical. Hegel is obsessed by the idea that there is ultimately only one source of synthesis and that this must turn out to be pure reason. There is no doubt though that Hegel thinks the transcendental imagination and intuitive understanding are not distinct faculties: 'die *Idee* dieses urbildlichen, *intuitiven Verstandes* ist im Grund durchaus nichts anderes als *dieselbe Idee der transzendentalen Einbildungskraft*, die wir oben betrachteten' (W ii 325), 'The *idea* of this archetypal *intuitive intellect* is at bottom nothing else but the *same idea of the transcendental imagination* that we considered above' (FK 89, Hegel's italics). Even less equivocally he says, 'die transzendentale Einbildungskraft ist also selbst anschauender Verstand' (W ii 325), 'Thus transcendental imagination is itself intuitive understanding' (FK 89).

Although on Hegel's reading 'Von dieser Idee erkennt Kant . . . daß wir notwendig auf sie getrieben werden' (W ii 325), 'Kant recognizes that we are necessarily driven to this idea' (FK 89), we are not driven far enough. We have to think the intuitive understanding but fall short of postulating its necessary reality as the synthesis of those oppositions that can only exist within it. The idea only occurs to Kant as a thought 'nur als Gedanke', (W ii 325), not as an actuality. The consequence of this is that the oppositions it purportedly subsumed in fact continue to exist as a set of dualisms. For example, 'wir sollen uns ein für allemal daran halten, daß Allgemeines und Besonderes unumgänglich notwendig unterschiedene Dinge' (W ii 325), 'we must once and for all accept the fact that universal and particular are inevitably and necessarily distinct' (FK 89). Hegel thinks Kant has no rational grounds for denying the reality of the intuitive understanding. In his view Kant maintains the empiricist assumption that human cognitive faculties are as they appear to experience and ordinary psychology (W ii 325, FK 89). This prevents him from postulating what is in Hegel's view actual: 'die Idee einer Vernunft, in welcher Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit absolut identisch ist' (W ii 326), 'the idea of a Reason in which possibility and actuality are absolutely identical'

(FK 89), and mitigates against genuine synthesis throughout the 'Critique of Teleological Judgement'. The second half of CJ is a philosophical failure in Hegel's opinion for this very reason. Kant never reconciles teleology and mechanism in actuality. He allows that we must *think* of nature teleologically —as we have to think it in accordance with natural law, according to CPR, but never shows, so Hegel believes, how both ways of thinking could be simultaneously true of the same reality. So when Hegel says *'An und für sich*, erkennt er, sei es möglich, daß der Mechanismus *der Natur*, das Kausalitätsverhältnis, und der teleologische Technizismus derselben eins seien' (W ii 326), 'He recognizes that *in and for itself* it may be possible that the mechanism of nature, the relation of causality, is at one with nature's teleological technique' (FK 90), he is criticizing Kant for taking actuality for mere possibility. Reality as it really *is in itself does* not contain contradictions, so the prima facie mutually inconsistent characterizations using 'teleology' and 'causality' need to be exhibited as two complementary accounts of a single whole. This in turn would require the realization of the intuitive understanding, but, as we have seen, that too is something Kant denies himself (*FK* 91, W ii 327).

Hegel concludes the chapter on Kant in FK by trying briefly to generalize these conclusions to the theoretical and the practical philosophy. After giving the reader a short lesson in dialectical reasoning he asserts that there is an unresolved tension between two whole aspects of Kant's thinking. On the one hand there is the Kant who speaks of 'Freiheit, praktischer Vernunft, Autonomie, Gesetz, praktischer Idee u.s.w.' (W ii 329), 'freedom, practical reason, autonomy, law, practical idea, etc.' (FK 93). On the other hand there is the Kant of 'Notwendigkeit, Neigungen und Trieb, Heteronomie, Natur, u.s.w.' (W ii 330), 'necessity, the inclination and drives, heteronomy, nature, etc.' (FK 93). Kant has not shown to Hegel's satisfaction how these seemingly mutually excluding predicates can coherently be applied to one and the same reality. He concludes the chapter as we began this one, by talking about faith. We can appreciate now a third level upon which the critical philosophy contains faith, not knowledge: the synthesis of oppositions is for Kant a mere 'ought' (FK 94) (soll, W ii 94), not an achievement of reason. It is left to Hegel's own system to obey this imperative.

THE LESSER LOGIC

Hegel begins the section dealing with Kant in the *Lesser Logic* by emphasizing the Critical Philosophy's affinities with Empiricism: 'Die kritische Philosophie hat es mit dem Empiricismus gemein, die Erfahrung für den einzigen Boden der Erkenntnisse anzunehmen' (SW viii 123), 'In common with Empiricism the Critical Philosophy assumes that experience affords the one sole foundation for cognitions' (LL 65). A lot rests on 'foundation' here. If Hegel means that it is Kant's view that unless there were experience there could not be knowledge, then it is true that Kant believes this and that it is also a part of empiricism. If he means experience is the sole source of knowledge for Kant then that is quite incorrect, although that too is part of empiricism. On either interpreta-

tion, Hegel thinks that Kant's epistemology does not allow that there are 'truths' (*LL* 65) ('Wahrheiten', *SW* viii 123), but only knowledge of 'phenomena' (*LL* 65) ('Erscheinungen', *SW* viii 123). We are only acquainted with the world as it appears to us, not as it really is in itself, and for Hegel this does not really count as knowledge because knowledge is necessarily of what is the case.

Hegel next begins a short explanation of the role of the categories in Kant's epistemology. He distinguishes the 'matter of sense' (*LL* 65), ('sinnlicher Stoff', *SW* viii 123) from its 'universal relations' (*LL* 65) ('allgemeine Beziehungen', *SW* viii 123). Here he indirectly allows a non-empirical contribution to what passes for knowledge in Kant's philosophy by conceding that 'universality' (*LL* 65) ('Allgemeinheit', *SW* viii 123) and 'necessity' (*LL* 65) ('Notwendigkeit', *SW* viii 123) are equally essential in constituting experience. This is not quite right, because it is Kant's view that strict universality and necessity are *criteria* for some knowledge, or some concept, being a priori. Those concepts which are a priori, called 'categories' (*Kategorien*), are psychologically contributed to experience and make it both possible and what it is. Hegel is right to point out though that Kant agreed with Hume that universality and necessity are not empirical concepts, '... dieses Element nun nicht aus dem Empirischen als solchem herstammt, so gehört es der Spontaneität des Denkens an oder ist a priori' (*SW* viii 123), 'This element, not being derived from the empirical facts as such, must belong to the spontaneity of thought; in other words, it is a priori' (*LL* 65). It is because the categories are a priori, says Hegel, that Kant can account for the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions (*LL* 65) ('synthetische Urteile a priori', *SW* viii 123). This is true but terribly incomplete. For example, the whole contribution of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' would also have to feature in any account of how, say, the synthetic a priori propositions of geometry are possible. Hegel never really spells out the view that, whatever our experience turned out to be like, it could not cease to be spatio-temporal, of physical objects entering into causal interaction, etc., just because we have the transcendental categorial framework we do, and the forms of intuition we do.

Instead he goes on to discuss Kant's philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Kant is allegedly interested in testing the categories in three areas: 'metaphysics' ('Metaphysik', *SW* viii 123), 'other sciences' ('andere Wissenschaften', *SW* viii 124), and 'ordinary conception' (*LL* 65), ('gewöhnliches Vorstellen', *SW* viii 124). The test is, can they generate new knowledge? Hegel has three criticisms of Kant's procedure: he does not inspect the 'content' ('Inhalt', *SW* viii 124) of the categories, nor the relation they bear to one another, but only considers them as affected by the difference between subjectivity and objectivity (*LL* 66) ('Subjektivität and Objektivität', *SW* viii 124). These criticisms are unfounded unless Hegel just means Kant did not adopt his own procedures. For example, Kant does not give the categories the 'content' Hegel would wish —the whole. He says they have only an empirical use. It is clear too that Kant thinks the categories are closely related, indeed interdependent, in many

complex ways: for example, the categories of causation and substance are each essential to our empirical concept of a physical object. Hegel thinks the relations between categories are dialectical, and sought to exhibit those relations in the *Science of Logic*. On the other hand, he approves elsewhere the triadic arrangement of the table of categories where the first two of each set of three is implicit in the third. His last criticism is part of a persistent complaint that Kant's philosophy is 'subjective idealism' (*LL* 70 z), ('subjektiver Idealismus', *SW* viii 131). Hegel means by this that the only objectivity Kant allows is provided by the categories, but that these in turn are subjective because 'psychological' (*LL* 66) ('psychologisch', *SW* viii 131). We never know reality as it really is in itself, but only as we are constrained to think it. All our purported knowledge is thus subjective, not objective: it is determined by facts about our psychology not by how the world is quite independent of that psychology. For these reasons Hegel says subjectivity includes the 'ensemble of experience' (*LL* 66), ('Das Gesamte der Erfahrung', *SW* viii 131) in Kant's philosophy.

The *Zusatz* (*LL* 66, *SW* viii 124) contains both one of Hegel's greatest departures from the critical philosophy, also one of his most massive concessions to it. The concession is that Hegel accepts that philosophy should be 'critical', the departure is from the method of Kant's critique. The essential principle of 'critical philosophy' is: 'das Denken selbst sich untersuchen soll, inwiefern es zu erkennen fähig sei' (*SW* viii 125), 'Thought must itself investigate its own capacity for knowledge' (*LL* 67 z). Hegel accepts this as a vital part of any philosophy likely to contain the truth, and criticises old, pre-Kantian metaphysics which failed to make its presuppositions explicit; it just assumed that its categories were appropriate to its subject mater. For this reason Hegel says pre-Kantian philosophers were not 'free thinkers' (*LL* 66 z) ('freie Denker', *SW* viii 124). Free thinkers are prepared to revise, amend and discard any aspect of their own thinking that is falsified or shown inadequate in practice. Thus Kant is praised for inventing a new sort of philosophy, original at least in modern times. Unfortunately Kant required a criticism of the scope of the categories prior to or independently of their exercise and this, according to Hegel, is a terrible mistake. In particular he thinks it involves Kant's project in a paradox: that of 'erkennen schon erkennen' (*SW* viii 125), 'already knowing before you know' (*LL* 66 z). This, in Hegel's metaphor, is refusing to enter the water until you have learned to swim.

The solution is that the categories must examine themselves in their own employment, since their limitations will be revealed in their use: 'Sie selbst untersuchen sich, müssen an ihnen selbst sich ihre Grenze bestimmen und ihren Mangel aufzeigen' (*SW* viii 125), 'They must examine themselves: in their own action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects' (*LL* 66 z). It follows that Hegel's theory of knowledge is much more *pragmatic* than Kant's. Truth is accumulative and gained by reflection on the inadequacy of concepts in their use. It is precisely this action of the categories—their revision and enrichment in use—that Hegel says he will henceforth call 'dialectic' (*LL* 66 z) (*Dialektik*, *SW* vii 125).

Hegel divides the remainder of the chapter called 'The Critical Philosophy' into three sections. They are called: (a) 'The Theoretical Faculty: Cognition qua Cognition' (*LL* 68) ('Das Theoretische Vermögen, die Erkenntnis als solche', *SW* viii 127); (b) 'Practical Reason' (*LL* 86) ('Die Praktische Vernunft', *SW* viii 152); and (c) 'The Reflective Power of Judgement' (*LL* 88) ('Die Reflektierende Urteilskraft', *SW* viii 154), and deal with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgement* in that order. The middle section, (b), is much shorter than the other two. I shall comment on each in turn.

The Theoretical Faculty (LL 68–86, SW viii 127–52)

Hegel begins this section by trying to isolate the conditions for experience according to Kant. These are: the 'trancendental unity of self-consciousness' (*LL* 68) ('transzendentale Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins', *SW* viii 128), 'space and time' (*LL* 68) ('Raum und Zeit', *SW* viii 128), and the 'manifold of sensation' (*LL* 68) ('Mannigfaltige des Empfindens', *SW* viii 128). The transcendental unity of self-consciousness is the 'identity of the "I" in thought' (*LL* 68) ('Identität des Ich im Denken', *SW* viii 128). This is a reference to Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction that it is a condition of a set of experiences being episodes in the self-same consciousness which is 'mine' that they can each in principle be prefaced by 'I think . . .'. Hegel does not enter into the considerable complexities of Kant's account here but there is some evidence that he reifies Kant's transcendental unity into an Ego that is perpetually subject but never object. The following passage for example could be read that way: 'Kants Behauptung also ist, daß die Denkbestimmungen ihre Quelle im Ich haben, und daß demnach Ich die Bestimmungen der Allgemeinheit und Notwendigkeit gibt' (*SW* viii 129), 'Kant therefore holds that the categories have their source in the Ego, and that the Ego consequently supplies the characteristics of universality and necessity' (*LL* 69). But for Kant the transcendental ego is nothing over and above the unity of consciousness. On the other hand in another passage Hegel seems to reproduce Kant's view much more accurately: 'Ich, die Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins, ist ganz abstrakt und völlig unbestimmt' (*SW* viii 128), 'I, the unity of self-consciousness (is) quite abstract and completely indeterminate' (*LL* 68). This captures quite well the idea of the unity of consciousness as a *formal* condition of experience, and is devoid of any ontological commitment to an irreducibly subjective 'source' of consciousness.

Space and time are dealt with in a single sentence: 'Raum und Zeit . . . als Formen (das Allgemeine) des Anschauens, selbst a priori sind' (*SW* viii 128) 'Space and time . . . being the forms, that is to say, the universal type of perception, are themselves a priori' (*LL* 68). This is perfectly accurate so far as it goes. Space and time are not empirical concepts for Kant nor are they Newtonian 'containers', or simply relations between physical objects, as Leibniz thought. They are the way or manner in which persons perceive. They

are also 'a priori' in the sense of 'psychologically contributed to experience but not abstracted from it'.

Hegel's main criticism of Kant's theory of sensation is that it is undialectical. To understand this we have to untangle the following remarks: 'Das Sinnliche dagegen ist das Außereinander, das Außersichsehenden: dies ist die eigentliche Grundbestimmung desselben' (SW viii 129), 'The world of sense is a scene of mutual exclusion: its being is outside itself. That is the fundamental feature of the sensible' (LL 69 z). What he means is that for any particular item met in sense perception *x* it is a condition of *x* being either (a) the very object it is, or (b) the sort of object it is, that it not be not-*x*. This for Hegel is an essential property of each thing; that it not be all those things it isn't. This rather tautologous thought is the force of the sensible 'ist nur insofern es das Andere nicht ist und nur insofern das Andere ist' (SW viii 129) 'is only in so far as it is not the other, and only in so far as that other is' (LL 69 z). So the existence of what is not-*x* (not just the conception of what is not-*x*) is a necessary condition for the existence of *x* on Hegel's view. This is what Hegel means when he talks about things having their being outside themselves.

The Ego on the other hand, as transcendental subject, allegedly exists without ontological contrast with a non-Ego or other-Ego. The Ego is 'the primary identity' (LL 69 z) ('das ursprünglich Identische . . .', SW viii 129), and its existence is precisely the reverse of that of the objects of perception. It is 'mit sich Einige und schlechthin bei sich Sehende' (SW viii 129) 'at one with itself and all at home in itself' (LL 69 z). Hegel is careful to distinguish the transcendental unity of apperception from empirical apperception: the latter is just the discontinuous awareness we each have of our own mental (and physical) states. The implication is, I think, that the being of the objects of empirical apperception is 'outside itself' while that which grounds all these ontological distinctions must itself be undifferentiated. Hegel is aware that Kant does not place much emphasis on these thoughts but still allows that, 'Hiermit ist nun allerdings die Natur alles Bewußtseins richtig ausgesprochen' (SW viii 129) 'This view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the nature of all consciousness' (LL 69 z).

Despite these words of praise Kant falls far short of Hegel's own metaphysical account of the possibility of experience. The undifferentiated ground of experience is *Geist* for Hegel, not merely the unitary psychology of the individual person. But Kant's psychologism is an insurmountable obstacle to his system ever being absolute knowledge: 'Zugleich ist dann aber zu bemerken, daß es nicht die subjektive Tätigkeit des Selbstbewußtseins ist, welche die absolut Einheit in die Mannigfaltigkeit hineinbringt. Diese Identität ist vielmehr das Absolute . . .' (SW viii 129–31) 'At the same time we must note that it is not the mere act of our personal self-consciousness which introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather this identity is itself the absolute' (LL 69 z).

Hegel next develops a second group of reasons why Kant can have no grasp of Absolute Knowing. This concerns the categories. Hegel notes that the

categories transform the manifold, or sensory input, into the world of our empirical experience. He then, however, makes two mistakes. He says the categories are 'conditioned' (*LL* 71) (*bedingt*, *SW* viii 132) by the material given to them. This is wrong if it means a category is made what it is by the sensory input it is applied to. Rather the reverse is the case. If Hegel just means the categories have only an empirical role, then that presents Kant's view accurately. This construal is certainly born out by, '(the categories) haben ihre Anwendung und Gebrauch allein in der Erfahrung' (*SW* viii 132) 'they can be applied (to use) only within the range of experience' (*LL* 71). The other mistake is saying that the impressions of sense are no less subjective than the categories (*LL*, *SW* viii 132). If the criterion for being subjective is genetic, that is, some phenomenon is 'subjective' if, and only if, it has its source in the psychology of the subject, otherwise it is objective, then the sensory input is objective and clearly contrasts with the categories in this respect.

The *Zusatz* (*LL* 71, *SW* viii 132) is a rejection of Kant's claim that the categories are empty (*leer*, *SW* viii 132) when considered in abstraction from their empirical applications. Hegel insists they have content even though this is not detectable in sense experience, nor is it spatio-temporal. He tries to explain this idea of content by analogy with the content of a book. A book with 'content' (*Inhalt*, *SW* viii 132) contains a large number of 'thoughts' (*LL* 71 z) (*Gedanken*, *SW* viii 132)—not just descriptions of incidents and situations. I think the distinction is supposed partially to correspond to that between what is perceptible and what is thinkable. The analogy is not very clear because what is perceptible is thinkable and, arguably, a sort of thing that is thinkable must in some degree be perceptible at least in principle on, say, an empiricist epistemology. Hegel could have strengthened his argument in two ways, I think. He could have said (i) we can discriminate one category from another in thought; (ii) the sensory input is wholly indeterminate so provides no grounds for this discrimination; (iii) the categories have some non-empirical properties which distinguish them one from another—I (Hegel) will call this their 'content'. It could then be argued that the categories perhaps have *semantic* properties which cannot be reduced to their empirical use. I think Kant would have rejected this line of thinking because for him any such putative semantic properties will necessarily turn out to be rules for making the empirical world intelligible.

Hegel allows one sense in which the categories could accurately be called 'empty'. In Kant's philosophy they do not make the whole intelligible. They are just parts of the Logical Idea (*LL* 77 z) (*logische Idee*, *SW* viii 132) and are inadequate as expressions of the relationship between 'Nature' (*LL* 71 z) (*Natur*, *SW* viii 132) and *Geist* (*SW* viii 132).

It follows that 'Die Kategorien sind daher unfähig Bestimmungen des Absoluten zu sehn, als welches nicht in einer Wahrnehmung gegeben ist, und der Verstand oder die Erkenntnis durch die Kategorien ist darum unvermögend die Dinge an sich zu erkennen' (*SW* viii 133), 'the categories are no fit terms to express the Absolute—the Absolute not being given in

perception—and understanding or knowledge by means of the categories, is consequently incapable of knowing the things-in-themselves' (*LL* 72). We should understand this in the context of Hegel's own system. He accepts there are categories but departs from Kant in three crucial respects. For Hegel there are many more than twelve. Secondly, they are historically developing, not ahistorically fixed. Finally, they apply to things in themselves, or—what amounts to the same thing—there are no things in themselves because the categories apply to reality as it really is in itself. Hegel rejects the idea of the thing in itself on two main grounds. He thinks it is incoherent, and he thinks it is just a psychological construct. 'Thing-in-itself' is incoherent because it purportedly denotes an object which exists, but of which that is all that is true. As we have seen (page 17 above) for Hegel if x exists then x is some *sort* of thing. The existence of things-in-themselves is a psychological construct partly because it is reality as it is in itself *as conceived by us*. It is 'only a product of thought' (*LL* 72) ('nur das Produkt des Denkens', *SW* viii 133). I take this to also mean things-in-themselves *only* exist in our thoughts *according* to Hegel. They are fictions that do not exist over and above our imaginings of them. Finally he says he is perpetually surprised by Kant's claim that we cannot know things-in-themselves: 'es ist nichts leichter als dies zu wissen' (*SW* viii 133) 'there is nothing we can know more easily' (*LL* 72).

Hegel obviously has a variety of criticisms of Kant's concept of a thing-in-itself and it is doubtful whether these can be made consistent. For example it is supposedly *thinkable* but incoherent. Against this, though, I should say some purported object that was self-contradictory to describe not only logically could not exist but logically could not be imagined either. Also, Hegel oscillates between these two criticisms of Kant: there are no things-in-themselves, and there are things-in-themselves but we can obtain knowledge of them.

There is one passage where Hegel makes it clear that his attack on things-in-themselves is quite consistent with his own philosophy remaining an idealism. He acknowledges that 'Erst durch Kant ist der Unterschied zwischen Verstand und Vernunft bestimmt hervorgehoben' (*SW* viii 134), 'Kant was the first definitely to signalize the distinction between *reason* and understanding' (*LL* 73 z). Kant's drastic underestimation of the powers of reason, however, is partly due to an impoverished concept of infinity. While Kant's concept of infinity stands in semantic contrast with 'finitude', Hegel thinks the only real or true infinity must be the unity of finite and infinite, that is, the whole. This is what he means by: 'das wahrhaft Unendliche ist nicht ein bloßes Jenseits des Endlichen, sondern es enthält dasselbe als aufgehoben in sich selbst' (*SW* viii 134), 'The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature' (*LL* 73 z). Once it is realized that a new absolute infinity exists as the synthesis of finite and infinite, Kant's 'psychological' method can be abandoned and subjective idealism can give way to Absolute Idealism. Finite objects —the empirical objects of sense experience, for example—are not a 'purely personal world, *created* by ourselves alone' (*LL* 73 z), ('ein nur Unsriges, nur

durch uns Geseßtes ist', SW viii 135), they are made possible by 'the universal divine Idea' (LL 73 z) ('allgemein göttliche Idee', SW viii 135) which is their 'ground' (LL 73 z) (*Grund*, SW viii 135). Properly understood, the universal Idea is the whole and it includes human subjects as its finite points of view on itself as well as the putative things in themselves. So Hegel says: 'Diese Auffassung der Dinge ist dann gleichfalls als Idealismus, jedoch im Unterschied von jenem subjektiven Idealismus der kritischen Philosophie als absoluter Idealismus zu bezeichnen' (SW viii 135), 'This view of things, it is true, is (as) idealist (as Kant's); but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy should be termed "Absolute Idealism" ' (LL 73 z).

Hegel concludes the section called 'The Theoretical Faculty' by criticizing Kant's treatment of the self, the world, and God in the 'Transcendental Dialectic', the third and final major sub-division of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant has allegedly identified the correct subject matter for pure reason but misses the opportunity to change his philosophy into a metaphysical description of the essential properties of reality as a whole.

The *Paralogisms* are briefly summarized (LL 74–5, SW viii 137–8). Hegel captures the main thrust of Kant's attack on the rationalist theory of the self when he says that 'empirical attributes' (LL 74–5) ('empirische Bestimmungen', SW viii 138–8) have been illegitimately replaced by 'categories' (LL 74–5) ('Kategorien', SW viii 137–8) in the old metaphysics. He thinks, though, that Kant's theory of the self is little advance on that of Hume, and, indeed, just forms part of the general Humean thesis that we are in possession of certain concepts, 'the self' included, which have not been straightforwardly abstracted from experience. Despite doubting its originality, Hegel agrees with the conclusion of the Paralogisms to the extent of saying: 'Immer ist es für einen guten Erfolg der kantischen Kritik zu achten, daß das Philosophieren über den Geist von dem Seelendinge, von dem Kategorien und damit von den Fragen über die Einfachheit oder Zusammengefaßtheit, Materialität u.s.w. der Seele, befreit worden ist' (SW viii 138), 'Unquestionably one good result of the Kantian criticism was that it emancipated mental philosophy from the "soul-thing", from the categories and, consequently from questions about the simplicity, complexity, materiality etc. of the soul' (LL 75). Although he agrees with Hume and Kant that the self is not a Cartesian soul nor a Leibnizian monad, he subscribes to a theory of the subject which both the empiricist and the transcendental idealist would have abhorred or even regarded as nonsensical. Hegel thinks the individual human consciousnesses are each an aspect of Geist's consciousness, or, to put it another way, are the set of reality's points of view on itself.

It is hardly surprising then that Hegel thinks the categories are 'not good enough' (LL 77 z) ('zu schlecht sind', SW viii 139) to provide an adequate account of subjectivity and individuality. Far from it being the case that reason has overstepped its limits, it has only begun to realize the nature of its subject matter. Hegel will reveal this in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in the *Science of Logic*, he claims.

The *Antinomies* are treated by Hegel in *LL* (76–9) and *SW* (viii 139–43). Hegel defines 'antinomy' as 'zweite entgegengesetz Sätze über denselben Gegenstand' (*SW* viii 139) 'two opposite propositions about the same object' (*LL* 76). If we take 'opposite' to mean 'mutually inconsistent' here, then this is a fair description of the conclusions of an antinomy but an antinomy itself is a pair of arguments which yields, and thus only partly is, two such conclusions. Hegel has three main objections to Kant's Antinomies. Firstly, Kant drastically underestimates their number in mentioning only four. This number rests artificially on the list of categories (*LL* 78, *SW* viii 142). In fact 'die Antinomie sich befindet . . . in allen Gegenständen aller Gattungen, in allen Vorstellungen, Begriffen und Ideen' (*SW* viii 141), 'Antinomies . . . appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions, notions and ideas' (*LL* 78). Indeed, it is Hegel's view that only those ways of thinking in which this is recognized can properly be called 'philosophical'. Strictly speaking for him then, Kant's books only contain any philosophy at all to the extent that they include anticipations of dialectical reasoning.

Secondly, Kant is allegedly wrong in thinking that contradictions exist only in thought and not also in what thought is about. It is Hegel's view that reality as we think it ('the world', *LL* 77, *der Welt*, *SW* viii 140) is itself paradoxical. He is led to this view by the doctrine of identity of form and content. Unfortunately it remains deeply ambiguous because of a lack of clarity in his use of 'contradiction'. Sometimes Hegel does mean by 'contradiction' a 'formal contradiction'. In this sense it denotes any proposition that reduces to the form 'both *p* and not-*p*'. Sometimes, though, he means something like 'conceptual contrast' and this is not a relationship between propositions but concepts: freedom and necessity, subject and object, Idea and Nature, mind and matter. Taken in the first sense, it makes no sense at all to say that contradictions correspond to anything in 'the world' because purported states of affairs whose descriptions contain contradictions are logically impossible. More sense can be attached to the second use though. If we allow that predicates like 'up' and 'down' and 'large' and 'small' and 'free' and 'determined' apply to non-linguistic reality, then Hegel can be read as claiming that 'the world' possesses features in virtue of which those predicates can be simultaneously true of what is. It would be a serious mistake—but one Hegel sometimes falls into—to think this way of thinking in some way violates the axioms of logic, say, the law of non-contradiction.

Reason's third subject matter is God. Hegel devotes *LL* 79–86, *SW* viii 144–52 mainly to an outline of his own concept of God, contrasting his pantheism with that of Spinoza. The treatment of Kant is confined to a defence of a version of the ontological argument against Kant's attack in *CPR*. Hegel thinks the ontological argument is valid but this is precisely because God, on his account, just is the unity of thought and being. God is the whole and the whole is Spirit (*Geist*). It follows that 'Gott nur das wahrhafte Sein ist' (*SW* viii 146) 'true being is another name for God' (*LL* 82), and 'Es wird mit Recht gefordert, daß Gott als absoluter Geist bestimmt werden müsse' (*SW* viii 147),

'it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined as absolute Spirit' (*LL* 82). Hegel concedes that from the fact that a person possesses the empirical concept of an object it does not follow that that object exists. With reference to Kant's example of the hundred thalers he says: 'Nichts kann so einleuchtend sein, als daß dergleichen, was ich mir denke oder vorstelle, darum noch nicht wirklich ist' (*SW* viii 150) 'Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or conceive is not on that account actual'(*LL* 84), but the concept of God, that is, the concept of the whole or the infinite, is an exception. It is precisely the nature of the infinite to be both thought and reality: 'Diese Einheit des Begriffs und des Seins ist es, die den Begriff Gottes ausmacht' (*SW* viii 150) 'It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God' (*LL* 85). Theists might find this conclusion rather disappointing. It amounts to the conclusion that if there is thought, then something is. This is the whole and that exists whatever it may be. It requires additional premisses taken from Absolute Idealism to make what is, spiritual.

Practical Reason (LL 86–8, SW viii 152–4)

Hegel briefly summarizes Kant on the will and brings a single criticism of the categorical imperative—one that he regards as decisive. The will for Kant 'soll imperative, objektive Gesetze der Freiheit geben' (*SW* viii 152) 'give(s) objective, imperative laws of freedom' (*LL* 86), that is 'solche, welche sagen was geschehen soll' (*SW* viii 152), 'laws ... which state what ought to happen' (*LL* 86). Very broadly, what Hegel says is correct. His criticism is that the categorical imperative is purely *formal* in nature. Kant would agree (indeed would insist) that it is formal but would not have thought this in any way detrimental to his ethics. Hegel says, 'Wenn dann gesagt wird, der Mensch solle das Gute zum Inhalt seines 'Willens machen, so rekurriert sofort die Frage nach dem Inhalt d.h. nach der Bestimmtheit dieses Inhalts und mit dem bloßen Prinzip der Übereinstimmung des Willens mit sich selbst, so wie mit der Forderung, die Pflicht um der Pflicht Willen zu tun, kommt man nicht von der Stelle' (*SW* viii 154), 'Hence to say that a man must make the Good the content of his will raises the question, what that content is, and what are the means of ascertaining what good is. Nor does it get one over the difficulty by the principle that the will must be consistent with itself, or by the precept to do duty for the sake of duty' (*LL* 87–8 z). Hegel is making two points here. Firstly he is saying that the categorical imperative as a principle of universalizability just requires that I be consistent in my actions, such that they could still be performed if everyone adopted the recommendation to perform them. This, though, is not a sufficient condition of their being good. Secondly, he is saying that this problem of giving 'good' a content cannot be provided by Kant's concept of duty because the precept to act for the sake of duty alone leaves the concept of duty equally vacuous. Hegel thinks Kant's practical philosophy a complete failure in this respect, namely, that the question 'what ought I to do?' cannot be answered from its resources alone.

The Reflective Power of Judgement (LL 88–94, SW viii 154–63)

This is the same faculty discussed by Hegel in FK (85–6) and examined as 'reflecting judgement' (pp. 18–9, above). Hegel says reflecting judgement is really identical with intuitive understanding in Kant's system. They are two expressions for the only faculty which not only subsumes particulars under universals but which determines the particulars by the universals. The universal makes the particular what it is: 'Das Besondere . . . durch die Allgemeine selmst bestimmt werde' (*SW* vii 154), 'the particulars (are) . . . moulded and formed by the universal itself' (*LL* 88).

Hegel thinks this is a close anticipation of the *Idea*. Kant has not succeeded in offering a rational depiction of the Idea but 'Kant in ihr (the *CJ*) die Vorstellung, ja den Gedanken der Idee ausgesprochen hat' (*SW* viii 154–5), 'He gave a (re)presentation and a name, (if not even an intellectual expression) to the Idea' (*LL* 88). In exhibiting the reciprocal dependence of universal and particular Kant's philosophy shows itself capable of being genuinely speculative (*LL* 88) (*spekulativ*, *SW* viii 155). The synthesis, though, is only apprehended in sense experience. It is not thought in its necessity. Hegel thinks Kant has shown that it is possible to perceive the unity of universal in particular in the teleology of living organisms and in the beauty of works of art, but a question arises about the appropriateness of these particular objects as embodiments of the unity of universal and particular. We should understand this in the context of Hegel's system rather than Kant's, I think, and bear in mind Hegel's remark that the beauty of art is 'higher' than that of nature, even though both are expressions of the Idea.[12] It needs rational reflection to transform Kant's perceived unity of universal in particular into the 'concrete Idea': 'Die kantischen Reflexionen über diese Gegenstände waren daher besonders geeignet, das BewuBtsein in das Fassen und Denken der konkreten Idee einzuführen' (*SW* viii 155), 'Consequently Kant's remarks on these objects were well adapted to lead the mind on to grasp and think the concrete Idea' (*LL* 88). Kant would have seen little value in locating his aesthetics within a philosophy which gave teleological systems and works of art a role in bringing reality to self-knowledge by being the physical expressions of the Idea, but this is precisely the value Hegel sees in them.

Had Kant thought through his teleology he would allegedly have addressed the question 'What is the final end of *the whole?*' In the *CJ*, though, he only inquires into the ends and means of finite objects. Had he abdicated this empiricism Hegel thinks he would have realized that the final end of the whole is 'the Good' (*LL* 90), (*das Gute*, *SW* viii 157), and that this in turn requires the existence of God for its realization. Indeed. God invented the final end of the world and He will implement it. This implementation, though, is nothing over and above the Idea's dialectical progress through history. God

[12] The remark is to be found on p. 2 of Karclis, op. cit. For an interpretation see Stephen Priest, 'A Point of Dispute About Hegel's Aesthetics', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1984.

is *Geist*: 'Gott, in welchem, der absolute Wahrheit, hiemit jene Gegensätze von Allgemeinheit und Einzelheit, von Subjektivität und Objektivität ausgelöst und für unselbstständig und unwahr erklärt sind' (*SW* vii 156) 'Thus in him (God) who is the absolute truth those oppositions of universal and individual, subjective and objective, are solved and explained to be neither self-subsistent nor true' (*LL* 90). Kant fails to appreciate this in his teleology just as in his ethics the only good was 'our good' (*LL* 90) (*unser Gutes*, *SW* viii 157) not divine goodness. Kant postulates the existence of God for the realization of human ethical goals. Hegel's God postulates the existence of man for the realization of his own cosmic ideals.

THE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Kant's thinking is 'finite', 'subjective', 'abstract', and 'personal', according to the opening paragraphs of the *LHP* iii chapter called 'Kant' (*LHP* iii 423–4, *SW* xix 551). 'Finite' (*endlich*) is equivalent to 'confined to the understanding'. This is because for Hegel only *Reason* gives knowledge of the whole or the infinite but Kant confines knowing to empirical objects, and these are merely finite. 'Subjective' (*subjektiv*) here implies that what the empirical world is like is due to features of the psychology of the subject, not features of reality as it is in itself. 'Abstract' (*abstrakt*) means 'undialectical'. An object is abstract if abstracted (in thought) from its essential relations to other objects and 'abstract' thinking does just that. It is Hegel's notorious doctrine of 'internal relations' that it is not possible to say correctly what one thing is without mentioning its relations to other things, including those things it necessarily is not. The opposite of 'abstract' is 'concrete' (*konkret*) and this means, roughly, 'dialectical' or 'understood dialectically'. Finally, in calling Kant's philosophy 'personal' (*persönlich*) Hegel is implying it is a kind of solipsism, at least in the minimal sense that reality is psychologically but not socially constructed for Kant, and perhaps to the extent of suggesting that his Cartesian or first-person starting-point is never really abdicated.

Of these deficiencies far and away the most serious is the Critical Philosophy's 'subjectivity'. Because of this feature the possibility of knowing the absolute is denied it (*LHP* iii 425). The Absolute is God, according to Hegel, but despite his subjectivism Kant denies that God can be found in either inner or outer experience: 'Gott ist bei Kant ... in der Erfahrung nicht zu finden' (*SW* xix 551). Nor on the other hand can the existence of God be established by rational argument within the framework of Kant's philosophy. He remains a mere 'hypothesis' (LHP iii 425) or postulate of practical reason. The aim of philosophy for Hegel is the rational description of the whole, so any philosophy such as Kant's which allows postulates, or hypotheses or which merely states what ought to exist—without saying whether it does—is necessarily incomplete. Thinking which falls short of the metaphysical ideal of completeness falls short of the truth.

Pages 423–6 in *LHP* iii and pages 551–4 in *SW* xix contain comparisons

between Kant's philosophy and those of Jacobi, Rousseau, and Wolff. Hegel concentrates his attention (*LHP* iii 426, *SW* xix 554) on locating Kant's thought in the history of philosophy in general and within the Enlightenment in particular. Hegel is interested in the history of philosophy in so far as it is an expression of the *Idea's* progress to self-knowledge. The *Concept*, the whole's conception of itself, is apparent in German thought for the first time during the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*, *SW* xix 554), and Kant's critical philosophy is the loose assumptions of Enlightenment thinking made explicit and methodical, so Kant encapsulates and renders systematic the mentality of his age. There are three themes in particular in Enlightenment thinking which Hegel thinks Kant makes clearer. These are Reason (*Vernunft*), Self-Consciousness (*Selbst-Bewußtsein*), and Freedom (*Freiheit*). Hegel here concentrates on the second of these because self-consciousness is of enormous significance for Hegel's metaphysics. The growth of human awareness especially as expressed through art, religion, and finally philosophy is, when thoroughly understood, the growth of the whole's knowledge of itself. Thus Hegel is crediting Kant with both an enormous advance in human thinking and—under a different description—a qualitative leap in *Geist's* rational progress when he says, 'Der sich selbst denkende, in sich gehende absolute Begriff ist es nun, den wir in Deutschland hervortreten sehen, das in das Selbstbewußtsein alle Wesenheit falle' (*SW* xix 553–4), 'It is thus the self-thinking absolute Concept that passes into itself which we see making its appearance in Germany through this philosophy, in such a way that all reality falls within self-consciousness' (*LHP* iii 426). In two very different senses it is equally true of the systems of both Kant and Hegel that 'all reality falls within self-consciousness' according to them. Kant though allegedly has no account of what self-consciousness is, he only says *that* it is not *what* it is. This is what Hegel means when he says Kant supplies no 'essence' (*Wesen*, *SW* xix 553–4) to self-consciousness. Kant also fails in two other ways. Hegel thinks his methods are 'empirical' and 'psychological', with the consequence that Kant is blind to the metaphysical dimensions of self-consciousness. He thinks it is only a feature of and a condition for the experience of individual persons, but misses that it is an essential property of the whole. Kant never masters the 'individuality of self-consciousness' (*LHP* iii 426) ('die Einzelheit des Selbstbewußtseins', *SW* xix 553–4), but lapses once more into the subjective and finite thinking of the understanding.

Hegel does not deny the importance of self-consciousness in Kant's own philosophy. Indeed, he thinks the most general truth contained in it is that the categories find their source in 'I', in my self consciousness: 'diese Quelle ist das Subjekt, Ich in meinem Selbstbewußtsein' (*SW* xix 555).

There then follows a passage very similar to that in *LL* (66 z) and *SW* (viii 125) in which Hegel argues hat Kant's project of a critique of knowledge is paradoxical. It duplicates the charge that drawing limits to knowledge requires acquiring some knowledge—knowledge of knowledge—but also makes a fresh point. This is that on Kant's view knowledge is an *instrument* (*ein Instrument*,

SW xix 555) for obtaining the truth. This instrument must be inspected before if is ever employed to make sure it is appropriate to its subject matter. In particular Kant wants to know whether using the instrument will alter what it is applied to. Both these requirements are misguided according to Hegel. We cannot test instruments in abstraction from their use. The only way to show up their limitations is to observe them in action. Secondly, it is just not possible to detect the difference perceiving or knowing an object makes to that object. To discover such a difference we should have to compare the object as it is with it as it is known by us. But these could not possibly be two separate enterprises. What is and what appears are to be *aufgehoben*.[13]

This passage is flanked by short comparisons of Kant's thinking with that of Locke, Hume and Wolfe. Hegel devotes the rest of the chapter, though, to a topic-by-topic treatment of the three Critiques. I shall briefly summarize these, following Hegel's order.

Space and Time

Hegel devotes *LHP* iii 434–5 and *SW* xix 562–4 to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. He lists Kant's claims that space is not an empirical concept, that the existence of space is a condition of my referring my sensations to something outside me, that space is necessary for all 'outer' experience, that time is a necessary condition for all phenomena, that space and time are a priori so universal and necessary, and are also the 'forms of intuition', and finally that we can represent to ourselves only one space and one time, seemingly discrete spaces being, in fact, parts of the same space, seemingly discrete times being, in fact, parts of one and the same time (cf. *KRV* A19, B34–73, *CPR* 65–91).

Hegel has two main criticisms, one to do with non-empirical concepts, the other concerning the unity of space and time. He agrees both that space and time are not concepts and that the concepts we do have of them are not empirical. Despite this his verdict is: 'In solchen barbarischen Formen spricht Kant beständig' (*SW* xix 562) 'It is in barbarous forms like this that Kant always expresses himself' (*LHP* iii 434). Kant does not realize that 'Begriffe ist nichts Empirisches' (*SW* xix 562) 'the Concept is never anything empirical' (*LHP* iii 434). Any concept properly understood is a component of the Concept, the whole's conception of itself, and this is not empirical. When Hegel complains about Kant's 'barbarous' terminology he usually thinks Kant has failed to anticipate a piece of metaphysics he thinks important.

The second objection is that although there is only one space and only one time 'Ebenso gibt es aber auch nur ein Blau' (*SW* xix 563), 'but there is in like

[13] 'Sublate', 'reconcile', 'unite', and 'synthesize' are different attempts to capture in English Hegel's *aufheben*, which has three main senses in ordinary German: (i) lift up, raise, pick up; (ii) keep, preserve; (iii) annul, abolish, remove. (See for example *Langenscheidts Universal Wörterbuch Englisch–Deutsch, Deutsch –Englisch*, Berlin and Munich, 1957.) Although prima facie mutually inconsistent Hegel thinks the senses of this term are uniquely appropriate for the denotation of the seemingly paradoxical but really truly rational relationship that obtains between two dialectically antithetical concepts and their speculative unity in a 'synthesis' or higher concept.

manner only one blue' (*LHP* iii 435). Hegel seems to be forcing an analogy which Kant would wish to reject. Space, time, and blue are all universals for Hegel but although we never meet with discrete spaces or times we do encounter discrete—numerically distinct—instances of the universal *blue*, the implication being that from the fact that these are universals it does not follow that they are ontological unities. I think the objection fails against Kant because his thesis about the unity of space and the unity of time rests on a different pair of premisses. These are that any purportedly numerically distinct spaces will in fact turn out to be spatially related (if they exist simultaneously) and so be parts of one and the same space; and that any purportedly numerically distinct times will in fact turn out to be temporally related and so be parts of one and the same time. A better strategy for Hegel would be to seek counter-examples in refutation of these premisses.

Synthetic A Priori Propositions

Hegel gives three examples of propositions which are synthetic a priori according to Kant. These are: (i) 'daß der Raum drei Abmessungen habe' (*SW* xix 564) 'that space has three dimensions' (*LHP* iii 435–6); (ii) 'die Definition der geraden Linie, daß sie der kürzeste Weg zwischen zwei Punkten sei' (*SW* xix 564) 'the definition of a straight line, that it is the shortest distance between two points' (*LHP* iii 435–6); and (iii) '5+7=12' (*SW*, *LHP* ibid.). Hegel's view of their logical status is: 'Diese Letzte ist sehr analytisch, ebenso das Andere' (*SW* xix 564) which Haldane and Simson render as "All these propositions are however very analytic' (*LHP* iii 436). Suppose Hegel thinks they are all analytic. If 'analytic' means 'true by definition' then he is right about the last two and also right about the first if 'space' here means 'Euclidean space'. The mathematical definition of 'straight line' is 'shortest distance between two points' and the proposition 7+5=12 means '1+1+1+1+1+1+1 + 1+1+1+1+1=1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1'. I think the first two examples are open to Quine's objections to analyticity based on synonymy but the last is not: so long as being tautologous is a sufficient condition of being analytic. Whether they turn out as analytic on Kant's criterion (*KRV* B11, *CPR* 48) depends on what the analysis of the subject is in each case. If 'space', 'straight line' and '7+5' can be adequately analyzed without mentioning 'three dimensions', 'shortest distance between two points' and '12' respectively, then a Kantian defence of them as synthetic could be mounted. The issue will then rest on criteria for 'adequate' in each case.

Categories

In *LHP* (iii 436) and *SW* (xix 565) Hegel notes Kant's distinction between sense experience and understanding, the senses being passive or characterized by 'receptivity' (*Rezeptivität*), the understanding being active or characterized by 'spontaneity' (*Spontaneität*). He goes on to quote with approval Kant's

famous dictum that 'Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind' (*KRV* B74, A50, *SW* xix 565), 'Thoughts without content are (void and) empty (sensuous) perceptions without concepts are blind' (*LHP* iii 436–7). Kant has taken the first step towards a dialectical epistemology in realizing the mutual dependence of sense and understanding. He falls short of appreciating that these faculties are two aspects of one reality, though, and his confining the categories to an empirical use means his thoughts are limited to the finite.

Hegel also criticizes Kant for limiting the number of categories to twelve. According to Hegel there are many more of them and Kant was wrong simply to assume the list available from the logic text books of his time was complete. Even more serious, Hegel takes it that Kant's view is that the categories are just features of human psychology. This makes it a thoroughly contingent fact that the world appears to us just as it does. It could just as well have appeared radically different if we had a different conceptual scheme, and there is absolutely no guarantee that it is in itself as it appears to us. Hegel is horrified by this epistemology as he understands it. His view is that the categories—his categories in the *Science of Logic*—are correctly applicable to necessary properties of reality as a whole. I think Hegel mistakes Kant's project here. Kant is not engaged in empirical psychology with a view to discovering those ways of thinking and perceiving human beings in fact have. Rather he aims to discover those rules of intelligibility that are necessary conditions for any self-conscious being having experience at all. Of course it was open to Hegel and is open to us to argue that Kant failed, but if he did fail then his failure was a philosophical one, not a psychological one.

Self-consciousness

The summary of the transcendental unity of apperception in *LHP* (iii 437) and *SW* (xix 566) is broadly accurate. Hegel only seriously misrepresents Kant's position at one point; that is when he says that the 'I think' (*Ich denke*) must accompany all my experiences. This suggests that on Kant's account if a person is conscious at all then that person must be occurrently self-conscious during that time. I think rather Kant's view is a dispositional one. He is saying that unless the possibility of any thought being preceded by 'I think' existed then no sense could be attached to saying they were 'mine'. To establish that, Kant does not need the stronger view that the 'I think' actually accompanies every experience. Hegel says 'Das ist eine barbarische Exposition'(*SW* xix 566) 'this is a barbarous exposition (of the matter)' (*LHP* iii 437). Perhaps, but Hegel is criticizing a view to which Kant did not subscribe.

Hegel does find much to praise in the idea of the self as the unity of apperception which makes experience possible. He says, 'Dies ist eine groBe BewuBtsein, eine wichtige Erkenntnis. Das ich das Eine bin' (*SW* xix 566) 'This is a great fact, an important item of knowledge ... that I am the One' (*LHP* iii 437). I think he is impressed by Kant's theory of the self at this point

because he sees in it an anticipation of his own view that there is no numerical difference between the individual consciousness of human beings and the universal, cosmic consciousness of *Geist*. *Geist* is a social, historical, and metaphysical transformation of the transcendental unity of apperception. I think that when Hegel uses the expression 'the One' (*das Eine*) in this passage he means 'the whole'—not just the Kantian unity of consciousness. His usual term for that is simply 'unity' (*Einheit*).

He also approves the Schematism. This is praised for its function in making possible the application of concepts to sense perceptions: 'Im Gemüte, Selbstbewußtsein sind also reine Verstandesbegriffe und reine Anschauungen' (*SW* xix 569–70) 'In the mind, in self-consciousness there are pure conceptions of the understanding and pure sensuous perceptions' (*LHP* iii 441) but the appropriate concept is needed to make intelligible any given set of perceptions. This 'mediation' is achieved by the schematism which, because it performs just the same function, is equated by Hegel with the transcendental faculty of judgement and the transcendental imagination. He says, 'Diese Verbindung ist wieder eine der schönsten Seiten der kantischen Philosophie, wodurch reine Sinnlichkeit und der reine Verstand, die als absolut entgegengesetze Verschiedene vorhin ausgesagt wurden, vereinigt werden' (*SW* xix 570) 'The connection of these two is again one of the most attractive sides of the Kantian philosophy whereby pure sensuousness and pure understanding, which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites, are now united' (*LHP* iii 441). The result of this synthesis is what was regarded as valuable in *Faith and Knowledge*, 'intuitiver Verstand, oder verständiges Anschaun' (*SW* xix 570) 'an intuitive understanding or an understanding perception' (*LHP* iii 441). Kant, though, fails to see this important implication of his concept of schematism.

Reason

So, the understanding does not yield genuine knowledge. Its findings are 'subjective' and 'finite'. Kant never achieves the true objectivity which is the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity, nor the true infinite which is not contrasted with finitude:

> Wenn wir aber diese Kategorien, die nur auf sinnliche Anschauung angewendet werden können, zum Bestimmen des Unendlichen gebrauchen, so verwickeln wir uns in falsche Schlüsse (Paralogismen) und Widersprüche (Antinomien); und es ist dies eine wichtige Seite, der kantischen Philosophie, die Bestimmung, daß das Unendliche, so weit es durch Kategorien beestimmt wird, sich in Widersprüchen verliert. (*SW* xix 576)

> If for the determination of the infinite we employ these categories which are only applicable to phenomena we entangle ourselves in false arguments (paralogisms) and in contradictions (Antinomies) ... it is an important point in the Kantian philosophy that the infinite, so far as it is defined by means of categories, loses itself in contradictions. (*LHP* iii 445)

Hegel sums up Kant's position correctly when he says: 'Die Vernunft hat nun den Trieb das Unendliche zu erkennen; aber dies vermag die Vernunft nicht' (SW xix 575), 'Kant says that reason certainly has the desire to know the infinite, but has not the power' (LHP iii 444).

As Hegel allows reason this power—indeed this is precisely the role of reason in his system—it is worth inspecting Kant's reasons for denying it. Kant has a Humean objection to the concept of infinity: it lacks an empirical referent.

> Das Unendliche nicht in der Erfahrung gegeben ist ... diesem keine psychologisch sinnliche Anschauung, Wahrnehmung entspricht ... es nicht in der äußerlichen oder inneren Erfahrung gegeben ist;—der Idee 'kann kein kongruierender Gegenstand in der Sinnenwelt gegeben werden'. (SW xix 576)

> ... no psychologically sensuous intuition or perception corresponds with 'the infinite', that is, it is not given in outward or inward experience; to the idea 'no congruent or corresponding object can be discovered in the sensuous world'. (LHP iii 444)

To Hegel this is in one way right and in another way wrong: 'Das ist nun allerdings richtig; das Unendliche ist nicht in der Welt, in der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung gegeben' (SW xix 576), 'It is certainly correct to say that the infinite is not given in the world of sense perception' (LHP iii 445). I take this to mean that infinity is not a discrete item falling within the field of sense perception. On the other hand, to Kant's inability to find infinity in the world of sense at all, he says: 'Es kommt darauf an, wie man die Welt ansieht; aber die Erfahrung, Betrachtung der Welt, heißt Kant nie was Anderes als das hier Leuchter liegt, hier eine Tabaksdose' (SW xix 576), 'It depends however on how the world is looked at; but experience and observation of the world mean nothing else for Kant than a candlestick standing here, and a snuff-box standing there' (LHP iii 444–5). It is perhaps possible for it to seem to oneself *that* the world is infinite without thereby concluding that infinity is a peculiar particular; perhaps by seeing the spatially distributed objects around one 'as' continuing without apparent boundary or limit into the distance. If this is what Hegel means I do not think we can conclude from it that the physical world is 'infinite', if this means either 'unlimited in space' or 'unlimited in time'. From the fact that it looks infinite it does not follow that it is. Hegel, though, does not rely on this argument himself, as earlier he says that the infinite is only fully known by reason: 'Man wird auch für die Bewahrheitung des Unendlichen nicht eine sinnliche Wahrnehmung sorden wollen; der Geist ist nur für den Geist' (SW xix 576), '... no one wants to demand a sensuous proof in verification of the infinite: Spirit is for Spirit alone' (LHP iii 445).

Kant acknowledges that ordinary thinking has a tendency to try to think what Hegel would call the 'infinite' or the 'unconditioned' and Hegel acknowledges this strain in his thought: 'Die Vernunft hat auch die Forderung in sich, die Wahrnehmung, Erfahrung, Verstandeskenntnis auf das Unendliche

zurückzuführen' (SW xix 576), 'Reason ... retains its claim to trace perception, experience and knowledge pertaining to the understanding back to the infinite' (*LHP* iii 445). So the Paralogisms and the Antinomies arise very naturally out of commonsensical thinking. For example, I can and do think of event E being preceded by an earlier one E_1, E_1 by a still earlier one, E_2 and so on, but was there a *first* event? Place P is located within place P_2, P_2 within P_3 and so on, but where are all these located? For Hegel Kant has travelled to the very brink of rational comprehension: 'die höchst konkrete Vereinigung des Unendlichen mit dem Endlichen der Verstandeserkenntnis oder gar der Wahrnehmung' (SW xix 576), 'the (highest concrete) union of the infinite, the unconditioned with the finite and conditioned' (*LHP* iii 445). This is 'the very acme of concreteness' (*LHP* iii 445) ('das Konkrete der Vernunft', *SW* xix 576). In not allowing the *ideas of reason to correspond to any* reality, Kant missed an essential opportunity to acquire genuine knowledge of 'das denkende Subjekt' (*SW* xix 577), 'the thinking subject', 'der Inbegriff aller Erscheinungen' (SW xix 577), 'the sum total of all phenomena', and 'die oberste Bedingung der Möglichkeit von allem, was gedacht werden kann' (*SW* xix 577), 'the condition of possibility of all that can be thought' (*LHP* iii 446). These are the *soul* (*die Seele*), the *world* (*die Welt*), and *God* (*Gott*). In Kant, though, they remain confined to subjective thought. Hegel's claim is that reason can bring these objects to reality (*LHP* iii 446). To see how we have to examine his critique of the *Paralogisms*.

Hegel agrees with Kant so far as to say 'Kant hat ganz Recht, wenn er behauptet, daß Ich nicht ein sinnliches Ding ist, ein totes Beharrendes, ein Seelen-ding, das ein sinnliches Dasein hat' (SW xix 578), 'he is perfectly correct when he maintains that the Ego is not a soul-thing, a dead permanency which has a sensuous present existence' (*LHP* iii 447), and he has a Humean argument to support this conclusion: were it to be an ordinary thing, in Hegel's view, it would be necessary that it should be capable of being experienced (*LHP* iii 447). If the subject were an object, then that which has experiences would be an item for those experiences. The transcendental subject has three characteristics mentioned by Hegel: it is subjective not objective; it is dynamic, becoming or developing; and it is universal, not particular. Kant, though,

> Das Gegenteil, das er behauptet, ist aber nicht, daß Ich, als dieses Allgemeine oder das Sich-denken, das Wesen und die wahrhafte Realität, das Moment der Wirklichkeit, die er verlangt als gegenständliche Weise an ihm selbst hat. (SW xix 578)

> ... does not assert the contrary of this, that the ego, as this universal or as self-thinking has in itself the true reality which he requires as an objective mode. (*LHP* iii 447)

Kant, then, has missed another opportunity; this time to show Geist as the synthesis of Idea and Nature. The reason, according to Hegel, is that Kant is hidebound by an empiricist conception of reality: 'die Realität darin bestehe, ein sinnliches Dasein zu sein; aus dieser Vorstellung kommt Kant nicht heraus' (SW xix 578), 'He does not get clear of the conception of reality in

which reality consists in the possession of a sensuous present existence' (*LHP* iii 447). 'Real' for Hegel does not entail 'in principle observable'. Because Kant does allegedly make this assumption, he illegitimately infers from 'the self is not observable' to 'there is no self' or equivocates between that and 'the subject is not real': 'Ich ... in keiner außeren Erfahrung gegeben ist, so ist es nicht reell' (*SW* xix 578), 'because the Ego is given in no outward experience it is not real' (*LHP* iii 447).

Kant's view then is that

> Ich ist das leere transzendentale Subjekt unserer Gedanken, es wird aber nun durch seine Gedanken erkannt; was er aber an sich ist, davon können wir daraus nicht den geringsten Begriff haben. (Eine abscheuliche Unterscheidung! Der Gedanke ist das Ansich.) (*SW* xix 577–8)

> The ego is therefore the empty transcendental subject of our thoughts, that moreover becomes known only through its thoughts; but of what it is in itself we cannot gather the least idea. (A horrible distinction! For thought is nothing more or less than the in-itself or implicit). (*LHP* iii 446–7)

Geist, or pure spirit, is what is most fully real in Absolute Idealism. It is *in-itself*—its existence is not finitely contrasted with any semantic or ontological opposite. It is *implicit*—it is the goal of the dialectical enrichment of the determinations (*Bestimmungen*) of finite thought. So there can be no individual particular selves-in-themselves for Hegel. Only the universal self is really real and as pure self-thinking thought this is *Geist*. Again, Kant fails to grasp this rational metaphysical truth because of his empiricism and his Cartesian first-person starting point: 'Denn Selbstbewußtsein, Ich als solches, ist nicht die Realität; es ist nur unser Denken, oder Kant faßt das Selbstbewußtsein schlechthin selbst nur als sinnliches auf' (*SW* xix 578), 'For self-consciousness, the Ego as such is not according to Kant, reality, it is only our thought, or in other words he regards self-consciousness as being itself simply and entirely sensuous' (*LHP* iii 447).

The 'contradiction' in Kant's account is this: 'Wir wissen wohl, Ich ist Subjekt; gehen wir aber über das Selbstbewußtsein, und sagen, daß es Substanz sei, so gehen wir weiter, als wir berechtigt sind. Ich kann dem Subjekte keine Realität geben' (*SW* xix 578), 'We ... know very well that the Ego is subject, but if we pass beyond self-consciousness, and say that it is substance, we go farther than we are entitled to do. I cannot therefore assign any reality to the subject' (*LHP* iii 447). Hegel's verdict: 'we see here Kant fall into contradiction' (*LHP* iii 447) (*Widerspruch*, *SW* xix 578) rests on his now familiar refusal to separate logic from ontology. Kant is allegedly minimally committed to the view that the Ego is subject, and exists, but is not real: it is, but there isn't anything *that* it is, Kant, in fact, has barely succeeded in establishing the lowest and poorest fact about the subject: that there is one. Hegel next turns his attention to the Antinomies.

Hegel has two main criticisms of the Antinomies: Kant drastically underestimates the number—there are many more of them. Secondly, Hegel thinks

the conclusions of each Antinomy (not just those of Kant's third) are only apparently mutually exclusive. What appears to the understanding to be a contradiction can be superseded (*aufgehoben*) by reason. Hegel says: 'Kant zeigt vier Widersprüche auf; das ist wenig, allenthalben sind Antinomien. In jedem Begriffe ist es leicht, einen Widerspruch aufzuzeigen; den der Begriff ist konkret, so nicht einfache Bestimmung' (SW xix 579), 'Kant here points out four contradictions, which, however, is not enough; for in each concept there are antinomies, since it is not simple but concrete, and therefore contains different determinations, which are direct opposites' (*LHP* iii 448). Hegel agrees in each case that 'one of these opposites is just as necessary as the other' (*LHP* iii 450). This is true if it means each conclusion of each Antinomy is validly derived from its premisses. Hegel says next, 'Die Notwendigkeit dieser Widersprüche ist die interessante Seite, die Kant zum BewuBtsein begracht hat' (SW xix 581), 'the necessity of these contradictions is the interesting fact which Kant has brought to consciousness' (*LHP* iii 450). This remark of Hegel's is not very plausible, if it means each conclusion of each Antinomy is a necessary truth—which is patently false, or if it means that the conclusions of the Antinomies cannot not be thought by the understanding. This also is not obviously right because even if it is a fact that ordinary thinking leads naturally to contradictions this is arguablly a contingent fact not a necessary one as Hegel believes. Even more questionable is, 'Man stellt sich nach der gemeinen Metaphysik vor, eins müsse gelten und das Andere widerlegt werden' (SW xix 581), 'in ordinary metaphysics, however, it is imagined that one of these contradictions must hold good, and the other be disproved' (*LHP* iii 450). Here *eins* and *Andere* refer back to *Widersprüche*. What Hegel means to say is that of each of the two mutually contradictory propositions forming the conclusions of each Antinomy, it is commonsensically assumed that one must be true and the other false. Instead of 'one of these contradictions' we should substitute 'either the proposition or its contradictory'. Then Hegel's claim makes sense, and expresses something true.

In the present text Hegel says that 'Kant löst diese Antinomien auf' (SW xix 581), 'Kant indeed solves these Antinomies' (*LHP* iii 450), but earlier, in *Faith and Knowledge*, he had written 'he did not succeed in dissolving the conflict' (FK 84). I leave aside the historical question of whether Hegel changed his mind. In fact the two claims can be understood as consistent if we preface the first with something like 'to his own satisfaction', and continue the paragraph which qualifies it, 'but only in the particular sense of transcendental idealism' (*LHP* iii 450) (*im Sinne des transcendentalen Idealismus*) (SW xix 581). Given the premiss that Hegel thinks transcendental idealism is false, it follows that in his view Kant did not really resolve the Antinomies. Instead of saying that in each case (except the third) thesis and antithesis were both false—because they falsely presupposed transcendental realism—Kant should have said in every case they are both true. In other words, Kant should have adopted transcendental realism in Hegel's view.

In advocating transcendental realism I think Hegel understands very well

what he is rejecting: 'alle diese Bestimmungen von Anfang in der Zeit u.s.w. kommen nicht den Dingen, dem Ansich, selbst zu, das außerhalb unseres subjektiven Denkens für sich existierte' (*SW* xix 581–2), 'all these determinations of a beginning in time, and so on, do not really belong to things, to the implicitude of the phenomenal world, which has independent existence outside our subjective thought' (*LHP* iii 450). So, for example, on the Kantian view because space and time are ideal it does not make sense to ask whether the world has a beginning in time or a limit in space. This is a use of reason outside possible experience: 'Kamen solche Bestimmungen der Welt, Gott, den Freien zu, so ware objektiver Widerspruch vorhanden, sondern kommt nur uns zu: er hat seine Quelle allein in unserm Denken' (*SW* xix 582), 'If such determinations belonged to the world, to God, to free agents, there would be an objective contradiction; but this contradiction is not found as absolute, it pertains only to us' (*LHP* iii 450–1).

Hegel cannot possibly accept this for two reasons. The doctrine of the identity of form and content implies that contradictions cannot simply be linguistic or conceptual items. Absolute Idealism—the complete truth about reality—must be the sum of consistent metaphysical propositions. As reports of perspectives on the whole or of the whole on the whole the pairs of propositions forming the Antinomies' conclusions are consistent:

> . . . dieser transcendentale Idealismus läßt den Widerspruch bestehen, nur daß das Ansich nicht so widersprechend sei, sondern dieser Widerspruch allein in unser Gemüt falle. So bleibt denn dieselbe Antinomie in unserem Gemüte; wie sonst Gott das war, das aller Widersprüche in sich aufzunehmen hatte, so jetzt das Sebstbewußtsein. (*SW* xix 582)

> Transcendental idealism lets the contradiction remain, only it is not Being in itself that is thus contradictory, for the contradiction has its source in our thought alone. Thus the same Antimony remains in our mind; and as it was formerly God who had to take upon himself all contradictions, so now it is self-consciousness. (*LHP* iii 451)

Hegel thinks that to take this view is unjustifiably to privilege the empirical world over the mental and to remain confined within an individualist conception of self-consciousness: 'Das ist zuviel Zärtlichkeit für die Dinge; es wäre Schade, wenn sie sich widersprächen. Das aber der Geist (das Höchste) der Widerspruch ist, das soll kein Schade sein' (*SW* xix 582), 'Kant shows too much tenderness for things: it would be a pity he thinks if they contradicted themselves. But that mind, which is far higher, should be a contradiction—that is not a pity at all' (*LHP* iii 451). What appear to be contradictions to the finite mind or understanding are complementary aspects of the conceptual structures of infinite mind for reason. The relation between the 'two' mentalities is particular to universal. The syntheses of reason transcend yet make possible the understanding's categorical and empirical use. Absolute knowing is this synthesis of reason and understanding: 'Die wahrhafte Auflösung geht auf den Inhalt, daß die Kategorien keine Wahrheit an ihnen haben, ebenso wenig

aber das Unbedingte der Vernunft, sondern nur die Einheit Beider als konkrete' (*SW* xix 582), 'The true solution would be found in the statement that the categories have no truth in themselves, and the unconditioned of reason just as little, but that it lies in the unity of both as concrete, and in that alone' (*LHP* iii 451). If we read Hegel's *Unbedingte der Vernunft* as partially semantically equivalent to Kant's *reinen Vernunft* so that each includes the sense of 'non empirical', or 'pure reason', then Hegel may be interpreted as completing a project Kant unwittingly initiated. Pure Reason according to Kant is used in metaphysical attempts to obtain knowledge of the whole, but these are guaranteed to fail because the use of reason outside experience generates contradictions. For Hegel too the function of reason is to know the whole, but for him Absolute Knowing is both possible and actual through the synthesis of reason and understanding.

Practical Reason

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant shows a deeper appreciation of the powers of reason than in the first *Critique* and in several respects comes close to revealing essential moments of the whole. In particular Hegel sees the freedom, self-consciousness, and unconditioned rationality of the Idea as partly present in the Moral Law. Also the postulates of practical reason although not resting on necessary proofs have the correct content: freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.

Hegel contrasts Kant's concepts of theoretical and practical reason: 'Die theoretische Vernunft hat Kant so gesäßt, daß ihr, insofern sie sich auf einen Gegenstand gegeben sein muß; insofern sie ihr sich selbst gibt, hat er keine Wahrheit; und die Vernunft kommt,—(in diesem)—nicht zur Selbstständigkeit' (*SW* xix 588–9), 'Kant's idea of theoretical reason is that when reason relates itself to an object, this object must be given to it; but when the object is given by reason to itself, it has no truth; and reason of this kind does not arrive at independence' (*LHP* iii 457). This is right so long as it just means the objects of theoretical reason must be possible objects of experience. 'Given' must not be taken to entail 'occurrently present in perception'. 'Selbstständig in sich ist sie dagegen als praktische Vernunft als moralisches Wesen ist der Mensch frei, über alles Naturgesetz und Erscheinung erhaben' (*SW* xix 589), 'As practical on the contrary, reason is independent in itself; as a moral being man is free, raised above all natural law and above all phenomena' (*LHP* iii 457). 'Independent' in both these contexts means 'unconstrained by empirical content'. So, Hegel is right to say, '... hier verächt die Vernunft allen gegeben Stoff, der ihr im Theoretischen notwendig ist' (*SW* xix 589), '(practical) reason disdains all the given material which was necessary to it on the theoretical side' (*LHP* iii 457). It is, indeed, Kant's view that one and the same faculty of reason admits of a theoretical and a practical employment.

So, practical reason is not empirically determined. Indeed, 'Die rousseau'sche Bestimmung, daß der Wille an und für sich frei ist, hat Kant aufgestellt' (*SW* xix 588), 'Kant accepted Rousseau's conclusion that the will is absolutely free',

so 'Der Wille bestimmt sich in sich, auf Freiheit beruht alles Rechtliche und Sittliche' (*SW* xix 589), 'the will determines itself within itself; all that is right and moral rests on freedom' (*LHP* iii 457). In the idea of self determination Kant has unknowingly glimpsed the Absolute; reality as a whole thought as unconditioned or self-determining. In this freedom 'hat der Mensch sein absolutes SelbstbewuBtsein' (*SW* xix 589), 'man has his absolute self-consciousness' (*LHP* iii 457–8), according to Hegel. 'Es ist Standpunkt der Absolutheit; aufgeschlossen in seiner Brust ist dem Menschen ein Unendliches' (*SW* xix 589), 'Thus we have the standpoint of absoluteness revealed, since there is an infinite disclosed within the human breast' (*LHP* iii 458). In particular Hegel thinks the transition from the concept of reason of the first to the second *Critique* is dialectical. The over-empirical idea of reason of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is found inadequate in thinking moral subject matter and has to be made pure: 'Hier ist der Begriff der das BewuBtsein seiner Mangelhaftigkeit hat; was die theoretische Vernunft nicht haben sollte,—der Begriff sollte eben der Begriff bleiben' (*SW* xix 589), 'Here we have the Concept which is sensible of its own deficiency; this theoretical reason could not be, as in it the Concept had to remain the Concept' (*LHP* iii 458). 'The Concept had to remain the Concept' is misleading in so far as it implies, incoherently, that the transition from theoretical to practical reason required a concept to differ from itself, or not be what it is. We can read this intelligibly as 'it remained what it was' and 'then, it changed from what it was', though Hegel would prefer 'it becomes what it really is'.

Hegel finds Kant's division of the 'will into lower and higher faculties' 'not inapt' (*LHP* iii 458) ('Den Willen teilt Kant in niederes und höheres Begehrungsvermögen. Dieser Ausdruck ist nicht ungeschickt', *SW* xix 589). He agrees there is a distinction between the will as empirically determined, by 'impulses, inclinations etc.' (*Begierden, Neigungen u.s.w.*, *SW* xix 589), and the will as self-determining. Hegel does not object to Kant's view that self-love, benevolence, and other 'material principles of action' are all reducible to happiness (*Glückseligkeit*, *SW* xix 589) but thinks Kant fails to distinguish higher and lower sorts of happiness. Kant is right in Hegel's view not to found morality on the empirical particular desire for happiness which would provide a merely changing and contingent content for ethics. Despite this Kant does not recognize the deeper spiritual happiness which is *Geist's* self awareness: the unity of particular human happiness with universal metaphysical happiness. This sort of happiness does have an ethical role for Hegel. Fundamentally it is the content of ethics.

This idea of spiritual happiness provides Hegel's solution to the greatest shortcoming he sees in Kant's ethics: it has no content. Or, as he frequently repeats, it is 'purely formal' (*LHP* iii 458), (*rein formal*, *SW* xix 590). The trouble is that the following limitation of the Categorical Imperative: 'Was als Gesetz gelten soil, als allgemeingültige Gesetzgebung muB gedacht werden können; so daB es sich nicht aufhebt, wenn es als solches gedacht wird' (*SW* xix 590), 'what is to hold good as law must be capable of being thought of

as a law of universal application, without destroying itself' (*LHP* iii 458), does not provide a principle to distinguish the moral from the non-moral. 'Without destroying itself' can be read here as 'without contradiction'. The Categorical Imperative provides only a necessary condition for an action's being moral. It is not sufficient. Indeed, the proposal that an action must be universalizable in a way that is logically consistent might be thought a requirement on any sort of proposal whatsoever, moral, immoral, or non-moraL For these reasons Hegel thinks his criticism of Kant's ethics is well founded and that he is right to say 'the rational in itself is purely formal' (*LHP* iii 458). As he argued in *LL*, from the fact that a set of recommendations is consistent, it does not follow that they should be adopted.

The *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* has a broadly accurate summary of the agent's relation to the Moral Law: 'Alle Moralität der Handlung nun beruht auf der Gesinnung, daß sie mit ßewußtsein des Gesetzes und um des Gesetzes Willen aus Achtung für dasselbe und vor sich selbst geschehe, mit Erwahrung dessen, was glückselig macht' (*SW* xix 590), 'All morality of action now rests upon the conviction that the act is done with consciousness of the law, for the sake of the law and for itself, without any regard for what makes for happiness' (*LHP* iii 458). Aside from the important proviso about spiritual happiness Hegel accepts Kant's general repudiation of utilitarianism. He praises the conception of the will as self-determining but thinks this too is marred by a lack of content: 'Es ist ein großer Forschritt, daß dies Princip aufgestellt ist, daß die Freiheit die letzte Angel ist, auf der Mensch sich dreht, diese letzte Spitze, die sich durch nichts imponieren läßt' (*SW* xix 591), 'It is a great advance when the principle is established that freedom is the last hinge on which man turns, a highest possible pinnacle, which allows nothing further to be imposed upon it' (*LHP* iii 459). However, Hegel's question is, 'Was ist aber der Inhalt dieses Gesetzes? Hier sind wir sogleich wieder bei der Inhaltslosigkeit' (*SW* xix 591), 'But what is the content of this law? We at once come back to the lack of content' (*LHP* iii 460). For Hegel we still have not been supplied with an answer to the question, 'What specifically should I will?' Kant has only provided a negative conception of freedom: as absence of empirical determination plus self-determination. The will makes itself be what it is. This in turn is just tautologous in Hegel's view: 'Es ist die Identität des Willens mit sich selbst, daß er bei sich ist' (*SW* xix 591), 'It is the identity of the will with itself, its at homeness with itself' (*LHP* iii 460). This freedom then is 'daß Negative alles Andern' (*SW* xix 591), 'only the negative of everything else' (*LHP* iii 460). It is not what it is not. So Kant has really only done three trivial things: defined freedom tautologously, said freedom does not differ from itself, and said freedom is not not freedom. Because of its lack of prescriptive content Kant's theory of reason as practical has really not moved from his conception of it as understanding: to duty 'Kant ... nichts gehabt, als die Form der Identität, des Sichnichtwidersprechens, was das Gesetz des abstrakten Verstandes ist' (*SW*, xix 592), 'Kant has contributed nothing but the form of identity, which is the law of abstract understanding'

(*LHP* iii 460). Practical Reason is no more dialectical than theoretical reason.

There is perhaps one aspect of Kant's ethics that Hegel is prepared to concede is dialectical. This is in the connection of the concept of the will with the particular will of the individual. Not only is the fully adequate concept of will identified with the universal will, but particular will and universal will too are 'identical'. This is part of what makes a person a moral being (*LHP* iii 461). Once again, though, 'Was aber moralisch ist, oder an ein System des sich verwirklichenden Geistes wird nicht gedacht' (*SW* xix 593), 'It is not said what is moral; and no thought is given to a system of the self-realizing spirit' (*LHP* iii 461).

Just as serious is the fact that there is no genuine synthesis of universal and particular in Kant's ethics. This is one reason why the immortality of the soul has to be *postulated*. Kant has realized that morality is incomplete in the sense that persons seem to have a concept of moral progress and perfection that their limited existence precludes their realizing. Immortality allows infinite progress or the possibility of perfection. Hegel thinks this realization in turn requires the unity of particular and universal will.

The relation between practical reason and the immortal soul in Kant's ethics is in Hegel's view strikingly like the relation between theoretical reason and the 'noumenal world' in the epistemology. Just as theoretical reason contrasts with the objectivity of the senses, so practical reason excludes empirical determinants: impulses and inclinations. But, like things-in-themselves, 'Die vollendete Moralität muß ein Jenseits bleiben' (*SW* xix 593), 'Perfected morality must remain a beyond' (*LHP* iii 461). And, as we have seen, no incomplete philosophical system can be in possession of the truth in Hegel's view.

God

Hegel argues against Kant's view that God is an object of faith, not knowledge, in many places. I will concentrate on just two central issues: Hegel's criticisms of the third postulate of practical reason, and his defence of the Ontological Argument. Part of what is at stake here is the correct concept of God. Kant's God is the transcendent God of Protestant Orthodoxy who causes the universe to be. Hegel's God is not the cause of what is, it is what is. Hegel regards it as a limitation on God's infinity for pantheism not to be true, so God is then 'infinite' in the sense that there is nothing that is not God. 'God' and *Geist* are just two semantically distinct ways of referring to the whole, the Absolute, the totality of what is as it fully knows itself. As God is the Absolute in Hegel's philosophy he is the synthesis of all dialectical oppositions.

Kant's third postulate is maligned in so far as it falls short of this account. Hegel thinks Kant has established clearly the need for God to exist in order to make sense of the relationships between human action considered ethically and considered empirically. There is an antithesis between freedom and nature created by the purity of the moral law and Hegel assimilates this to his own antithesis between the Idea and Nature. Kant's ethics requires that the natural

world be in harmony with the concept of freedom. 'That is the postulate of the existence of God' (*LHP* iii 462), ('Das andere Postulat ist Postulat Gottes', *SW* xix 594). God is the synthesis of the antithetical objects of reason of the first and second *Critiques* but Kant never establishes this rational synthesis because he has no proof of God's existence. Hegel puts the opposition under different descriptions: 'Der Wille hat die ganze Welt, das Ganze der Sinnlichkeit sich gegenüber' (*SW* xix 594), 'Will has the whole world, the whole of the sensuous in opposition to it' (*LHP* iii 462). 'Reason insists on the unity of Nature or the moral law as the . . . Good' (*LHP* iii 462), ('Die Vernunft bringt auf Einheit beider Seiten; die Natur, die Welt soll in Harmonie mit dem vernünftigen Willen, dem Guten sein', *SW* xix 594). 'It stands opposed to the impulses and inclinations of a subjective and an external independent Nature' (*LHP* iii 462) ('. . . steht den Trieben und Neigungen einer subjektiven,—und einer äußeren selbstständigen Natur gegenüber', *SW* xix 594). Although Kant offers no rational proof of God's existence he does try to overcome the contradiction between Freedom and Nature by the concept of the highest good. The highest good, for Hegel, is God under another description. This means that Kant arrives at the very brink of allowing God as the synthesis of the Idea and Nature. So much so that Hegel goes so far as to say: 'Den Widerspruch beider vereint Kant in dem Gedanken des höchsten Gutes, worin die Natur der Vernunft angemessen sei' (*SW* xix 594), 'Kant reconciles the contradiction of the two in the thought of the highest good in which Nature is conformed to rational will, and happiness to virtue' (*LHP* iii 462). The 'idea of the good' 'is the ultimate end of the world'.

Kant has identified the correct issues, his philosophy has the correct subject matter, but he falls short of adequate, that is complete, solutions. In the moral life happiness is virtue and virtue is happiness but Kant has an individualist and undialectical grasp of this truth. For him 'Glückseligkeit ist nur das sinnliche Selbstgefühl oder Wirklichkeit dieses Individuums, nicht die an sich allgemeine Realität' (*SW* xix 594), 'happiness is only one's own sensuous consciousness, or the actuality of a particular individual, not universal reality in itself' (*LHP* iii 462). This implies that for Kant the synthesis of freedom and nature is never actual but always ought to be. For Hegel it ought to be but it really is as well: Geist's progress to relf-realization is sometimes paradoxically thought of by Hegel as Geist's bcoming what it really is, but Kant's philosophy lacks a complete concept of God so this synthesis remains only 'a beyond' (*ein Jenseits*, *SW* xix 594) or 'a thought' (*ein Gedanke*, *SW* xix 594), (*LHP* iii 462). The harmony of freedom and nature in the highest good exists 'only in infinite progress' (*als unendlicher Progreß*, *SW* xix 594) and this permits the antithesis to rest unsublated.[14] Kant is aware only of the 'abstract' fact that a moral requirement for a complete synthesis exists. The highest good too is therefore always 'a beyond' with respect to Nature: 'Das Gesetz der Notwendigkeit und das Gesetz der Freiheit sind verschieden von einander'

[14] Hegel quotes extensively from Kant: *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (3rd edn., Berlin, 1799), Einleitung, pp. xvii–xx, xxv.

(*SW* xix 595), 'the law of necessity and the law of liberty are different from one another' (*LHP* iii 462). They are the terms of a 'dualism' (*Dualismus*, *SW* xix 595). The Idea as freedom and subjectivity and Nature as determinism and objectivity should be subsumed (*aufgehoben*) by God as the highest good, but in Kant Nature remains nature in fixed contrast with the freedom of the individual subject: 'Die Natur bliebe nicht mehr Natur, wenn sie dem Begriffe des Guten angemessen würde; es bleibt so beim höchsten Widerspruche, sie können sich nicht vereinigen' (*SW* xix 595), 'Nature would remain Nature no longer, if it were to be conformed to the concept of the Good, and thus there remains an utter opposition between the two sides, because they cannot unite' (*LHP* iii 463). For Hegel 'Es ist ebenso notwendig, die Einheit Beider zu setzen; sie ist aber nicht wirklich. Das Andere, die Trennung Beider ist gesetzt' (*SW* xix 595), 'It is . . . necessary to establish the unity of the two; but this is never actual, for their separation is exactly what is presupposed' (*LHP* iii 463).

Because this synthesis is never actual, there is no rational proof of God's existence in Kant. This is because Kant's concept of God is faulty; he postulates the existence of God as the *cause* of the harmony that is needed between the will and nature (*LHP* iii 462). But God is this harmony for Hegel. God does not stand in a causal relation to contradictions. Their terms are *aufgehoben* in God. The result is that Kant relapses into the perspective of the individual human subject and 'Gott bleibt so Postulat, ist nur ein Glaube, ein Dafürhalten, welches nur subjektiv, nicht wahr an und für sich ist' (*SW* xix 595), 'God is for him (Kant) therefore only a faith, an opinion, which is only subjectively, and not absolutely true' (*LHP* iii 463).

There are different sorts of 'contradiction' generated by the relations between the first two *Critiques*. Freedom and determinism, subjectivity and objectivity, universal and particular, finite and infinite stand in fixed opposition to one another. 'Diese Postulate drücken von nichts, als die gedankenlose Synthesis der verschiedenen Momente aus, die sich allenthalben widersprechen; sie sind ein "Nest" von Widersprüchen' (*SW* xix 595), '(the) postulates express nothing but the synthesis, devoid of thought, of the different moments which contradict each other on every hand; they are therefore a "nest" of contradictions' (*LHP* iii 463). There is a further contradiction detected by Hegel between the description of the moral law given by Kant and one reason given for God's existence:

> Der Behuf, zu dem er zugleich angenommen wird, daß durch die Vorstellung eines heiligen Gesetzgebers das Sittengesetz um so mehr Achtung gewinne, widerspricht dem, daß eben die Moralität darin besteht, das Gesetz rein um seinerselbst willen zu achten. (*SW* xix 595–6)
>
> The ground on which God is accepted—that by the conception of a holy law giver the moral law may acquire additional reverence—contradicts the fact that morality really consists in reverence for the law simply for its own sake. (*LHP* iii 463)

To the extent that Kant adopts this reason for believing in God I think Hegel has isolated a real inconsistency in his ethics. It cannot be true both that I obey

the moral law for its own sake alone and that I obey it because it has divine sanction. This would entail that both *p* and not *p*, and no amount of dialectic can make that conjunction true.

Kant's non-acceptance of God as the synthesis of all dialectical oppositions is also allegedly the reason why he fails to perceive the validity of the Ontological Argument. Hegel's pantheism, and his dialectic, require that God be the synthesis of thought and being. 'God' is the name of this synthesis and this synthesis is what most truly is.

Kant starts the argument with what for Hegel is a false distinction between thought and being. Absolute Idealism entails the identity of thought and being so the antithesis between our concepts and what they are of can only be appearance, but Kant's object is 'zu beweisen, daß Gott nicht bloß Gedanken ist, sondern daß er ist, Wirklichkeit, Sein hat' (SW xix 583), 'to prove that God is not only thought, but that He is, that he has reality, being' (*LHP* iii 451). The relation between the concept of God and God's existence for Kant is rather like that between the concept of art, the 'Ideal' and works of art according to Hegel. 'Kant wonders whether this Idea can be realized' (*LHP* iii 452–3), something that it barely makes sense to ask for Hegel.

Hegel summarizes Kant's main objections to the argument: that 'being is not a real predicate' (*LHP* iii 452) ('Sein ist kein reales Prädikat', SW xix 583); that in saying that something exists, nothing is added to the concept of it, for example, that from the fact that I can imagine a hundred talers in my pocket it does not follow that I own them; that they exist: 'Aus dem Begriff kann also nicht auf das Sein geschlossen werden, weil das Sein nicht im Begriffe liegt, sondern zum Begriffe hinzukommt' (SW xix 583), 'Being cannot therefore be derived from the concept, because it is not contained therein but must be added to it' (*LHP* iii 452). In other words, in Kant's view for any *x*, '*x* exists' cannot be analytic. Finally for Kant it cannot be an a priori fact that for some *x*, '*x* exists' is true: 'Für Objekte des reinen Denkens ist kein Mittel, ihr Dasein zu erkennen, weil es a priori erkannt werden müßte; unser Bewußtsein aller Existenz aber gehört ganz und gar zur Erfahrung' (SW xix 583–4), 'With regard to objects of pure thought, there are no means of coming to know of their existence, because it had to be known a priori; but our consciousness of all existence belongs entirely to experience' (*LHP* iii 452).

As in *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel accepts Kant's account so far as the empirical concepts of the finite understanding are concerned. From the fact that the concept of *x* is thinkable it does not logically follow that *x* exists. As he says about Kant's hundred dollars, 'Allerdings, die Vorstellung tuts nicht, wenn ich hartnäckig darin stecken bleibe; ich kann mir einbilden, was ich will, darum ist es nicht' (SW xix 585), 'Of course the mere conception is no good (even) if I obstinately hold by it; for I can imagine what I will but that does not make it exist' (*LHP* iii 454). The concept of God, though, is not an empirical one: it is logically required to make sense of what exists. God is existence but Kant does not know this. He never effects the synthesis of the Concept (*der Begriff*) and Being (*Sein*): he never realizes that the whole is

identical with its Concept of itself, that there is no difference between the whole's knowing what it is and its being what it is. To require Kant to accept this though is to require him to adopt Absolute Idealism.

Aesthetics and Teleology

The third postulate of practical reason left the reconciliation of the tension between freedom and nature as a 'beyond'. In the *Critique of Judgement* though a synthesis is achieved *als ein Gegenwärtiges* (SW xix 596), 'as present' (LHP iii 464). This is an improvement for Hegel but still falls short of 'rational synthesis' in Absolute Knowing. Hegel quotes Kant on the fixed opposition that allegedly obtains between the concept of freedom and the concept of nature: 'Von dem ersteren zum andern kein Übergang möglich ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten wären' (SW xix 597),[15] 'It is not possible to pass from one to the other . . . just as if there were two different worlds' (LHP iii 465; CJ 36–7). Despite this, Hegel detects a demand for the 'concrete' and the idea of 'unity' in Kant's text (LHP iii 464). Kant has seen that Nature can be thought of as where the aims of freedom can be realized and, he concludes, because of this conceivability some prior ground of the unity of freedom and nature must exist.

Hegel summarizes Kant's view that the faculty of judgement is either aesthetic, or teleological (LHP iii 468), and says of these that aesthetic judgement concerns subjective adaptation to end, while teleological judgement concerns objective adapatation to end. Each aspect of the faculty is directed towards a different sort of object. This is what is beautiful in works of art and in the natural products of organic life respectively (LHP iii 468). The perception of the two sorts of aesthetic object requires a synthesis of universal and particular which itself makes consistent what is described as 'free' and what is described as 'natural'. Hegel credits Kant with the view that the universal as implicit in the particular is the precise object of aesthetic judgement, and that this is partly constitutive of both sorts of aesthetic object, qua aesthetic object. This is one way of describing aesthetic appreciation of an object for Kant: there is a harmony or 'fit' between the appearance of the object and the universal category through which it is thought, even though the unity of universal and particular is only achieved at the level of *Verstand*.

This harmony or unity of category and object dissolves the tension between freedom and necessity, Idea and Nature. It does this 'subjectively' but not 'objectively'. I think Hegel means that the antitheses between freedom and necessity, Idea and Nature do not appear to the aesthetic consciousness. The harmony between the universal concepts of the perceiver, and particularity of the object perceived prohibit the perception or thought of any tension between free subject and determined nature. It does not follow at all from this that these antitheses do not still really exist: in particular Hegel thinks Kant is committed to the view that the antitheses sill exist at the level of 'things-in-

[15] Compare the sections at *LL* 66 z and *LHP* iii 427 with the passage at *Phen.* 46–7. Kant is the unnamed target in this part of the *Phenomenology*.

themselves'. They have only been resolved within the experience of the subject. Again, Kant has failed to escape the point of view of the perceiving human subject.

Hegel largely approves Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the sublime and tries to show its role in revealing the unity of universal and particular: Hegel also says Kant has said the first reasonable thing about beauty: 'Ein Gegenstand, dessen Form (nicht das Materielle seiner Vorstellung als Empfindung) als Grund der Luft an der Vorstellung eines solchen Objekts beurteilt wird, ist schön' (SW xix 601), 'An object whose form (not the material of its conception as sensation) is judged to be a cause of the pleasure which springs from the conception of such an object, is beautiful' (LHP iii 469). He thinks this is 'reasonable' because it implies a synthesis of sense and understanding. Although this synthesis is merely experiential and not dialectical, it accords with Hegel's own view that sense experience is just one moment of the beautiful, which must also express Spirit (*Geist*) through its Concept. Hegel approves Kant's view that objects of aesthetic appreciation have to be viewed without 'subjective interest' and as objects of 'universal pleasure': 'Es ist nicht für mich schön' (SW xix 602), 'It is not beautiful for *me*' (i.e. me alone) (LHP iii 469), where 'for me' means 'only for me'. But he thinks Kant misses entirely the role of *Geist* in the production of works of art because of his view that aesthetic objects are perceived 'without concepts' (LHP iii 469) (*ohne Begriffe*, SW xix 60). Despite this crucial difference between the two aesthetic theories, Hegel can say that in the aesthetic faculty of judgement Kant has effected the immediate unity of universal and particular. The beautiful is that very unity. It is *immediate* because effected without concepts. The price of this experiential unity is high, though. It entails that Kant's aesthetic theory is not fully rational, not objective in any sense stronger than 'universalizable' and, most drastically, art and nature are not the expression of *Geist*. Because beauty is restricted by the point of view of the subject, it is *finite* beauty only. Real beauty, the beauty of Spirit in nature, is the synthesis of Kant's 'experiential' beauty and conceptually mediated beauty.

Works of art are the expression of *Geist* for Hegel and this fact marks another crucial difference between the two aestheticians. For Hegel the beauty of art is 'higher' than that of nature. For Kant, art imitates nature and what is thus imitated is richer, more complex, more beautiful than the imitation. In this respect the aesthetic philosophies of Kant and Hegel pull in opposite directions. It is fair to say, I think, that for Kant we only find art beautiful because we find nature beautiful, but for Hegel we only find nature beautiful because we find art beautiful.[16] Kant is nearer to the Hegelian conception of the aesthetic in his account of the sublime. 'Das Erhabene ist das Bestreben, eine Idee sinnlich darzustellen, wo zugleich die Unangemessenheit, das Nicht-

[16] I borrow this idea from Stephen Bungay. On the aesthetics of Kant and Hegel see his *Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics*, Oxford, 1984, esp. Chapter One. See also, Stephen Priest, review of the same in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter, 1986.

gefaßtwerdenkönnen der Idee durch das Sinnliche sich darstellt' (SW xix 602), 'The sublime is the effort to give sensuous expression to an idea in which the inconceivability of the idea, and the impossibility of finding an adequate expression of it by means of the sensuous, are clearly evinced' (*LHP* iii 469–70). Hegel finds here an anticipation of the Idea/Nature antithesis.

The expression of the Idea is even more nearly anticipated in Kant's teleology. Hegel clearly distinguishes 'internal' from 'external' teleology in Kant's theory and thinks 'internal' teleology is an important property of the Idea. The teleological way of regarding nature is dialectical to the extent that it is a method for establishing harmony: within teleological judgement, the immediate unity of the Concept and reality is realized objectively, not just subjectively. According to Hegel this synthesis is the purpose of nature (*LHP* iii 470). As with the aesthetic appreciation of the work of art, the unity or synthesis Kant achieves is that of universal in particular. Hegel allows that Kant has a concept of nature that contains the particular in universality. The distinction between internal and external teleology is that in external teleology one thing has its purpose in another but in internal teleology a thing is itself both its own end and means. Its end is therefore not 'beyond' itself. The unity of universal and particular is to be thought in internal teleology not external. Kant partially anticipates this in his doctrine that all is end and all in turn is means, but for Hegel the more thoroughly satisfactory model is the Aristotelean one of the 'infinite that returns to itself'. This he allows as one of the definitions of the *Idea*. Kant, though, perpetually failed to grasp such speculative syntheses and so never produced real or genuine philosophy.

Towards the end of the chapter on the critical philosophy in *LHP* iii, Hegel says that Kant's thought 'ist gute Einleitung in die Philosophie' (SW xix 610), 'is a good introduction to philosophy' (*LHP* iii 478). He means, of course, his own philosophy.

CHAPTER I

KANT AND HEGEL ON SPACE AND TIME

MICHAEL INWOOD

KANT AND HEGEL both discussed space and time at some length, but they did so in different ways and in different contexts. Kant's main account—in the section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled 'Transcendental Aesthetic'—is intended to establish that space and time are essential to our experience, that they are forms of our sensibility or intuition, and that they do not apply to things in themselves. Hegel's account, by contrast, occurs in the context of his philosophy of nature; he is primarily concerned to examine the nature of space and time, and shows no great interest in the question whether they are in us or in things. Though he rarely refers to Greek philosophers in this context, his discussion probably owes more to Zeno, Plato and Aristotle, than to Kant.[1] Some contact can be established, however, owing to the fact that Hegel critically discussed Kant's views on space and time. Apart from the *Logic*, the works in which he did so fall into three groups: (1) the early essay, *Faith and Knowledge*;[2] (2) the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* delivered on nine occasions between 1805 and 1830; (3) the writings on the philosophy of nature, especially the second part of the *Encyclopaedia*. I shall devote a section of this paper to each of these groups.

I FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

(*a*) In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', Kant maintains that our sensibility is purely passive or receptive and that space and time, the forms of sensibility, are quite distinct from the concepts which arise from the understanding (CPR A19, B33).[3] In FK, Hegel rejects this view and prefers Kant's later account—in the 2nd edition version of the Transcendental Deduction (CPR, B150–3, 160–1, esp. note a)—in which 'space and time are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity, the absolute synthetic activity of the

[1] For Zeno, see Aristotle, *Physics*, and H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 1952, vol. i, 247–58; for Plato, *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*; for Aristotle, *Physics*. The affinity of Hegel's account of time to Aristotle's (*Physics*, 4. 10–14) is stressed by M. Heidegger in *Being and Time*, *trans.* J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford, 1962, 480–6, 500–1, n. xxx, and by C. M. Sherover in *The Human Experience of Time*, New York, 1975, 157–63.

[2] *Glauben und Wissen* was first published in July 1802 in vol. ii, no. 1 *of the Critical Journal of Philosophy, edited by* Hegel and F. W. J. Schelling.

[3] Hegel was not the first to criticize Kant's distinction between receptive sensibility and spontaneous understanding. For the criticisms of J. S. Beck, S. Maimon, and J. G. Fichte, see H. Vaihinger, *Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1922, vol. ii, 23.

productive imagination, is conceived as the principle of the very sensibility which was previously characterized only as receptivity' (SW i 297; FK 69–70).[4]

(b) Kant believed that we are unable to answer the question 'why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition' (CPR B146). Hegel suggests an answer to this,[5] but he presents his suggestion as an interpretation of Kant. Kant's central problem in the *Critique* is 'How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?' (CPR B19). In such a judgement, Hegel says, 'the subject which is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical' (SW i 297; FK 69). This is where space and time come in: the 'antitheses step apart as two forms of intuiting, the one as identity of thinking, the other as identity of being, the one as intuition of time and the other of space' (SW i 298; FK 70). This suggestion, however, is both unhelpful and un-Kantian. There are, on Kant's view, synthetic a priori judgements which concern time alone and others which concern space alone. (Cf. II (g)).[6] We cannot therefore associate space with the subject of such a judgement ('being') and time with the predicate ('thinking').

(c) In Section B of FK, Hegel defends Kant against F. H. Jacobi's polemic in *On the Attempt of Criticism to Reduce Reason to Understanding*.[7] Jacobi saw a contradiction between Kant's claim that space and time are merely *forms* of intuition (CPR A291, B347) and his claim that they are objects (B160 n.) and intuitions (B136 n.) (Jacobi, *Werke* iii 77–9). Hegel aptly cites, in reply, Kant's own distinction between the form of intuition and the formal intuition: the latter, unlike the former, 'presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible' (CPR B161 n. *a*). 'Now where', Hegel asks, 'is the contradiction in this: the form of intuition, as a purely abstract form opposed to the concept of the understanding, is not an object, but it can be made an object, as in geometry, because of space's inner unity, which is *a priori*, though the unity does not emerge as such in space as a bare form of intuition?' (SW i 357; FK 122).[8]

(d) Jacobi argued that Kant cannot answer the question how pure time can 'give birth to times, space to spaces' (SW i 362; FK 127): 'To all eternity, a pure and empty imagination ... will not be able to produce in [space] even a point' (Jacobi, *Werke* iii 151).[9] Hegel's reply, in FK, is to refer once again

[4] Cf. Schelling, Preface to First Edition (1795) of *Of the I as Principle of Philosophy*, in *Schellings Werke*, ed. M. Schröter, Munich, 1927, vol. i, 77 and *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge*, trans. by F. Marti, Lewisburg and London, 1980, 65: 'space and time, which are supposed to be only forms of intuition, cannot possibly precede *all* synthesis and must therefore presuppose a *higher* form of synthesis'.

[5] So Cerf and Harris, in FK, 70 n. 10.

[6] References of this type are to sections and subsections of this paper.

[7] First published in K. L. Reinhold's *Beiträge*, vol. iii (1801), and reprinted in Jacobi's *Werke*, Leipzig, 1816: Darmstadt, 1980, vol. iii, 59–195.

[8] For a criticism similar to Jacobi's, see H. A. Pritchard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, Oxford, 1909, 37 ff. On the criticism and replies to it, see Vaihinger, ii, 103–7, 224–7.

[9] This criticism occupies Jacobi's *Werke* iii 113–58.

to Kant's account of space and time as products of an imaginative and intellectual synthesis. In his later *Science of Logic*[10] Hegel discusses Jacobi's objection in a significantly different way. The question, he says, 'has been answered by Kant in his own manner' (*SW* iv 106; *SL* 96), but Hegel is no longer much interested in Kant's answer and he gives his own answer independently. (He rejects the terms 'synthesis' and 'synthetic unity', for example, since they suggest 'an external bringing together of mutually external things already there' (*SW* iv 106; *SL* 96).) Hegel points out that space and time as Jacobi conceives them are not the space and time of our experience; they are abstractions. We can, of course, abstract from the things and events in space and time, but then we are left with thoughts rather than intuitions, the thoughts of pure space and of pure time. This 'thought of pure space, etc.' can now be 'demonstrated as null'. We can show that 'it is as such already its own opposite ..., that it is already by itself the accomplished coming-forth-from-itself, a determinateness'. For it is 'this very *indeterminateness* which constitutes its determinateness; for indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness; hence as so opposed it is itself determinate or the negative, and the pure, quite abstract negative' (*SW* iv 108–10; *SL* 98–9). This dialectic, Hegel maintains, is formally similar to that of pure being, which, in rough paraphrase, runs as follows: since it is indeterminate, being lacks all properties; but then it is (1) determinate, since it has the *property* of having no properties, and (2) nothing, since it lacks the property of being *being*. But the argument also foreshadows the philosophy of nature, where Hegel attempts to derive time and determinate things and events from the concept of pure space. While Hegel presents himself as agreeing with Jacobi that pure space and time are empty abstractions, he is in fact arguing that these abstractions can be made to yield determinacy (Cf. II(*f*)).

In FK, Hegel displays a sympathy for Kant and an interest in the details of his text which are missing in his later works. But the problems which he raises in FK are not forgotten.

II THE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Four pages of Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy are devoted to the Transcendental Aesthetic (*SW* xix 561–4; *LHP* iii 433–6). Hegel is here no longer concerned to defend Kant against ill-conceived objections, but to raise objections of his own.

(*a*) One group of objections involves the claim that Kant simply accepts something 'empirically', as a matter of fact, when he should have derived, demonstrated or explained it:

(i) Kant distinguished three components of theoretical consciousness: intuition or the sensuous—the seat of space and time; understanding; and

[10] All references are to Glockner's *Sämtliche Werke*, vols. iv and v (*SW* iv and *SW* v) and to the Translation by A. V. Miller, *Hegel's Science of Logic* (*SL*), London and New York, 1969.

reason. Here Kant 'sets to work psychologically, i.e. historically ... He just narrates all this, accepts it entirely empirically, without developing it from the concept' (*SW* xix 561; *LHP* iii 433).

(ii) According to Kant, Hegel says, space and time are a priori, universal and necessary; 'that is to say we find this to be so' (*SW* xix 563; *LHP* iii 434). Kant should, he implies, have demonstrated what he simply found to be the case. Kant does in fact have an argument for the apriority of space: 'We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects' (CPR A24, B38. Cf. A31, B46 on time). In his report of this argument, Hegel weakens it to: 'we cannot represent things without space and time' (*SW* xix 563; *LHP* iii 434). But this does not impair his objection. Our inability to think of the absence of space and time, or to think of objects without them, may simply reflect a failure of imagination.

(iii) Kant held that space and time are the only forms of our intuition, but was unable to say why this is so. (Cf. I(b)) Hegel thus objects that Kant does not say 'how the mind comes to have just these forms' (*SW* xix 564; *LHP* iii 436), and later says that Kant does not bother 'to deduce these species [of judgment] any more than space and time; they are taken from experience' (*SW* xix 568; *LHP* iii 439).[11]

It is not obvious, in any of these cases, how a deduction or demonstration should proceed or what it is to take as its starting-point. But Hegel implies that it can be done and that he will do it in his own philosophy.

(b) Kant held that space is the form of outer sense and time is the form of inner sense (CPR A22–3, B37. Cf. A33, B49–50).[12] Hegel ignores this distinction, except for remarking that, in the case of time, 'the material is the same or different [as in the case of space], especially inner feelings are the determinant' (*SW* xix 561; *LHP* iii 433). Sensations acquire objectivity by being transferred outside ourselves into space and time (*SW* xix 562; *LHP* iii 434).

(c) In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant viewed sensibility as passive or receptive (cf. I(a)). Hegel no longer, as in FK, refers to Kant's other account in the Transcendental Deduction; he simply interprets this feature away. The language of activity pervades Hegel's account: 'it is the activity, the action of *a priori* sensibility to cast out the content [into space and time]' (*SW* xix 562; *LHP* iii 434). In particular whereas Kant's forms of intuition have often been compared to a garment in which sensations are clothed, to wax that receives an impression, and to tinted spectacles, Hegel prefers the analogy of mouth and teeth: 'as eating places things in the mouth and between the teeth, so they are placed in space and time' (*SW* xix 563; *LHP* iii 435). 'It remains

[11] Cf. Schelling, loc. cit.: 'Thus Kant names the only possible forms of sensuous intuition, without having derived them ... according to some principle', *Werke* i 78; Marti, 65 (cf. n. 6 above).

[12] See J. Moreau, 'Le temps, la succession et le sens interne', in *Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Mainz, 1974, Teil I, ed. G. Funke, Berlin, New York, 1974, 184–200.

Hegel's merit', writes Vaihinger, 'to have found the crudest conceivable analogy' (op. cit., ii, 63). No doubt Hegel's analogy is intended to ridicule Kant's theory, but, unlike the other analogies, it also represents our sensibility as thoroughly active rather than passive and receptive.

(d) From the fact that space and time are a priori forms of intuition, Kant inferred that they are not objectively real (*CPR* A26, B42; A32–3, B49–50, etc.). Hegel argues that this inference is invalid: 'As *a priori* they are universal and necessary; . . . But it does not follow that they must be there in advance,[13] lie at the basis as representations. They do indeed lie at the basis but likewise as an external universal' (*SW* xix 563; *LHP* iii 434). The premiss of the argument which Hegel is criticizing is:

1. Space and time are a priori, universal and necessary.

But it is not clear whether he takes its conclusion to be:

2. Space and time lie at the basis as representations

or:

3. Space and time lie at the basis *only* as representations.

2 and 3 differ in that, while 3 excludes the possibility that space and time are *also* objectively real, 2 does not. Correspondingly, it is unclear whether, when Hegel says that space and time are 'likewise ... an external universal', he means to endorse:

4. Space and time are only an external universal

or:

5. Space and time are an external universal.

(4 is incompatible with both 2 and 3, while 5 is incompatible only with 3.) In criticizing the inference from 1 to 3, Hegel is surely correct. That space and time are a priori, etc. does not entail (though it may render it more probable) that space and time are not *wholly* objective, as well as being forms of our sensibility.[14] The inference from 1 to 2 is also invalid, but its invalidity is less obvious and it is unlikely that Hegel got to the bottom of it.[15] Hegel's own thought and the terms in which it is expressed are so far removed from Kant's that it is hard to say where exactly he stands in relation to Kant, on this as on other matters. But Vaihinger is probably right in attributing to Hegel the view that 'space and time are *both* freely produced by the human mind *and* lie in the nature of things, that therefore Kant's proof of subjectivity from apriority is invalid' (op. cit., ii, 323). If this is correct, then Hegel is criticizing

[13] *vorher . . . da seyn.* Kant's expression is *zum Grunde* liegt, as in Hegel's next clause. For the tendency of commentators to substitute the former expression or an equivalent for the latter, see Vaihinger, ii, 167, who, however, cites passages where Kant does the same (e.g. *Prolegomena*, § 10).

[14] For references to other critics of this inference, including Aenesidemus (G. E. Schulze), Fichte, and Schelling, see Vaihinger, ii, 315 ff.

[15] See C. D. Broad, *Kant: An Introduction*, Cambridge, 1978. 47 ff.

the inference from 1 to 3, rather than from 1 to 2, and asserting 5, rather than 4.[16]

(*e*) Space and time, Kant argues, must be a priori intuitions rather than universal concepts of the relations of things, since there is only one space and only one time (*CPR* A24–5, B39 on space; A31–2, B47 on time). After a brief exposition of this, Hegel says: 'But likewise there is only one blue' (*SW* xix 563; *LHP* iii 435). This remark can be taken in at least two ways. First, Hegel may mean that since blue is, despite its uniqueness, an a posteriori rather than an a priori intuition, the uniqueness of space and time does not entail their apriority. Or he may mean that since blue is nevertheless a concept[17] or an abstract universal, the uniqueness of space and time does not entail that they are not concepts or abstract universals. In either case, however, Hegel's objection is unsound. While the concept of blue is not, like that of a tree (Hegel's other example), a sortal concept—it makes better sense to say "There is only one blue' than 'There is only one tree'—the colour blue differs significantly from space and time. Different blue things need not be continuous with each other, but are separated by things which are not blue but red, for example; stretches of space and of time, by contrast, cannot be separated from each other by entities that are non-spatial or non-temporal.

(*f*) Kant held that space and time are individuals and not concepts (Cf. II (*e*)). Hegel asserts, both in interpreting Kant (cf. II (*d*)) and in criticizing him, that they are universal and abstract: 'Space and time are no individuals, but universal, abstract' (*SW* xix 563–4; *LHP* iii 435). He claims that they are 'a concept, as soon as one has a concept of them' (*SW* xix 564; *LHP* iii 435). These claims are ambiguous. They can be interpreted in such a way that Kant himself might accept them. Space and time, as all-pervasive features of our experience, can be said to be universal in a sense in which particular objects and events are not. Kant himself would agree that we have a concept of space and of time, a concept which, unlike most concepts, is singular or individual and is based on an a priori intuition.[18] That we have a concept of space and of time need not imply that space and time are *themselves* concepts or that our primary mode of access to them is conceptual rather than intuitive. The remarks can be interpreted, however, so as to yield a more substantial objection to Kant. Kant needs to distinguish at least two notions of space and time. Space I and Time I are the concrete, filled space and time of our everyday experience. This space and this time are intuited, though conceptual synthesis plays a greater

[16] Vaihinger refers to M. Rackwitz, *Hegels Ansicht über die Apriorität von Zeit und Raum*, Leipzig, 1891, 1–8, 72–82, but I have not seen a copy of this work.

[17] Hegel would not call the notion of blue a *concept* (*Begriff*). He rebukes Kant for speaking of 'empirical concepts': 'Kant speaks continually in such barbaric forms; a concept is nothing empirical' (*SW* xix 562; *LHP* iii 434, referring to *CPR* A23, B38). The objection *may* be more than terminological: see Vaihinger, ii, 157 ff. and my II(f) below.

[18] Kant refers to the 'concepts' of space and time in the paragraph titles which he added in B (e.g. B40: 'The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space'). Vaihinger, ii, 211, cites Kant's *Reflexionen*, ii, no. 334: 'der Raum is kein allgemeiner, sondern einzelner Begriff'.

part in our spatial and temporal intuitions than Kant generally allows (cf. I (*a*)). Space *II* and Time *II* are empty space and time; Space *II* is the space of Euclidean geometry. Space *II* and Time *II* are not intuited, but are conceptual constructs, derived by abstraction from Space *I* and Time *I* (cf. I (*d*)).[19] Kant is speaking primarily of Space and Time *II*, but he does not distinguish them sufficiently from Space and Time *I*. The fact that Space and Time *II* are concepts or conceptual constructs does not entail that we should not think about them. It does imply, however, that we should think about them as concepts, investigate them conceptually. Kant fails to do this.[20] He takes the question 'What are space and time in themselves?' to mean not 'What is their concept?' but 'Are they external things or something in the mind?' (SW xix 564; *LHP* iii 436). Yet this is an inappropriate question, if space and time are conceptual abstractions, or at least it is a secondary question, to be preceded by an examination of the concepts themselves.

(g) Kant argued that certain synthetic a priori judgements can only be accounted for if space and time are a priori forms of intuition (*CPR* B40–1; B46). Hegel gives three examples:

1. Space has three dimensions (cf. *CPR* B41).
2. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points (cf. *CPR* B16–17).
3. 5+7=12 (cf. *CPR* B15–16).

(1 and 2 concern space. Although Kant is half-heartedly inclined to associate arithmetic with time,[21] he does not introduce it in this context. His examples of synthetic a priori judgements concerning time are non-mathematical: 'Time has only one dimension' and 'Different times are not simultaneous but successive' (*CPR* B47).) Hegel regards none of these judgements as synthetic a priori. 2 and 3 are 'very [obviously] analytic' (SW xix 564; *LHP* iii 436), 1 is not, on Hegel's view, straightforwardly analytic like 2 and 3, but it is not synthetic a priori.[22] Hegel attempts to establish it conceptually in his philosophy of nature (cf. III (d)).

It is not obvious that, if there were no synthetic a priori propositions concerning space and time, this would refute Kant's theory of space and time. Nor does Hegel make this claim. He is more concerned to argue that Kant's separation of intuitive and conceptual considerations is mistaken: 'We have it [on Kant's view] just in intuition, not through the understanding or concept. But Kant does not combine these' (SW xix 564; *LHP* iii 436).[23]

[19] For a fuller discussion of this, see Vaihinger, ii, 87 f.

[20] Cf. Vaihinger, ii, 155: what Kant provides is 'not a logical definition of the space-*concept*, but a factual investigation of the space-*representation*'.

[21] See Broad, 68 f., who cites *CPR*, A143, B182 and *Prolegomena* § 10 for this association.

[22] These examples are discussed more fully in SW iv 245 ff.; *SL* 204 ff.; SW v 291 f.; *SL* 796 f.; and SW v 307 ff.: *SL* 809 f.

[23] Cf. I(a) and n. 4 above.

III THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Hegel's main account of space and time occurs in his philosophy of nature. Our sources for this are:

1. *Jenenser Logik Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie* (JLMN), 202–14[24] (a manuscript of 1804–5).
2. *Jenaer Realphilosophie* (JR), 4–21[25] (a lecture manuscript of 1805–6).
3. *Naturphilosophie, Band I: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20*, 13–23.[26]
4. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (E) ii, §§254–61.

(Three editions published by Hegel, in 1817, 1827, and 1830. The posthumous edition of 1842 contains 'Additions', compiled by the editor, K. L. Michelet, from various manuscripts, including, notably, JR.)[27]

There are scattered remarks on the subject in other works, especially the *Phenomemology of Mind*,[28] the *Science of Logic*, and the *Philosophische Propädeutik*, iii, §§99–109 (Glockner, SW iii 192–4). I shall draw mainly on E ii, with occasional references to other works.

(*a*) Kant was unable to answer the question why space and time are the only forms of intuition (Cf. I(b), II(*a*)(iii)). Hegel attempts to answer this question in two stages. First. space is established as necessary, and, second, time is derived from space (cf. III(*f*)). The space and time so derived are the abstract Space *II* and Time *II* of II(*f*). A third stage is the derivation from these of concrete Space and Time *I* (cf. *III*(*l*)).

Hegel's derivation of space at the beginning of E ii is obscure, but its outline is this. While Kant considered sensibility first and then proceeded to 'transcendental logic', Hegel reversed the order, moving from logic to philosophy of nature. Logic establishes that nature must have certain general features, and particular natural phenomena are seen to embody these features: '. . . besides presenting the object in its conceptual determination in the philosophical progression, we must further specify the empirical appearance which corresponds to it and show that this appearance does in fact correspond to the conceptual determination' (E ii § 246 A). Hegel has argued that the primary characteristic of nature is 'externality' (*Äusserlichkeit*, SW v 353; SL 843; E ii §247), and so the first conceptual determination in nature is 'self-externality' (*Aussersichsein*, E ii §254) and the corresponding phenomenon is space. Spatial areas (*Heres*) are distinct from and next to each other. but there is in space as such nothing to differentiate one area from another or to mark the point where one area ends and another begins (E ii §254 Z).[29]

[24] G. Lasson, ed., Hamburg, 2nd edn. 1967. Hereafter 'JLMN'.
[25] J. Hoffmeister, ed., Hamburg, 2nd edn. 1969. Hereafter 'JR'.
[26] M. Gies and K.-H. Ilting (eds.), Naples, 1982. Hereafter 'Np'.
[27] References are to the numbered paragraphs, the remarks published by Hegel (*Anmerkungen*, 'A') and Michelet's additions (*Zusätze*, 'Z'). Hereafter 'E ii'. Translations are by A. V. Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, Oxford, 1970, and M. J. Perry, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, London and New York, 1970, vol. i.
[28] References are to SW ii and to A. V. Miller's translation, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford, 1977.
[29] Cf. SW ii, 84 ff.; Phen. 60 ff.

(b) Kant held that space is a subjective form of intuition (cf. II(d)). Hegel rejects Kant's 'subjective idealism', but agrees that space is 'a mere form, i.e. an abstraction' (E ii § 254 A). His point seems to be that the space here considered is empty space (Space II), and filled space (Space I) is 'the truth of' abstract space (E ii § 254 Z).

(*c*) Kant held that it is conceivable that space should be completely empty (CPR A24, B38), though he argued that 'the proof of an empty space . . . can never be derived from experience' (CPR A172, B214) (cf. II(*a*)(ii) and (*f*)). Hegel believes that it is inconceivable that space should be entirely empty. Two other views of space imply, he believes, that space could in principle be empty, and are therefore to be rejected. First, Newton's view, that space is 'independently real', implies that space is like a box which would persist even if nothing were in it. Secondly, Leibniz' view, that space is 'an order of things', implies that 'if the things which fill space are taken away, the spatial relationships persist even independently of the things' (E ii § 254 Z).[30] Space, on Hegel's view, is essentially filled. Empty space is an 'abstraction'.

(*d*) That space has three dimensions, Kant believes, is a synthetic a priori truth, certifiable in virtue of an a priori intuition (cf. II(g)). Hegel attempts to establish it conceptually. Since space is 'in itself concept', it has the concept's 'distinction' in it, the three dimensions (E ii § 255).[31] These dimensions—height, length, and breadth—are distinct, but intrinsically undifferentiated. It makes no difference whether we regard an object as 6 feet high, 8 feet long, and 2 feet thick or as 2 feet high, 6 feet long, and 8 feet thick (E ii § 255 A). But these indifferent dimensions are related to geometrical entities which do involve 'determinate, qualitative difference': the point, line, plane, and solid (E ii § 256).[32] The point is the negation of space, since, being extensionless, it involves no self-externality (E ii §§ 254 A, 256). But to be a point in *space*, it must be related to another point, giving a line. (The line is a straight line, since a curved line involves at least two dimensions (E ii § 256 Z).) The point is now other than itself, but the truth of other-being is the negation of the negation—the plane. The plane, in turn, is also the surface, which encloses a whole area of space and thus restores the spatial totality negated by the point (E ii § 256). Hegel's account is obscure and supplies no apparent answer to such questions as 'Why must space involve a point?' (cf. I(*d*)) and 'Why stop at three dimensions?' But he is attempting to establish conceptually what was for Kant a matter of intuition.[33]

(*e*) Hegel argues, against Kant, that the principle of geometrical construc-

[30] On these doctrines, see *The Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence*, ed. H. G. Alexander, Manchester, 1956.

[31] The reference is to *SW* v 35 ff.; *SL* 600 ff., where Hegel argues that the three 'distinctions' of the concept are universality, particularity, and individuality.

[32] There are four items here rather than three, but, since Hegel requires only three, he treats the solid as an aspect of the plane.

[33] A plausible reconstruction of Hegel's argument, which attempts to counter these objections, is provided by D. Wandschneider, 'Räumliche Extension und das Problem der Dreidimensionalität in Hegels Theorie des Raumes', in *Hegel-Studien* 10 (1975), 255–73.

tions is 'the identity of the understanding, which determines figurations to *regularity* and thus establishes relationships which can thereby be known' (E ii § 256 A). In particular he attacks the view that the definition of a straight line as the shortest distance between two points is synthetic (cf. II(*g*)). In one sense, he argues, any definition is synthetic—not in Kant's sense, that the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject (CPR A6–7, B12–12), but in the sense that there is no concept of the *definiendum* until we supply it in the *definiens*; the *definiendum* is initially given only in intuition or representation. Hegel's point seems to be that the definition of a straight line is a stipulative definition, intended to introduce a concept and not to elucidate an antecedently given concept: 'geometrical objects ... are essentially only what they are supposed to be' (*SW* v 291; *SL* 796).[34] But he then argues that the definition is analytic in the stricter sense that straightness is 'reducible to simplicity of direction, but simplicity, taken in relation to *amount*, gives the determination of the *smallest* amount, here the shortest distance' (E ii § 256 A). Hegel's first argument is better than his second.

(*f*) Kant did not believe that space and time are connected in any intrinsic way; they are simply two forms of intuition. Hegel attempts to show that time is a necessary consequence of space: 'In representation space and time are far apart, there we have space and then *also* time: philosophy combats this "also" ' (E ii § 257 Z). In doing this, Hegel completes his answer to the question 'Why space and time?' (cf. III(*a*)). Hegel's argument is, however, obscure and unconvincing. It is that there is a 'contradiction' between the 'static juxtaposedness' of space and the active negativity which generates points, lines, etc. This negativity therefore develops a life of its own, in the form of time (E ii § 257 and Z). This negativity is presumably the point, which, as spatial, is related to other points in space, but acquires independence and 'actuality' in time; it is now a point in time sustained by its relationships to other points in time (E ii § 257, cf. § 260 A).[35]

Various 'rational reconstructions' of Hegel's argument are possible, and can be given in an ontological version (OV) and a phenomenological or 'transcendental' version (PV):

1. (i) OV: The negativity which constitutes space requires time to do its work: 'now time is just the existence of this perpetual self-sublation, thus in time the point has actuality' (E II § 257 Z). But the negations of E II § 256 are not obviously temporal processes.
   (ii) PV: Our awareness of space involves time. We could not, e.g., trace the line between two points unless we had time to do so.

[34] In *SW* v 291 f.: *SL* 796 f., Hegel distinguishes between the definitions of artefacts, of geometrical objects and of natural objects. What is said, in E ii § 256 A, of all definitions is there restricted to geometrical definitions.

[35] The argument is taken in this way by Petry, i, 314, n. to 229, line 30, and by

2. (i) OV: Space could not be indifferent subisistence or static nextness unless there were something which was its opposite or negation in these respects.
   (ii) PV: We could not regard space as indifferent subsistence or static nextness unless we were aware of its opposite or negation in these respects.
3. (i) OV: If space is static, then it must be static *in time*.
   (ii) PV: If we are aware of space as static, then we must be aware of it as static in time.

The phenomenological version of each of these arguments is more plausible than the ontological version, and could, incidentally, be accepted by Kant. But Hegel perhaps means to renounce phenomenological arguments in saying: 'we do not pass subjectively over to time, but space itself passes over' (E ii § 257 Z). However, *none* of these arguments is obviously what Hegel intended.

Hegel wants to establish a necessary connexion between space and time, or even a sort of identity: 'space becomes time' (E ii § 257 Z). It does not follow that he anticipated H. G. Wells, Minkowski, or Einstein in regarding time as a fourth dimension of space–time.[38] He does not suggest that the duration of an object is undifferentiated from and interchangeable with its spatial dimensions, that it makes no difference whether an object is said to be 6 feet high, 8 feet long, 2 feet thick, and of 10 years' duration, or to be 10 feet high, 8 feet long, 2 feet thick, and of 6 years' duration (cf. III(*d*) and E ii § 255 A).[37] Moreover, Hegel believes that time itself has three dimensions (cf. III(i)). But a dimension of *space* has no dimensions of its own.

(*g*) Hegel agrees with Kant that time is a 'pure form of sensibility or of intuiting, the unsensuous sensuous', but he does not agree that time is subjective: 'the distinction between objectivity and a subjective consciousness opposed to it does not concern time any more than space' (E ii § 258 A, Cf. III(b)). Hegel adds: 'If these determinations are applied to space and time, then space would be abstract objectivity, and time abstract subjectivity. Time is the same principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness; but this principle, or the simple concept, still in its complete externality and abstraction' (E ii § 258 A). But it is not clear what he means by this. Nor is it clear what he means when he identifies or assimilates the I=I, the concept, the concept of time, the idea, spirit, and even time itself, and regards them as atemporal or eternal (E ii § 258 A and Z).[38] But since this is far removed from the concerns of the Transcendental Aesthetic, it need not concern us here (cf. III(i)).

[36] So, by implication, Petry, i, 314 n. to 229, line 12, and Sambursky, loc.cit.

[37] For a fuller discussion, see G. Gamow, *One Two Three... Infinity*, New York, 2nd edn., 1961, 64 ff.

[38] Cf. SW ii, 44; *Phen.* 27: 'As for time, ... it is the existent concept itself'; SW ii, 612 f.: *Phen.* 487; SW ii, 615: *Phen.* 489. Koyré and Kojève rely partly on these passages for their interpretation of Hegel s theory of time. On their view Hegel's account of time is (1) phenomenological, and (2) an account not primarily of physical time, but of the time of human activitv and historv. Kovré in oarticular relies heavilv on *ILMN* where. he

(*h*) Kant held that *empty* time is conceivable, though not empirically demonstrable, and also that time is the form only of *inner sense* and not of outer sense (cf. III(*c*) and II(b)). Hegel challenges both views by arguing that time is, rather than *contains*, the changes of finite things, and that the changes are changes in actual things and not simply in 'representations in our inner state' (CPR A33, B51). Time is not a container or a flowing stream that might exist even if no changes were to occur. Time appears to be independent of things, because they endure while time passes on. But this only means that while *some* things endure, *others* are changing. If change were to cease, then so would time (E ii § 258 Z).[39] Because things are finite and 'one-sided', they change and pass away;[40] because they change and pass away, they are temporal; and because they are temporal, there is time (E ii § 258 A).

(*i*) That time has only one dimension is, on Kant's view, a synthetic a priori truth (CPR A31, B47; cf. II(*g*)).[41] Hegel attempts to establish conceptually that time has *three* dimensions—past, present, and future. Hegel associates these dimensions with the dialectic of being, nothing, and becoming in the *Logic* (SW iv 87–9; SL 82 f.). Each dimension involves both being and nothing, but in different ways. The past, since it has been but is no longer, is primarily being and only secondarily non-being, which supervenes. The future is primarily non-being and secondarily being. The present is the 'indifferent unity' of both being and nothing (E ii § 259 and Z). Despite Hegel's insistence that the order in which being and nothing occur here is not a temporal order (E ii § 259 Z), his account is plainly circular: no sense can be given to the claims that the past is primarily being and secondarily non-being and that the converse is true of the future, except the temporal sense that the past *used to* be but *now* is not and the future is not *now* but will *be* later.

Hegel adds that in nature, 'where time is the Now', there is no '*subsistent* distinction' between these dimensions; 'they are necessarily only in subjective

Etudes d'histoire *de la pensée philosophique*, Paris, 2nd edn., 1971, 147–89, and A. Kojève, 'A Note on Eternity, Time and the Concept', in Introduction to *the Reading of Hegel*, ed. A. Bloom and trans. J. H. Nichols, Jr., New York, 1969, 100–49, esp. 130–49. Hegel *uses* the concept of time in a variety of contexts (biological, historical, aesthetic, etc.), but his *explicit examination* of it occurs in the context of physics. His account no doubt introduces elements which go beyond what physics requires, but Koyré's and Kojève's interpretations read too much into this. Cf. III(f), III(i) and IV.

[39] For a critical discussion of this, see S. Shoemaker, 'Time without Change', in *The Journal of Philosophy*, lxvi (1969), 363–81.

[40] For criticism of this argument, see C. Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge, 1975, 233 ff.

[41] Vaihinger notes that this was not Kant's last thought on the matter: 'Kant was much occupied with this question of the dimensions of time; thus we find notes on it in *Reflexionen*, II, nos. 365–369, 373, 384, 390, 391. There Kant establishes sometimes one dimension, sometimes two and sometimes three. Duality comprises, as in the *Dissertation* [*On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*, § 14], succession and simultaneity, or, according to nos. 381, 382, temporal subordination and temporal coordination; triplicity comprises present, past, future, or again simultaneity, priority and posteriority' (ii 393). However, in CPR Kant's (unHegelian) comparison of time with 'a line progressing to infinity' (A33, B50) commits him to regarding it as one-dimensional. (Of spatial analogues of time, Hegel prefers the circle: cf. III(l).)

representation, in recollection and in *fear* or *hope*' (E ii § 259 A).[42] It does not follow that Hegel believed time to be subjective (cf. III(g)). For, firstly, even if the distinction between past, present, and future is subjective, it may still be an objective fact that events occur in a certain temporal order. (Hegel, however, may be confusing the past–present–future distinction with temporal succession: 'Only the present is, the Before and After are not' (E ii § 259 Z). His use of the word 'Now' to denote both a temporal instant *and* the *present* instant fosters this confusion.)[43] Secondly, Hegel is probably arguing not that in nature there is no distinction between past, present, and future, but that in nature the past and future, or past and future states of affairs, do not actually (i.e. *now*) exist; only the present exists *now* objectively, the past and future exist *now* only in our memories and expectations. Nevertheless, this doctrine may help to explain Hegel's association of time with subjectivity (cf. III(g)).

More generally, Hegel's concern with past, present, and future shows that his interest in time goes beyond physics.[44] A physicist as such is interested in the duration of an event and its temporal position in relation to other events, but not in whether it is occurring now, occurred in the past, or will occur later. Nevertheless, past, present, and future are not strictly *dimensions* of time. We can assign a date and a duration to an object or event, but we cannot *measure* it along the dimensions of past, present, and future. They differ in this respect from the spatial dimensions (cf. III(j)).

(j) Hegel associates arithmetic with time as half-heartedly as Kant does (cf. II(g)). There is, he says, no science related to time as geometry is to space. For the dimensions of time are not 'indifferent' to each other like those of space: an object *is* not *both* past *and present and* future, as it has both height *and* length *and* breadth (cf. III(i)). Time cannot, then, receive configurations, as space does, unless it is 'paralyzed, its negativity reduced to the *unit* by the understanding' (E ii § 259 A). Unlike Kant, Hegel has no special motive for linking arithmetic with time, since he does not regard it as synthetic, and the discussion of arithmetic which follows (E ii § 259 A and Z) has no significance for his theory of time.

(k) Although Hegel generally follows Kant in considering space before time,[45] the passing of one into the other is reciprocal. Time passes into space, just as space passes into time (cf. III(f)). The argument for the transition is again obscure, but it seems to depend on the fact that in nature the past and

[42] Cf. *JR*, 11: 'The future will be [means:] we represent the future as something, we transfer the being of the present to the future, we do not represent it as something merely negative'; *JR*, 15: 'the distinguishing of its dimensions falls outside it, . . . we are the space, in which they are placed, differentiated'; Np. 17: 'Dimensions of time (future, past, and present) are not distinctions, but rather only represented as distinguished.' A similar doctrine is expressed by St Augustine, in his *Confessions*, XI, xxviii.

[43] A similar confusion is present in Aristotle's *Physics*, *4*. 10–14, and partly for the same reason. These two features of time are distinguished clearly by J. M. E. McTaggart, in 'The Unreality of Time', *Mind*, 17 (1908), 457–74.

[44] See Koyré and Kojève.

[45] In *JLMN* time is treated before space. See Vaihinger, ii, 134, for the suggestion that time is prior to space, as 'the more universal and fundamental form of intuition'.

the future do not now exist: 'But the past and future, as *being* in *nature*, are space, for space is negated time' (E ii § 259 A). In some passages, however, it is especially the *past* which supplies the transition to space: time becomes past and thus, so to speak, fixed and static (*JLMN* 206; *JR* 13). Or, again, Hegel argues that all three dimensions 'immediately sublate each other', so that time is the 'immediate *collapse* into indifference, into undifferentiated externality or *space*' (E ii § 260).[46]

(l) Kant held that space and time are our only a priori intuitions: 'all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that of motion, in which both elements are united, presuppose something empirical' (*CPR* A41, B58).[47] Although space and time are united in motion, motion cannot be derived from them alone, since it 'presupposes the perception of something movable' (*CPR* A41, B58, cf. B48).[48] Hegel declines to draw a sharp distinction between the 'forms' of space and time and other natural phenomena, and proceeds to derive place and motion from space and time. This is already implicit in his quasi-identification of space with spatial things and of time with temporal things (cf. III(*c*) and (h)). The argument, in outline, is that abstract Space *II* and Time *II* are, each taken separately, unstable and pass into each other; from their union emerge concrete Space I and Time I (cf. II(*f*)). For the unification of space and time is not simply an interminable passage from one to the other and back again, but has a novel, concrete result.[49] We arrive at the notions of:

(i) Place (Ort): This is not simply a point, but a determinate, three-dimensional area of space which is, or might be, occupied by a body (cf. E ii § 260 and § 254 Z).

(ii) Motion: Distinct places are undifferentiated: each is intrinsically the same as the others and there is nothing to mark the boundaries between them.[50] This gives rise to motion from one place to another (E ii § 261 and Z).

(iii) Duration: Motion implies something which endures from one place to another (*JLMN* 217). In E ii duration is introduced prematurely (E § 258 Z), and is not discussed in Hegel's text. But its proper place is here, since it is the temporal counterpart of place, and Hegel's manuscripts bring it in here (*JLMN* 217; *JR* 13; E ii § 260 Z, a garbled version of *JR* 13 f.).[51]

[46] Cf. SW ii. 83 ff.: Phen. 59 ff.

[47] Vaihinger, ii, 437 suggests that Kant's 'remark, that motion is a synthesis of space and time, forms... one of the sources for the *dialectical method* discovered by Fichte and developed by Hegel, a method whose kernel is just the derivation of a third concept from two others through synthesis'.

[48] For a discussion of the doctrine that space and time are the only a priori principles of sensibility and for references to its critics, see Vaihinger, ii, 436–41.

[49] Hegel's argument is formally similar to the dialectic of being, where the passage of being into nothing and of nothing into being gives rise to determinate being (*Dasein*) (SW iv 87–9, 118–20: *SL* 82–3, 105–6). See also I(d).

[50] Cf. SW ii. 84 ff.: Phen. 60 ff.

[51] Cf. *JLMN*, 217: 'Simple motion in space, as change of place which again sublates itself, is enduring motion, or it is time appearing in space only as change of place, and time itself as changing itself is sublated, it is absolute duration'.

(iv) Matter: Motion requires something that moves, and this is matter (E ii § 261, A, Z).[52]

These notions resolve the difficulties or 'contradictions' in space and time. Matter, for example, articulates the self-externality of space in a way that geometrical constructions cannot: 'Matter is . . . positive subsistence of space, but as excluding other space. The point too is *supposed* to exclude, but it does not do so yet, for it is only abstract negation' (E ii § 261 Z). Again, in place and motion 'the vanishing of the dimensions of time is paralyzed' (E ii § 261 Z): although the past and the future do not exist now as such (III(i)), the place which a moving body *once* occupied and the place which it will occupy do now exist (cf. III(k)). E ii § 261 Z argues that circular motion, in which the place that *has been* vacated is also a place that will *be* occupied, expresses the nature of time better than rectilinear motion.[53] But this idea is far removed from the concerns of the Transcendental Aesthetic. (But cf. n. 41 above.)

IV PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

Hegel's account of space and time in E ii can be plausibly read, in part, as a running argument against Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. The argument is conducted on a fairly narrow front: in his later works Hegel does not do full justice to Kant's complex and changing thought. But the questions raised by Hegel—for example, 'Why (only) time and space?' and 'Why does space have three dimensions?'—are good questions, even if they are difficult to answer. How good are Hegel's answers? Hegel's obscurity means that the interpretation and assessment of his thought is open-ended, but one general feature of it may be remarked on. Hegel tends to present as ontological or conceptual necessity what Kant regarded as only phenomenological or transcendental necessity (cf. III(f)). In answer, for example, to the question 'Why does space contain matter?' Kant would agree that:

1. We could not be aware of space unless we were aware of matter.

But he would not agree that:

2. There could not be space without matter,

nor would he accept Hegel's conceptual justification of 2:

3. 'Space is not adequate to its concept: it is therefore the concept of space itself which supplies existence to itself in matter' (E II § 261 Z).

[52] Kant covered this ground, in a different way from Hegel, in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans. J. Ellington, Indianapolis and New York, 1970. See esp. the first chapter, 'Metaphysical Foundations of Phoronomy' (18–39, esp. 21 on motion and place). Hegel discusses this work at *SW* xix 587 f.: *LHP* iii 456 f.; E ii §§ 262, A, 293 A; *SW* iv 210–18: *SL* 178–84. For a fuller discussion of Kant's and Hegel's views on these topics, see G. Buchdahl, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and the Structure of Science', in *Ratio*, 15 (1973), 1–27, and *Hegel*, ed. M. Inwood, Oxford, 1985, 110–36.

[53] Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, 4. 14, 223b 12 ff.

It is however questionable whether Hegel's arguments can be sustained (or even, perhaps, understood) unless they are covertly translated into phenomenological or transcendental terms, becoming arguments for 1 rather than for 2 and 3.[54]

In reply it might be said that Hegel himself declines to accept the distinction between ontology and phenomenology, between how things are and how they appear to us—at least when our philosophical procedures are in good order. Points, lines, and planes, for example, are not simply constructions which we produce in order to explore the structure of space; they are, in some sense, essential and intrinsic to the structure of space itself. One implication of this is that Hegel rejects the distinction drawn in the Aristotelian tradition between what is prior in itself and what is prior for us or for our cognition.[55] Aquinas believed, for example, that a point is prior in itself to a line and to spatial parts; and, as Hegel did, that eternity is prior in itself to time. But, conversely, we can define a point only in terms of what is posterior to it, as what lacks spatial parts; and we can know and define eternity only negatively, in terms of its lack of temporal features.[56] Hegel, by contrast, believes that eternity 'must not be conceived negatively as an abstraction from time' (E ii § 258 A); and he defines the point as the 'negation of space', which is prior to it, but not in terms of the line, which is posterior (E ii § 256, but cf. § 256 A). For Hegel, the systematic structure of things cannot differ from the structure of our systematic awareness of them. Thus the answers to the questions 'Could there be space without matter?' and 'Could we be aware of space without matter?' must ultimately be the same. To confront Hegel with a Kantian distinction between ontology and phenomenology, between how things are or must be and how we do or must conceive them to be, raises the larger question of Hegel's idealism, an idealism which is very different from Kant's and which is as yet not fully understood.

[54] See J. Volkelt, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Zeit*, Munich, 1925, 146 f., esp. 147 n. 1, for the 'strange mixture of cognitive factors' (phenomenological, conceptual, etc.) in Hegel's account of space and time.

[55] e.g. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4. 11, 1018b 30 ff.; *Nicomaehean Ethics*, 1. 4, 1095a 30 ff.

[56] *Summa Theologiae*, Ia. 10, 1 on eternity and the point; Ia. 85, 8 on the point. Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* 3. 7, 430b 20 ff. on the point.

CHAPTER 2

HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE *LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY*

GRAHAM BIRD

WE tend to think that the contemporaries or near successors of great philosophers have a clearer understanding of them than later commentators. Yet we also believe that later achievements may throw light on past philosophers which close colleagues could not have appreciated. One rather stark example of this conflict is given by Hegel's comments on Kant. Hegel makes a number of references to Kant throughout his writing, but in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* he offers an impressively concise account of the Critical philosophy. Most of the account attempts to summarize the central themes of Kant's work, and there is little extended discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. Hegel is content, within the time available to him, to point towards rather than to dwell on Kant's good and bad points as Hegel conceives them. He does allow himself a persistent complaint against what he calls Kant's 'barbaric' terminology, but I shall not pursue that evaluation.

What I intend to do is to compress still further Hegel's commentary in order to locate some central aspects of his interpretation of Kant's epistemology. I want to argue that at many points Hegel's account is inaccurate and distorted, but such a conclusion is of less importance than the wider implications of these errors. For Hegel's account essentially convicts Kant of a fundamental confusion in his admitted attempt to solve an epistemological issue over subjectivity and objectivity. At a key point in his discussion Hegel makes clear his view that the Refutation of Idealism (B274–9) in the first Critique totally fails to solve the problem of objectivity. Hegel's view rests, of course, on other interpretations of Kant's epistemology, and it is the weakness in those interpretations that I want to make apparent. For if that weakness can be demonstrated then not only Hegel's view of Kant's failure but also a wider associated traditional view of that failure can be put into perspective. It would probably be wrong to regard Hegel as the primary source of such traditional interpretations of Kant, but there can be little doubt that Hegel's discussion was influential in moulding that tradition.

A SUMMARY OF HEGEL'S ACCOUNT

Hegel begins by locating the centrepiece of Kant's epistemology in the notion of self-consciousness. That notion is required, he explains, as the non-perceptual

source of generality and necessity in our experience. According to Hume these features cannot be found in perception, and Kant is represented as agreeing with this view. But whereas Hume drew a sceptical conclusion from this claim, Kant instead identifies the non-perceptual self-consciousness as a legitimate basis for our general and necessary convictions.

Der allgemene Sinn der Kantischen Philosophie ist der, dass sich solche Eestimmungen, wie die Allgemeinhtit und Notwendigkeit, nicht in der Wahrnehmung finden, wie Hume gezeigt hat; sie haben also eine andere Quelle, als das Wahrnehmen, und diese Quelle ist das Subjekt, Ich in meinem Selbstbewusstsein. Dies ist der Hauptsatz der Kantischen Philosophie. (SW xix 555)

The general sense of Kant's philosophy is that such features as generality and necessity are not to be found in perception, as Hume showed; such features have consequently a source other than perception, and this is the subject, I in my self-consciousness. This is the principal claim of the Kantian philosophy.

Hegel goes on to note two points that worry him. First is that Kant makes knowledge into an 'instrument' for the coercion of truth. Second is that Kant's goal of investigating knowledge seems to require that we know something before we have any knowledge. Of the first of these points he complains: 'Es ist als ob man mit Spiessen und Stangen auf die Wahrheit losgehen könnte' (SW 555). It is as if one might pursue truth with pikes and staves.

Of the second he says, ironically:

Die Forderung ist also diese: Man soll das Erkenntnissvermögen erkennen, ehe man erkennt; es ist dasselbe wie mit dem Schwimmen-Wollen, ehe man ins Wasser geht. Die Untersuchung des Erkenntnissvermögens ist selbst erkennend, kann nicht zu dem kommen, zu was es kommen will, weil es selbst dies ist—nicht zu sich kommen, weil es bei sich ist. (SW xix 555).

The requirement, then, is this: We have to know our faculty of knowledge before we have knowledge; it is just like wanting to swim before one gets into the water. The investigation of the faculty of cognition is itself cognitive, and cannot arrive at its goal but rather is the goal itself—it cannot come to itself because it is already there.

Hegel then, correctly, locates a central conception in Kant as that of the synthetic a priori judgements, but he has crucial reservations about this conception.

Die Idee ... ist gross; aber die Ausführung selbst bleibt innerhalb ganz gemeiner, roher, empirischer Ansichten, und kann auf nichts weniger Anspruch machen, als auf Wissenschaftlichkeit. Und anderen Theils erhält dies wieder einen ganz gemeinen Sinn. Es ist Mangel an philosophischer Abstraktion in der Darstellung, in gemeinter Weise gesprochen. Von der barbarischen Terminologie nicht zu sprechen, bleibt Kant innerhalb der psychologischen Ansicht und empirischen Manier eingeschlossen. (SW xix 558).

The conception is grand; but its execution remains within a quite crude, raw, empirical framework, and can make a claim to nothing less than that of being scientific. In other ways, too, it maintains a quite humdrum direction. There is a deliberate lack of philosophical abstraction in the presentation. Not to speak of

the barbaric terminology Kant stays firmly enclosed in his psychological framework and his empirical style.

This charge is repeated in a later passage where the overall structure of the Critique is reviewed:

Kant geht nun psychologisch zu Werke, d.h. geschichtlich: er geht die Hauptweisen des theoretischen Bewusstseins durch. Das Erste ist die Anschauung, das Sinnliche; das Zweite der Verstand; das Dritte die Vernunft. Das erzählt er so her, nimmt es ganz empirisch auf, ohne es aus dem Begriff zu entwickeln. (SW xix 561)

Kant goes to work psychologically, that is, historically: he travels through the principal landmarks of theoretical consciousness. First comes intuition; then the Understanding; and thirdly Reason. The story is unfolded and elaborated quite empirically, and not developed from concepts.

Hegel generally characterizes the 'transcendental philosophy', an expression he finds 'barbaric', in terms of a simple subjectivity as against objectivity. He rightly notices a distinction in Kant between what is 'transcendental' and what is 'transcendent'; but according to Hegel the former has to do simply with subjective consciousness, while the latter attempts to go beyond this towards what is objective: 'Transcendent würde das Denken sein, wenn diese Bestimmungen von Allgemeinheit, Ursach und Wirkung, vom Objekt ausgesagt würden; man würde vom Subjektiven in ein Anderes transcendiren' (SW xix 559), 'Thinking would be transcendent if the features of generality, or cause and effect, were ascribed to objects; then one would transcend the subjective by moving outside it'. It is clear from this passage that, although Hegel does not characterize the objects explicitly as 'things-in-themselves', it is nevertheless with objects so conceived that he is concerned. Indeed, to that extent Hegel's reporting is entirely accurate. But already it is worrying that in such a passage Hegel envisages nothing beyond what is *either* essentially subjective, states of consciousness, *or* objective, that is noumenal, and so transcendent for Kant. This is a first indication of Hegel's stark distinction between what is simply subjective and what is objective.

Hegel goes on to note that for Kant the legitimate use of general or causal rules is only a subjective condition of knowledge, and does not concern things in themselves. Reason, consequently, in its appeal to generality provides no genuine knowledge. 'Sie [die Vernunft] is daher im Erkennen nicht konstitutiv sondern nur regulativ; sie ist die Einheit und Regel für das sinnliche Mannigfaltige' (SW xix 560), 'It [Reason] is not constitutive of knowledge but only regulative; it provides the unity and rules for the sensible manifold'. The same points are taken up in Hegel's discussion of the Refutation of Idealism. Kant wishes to secure a genuine knowledge of the outer world and argues in that passage that my own consciousness requires some persistent real object. But Hegel points out that all the material for knowledge, according to Kant, is subjective, namely sense-experiences, while even the formal conditions to transmute that subjective material into knowledge are themselves subjective conditions of consciousness. The required persistent objective

feature, it seems, turns out to be nothing but self-consciousness, that is, something wholly subjective.

Aber der reale Inhalt, Stoff, sind die Empfindungen, das andere Bestandstück der Erkenntniss: weder das Eine noch das Andere ist etwas an sich, und Beide zusammen, das Erkennen, auch nicht, sondern es erkennt nur Erscheinungen—ein sonderbarer Widerspruch. Erkennen ist in der Tat ihre Einheit, aber bei der Erkenntniss hat Kant immer das erkennende Subjekt als Einzelnes im Sinne. (SW xix 572)

But the real content or material is sensation, the other element of knowledge; but neither one nor the other is anything in itself, and when the two are taken together cognition is the same and cognizes only appearances—an extraordinary contradiction. Cognition is indeed a unity, but Kant has always in mind the knowing subject as an individual when he speaks of knowledge.

It is clear that Hegel is unimpressed by the attempted refutation, and he sums up his view in a concluding passage:

Einerseits sind Gefühlsbestimmungen, die mit unseren Organen zusammenhangen, andererseits Denkbestimmungen, die in meinem Ich liegen; so sind es nur Erscheinungen, die wir erkennen und bestimmen. Insofern nannte sich die Kantische Philosophie Idealismus: Wir haben es nur mit unseren Bestimmungen zu tun, kommen nicht zum Ansich: zum wahfhaft Objektiven kommen wir nicht. (SW xix 573)

On one side are aspects of feeling, bound up with our (sense-)organs; and on the other side are aspects of thinking which lie in my ego; so it is only appearance which we characterise and know. In that sense Kant's philosophy can be called 'Idealism'; we have to do only with features of ourselves and do not arrive at anything which exists in itself. We never gain access to what is truly objective.

With that concluding claim Hegel brings the discussion back to the starting point of self-consciousness. Within that framework he has (1) characterized Kant's central notion as that of self-consciousness, (2) queried Kant's general conception of knowledge, (3) objected to Kant's empirical and psychological manner, and (4) suggested that Kant's attempted refutation of Idealism is essentially no more than a re-statement of Idealist doctrine. It is clear that at the heart of all these points is Hegel's sharp division between what is subjective and what is objective. It is that basic division which I want to lay bare in considering the items (1) to (4).

COMMENTS ON HECEL'S ACCOUNT

(1) *Self-consciousness*

Hegel is, of course, correct in saying that *somehow* self-consciousness is at the centre of Kant's epistemology. The unique importance which Kant attaches to the idea of the transcendental unity of apperception in the Transcendental Deduction is a sufficient ground for that undeniable claim. If, however, we ask exactly *how* that notion is to be understood, then immediately provisos have to be made which Hegel simply disregards. I consider two in particular: one which has to do with the argument of the Deduction, and another which has to do with Kant's treatment of the self in the Paralogisms.

(a) In the transcendental deduction Kant's appeal to the unity of apperception is modified in two ways. First it is made clear that this unity is not itself to be identified with empirical apperception, and second it is made clear that such a unity is inseparably linked to the notion of a conceptual rule. These provisos are common to both versions of the deduction but I quote brief passages from (A) to show the point.

> This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception. Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense or empirical apperception. What has necessarily to be representd as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data. (CPR A107)

> The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition. (CPR A108)

The first of these passages makes it clear that Kant did not appeal to self-consciousness simply as some empirically given item, which might be investigated in psychology. The suggestion is that a psychological enquiry would deal only with the empirical self of inner sense or empirical apperception, but not with a transcendental self. The second passage indicates not so much an ambiguity in the idea of the self as a further, and puzzling, aspect of the transcendental notion of self. For it makes clear, what is in any case apparent in the whole of the argument in the deduction, that transcendental apperception has two aspects, first a *personal* unity and second a *conceptual* unity. A fair general summary of Kant's argument in this passage would be that both a personal and a conceptual unity are required for objective experience. What remains puzzling in such a claim is Kant's insistence that the two requirements are somehow identical. Even so the existence of the two requirements shows that on this side too Hegel has simply failed to take proper account of Kant's position.

This weakness in Hegel's view reveals another, deeper, inadequacy in that account. It is plain from the second passage above that it is the conceptual aspect of transcendental apperception which directly bears on the objectivity of experience. For it is the conceptual rules which are said to 'determine an object for intuition'. But it is abundantly plain that Kant's conception of an object here has nothing to do with things-in-themselves. This notion of an object is distinguishable both from things-in-themselves and from mere subjective sense-experiences, and so already begins to cast doubt on Hegel's wider assumption that Kant is dealing solely with a division between what is empirically subjective (sense-experiences) and what is genuinely objective (things-in-themselves). It is not part of my point here that Kant argues *successfully* for such a complication in the 'subjective–objective' distinction

but only that in reporting Kant's position it is unsatisfactory not to mention these complications. It is, further, worth reminding ourselves that it is the appeal to conceptual unity which comes to have more importance in the later versions of the argument in (B) and in the Preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences.*

(b) Kant's appeal to the transcendental unity of apperception, and to the Cartesian expression of this as 'I think', is further modified by the extended criticisms of Cartesianism in the two versions of the Paralogisms. Kant evidently shares with Descartes a belief in the importance of the 'cogito', and though Hegel does not make the point, he would be right to link Kant's appeal to self-consciousness to that Cartesian background. But once that link is made then it is also imperative to note the vital provisos which Kant struggles to add to the conception of self-consciousness in the Paralogisms. Once again a fair summary of Kant's general position would be that Descartes was quite right to insist on the importance of the 'cogito', but that he had seriously misunderstood the nature of this idea. Once again it cannot be claimed simply that Kant's treatment of these provisos is either wholly clear or certainly correct. But any account, such as Hegel's, which fails to note these provisos is at best offering a distorted view of Kant's aims.

Kant's provisos have essentially to do again with the distinction between a transcendental conception of the self and an empirical conception. His view is that we are in danger of hypostatizing, or reifying, the former and so of committing ourselves to a rational psychology whose task is to investigate this supposed object. When Hegel speaks of Kant's commitment to a psychological treatment of the self, or its mind, it is in part this pseudo-discipline that he indicates. It is worth noting that Kant himself is under no illusions about the spuriousness of such a commitment.

Kant, in talking of this misconception of the self (A382), says,

> In order that it should be possible by pure reason to obtain knowledge of the nature of a thinking being in general, this 'I' would have to be an intuition which, in being presupposed in all thought ... might as intuition yield *a priori* synthetic propositions. This 'I' is, however, as little an intuition as it is a concept of any object ... Thus the whole of rational psychology, as a science surpassing all powers of human reason, proves abortive, and nothing is left for us but to study our soul under the guidance of experience ...

More succinctly in (B) Kant makes the same general point (B409):

> The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object.

These are not by any means the only provisos that Kant makes in the passage. It is clear from the passage that Kant's central conception of transcendental self-consciousness is not simple or easy to grasp. The objection to Hegel's identification of this admittedly central item is that in treating it as a paradigm of

simple subjectivity he is making no acknowledgement of the subtle Kantian background.

(2) Kant's *Characterization of Knowledge.*

Hegel's two queries about Kant's conception of knowledge do not deserve extensive discussion. I shall deal with each quite summarily.

(*a*) *Knowledge as an Instrument*

It is true that Kant's term *Erkenntnissvermögen* may suggest that we have a special faculty for the acquisition of knowledge, and may be in danger of begging some standard epistemological questions of a sceptical kind. But these are stylistic rather than substantive worries. It is unfortunate that Kant uses such a term as *Erkenntnissvermögen* apparently to indicate both a means of investigation and a successful outcome of such an investigation. But it is, in any case, quite clear that Kant does not have in mind any special, self-certifying, faculty of knowledge, since for him our knowledge requires the conjunction of sensibility and understanding. These are Kant's basic cognitive faculties, along perhaps with imagination and judgment. Moreover the mere danger of begging sceptical questions in any such terminology is not by itself a serious objection to Kant's philosophy. It would, of course, be a serious objection to him if it were shown that his response to scepticism simply begged the question against such a doctrine, but that demonstration cannot be achieved merely by these terminological points.

(b) *The Nature of Philosophical Knowledge*

Hegel also suggests that Kant is committed to some incoherence in that we are to have knowledge, of a philosophical kind, from self-consciousness, as a condition of any knowledge. Then we seem to be in the position of requiring there to be knowledge before we have any, and clearly this is not coherent. There is a spurious and a genuine issue here. The spurious issue arises from a failure to recognize that Kant is not talking of the temporal acquisition of knowledge, and in any case does not believe that knowledge outside philosophy, say in mathematics, requires to be validated by philosophy itself.

But, although there is no reason to think that Kant commits himself to something's happening before it happens, Hegel has raised a genuine problem about the nature of philosophy. In Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*,[1] a

[1] A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, 2nd edn., London, 1946, 34–5, actually makes a more complex point in saying, '(Kant) made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic not, as we do, a matter of logic, but a matter of fact. He asserted not that our minds could not conceivably have had the power of penetrating beyond the phenomenal world, but merely that they were in fact devoid of it.' Ayer thus seems to focus on two points: first that Kant's claims are factual rather than necessary truths, and second that they have to do with our minds rather than with logic or language. The first point, of course, assumes Ayer's own positivist distinction between factual and necessary truth, which Kant would not have been prepared to accept. For his synthetic a priori classification is designed to cut across the traditional empiricist division between synthetic and analytic truth.

contrast is drawn between Positivists who hold that philosophical questions are questions of language, and a traditional philosopher such as Kant who held that these are questions about the nature of the mind. Neither simple characterization now seems quite satisfactory; and nor does the attempt to characterize Kant's questions as 'conceptual'. Many recent commentators, including myself, have made use of that ambiguous characterization, but the truth is that we still lack a clear conception of these issues, and to that extent Hegel's negative point is correct. Such correctness, however, is established at the cost of admitting also that Kant is no worse off in this respect than other philosophers.

That correct but negative point is, however, less important than the positive view Hegel adds to it. For Hegel's main objection here is not so much merely that Kant's procedure is unclear as that it is, objectionably, nothing more than that of empirical psychology. For Hegel plainly believes that Kant's transcendental access to self-consciousness, on which the Critical Philosophy rests, really belongs to the empirical science of psychology. Since it is this positive claim which is made explicit in (3), I turn to that.

(3) *Kant's Empiricist and Psychological Manner*

The only ground Hegel adduces for this charge is that Kant's appeal to basic psychological faculties, such as sensibility, understanding, and reason, is made in a chronological or historical way. Hegel might also, of course, have cited the three-fold synthesis from the transcendental deduction (A), in which Kant deals successively with what he calls apprehension, reproduction and recognition. The very structure of the Critique, in which the main sections deal successively with sensibility, in the Aesthetic, understanding, in the Analytic, and reason, in the Dialectic, may make it natural to see Kant's treatment as a chronological development of our cognitive abilities. This idea, coupled with the belief that Kant is essentially investigating the mind and self-consciousness, has led many philosophers besides Hegel to construe Kant's task as psychological. Once this step is taken, however, then Kant is faced with an awkward dilemma. If his psychology is merely empirical, as Hegel believed, then this conflicts with the whole apparatus of a priori truth which sustains the idea of a distinctive transcendental philosophy. If, on the other hand, the psychology is non-empirical, then it is at least liable to be construed, as both Bennett and Strawson construe it,[2] as concerned with things-in-themselves, and so officially beyond the scope of cognition. Is there any way for Kant to escape such a dilemma?

The first step in such avoiding action must be to note the provisos which Kant explicitly makes in the matter. First, as is well known, he explicitly distinguishes his own task from that of Locke, whom he takes to be engaged in an empirical, and chronological, survey of the development of our cognitive powers (A86–7). Kant plainly does not conceive of his own enquiry in that

[2] J. Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*, Cambridge, 1966, 21–2; P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, London, 1966, 32.

way, and this is reinforced by his claim elsewhere (*Prolegomena* 21a) that he is concerned with the *nature* of knowledge and not with its origin. Second, Kant's whole apparatus of synthetic a priori truth indicates at once his belief that transcendental claims, whether psychological or not, are not simply empirical. The synthetic a priori classification marks Kant's conviction that judgments are not exclusively either synthetic or a priori, and yet Hegel simply assumes such a dichotomy in his own discussion. The right way to begin to avoid the dilemma, then, is to note these ways in which Kant seeks explicitly to avoid it, and then to ask for an argument which shows that his attempt is a failure.

There can be no doubt that in his *Lectures* Hegel has not provided any such argument. Even more recent commentators, such as Strawson and Bennett, tend to *assume*[3] Kant's failure at this point and not to argue for it. But the dilemma does not itself present an exclusive alternative; it would do so only if there were but two options, namely that either Kant's claims about cognition are empirical or they are transcendent. Kant plainly believes that his claims are neither empirical nor transcendent, but are rather synthetic a priori truths of transcendental philosophy. Kant has precisely the apparatus that is needed to effect an escape from the original dilemma. The apparatus may be independently inadequate, but it cannot be a serious objection which convicts Kant of a failure by overlooking the very apparatus designed to avoid such a failure.

Hegel's objection, as it is stated, rests more on an inability to report Kant's views accurately than on a serious argument against his views. But it will be said that such a response is purely formal. It might be conceded that the escape route was there from the start, but still doubted whether it works or goes anywhere. Anyone, like Strawson,[4] who takes the view that the idea of a synthetic a priori judgment is worthless, will not be impressed by the formal point. Two further notes might be added to such a view. First the original dilemma involved the dichotomy between empirical truths about human psychology and purported non-empirical truths about noumenal psychology. We saw earlier, in the discussion of (1), that Kant firmly rejects the pseudo-science of noumenal psychology. All he needs to escape from the original dilemma is the claim that not all truths about human psychology are merely empirical. That view could be held by one who nevertheless rejects the synthetic a priori classification. This is, indeed, the view that Bennett takes

[3] Bennett, 22, says: 'Kant, then, will *not* have it that the outer sense theory is about empirical things. Probably he thinks it is about noumena.' Strawson, 32, says of Kant's 'transcendental psychology', 'that we can claim no empirical knowledge of its truth'. It is worth noting the divergence in the two arguments. To equate them would be to suppose that a non-empirical claim must be a claim about some non-empirical object. The denial of such a supposition is, of course, one of the central lessons Kant tried to teach in the *Critique*. He insistently stresses that even a priori claims may be made about empirical objects; and even that they must make such a reference if they are to have full meaning (B298–9 for example). Bennett's casual conclusion offers no argument and no means of assessing the probability in question. Probably he intended it as a joke.

[4] Strawson, 43.

when he holds that such transcendental truths are really 'analytic' or 'conceptual'.[5] The problem here, indicated earlier in discussion of (b), is the unclarity of the term 'conceptual'. It remains doubtful whether, for that reason, the classification 'synthetic a priori' is any worse than the term 'conceptual'.

The second note draws attention to our recognition that some psychological claims seem to have a peculiar status, to be hard to classify simply as empirical or not. If we consider such claims as 'If someone knows some truth then he is able to form concepts', or 'If someone knows (or believes) that there are n items of a certain kind here, then they have a memory', it will be difficult to determine whether they are simply synthetic or analytic.[6] On one side we may at least begin to construct possible counter-cases, as if the truths were not analytic. On the other side we may feel that such counter-examples should fail in the face of a central conception of what knowledge, belief, and truth are. One thing is finally clear, namely that however such claims may be classified Kant does not intend them as claims about noumenal subjects, and so has a clear line of escape from the original dilemma. No doubt the escape route remains to be investigated further, but it cannot be rejected out of hand. Even such a general point is worth making in the face of misunderstandings spanning the period from Hegel to Strawson.[7]

(4) *The Refutation of Idealism*

In this final point we find Hegel's earlier objections converging on a perennial worry about Kant's *Critique*. Everyone knows that Kant is an Idealist, and yet in several passages we find Kant denying, even claiming to refute, Idealism. There is an obvious move to make here, but few commentators explicitly make it. It is surely evident that Kant's Idealism is intended to be of a special kind,[8] that he wishes to refute certain forms of traditional Idealism but to accept another non-traditional form. Once that move is made the debate should usefully turn to the distinctions between these varieties of Idealism, but this has scarcely happened. What seems to have happened, as a matter of history, is that commentators, bemused by the terminology, have tended to suppose that there really is no distinction to be drawn, and that Kant is just another Idealist,

[5] Bennett, 42, classifies Kant's central claims first as 'unobvious but analytic', and a little later as 'conceptual but not analytic'. It is hard not to see this as simply confused.

[6] H. P. Grice, in his 'Method in Philosophical Psychology', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1977, also notes the difficulty of deciding whether certain claims in psychology are analytic or synthetic, but he gives a more explicit reason for these ambiguities (see 28–9). However, Grice would certainly not want to deny that there is room for a 'philosophical psychology' and it is that sort of interest that Kant's psychology has in the Critique.

[7] Two such lines of thought which have been pursued, despite Strawson's dismissal of the synthetic a priori classification are first (weakly) to identify propositions as synthetic a priori which are neither analytic nor synthetic; and second (more strongly) to devise a more liberal classification in which the term 'synthetic a priori' has a legitimate and well defined place, as in R. Bradley and N. Swarz, *Possible Worlds*. Oxford, 1979, chapt. 3.

[8] Cf. B. Stroud, 'The Allure of Idealism', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume lvii, 1984, who tries, but fails, to define Kant's intended special version of Idealism.

perhaps with a wish to escape from the full or official doctrine but with no available transport. That, in essence, is precisely Hegel's view in his discussion of Kant's attempted refutation of Idealism.

Suppose that we were to accept Hegel's earlier claims, that Kant is concerned with self-consciousness, with the very centre of what is empirically subjective; that he deals with it in an empirical and psychological way; and that the whole of our knowledge is restricted to, and must be composed out of, materials provided by these subjective psychological powers; then it may indeed seem inevitable that far from evading Idealism, or even offering a more subtle variant of it, Kant is merely plunging deeper into it. Once those earlier claims have been questioned, however, such a natural inference must seem less tempting. What remains is to raise similar doubts about Hegel's understanding of the Refutation of Idealism itself.

First it should be noted that Hegel misrepresents Kant's conception of reason and understanding. According to Hegel, reason, in Kant, is responsible for the unity and rule-governed nature of the sensible manifold, and yet it can yield only regulative and not constitutive knowledge. But Kant's clear view is that it is the understanding, and not reason, which provides us with the unity and rules for the sensible manifold, and that in this role it is as constitutive as anything can be. It is true that for Kant reason has only a regulative role to play with respect to our experience, but because Hegel confuses reason and understanding his version of this claim gives the impression that nothing can provide us with genuine or constitutive knowledge of the sensible manifold. This is wholly wrong, as a report of Kant's position, but it fits in with Hegel's view that Kant leaves us with far less than genuine knowledge of an outer world, and so eases the way towards an interpretation of Kant as a traditional Idealist.

Second, Hegel reinforces this same point by working with an exhaustive distinction between what is subjective and what is objective. For Hegel this division separates appearances, or ideas, from things-in-themselves, so that not only is there no room for any other category of existent, but also the outer world is simply identified as the world of noumena. Thus at the end of his discussion he says, 'Wir haben es nur mit unseren Bestimmungen zu tun, kommen nicht zum Ansich: zum wahrhaft Objektiven kommen wir nicht' (*SW* xix 573). Thus, for Hegel, Kant's striving for objectivity would be successful only if it re-establishes the realm of things-in-themselves. Perhaps such a view might initially seem appropriate to Kant's attempt to validate morality and transcendental freedom in making the transition from epistemology to moral philosophy, but Hegel is here not concerned at all with that wider context but only with Kant's epistemology. In that epistemological context such a background assumption is simply and evidently false. In the Refutation passage Kant is attempting to prove the existence of *empirical* objects, in particular *outer* objects, and not the existence of things in themselves. We might put the point in this way: Kant's rejection of Idealism rests precisely on his rejection of the view that there are just two sorts of existent,

namely empirical ideas, or sensations, and independent things-in-themselves. It is that assumption which Kant identifies in the Fourth Paralogism (A) as the combination of empirical Idealism plus transcendental Realism which it is his primary aim to reject. Kant's own preferred view, the opposite combination of empirical realism plus transcendental idealism, rests firmly on the conviction that we must distinguish at least empirical ideas, empirical outer objects, and transcendentally outer objects, that is, things-in-themselves. Assuming that Kant's view of the latter is that they exist but we can have no knowledge of them, then it is the two other categories which are crucially important for Kant. It is his view that both empirical ideas and empirical outer objects must exist, and it is the necessity of the latter category that he attempts to establish in the Refutation of Idealism. It is this view to which he gives the name empirical realism, and it is this view which enables him to draw the distinction between empirically outer objects (i.e. spatial appearances) and transcendentally outer objects (i.e. things-in-themselves). That distinction, which Hegel fails to notice in these comments, is absolutely central to an understanding of Kant's argument.

It is not surprising, given these mistakes on Hegel's part, that he should then so totally misunderstand the argument of the Refutation of Idealism. Where it is Kant's intention to reject Idealism in its traditional form because, or in so far as, it accepts that exhaustive division into sensations and things-in-themselves, Hegel simply endorses the division and then complains that Kant has not reached what is truly objective, namely things-in-themselves. Not only was it not Kant's intention to reach such a goal; it was actually his intention to show that the assumption on which such a hopeless goal rested was itself a mistake. Hegel has simply failed to see the strategy, and in a very striking way, since he remains firmly committed to the underlying Idealist assumption. With such a background it is unremarkable that Hegel should have thought Kant's argument a failure. But with such a background view Hegel has really disqualified himself from offering a serious evaluation of the argument.

CHAPTER 3

CATEGORIES AND THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES

JUSTUS HARTNACK

IN his *Science of Logic* Hegel has this to say:

It is to be remembered that I frequently take the Kantian philosophy into consideration in this work (superfluous though this may seem to some) because however its detailed determinations and the individual parts of its development may be regarded in this work and elsewhere it still remains the basis and beginning of modern German philosophy; whatever faults we may find with it, this must be set down undiminished to its credit. (*SoL* 73)

The two criticisms I shall concentrate upon are primarily launched, with or without mentioning Kant's name, in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the *Encyclopaedia*, and in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. They both arise from Kant's attempt to draw limits to the scope of the categories. The first is Hegel's charge of self-refutation, the second concerns things-in-themselves. In the *Lesser Logic* Hegel has this to say:

A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy ... tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument before we understand the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be inadequate all our trouble will be spen in vain . . . But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim. (*LL* para. 10)

And in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* he says:

The philosophy of Kant is likewise called a 'critical' philosophy because its aim, says Kant, is first of all to supply a criticism of our faculties of knowledge; before obtaining knowledge we must inquire into the faculties of knowledge . . . Knowledge is thereby represented as an intsrument as a method and means whereby we endeavour to possess ourselves of the truth. Thus before men can make their way to the truth itself they must know the nature and function of their instrument. They must see whether it is capable of supplying what is demanded of it—of seizing upon the object; they must know what the alterations it makes in the object are; in order that these alterations may not be mixed up with the determinations of the object itself. This would appear as though men could set forth upon the search for truth with spears and staves. For to investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them; but how are we to know without knowing? How we are to apprehend the truth before the truth it is impossible to say. (*LHP* iii 428)

I shall begin by examining what is implied by the claim that to investigate the powers of knowledge means to know them. Then I shall take up what is implied by thinking of knowledge as analogous to an instrument.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE

Hegel's charge is that it is false that in deciding the scope of knowledge we can thereby possess knowledge. Kant's project is allegedly self-refuting because it presupposes the validity of that whose validity is to be called into question. But did Kant commit such a fallacy?

How did Kant in fact proceed? By his own admission it was the Antinomies of Pure Reason that motivated his critique of knowledge.[1] He wanted to resolve what he thought of as the scandal of reason's contradiction with itself.

The very fact that it was the Antinomies—the paradoxes and dialectical illusions of reason—which led him to his investigation is significant. Kant is aware of the danger of self-refutation and avoids it. To discover or get into a paradox is not in any way to presuppose reason as the judge of reason; it is not an attempt to validate knowledge by presupposing the validity of that very same knowledge. Just as little does it presuppose knowledge of anatomy or biochemistry to be able to experience a pain. It does not require that we have knowledge of the correct functioning of reason to be able to recognize that something is wrong with reason itself. I shall use an analogy to illustrate this point and try to defend Kant by parity of argument.

From Plato through Aristotle, Mill, Sidgwick, Rawls, and Nozick, philosophers have tried to define 'justice'. But despite two thousand years of ingenuity there is still no consensus. Nevertheless, all of us, philosophers as well as non-philosophers, are able to recognize and agree upon instances of injustice. We simply do not need to possess any explicit definition of 'justice' in order to see, for example, that if a person is convicted of a crime committed by another person this is an injustice. It is not an uncommon assumption that one cannot possess the concept of injustice without possessing also the contrasting concept of justice. But this is a fallacy. If anything, possessing a positive concept of justice presupposes possessing the concept of injustice: we build up a positive conception of justice from witnessing aberrations from moral norms. The lesson of this analogy is this. I do not have to be able to define 'justice' to recognize injustices. I do not have to know what reason is to be a victim of its paradoxes and contradictions—nor even to realize that I am such a victim.

I wish now to give Kant a Wittgensteinian reading which is closer to his intentions in CPR than Hegel's own reading. In saying that 'reason is in conflict with itself' we should read 'language' for 'reason'.[2] What Kant, thus

[1] In a letter to Marcus Hertz, 11 May 1781.

[2] Hegel is rather explicit on that point. In *The Science of Logic* he says: 'It is in human *language* that the forms of thought are manifested and laid down in the first instance. In our day it cannot be too often recalled that what distinguishes man from

construed, is saying is: (1) the Antinomies show that in some sense the structure of language is in conflict with itself; (2) The metaphysical illusions of language are not due to departures from the surface grammatical rules of ordinary language. They are really due to what Wittgenstein would have called 'disagreement at the level of judgements'. They are generated by the depth-grammar of 'categories' of language. (3) A critique of the scope of the categories is a critique of the depth-grammar of language. This should free us from metaphysical bewitchments (Antinomies and Paralogisms) and show us that ordinary language (to quote Wittgenstein again) 'is in order as it is'.

This critique yields the depth-grammar rule: 'do not conceive the regulative use of ideas as if they were constitutive'. This is an imperative; a negative rule, a prohibition. It has the form of a warning. It is a warning about how to avoid metaphysical puzzles. The fly in the fly bottle is the prisoner of depth-grammar. In Kant we find where and why the fly made the wrong move: he mistook the linguistic rules of intelligibility for names of metaphysical objects. We cannot think in paradoxes and it is the common philosophical project of Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein to remove them. The best remedy though is not Hegel's—to take them as genuine and then try to 'reconcile' (*aufheben*) them. Rather than have recourse to such a drastic cure it is better to adopt the preventative therapy of Kant and Wittgenstein and make sure they never arise.

To say that language is 'in order as it is' is usually taken to say no more than that as language users we normally follow the rules of surface grammar. In unreflectedly constructing sentences we are surface-grammar rule followers: and to do this we do not need to be acquainted with the contents of grammar books of the sort used in schools. But Kant issues warnings about a depth-grammar we may not even be aware exists but which is a constraint on meaning. This is appropriately illustrated by Russell's now classic logical analysis of 'The golden mountain does not exist'. The surface-grammar is in order as it is, so the sentence is meaningful and, so far as we know, it expresses a true proposition. Meinongians though are misled into construing it as something like: 'there is an x such that x does not exist'—which is a metaphysical paradox. Heeding Kant's depth-grammar warning about not assimilating the regulative use of ideas to the constitutive we can appreciate Russell's insight that grammatical form does not necessarily coincide with logical form. The correct depth-grammar construal is Russellian: 'it is not the case that there exists an x such that x is golden and x is a mountain'.

Depth grammar may issue warnings which we may not, in our philosophical hours, sufficiently heed.

beast is the faculty of thought. Language has penetrated into whatever becomes for man something inner;—becomes that is, a notion, something which he makes his very own; and what man transforms into language contains—concealed, or mixed up with other things, or worked out to clearness—a category.' Preface (second edition), 39 f.

To return to my analogies: neither health, nor justice, nor reason, nor knowledge possess 'defining properties' in the sense of 'essences'. This implies that none of them can be an object of knowledge—and *a fortiori* knowledge itself cannot be an object of knowledge. To know what I know, to know when I am ignorant of an answer, to know when I am misled by grammar, I do not have to know what knowledge is.

Hegel's instrument model is accurate though. Kant did think of knowledge as a tool, and his project in CPR was to find the limits of its application. But however Kant thought of his work the fact is that his critical principles have the depth-grammatical form of depth-grammatical imperatives: they do not express propositions but prohibitions. If we are tempted, for example, to talk of events that are uncaused we run into patent absurdities. This is precisely the point of Professor W. H. Walsh's celebrated paper 'Categories'. He puts it thus: 'Briefly my thesis is that categorial concepts serve to mark off, at a basic level, what makes sense from what makes nonsense.'[3]

Before finally dismissing this first criticism of Hegel's I want to quote what the great German scholar of the history of philosophy, Kuno Fischer, says in Kant's defence. Fischer is replying to the self-refutation charge:

> Hegel hat sich auf diesen Spass mehr als billig zugute getan and ihn gern wiederholt. Polemisch genommen, ist er ganz wertlos, denn er gilt von jeder Erkenntnistheorie, gegen Locke ebensosehr wie gegen Kant, ausserdem wird in dem Spass der Unterschied zwischen dem Erkennen der Dinge und dem Selbsterkennen oder Selbstbetrachtung ganz übersehen.[4]

Hegel himself is the victim of a depth-grammar fallacy in accusing Kant of presupposing knowledge in his critique of knowledge. Criticism is therapy not knowledge; it contains rules not propositions.

KNOWLEDGE AS AN INSTRUMENT

Hegel's second criticism is a more serious one and is, I think, justified. If knowledge is an instrument whereby we attempt to possess the truth it follows that knowledge is applied to something—this is part of the concept of an instrument. The spears and spades Hegel talks about are metaphors for Kant's categories which are in turn a priori conditions of knowledge. As Hegel asserts it is paradoxical to set up conditions of knowledge which make knowledge impossible. That which knowledge purports to be knowledge of—is and must be forever unknown. The instrument model shows Kant's epistemology to be self-refuting in a new sense now. A theory of knowledge which asserts that knowledge is possible and yet makes knowledge a conceptual impossibility is self contradictory. To pursue the metaphor: an instrument is not an instrument unless it has a genuine application to

[3] *Kant-Studien*, Band 45, 1953/1954, 274.

[4] *Hegels Leben. Werke und Lehre*, zweiter Teil. 1142. Fischer is alluding to Hegel's sarcastic remark that it is absurd to seek to know before we know. (See p. 66 above.)

some subject matter. So, as Hegel emphasizes, an epistemology which makes reality as it is in itself unknowable is really no epistemology at all. This situation is bad enough, but worse is to come.

Nothing can be said about reality as it is in itself—not merely because of the fact that our concepts are not of what really is but for the stronger reason that there is nothing in principle that can be said about things in themselves. *No* predicates are true of them, *no* properties are ascribable to the noumenal world. I conclude from this that the Kantian *Ding-an-sich* is a pure nothing—or as Hegel would paradoxically express it: as pure being (*reines Sein*) it is nothing (*Nichts; cf. LL* 127). The point is this: whatever is, is something. This is not just a claim within Hegelian Logic; it is a rather commonsensical claim. Anything which exists, anything that can be thought of as existing, anything which can be named or pointed to must in principle be classifiable as a something or other. It must be a stone, a spider, a certain kind of flower, etc., etc. A something which is nothing is not just a logically self-contradictory notion but is also an ontological impossibility. On this point Hegel just expresses our comonsense view. It is for these good reasons that, in propositional logic since Russell, only that to which predicates are ascribable can be coherently said to exist. The conclusion, therefore, must be that Kant's position does not even have the merit of being: 'reality in itself is unknowable'. He is committed to the view, in spite of himself, that reality in itself is nothing. Paradoxically expressed, reality is unknowable because there is nothing to know. Nothing cannot be an object of knowledge. But if this is right then the very metaphor of an instrument is undermined. An instrument which cannot be applied to anything *is not* an instrument at all. The instrument model, which accurately captures Kant's epistemology as he conceives it, is in the end self-refuting.

Hegel appears not to take his argument that Kant's view of knowledge is as an instrument to its logical conclusions. He is satisfied to point to the paradox that the instrument-model leads to an unknowable reality. If he had thought it through he would have obtained an even stronger refutation of Kant's epistemology, namely, that it is committed to entities that logically cannot exist: things-in-themselves.

It has to be admitted that Kant is not very precise in his definition of *das Ding-an-sich*. Two common but conflicting interpretations of it are: (1) as a kind of existing object or entity which, in some way, is the ultimate ground of appearances (phenomena); (2) as not being anything that exists in some way ontologically independent of appearances. Instead 'noumenon' is to be understood as a purely limiting concept. The mainstream of German Idealism, that is, the movement from Solomon Maimon[5] through Fichte and Schelling

[5] In a letter to Reinhold, Fichte writes: 'For the abilities of Maimon I have boundless respect. I am firmly convinced, and am ready to prove, that the Kantian philosophy, as it is generally understood and interpreted by you, has been shaken by Maimon to its very foundation.' And in another place he writes about Maimon: 'He is one of the greatest thinkers of our time, who, as I see it, teaches the same doctrine concerning

to Hegel, has read Kant the first way. I shall argue that to the extent that that is his view he is vulnerable to Hegel's criticisms. To the extent that he can be construed the second way he is saying something close to the Hegelian view.

In order to see this it is necessary to understand how Hegel's epistemology differs from the instrument model, and how he thinks he is able to avoid the *enfant errible* of Kantianism: *das Ding an sich*. Hegel's primitive epistemological concept is 'consciousness'. Consciousness is determined by its object, that is, what consciousness is of makes it what it is. The three main 'shapes' or sorts of consciousness described in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are: Sense-Certainty, Perception, and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical criticism and the felt inadequacy of consciousness in making its objects intelligible is the moving force which changes one shape of consciousness into the next along the dialectical path of Absolute Knowledge. This is radically different from the instrument model. In the movement from stage to stage, knowledge itself is not negated—only what is false within each form of consciousness. What is not false is taken up (*aufgehoben*) by the next form, which is nearer the Absolute than the previous one. In this context the contradictions of Kant's epistemology are revealed in its application and it is *aufgehoben* by Hegel's richer model.

This dialectical process must not be regarded as a description of a *de facto* psychological or historical process. It is not, as Habermas thinks, a recapitulation of the cultural history of the race as a history of emancipation. Hegel is portraying 'the unfolding of self-consciousness in its truth'.[6] He provides a set of models for any possible form of consciousness. He begins by examining 'sense-certainty'. This state roughly corresponds to our pre-philosophical intuitions. He is right to do this because the point to begin any philosophical investigation is the situation as it is before there has been any philosophy at work. This beginning is comparable to the awareness of reality of Plato's prisoners chained at the bottom of the cave. By the dialectical onward march the prisoners are liberated from the darkness of the cave until, adjusted to the sunlight, they finally see the truth.

From the most rudimentary starting point the dialectic moves as a self-correcting process to Absolute Knowing. Absolute Knowing is the identity of the in-itself (*an-sich*) with the for-itself (*für-sich*). It is the consciousness that is *an und für sich*. By 'self-correcting' I mean to imply that thought itself cor-

the doctrine of reality as a thing-in-itself, that it is a consequence of a deception of our capacity of the imagination.' Here quoted from *From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Salomon Maimon*, by Samuel Atlas, The Hague, 1964, 318. In Richard Kroner's *Von Kant bis Hegel* (2 vols. Tubingen, 1921, 1924) Fichte is also quoted as saying (in continuation of the first of the above two letters): 'Das alles hat er getan, ohne dass es jemand merkt, und indes man vor seiner Höhe auf ihn herabsicht. Ich denke, die künftigen Jahrhunderte werden unserer bitterlich spotten', Kroner, I Band. 326 f.

[6] This is clearly stated in *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, by Werner Marx, New York, 1975, 40.

rects its own claims. This 'self-correction' process is called 'negativity'. What ought to be negated, that is, what thought must mercilessly negate, is thus negated. That which is not negated is preserved and incorporated (*aufgehoben*) into the next form of consciousness. Until Absolute Knowing, what was assumed to be knowledge turns out not to be real knowledge; the *an-sich* is still not identical with the *für-sich*.

Hegel says the true can be expressed not only as substance but equally as subject (*Phen.* 10). This insight, which it is the whole project of the *Phenomenology* to justify, is a clear example of the difference between Kant and Hegel. What to Kant was the unknowable *Ding-an-sich* has to Hegel become a substance which can equally well be called 'subject'. As Herbert Marcuse says: 'The *Philosophy of Mind*, and in fact the whole of the Hegelian system, is a portrayal of the process whereby "the individual becomes universal" and whereby "the construction of universality takes place" '.[7]

What does this mean? The subject finds itself in its otherness. The conceptual (categorial) structure of the subject is identical with the conceptual (categorial) structure of substance. This subject that finds itself in its otherness is the universal self.[8] What to Kant was the unknowable *Ding-an-sich* is for Hegel just as knowable as the subject. The categories expressing the universal self (as depicted in the *Science of Logic*) determine the subject as well as the *Ding-an-sich*.

Hegel has avoided the problem that not only Kant but Locke encountered. For Locke our ideas of the physical world represent it as possessing primary and secondary qualities, ideas of the first resemble features in the object, ideas of the second sort are just caused by powers of the object. Locke's 'substance he knows not what' is like the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*. There is room for the sceptic (say, Berkeley) to doubt whether it really possesses the primary qualities or whether it can be known to exist at all. Locke says this in the *Essay*:

> It is evident the minds knows not things immediately but only by intervention of ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?[9]

Obviously the view expressed here presupposes that there is an external object which is the cause of ideas. Locke relies on the authority of the physics of his time for this. Hegel does not deny the claims of science but as philosopher wants a purely 'rational' proof of the 'external world'. Hegel does not presuppose an external object which causes ideas in the mind; he begins with the purported knowledge of sense-certainty which is, falsely, taken to be

[7] *Reason and Revolution*, New York, 1955, 90.

[8] Cf. Werner Marx, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, New York, 1975, XIX ff.

[9] Cf. my book *Analysis of the Problem of Perception in British Empiricism*, 1950, Chapt. 1.

a non-universal knowledge of bare particulars. He does not assume a causal or representational theory of perception which, once adopted, creates an unbridgeable gulf between knower and known. The causal theory of perception is irrelevant for the process through which the individual becomes universal.

Hegel thinks the concept of a *Ding-an-sich is vacuous*. It has no sense or reference: 'It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen' (*Phen.* 103).

Can Kant be rescued by not construing him along Lockean lines? In the chapter 'The ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena' (CPR, 257–75), Kant makes a distinction between the negative sense of 'noumenon' and the positive sense: 'If by "noumenon" we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be a "noumenon" in the positive sense of the term (CPR 268). And a little later on he says: 'The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretentions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.' (CPR 372). Although Kant here certainly conceives of the *Ding-an-sich* as a limiting concept there are other places where he just as definitely thinks of it as an object. For example, in a letter to Christian Garve of 7 August 1783 he says: 'The key is already provided, though its initial use is unfamiliar and difficult. It consists in this: that all objects that are given to us can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand as appearances; on the other hand as things-in-themselves'.[10] Notice that he explicitly speaks of things-in-themselves as objects. Even more decisively it is said in the letter of 16 August 1783 to Mendelssohn:

> One would inquire whether the conclusion I draw is ... correct: that the *a priori* knowledge of which we are capable extends no farther than to objects of possible experience, with the proviso that this field of possible experience does not encompass all things-in-themselves; consequently there are other objects in addition to objects of possible sense experience—indeed they are necessarily presupposed, though it is impossible for us to know th slightest thing about them.[11]

Now let us examine the concept of the *Ding-an-sich* (or 'noumenon' as Kant now prefers to call it) as a purely limiting concept. It is a limiting concept in the sense that it has a solely negative or corrective function. It does not pick out or refer to any entity and in particular does not function as

[10] Here quoted from *Philoshophical Correspondence, 1759–99*, edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, Chicago, 1967, 103.
[11] Zweig, 106 f.

the name of a cause of appearances. But to say this leaves us with nothing but appearances and the term 'appearance' loses its meaning if not contrasted with something like 'reality'. Also, appearances are appearances of as well as appearances to. 'Noumenon' in the realist sense could perform both these functions.

Hegel avoids these difficulties by using 'appearance' in a different sense from Kant. Appearance to Hegel mediates between the understanding and the essence of things:

> The true essence of things has now the character of not being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the understanding, looks through this mediating play of forces into the true background of things. The middle term which united the two extremes, the understanding and he inner world, is the developed being of force which, for the understanding itself, is henceforth only a vanishing. This being is therefore called 'appearances'. (*Phen.* 86 ff).

To Hegel therefore, what is thought of as 'behind' appearances, that is, what the understanding experiences or takes to be the 'essence' of things, is only itself (*Phen.* 102 ff). If Kant takes the idea of 'noumenon' as a limiting concept seriously he has cut himself off from any meaningful talk of seeking essences behind appearances. The world of appearances acquires an ontological monopoly. This distinction between phenomena and noumena collapses ontologically, the latter being reduced to the former. Only the empirical is real and the unknowable disappears. It is not the appearance of the object but the object itself which then exists in space and time. It is not the appearance of the object but the object itself which must conform to categories.

But this view cannot be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Despite the fact that Kant talks about the *Ding-an-sich* as a limiting concept he does not draw out all the implications of this. If he had he would have produced a view utterly inconsistent with his philosophy—'transcendental idealism but empirical realism'. So, I think it is Kant's considered view that the *Ding-an-sich* is a sort of entity and is not only unknown but unknowable. This makes him vulnerable to Hegel's critique but saves his intrinsic position from gross incoherence.

Hegel was accordingly quite right to ignore completely Kant's concept of a noumenon as a limiting concept. His 'instrument' model captures very neatly Kant's conception of knowledge as a relationship betwen knower and known. Hegel shows that, paradoxically, neither knower nor 'known' can ever be really known on that epistemology.

Hegel's critique of Kant raises the general epistemological difficulty of the nature and knowability of the 'external' world. Three views seem to be possible: (1) Hume's empricism: what is to be explained in terms of perceptions (impressions and ideas); (2) Kant's transcendental idealism: only phenomena are known, noumena are unknowable; (3) Hegel's Absolute Idealism: rational knowledge of the whole is possible. (1) cannot provide an account of the meaning or origin of 'I', 'substance', 'cause', and related

non-empirical concepts; (2) postulates what does not exist; (3) is, I think, the most satisfactory theory as it does not presuppose an irreducible gap between knower and known. Knower and known are in the last resort identical. Hume's view negates itself by the fact that, in consequence of his own premiss, he has to deny the meaningfuiness of concepts necessary for the use of any language and knowledge. Kant's view entails the unknowability of that which it is the aim of epistemology to acquire knowledge of. But finally Hegel affirms absolute knowledge and elaborates criticism of the instrument model.

As this is Hegel's position it is quite surprising that a recent book on Hegel's philosophy doubts whether Hegel has succeeded in eliminating the unknowable thing-in-itself.[12] It is difficult to see how an examination of the *Phenomenology* could justify this criticism:

> After all, to say that mind imposes its categories on the raw information it receives from he senses—on the 'this' that is immediately present to consciousness at the level of sense-certainty—is to presuppose that there is raw information coming from somewhere. Hegel can deny that this raw information amounts to knowledge, but cannot deny that it suggests the existence of something outside mind itself.[13]

The author of the book admits that Hegel has made some acute criticisms of Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself, and then adds: 'but has he (i.e. Hegel) really shown that he can do without it?'[14]

I hope to have shown in this paper that he can.[15]

[12] *Hegel*, by Peter Singer, Oxford, 1983.
[13] Singer, 22.
[14] Singer, 23.
[15] I am grateful to Stephen Priest for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for a necessary reduction of too long a manuscript.

CHAPTER 4

KANTIAN ANTINOMY AND HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

JOHN LLEWELYN

These Kantian antinomies will always remain an important part of the critical philosophy; they, more than anything else, brought about the downfall of previous metaphysics and can be regarded as a main transition into more recent philosophy . . . (*SL* 190)

IN a letter written to Marcus Herz in May 1781 Kant remarks that he would have done well to begin the exposition of his critique of reason with 'what I have entitled the "Antinomy of Pure Reason", which could have been done in colourful essays and would have given the reader a desire to get at the sources of this controversy'.[1] For the reader of Hegel this raises the following two questions. How well would Hegel have done to begin his *Science of Logic* with an exposition of the Kantian antinomies? And does Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason point in the direction of what Hegel sees as the source of the ancient controversies which Kant deals with in the chapter on the antinomies in his Transcendental Dialectic?

Hegel's answer to the first of these two questions is given in the section of the *Science of Logic* entitled 'With what must the science begin?': the science must begin with the doctrine of being. But he does touch briefly on the topic of Kant's antinomies in the Introduction to that work. There it soon emerges that he agrees with Kant that one of the chief tasks of philosophy is to solve antinomies. The discussion of Kant's antinomies did not appear in the *Encyclopaedia* until the edition of 1827 where it is part of a historical section on attitudes to objectivity. This is a section which could be regarded as a preface or introduction and is indeed so called by a commentator whose views on Hegel's judgement of Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason will be put to service as a filter in the present paper. In the *Philosophical Propaedeutic* the Kantian antinomies are dealt with summarily in an Appendix. In the *Jena Sketch towards a System* the Kantian antinomies are not mentioned. Nor are they in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* or the *Berlin Phenomenology*. A few pages are devoted to an exposition and appraisal of them in the *History of Philosophy*, but the most detailed analyses occur in Notes or Remarks included in the chapters of the *Science of Logic* which treat of quantity and quantum.

Kant errs, Hegel says, in thinking that there are only four cosmological

[1] Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence 1759–1799*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig. Chicago, 1967, 96.

antinomies. He also errs in his method of attempting to show this by using his table of categories as a guide. This method is contaminated by the dependence of that table of categories on the merely empiric findings of Aristotle on which Kant bases the table of the forms of judgements which is his guide to the table of categories. Aristotle's sceptical predecessors were already ahead of Kant in so far as they perceived that antinomies 'appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions [*Vorstellungen*], notions [*Begriffen*] and Ideas [*Ideen*]' (*LL* 78).

Does this not mean that the answer to the second question posed above must be that Kant does not point in the direction of what Hegel considers to be the source of the antinomies which the ancient sceptics discerned? And is not the correctness of this answer confirmed by Hegel's statement regarding the second antinomy that 'infinitely more ingenious and profound than this Kantian antinomy are the dialectical examples of the ancient Eleatic school, especially those concerning motion, which likewise are based on the concept of quantity and in it find their solution'? (*SL* 196). This is hardly the 'culminating point' of 'the exaltation of Kantianism' which Martial Gueroult finds in the judgement Hegel makes about Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason in the *Science of Logic*.[2] Do we not find rather that if any philosopher is exalted in Hegel's discussion there of Kant's antinomies it is Aristotle, whose solutions to the traditional paradoxes are applauded for being framed in terms of 'genuinely speculative notions of space, time and motion'. Kant on the other hand is lumped along with Bayle who considers Aristotle's solution 'pathetic' and who, Hegel says, fails to understand that matter can be infinitely divisible without being actually divided. Presumably Hegel does not mean anything more by this comparison of Kant with Bayle than that each is a kind of empiricist. They restrict theoretical reason to the phenomenal. As Hegel says, Kant believes the general structure of the world to be as it appears. It is this belief which prevents Kant from achieving the right solution of the antinomies, the solution hinted at by Aristotle. Hegel also says that in the course of his arguments for the thesis and antithesis of the second antinomy Kant makes certain dogmatic assumptions.

The thesis of the second antinomy is: 'Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple'. Kant's proof of this is that if we suppose the opposite we are faced with a dilemma. Either we can think away all composition or we cannot. If we can we shall have thought away everything and therefore all substance, since *ex hypothesi* there are no simples. If we cannot think away all composition we shall still have thought away substance, since it must be possible to think away any compositeness from substances, compositeness with them being an accidental property.

[2] Martial Gueroult, 'Le jugement de Hegel sur l'Antithétique de la Raison Pure', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 38 (1931), 423. A German translation of this article is included in Rolf-Peter Horstmann (ed.), *Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Frankfurt am Main, 1978.

The antithesis of the second antinomy states the contrary opposite of the thesis—or rather implies it, for the antithesis speaks of things whereas the thesis speaks of substances. The antithesis is proved indirectly again by the argument that if the first half of the thesis is supposed to be true, that is, if we suppose that every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, it will follow that the simple is a composite of substances, which is absurd. This will follow because any composition of substances must be in space, but because every part of space is a space, hence not simple, every part of the composite in it must occupy a space. This holds for the supposed simple parts. And the supposition is that these parts are real. However the real which is in space must be substantial, for externally related accidents cannot exist except as accidents of substance. Therefore the supposition entails that the simple is a composite of substance. Because this is absurd we must deny the supposition from which it follows and affirm instead the antithesis.

Hegel protests that in the proof of this antithesis Kant ought not to have put substances in space. Before considering why Hegel thinks this, let us pause to ask whether the proof of the antithesis does put substance in space. Two arguments could be advanced for the view that it does.

First, it could be pointed out that in taking the view that the proof of the antithesis does not put *substance* in space we should be treating this proof as symmetrical with the proof of the thesis which does not put substance *in space*. The thesis, admittedly, may well be about the phenomenal world in space and time, but what it concludes about it is that in reality it is not in space and time; that the reality on which the phenomenal is founded is, as Leibniz maintained, noumenal simples.

Secondly, the sentence in which the antithesis is formulated does not contain the word 'substance', and the negation of the first part of the antithesis whose *reductio* Kant claims to produce is worded in such a way as to leave it open for the proponent of the antithesis to avoid committing himself to there being substances at all, whether simple or compound. The proof begins: 'Assume that a composite thing (as substance [*als Substanz*]) is made up of simple parts'. The antithesis is about things in general. It is only the propounder of the thesis who will say that among these things there are substances. The argument of the antithesis is about alleged substances, so-called substance. The word is written between invisible scare-quotes. The concept of substance, or at least the old concept, is suspended.

Why, it may be asked, does Kant handle this concept so gingerly? Has he not demonstrated our right to and need of this concept in our cognitive claims about the spatio-temporal world? He certainly believes that he has. But the proofs of the theses and antitheses of the Antinomies of Pure Reason are supposed to be independent of the conclusions of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. And the advocate of the antithesis of the second antinomy must not be identified with Kant, any more than may the advocate of the thesis. If the advocate of the antithesis has to be given a name, it will be the name of someone like Heraclitus or Hume or

Bergson who thinks there are only accidents. Naturally, the old force of the word 'accident' will also have been sapped along with that of its partner. And it cannot be denied that once we entertain the possibility that the advocate of the antithesis is not only rejecting simples but rejecting or revising the concept of substance, we have to allow that he is rejecting or revising the concept of reality, for his argument includes the following sequence: 'Now since everything real, which occupies a space, contains in itself a manifold of constituents external to one another; and since a real composite is not made up of accidents (for accidents could not exist outside one another, in the absence of substance) but of substances, it follows that the simple would be a composite of substance—which is self-contradictory'. So the anti-substantialist reading of the proof of the antithesis would also be anti-realist, that is, subjective idealist, as we should expect if a position is being defended which is in opposition to the position occupied by the thesis, and we take this latter to be an assertion of substantial realism.

This ani-substantialist reading of the antithesis would reinforce that part of Gueroult's criticism of Hegel's criticism of Kant which argues that in the case for the thesis the sensible (continuity and parts of space) is intellectualized (by composition and the concept of substance) and that in the case for the antithesis the intellectual is sensibilized. 'The proof of the thesis consists in stating the consequences of an intellectualization of the phenomena; that of the antithesis states the consequences of a sensualization of the thing in itself.'[3]

Another result of accepting the anti-substantialist reading of the antithesis would be to increase the number of objections Kant could make to Hegel's conclusion that in the proof of the antithesis 'the substances ought not to have been put in space' (*SL* 196). This conclusion is beside the point if the propounder of the antithesis is denying that there are substances.

If we are reluctant to say that the propounder of the antithesis is an anti-substantialist we can still allow Kant to object to the *argument* by which Hegel reaches the conclusion that in the proof of the antithesis substances ought not to have been put in space. Hegel's argument is as follows:

> once composition is assumed as an external relation, then spatiality itself (in which alone composition is supposed to be possible) is for that very reason an external relation for the substances, which does not concern them or affect their nature any more than anything else does that can be inferred from the determination of spatiality. For this very reason, the substances ought not to have been put in space.

This argument misrepresents Kant's proof of the antithesis. In that proof the domain of the spatial includes the domain of external relatedness, and the domain of external relatedness includes that of compositeness. In other words, compositeness entails externality and externality entails spatiality. But this leaves open the possibility that, even if Kant makes the domain of externality coterminous with that of spatiality, part of the domain of spatiality is outside the domain of the composite, not coterminous with it as Hegel has Kant say

[3] Ibid., 436.

it is. To express the difference in terms of Venn diagrams, Hegel supposes Kant to draw only one circle standing for the domain of the spatial, the external, and the composite, while Kant's text calls for at least two circles, an outer one standing for the spatial and the external, and an inner one standing for the composite. Hence at the stage of the proof where Kant sets out these implications it cannot be assumed that the only substances are composite ones, and from these implications alone it cannot be ruled out that there are non-composite substances which have spatiality as a property. Furthermore, Hegel's reference to the nature or essence of substances suggests that he may be equating externality with the accidentality which is opposed to essentiality. It is not evident that Kant means anything more by externality than spatiality, what the Critical doctrine calls outer sense; and it seems that compositeness of substances is not assumed at this early stage of the proof to be the only respect in which substance is spatial. At a later stage of the proof, as we have seen, he denies that a real composite is made up of accidents, but the non-accidentality of a real composite is entailed by its reality, not by its compositeness.

The most revealing charge which Hegel makes against Kant's arguments in the second antinomy is that Kant is partial in opposite ways in his argument for the thesis and in his argument for the antithesis. Hegel puts his point by saying that both thesis and antithesis are really not about space, time, substance, or matter, but about quantity—and this goes for the thesis and antithesis of the first antinomy too, notwithstanding that they are cast in terms of the limitedness or otherwise of the world in space and time, and that Kant's exposition and exposure of the antinomies would be more likely to attain his objective of giving the reader a desire to get at the source of the controversies if cast in the same terms as the well-known controversies handed down by the Eleatic philosophers to Aristotle, Leibniz, Clarke, and Bayle. Hegel would say that these earlier versions too were really about quantity in general.

Of Kant's second antinomy, Hegel says that the proof of the thesis considers one moment of quantity, namely discreteness, whose principle is the one, in isolation from the other moment of quantity, namely continuity, whose principle is the many, whereas the antithesis does the converse. Kant, Hegel says, trades on the difference between discreteness and continuity. In the proof of the thesis he forgets about the moment of continuity of space, time and substance, remembering only the moment of discreteness. In the proof of the antithesis he does the opposite. So both proofs commit the fallacy of four terms. There is therefore no compulsion to proceed as Kant does to the dualistic solution which links empirical realism with transcendental idealism. The correct solution lies in recognizing that

> the moment of the atom is contained in continuity itself, for this is simply the possibility of division; just as said dividedness, discreteness, sublates all distinction of the ones—for each of the simple ones is what the other is—consequently, also contains their sameness and hence their continuity. Since each of the two opposed

sides contains its other within itself and neither can be thought without the other, it follows that neither of these determinations, taken alone, has truth; this belongs only to their unity. This is the true dialectical consideration of them and also the true result. (SL 197)

In this passage Hegel is negotiating the barrier which Kant placed across the road between transcendental idealism and obective idealism when he asserted that space and time have parts which fall within them, not instances, whereas concepts have instances which fall under them, not parts (CPR B40, B47). For the crossing over between the thesis and the antithesis of the second antinomy is a crossing over between an argument revolving about a concept, substance, and an argument revolving about spatio-temporal intuition. The scheming by which in this X-change Hegel, with the cunning of reason, endeavours to accredit a *laissez-passer* is a speculation upon the *tour de passe-passe* which Kant calls schematizing. It is at this crux that Hegel must decide how moved he is to be by his earlier judgement that the productive imagination is for Kant the hidden root of conception and sensibility. Is he to remain as moved by this as will Heidegger? Is he to stand firm at the position he occupied in the *Differenee* essay (D) and in *Faith and Knowledge*? Or is sensuous intuition to be seen henceforth in a yet more subordinate role, and the ghost of sensuous intuition to be withdrawn from the scene in the last act, when the order of priority of art and religion, on the one hand, and philosophy, on the other, is reversed: so that it can no longer be said that philosophy has to stop short of religion and art? (D 171 ff, 51, 58).[4] Is the productive confusion of the transcendental imagination with the transcendental unity of apperception on which Hegel's thinking turns at this time, as does that of Schelling and (on some interpretations) Kant, productive enough to explain the plasticity of reason? We know that, despite their time-generative *Bewegung*, the schemata (CPR B154), the sensible but not empirical concepts of the Transcendental Analytic (CPR B154),[5] even when they have

[4] Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox, Philadelphia, 1971. But see H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, Oxford, 1972, xxi: 'Hegel's ideal was not in the end a philosophical but a religious–aesthetic one'. Cf. 391.

[5] As the late W. H. Walsh pointed out to me, at CPR B180 it is the mathematical concept of a triangle in general, which is said to be a pure sensible concept. Cf. B181 where the schemata of sensible concepts are distinguished from those of pure concepts of the understanding. This is not, I believe, in conflict with what Kant says at B40 and B47. Although a triangle and the space it occupies have parts, the concept of a triangle in general does not. Nor is it in conflict with Kant's doctrine that the schemata both of pure sensible concepts and of pure concepts of the understanding are (pure) sensible concepts, i.e. time determinations attributable to the transcendental imagination. The pure sensible concepts of B180 and B181 are put concepts of sensibility, or concepts of pure sensibility, as opposed to the pure concepts of understanding or concepts of pure understanding. The sensible concepts of B186 are opposed to both of these as the pure transcendental imagination is opposed to both the mathematical imagination and the transcendental understanding. These sensible concepts do not have parts because they are not images but procedures. Granted we still need a solution to the infamous problems as to how a procedure can escape having temporal parts, and why in the Aesthetic Kant calls space and time 'concepts'.

become distilled into Hegel's intellectual-intuition-cum-intuitive understanding (LHP iii 441, *D* 69, n. 32), are found inadequate to the task of accounting for the motivation of spirit and history. Construction must be supplemented or replaced by negation. So instead of pursuing further the clue of Kant's Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding and the extension the constructivist theory there sketched undergoes in the third *Critique* and in Schelling's philosophy of constructive identity, Hegel picks up the clue of the Antinomy of Pure Reason. Both clues, it will be noted, bear on what could be called the problem of judgement understood as the problem of the relation of predicates to spatio-temporal particulars. And although Hegel believes that we are taken nearer a solution by following the clue of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, what Kant says there is also found wanting. It is found wanting because it makes certain dogmatic assumptions. Some of these alleged assumptions we have already discussed. We shall now consider what precisely Hegel means when he describes them as dogmatic. This can be explained effectively in conjunction with a brief explanation of why Hegel directs the charge of dogmatism also at Fichte and Schelling.

Thanks to the constructive schema, Schelling says,

> the particular becomes absolute form by the universal becoming one with it, and the universal becomes absolute existence by the particular becoming one with it. But these two unities, as in the Absolute, are not outside of one another, but in one another, and therefore the Absolute is absolute indifference of form and existence. (cited by Hegel, *LHP* iii 538)

The Absolute is the indifference point where the particular and the universal, finite and infinite, object and subject, percept and concept 'are both the equal roots of the Absolute'. Hegel complains that this Ein-Bildung or In-Eins-Bildung as he calls it, this Einbildungskraft, this power of the imagination to construe two chiasmically as one, is merely asserted. And Schelling's subjective and objective powers, Potenzen, are impotent. The difference in the measure of subjective and objective power which is supposed to give rise to individual entities is merely quantitative. It is therefore not true difference. It is only an external relation. Since Schelling's theory results from combining Adam Eschenmeyer's concept of mathematical Potenz with an elaboration of Kant's doctrine of schematic construction it is not difficult to understand why Hegel should think that it continues to be no less immersed in the sensuous than the philosophy of the *Critique of Judgement* and why he should write that Schelling 'advanced only as far as the organism, and did not reach the presentation of the other side of knowledge, that is, the philosophy of spirit' (LHP iii 534). Schelling's philosophy and Kant's are one-sided. That is to say, they are dogmatic. Thus, although according to Schelling art is intellectual intuition become objective, this sensuous objectivity falls short of the objectivity of the Notion which is comprehended necessity (LHP iii 524). True, Schelling asserts of 'the absolute point of identity of philosophy' that 'it is

not equal to any particular *Potenz*, and yet it comprehends all of them'.[6] But this comprehension is an engulfment in 'the One, and just this unique One' of an identity which is indifferent to difference. Schelling envisages a synthesis of the subjective and objective, but the former vanishes into the latter and he does not carry the passport of *Aufhebung* which saves the former from vanishing without trace.

A philosopher is dogmatic in Kant's sense if he fails to investigate the scope and limits of reason, that is, if he is not only uncritical but un-Critical (*CPR* Bxxv). Yet Kant's own Critical philosophy is dogmatic in Fichte's sense of the term.

> *The thing*, which must be determined independently of our freedom and to which our knowledge must conform, and *the intelligence*, which must know, are in experience inseparably connected. The philosopher can leave one of the two out of consideration and he has then abstracted from experience and raised himself above it. If he leaves out the former, he retains an intelligence in itself, that is, abstracted from its relation to experience, as a basis for explaining experience; if he leaves out the latter, he retains a thing-in-itself, that is, abstracted from the fact that it occurs in experience, as a similar basis of explanation. The first method of proceeding is called idealism, the second dogmatism.[7]

Dogmatism in Fichte's sense, then, is one-sidedness in favour of transcendental realism or, more generally, in favour of the object. In Hegel's sense of the term any one-sidedness is dogmatic, including Fichte's idealism with its partiality toward the subject, as well as Schelling's with its underdeveloped comprehension of the subject, and Kant's because it 'does not let itself be brought beyond the empirical element to thought' (*SL* 199). The source of this one-sidedness is the supposition that one of a pair of opposed judgements must be rigidly true, if it is true, and the other rigidly false (*LL* 52). The conjunctive disjunctivism of reason to which Hegel believes this exclusive disjunctivism of the understanding must yield is anticipated only verbally and superficially in Fichte's statement that in our experience the thing and intelligence are inseparably connected. That is a statement about the understanding, and although Fichte posits an object over against the subject, he holds that the object is a posit by the subject. Hence, as Hegel expresses it in the *Difference* essay, the subject=object remains a subjective subject=object (*D* 133). Hegel applauds Fichte's resolution to improve the Critical system by adding to it a thoroughgoing deduction of the categories and by subtracting from it the doctrine of the thing-in-itself. He fails, in Hegel's estimation, because his way of seeking to make these repairs in Kant's system commits him to the no less defective idea of a vicious infinite progress, the melancholy spectacle of a spurious progress to infinity which is 'only the perpetual repetition of the same content, one and the same tedious alternation of this finite and infinite'

[6] F. W. J. Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, London, 1845, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–1861, vol. v, 367.

[7] J. G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs, New York, 1970, 8–9.

(*SL* 130), the idea of the Idea to which Kant believes he himself is committed by his own solution of the antinomies treated in the three Critiques. The 'is' of Kant's thing-in-itself is superseded in Fichte's philosophy by the 'ought' of the Kantian Idea. Thereby one absurdity is superseded by another. The infinite striving of the ego needs the non-ego to make this practical striving possible, yet this striving, which is, as Sartre too will say, the freedom that comprises the ego and not merely a property of a substantive self, makes sense only if the opposition which is its condition can be overcome. Sartre accepts this absurdity as part of the human condition which absorbs it through the stratagems of bad faith. Sartre's philosophy swallows hard, making believe it can stomach such ontological tragedy. It is otherwise with the romantic rationalisms of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. But Hegel objects that the antidote to tragedy which Kant and Fichte prescribe is no more than a blind faith that the opposition of *Sein* and *Sollen* will be overcome. They do not realize, he says, that it is implicitly already overcome, as is made explicit in the absolute speculative Idea in which theoretical and practical knowing are seen to be one with each other, with life, and with that which is known.

The content of the speculative Idea is none other than the system of categorial notions set out in the *Science of Logic*, that is, the Notion writ large. Its form is the method. This, Hegel says, with his finger pointing at the practice of treating methodology as if it were a mere appendix to science, is the necessary dialectical movement of the Notion itself by which we achieve a retrospective grasp of its self-development. Comprehended in that retrospect is the knowledge that what Kant calls the *Ding an sich* is superseded by what Hegel calls the *Sache selbst*. The latter is quite literally the subject matter, but an objective subject matter. not the one-sided subjective subject-matter of Fichte's philosophy.

With this knowledge it is no longer possible to fix a gulf between reason and the world as Kant does in order to solve the antinomies. It is no longer possible to locate the source of these antinomies in reason and its misuse as opposed to in the world. If there is contradiction it will be in the world as much as in reason, for reason and the world are ultimately and originally not opposed.

By the same token, however, contradiction will be as much in reason as in the world. This is why in the *Encyclopaedia* Logic, immediately after making this observation that Kant's solution of the antinomies restricts contradiction to reason, Hegel is bound to say that Kant here touches on the fact [*Hier kommt es zur Sprache*] that the contradiction is induced by the subject matter [*Inhalt*], namely by the categories. However much Kant may regret that we become embrangled in contradiction, when he says our susceptibility to dialectical illusion is *transcendental* and endemic to our reason he confers on dialectic a dignity it was denied by the Eleatic dialecticians and even, Hegel implies, by Plato (*SL* 55–6), because their dialectic is external and purely negative, arising out of a subjective mania to reduce to nought what is

ordinarily accepted without question. This may or may not be an underestimation of the Eleatics and of Plato. Anyway, Hegel is more generous to Plato elsewhere (LHP ii 64 ff.), though this generosity seems to be based on a misreading of *Sophist* 259b.[8] But Hegel's estimate of Kant here is fulsome enough to merit Gueroult's word 'exaltation'. However, it is an exaltation of Kant's insight regarding what he entitles the seat of transcendental illusion. It is not an exaltation of the particular arguments Kant uses as proofs of the theses and antitheses of the antinomies; Hegel considers these scarcely worth considering, though he considers them at some length. Nor is it an exaltation of the general strategy which Kant has in view in setting out the antinomies, or of Kant's solution. Hegel judges Kant's strategy and solution to be misconceived, as is plain from what has been said earlier in this paper. Now Gueroult believes that Hegel's criticism of Kant's solution does Kant an injustice. He also believes that Hegel's praises of Kant are misplaced and that if he had been less predisposed to see Kant's thory of dialectic as an anticipation of his own he might have perceived the injustice of his criticism of Kant's solution. Gueroult believes this because he believes Hegel to be mistaken in thinking that Kant holds dialectic to be internal to reason. Hegel is mistaken because although in the proofs of the thesis and antithesis of the second antinomy unschematized reason goes through a form of marriage, so to speak, with reality, in Kant's view this union is purely formal and unconsummated. When transcendental idealism is substituted for transcendental realism the partners go their separate ways. There was only a mirage of marriage within each proof. And because there was no matrimony there, there can be no antinomy between the thesis and the antithesis: no dialectic of contradiction, either external or internal. Hegel's mistake, Gueroult argues, is evident in the following passage of the *Encyclopaedia* Logic:

> Probably nobody will feel disposed to deny that the phenomenal world presents contradictions to the observing mind; meaning by 'phenomenal' the world as it presents itself to the senses and understanding, to the subjective mind. But if a comparison is instituted between the essence of the world and the essence of the mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the modest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others, that it is not in the essence of the world, but in the essence of thinking to be intrinsically contradictory. It is no escape to turn round and explain that reason falls into contradiction only by applying the categories. For this application of the categories is maintained to be necessary, and reason is not supposed to be equipped with any other forms but the categories for the purpose of cognition. But cognition is determining and determinate thinking: so that, if reason be mere empty indeterminate thinking, it thinks nothing. And if in the end reason be reduced to mere identity without diversity . . . , it will in the end also win happy release from contradiction at the slight sacrifice of all its content and value. (LL 77)

How would Hegel have us understand the imagined explanation which he formulates here in the words: 'reason falls into contradiction only by applying

[8] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic*, trans. P. Christopher Smith, New Haven and London, 1976, 22.

the categories'? As Gueroult rightly implies, if this is meant to be a report of an explanation given by Kant, it would be more accurately reported by saying that reason falls into contradiction only by misapplying the categories. For Kant's position is that where reason is taken narrowly, that is, as but one faculty of reason taken broadly, another faculty being understanding, the categories are available to it only as unschematized. When it is supposed that the categories employed independently of schemata can be constitutive of theoretical knowledge, the path of thought becomes blocked by dialectical contradiction. From this Gueroult infers that Kant's teaching is that 'contradiction has its seat neither in the world, nor inside reason, but in the relation established between the two as a consequence of applying the latter to the former'.[9]

This is indeed Kant's teaching. But, as we have seen, Kant himself refers to reason as the seat of transcendental illusion. One of his titles near the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic runs: 'Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion' (CPR B355), and what he says under that title puts it beyond all doubt that this title describes a view held by the author. So there are two responses which Hegel could offer to Gueroult's contention that he is wrong in asserting that out of tenderness for the world Kant makes contradiction interior to reason. He could agree with Gueroult that dialectical contradiction is not interior to reason in Kant's narrower sense of *reason* and agree that the contradiction arises from reason in this narrow sense and the understanding with which it is contrasted. This response is compatible with the title *Critique of Pure Reason*, and entails the dialectical contradiction's being internal to reason in the wide sense in which it is employed in that title.

However, Hegel might think more could be achieved by responding otherwise to the charge that he is mistaken in attributing to Kant the view that dialectical contradiction has its seat in reason. He might simply point to the title given at B355, noting that 'reason' is there used narrowly. Kant plainly distinguishes understanding as the faculty of rules (*Regeln*) whose synthetic a priori principles, as Kemp Smith calls them, are what Kant calls *Grundsätze*, from reason which is the faculty of inference whose principles, as Kemp Smith calls them, are *Prinzipien*. These *Prinzipien*, for example, the principle that everything has an absolutely sufficient reason, require that for any rule reached by understanding we reach out to an absolutely unconditioned condition. The use of reason is 'formal' or 'logical' when it is the maxim of an inferential procedure obliging us to seek higher premisses from which to deduce the major premiss of any given syllogism. The use of reason is 'pure', 'real', or 'transcendental' when it presumes to affirm that the absolutely unconditioned condition exists. Note that this is a distinction betwen two uses or employments of pure reason. Subsection C beginning at B362 is about a pure, as opposed to merely logical, employment of the pure reason mentioned in the title of the section beginning at B355. We have already said that in

[9] Gueroult, 433.

that section the word 'reason' is given a narrow sense relative to the broad sense Kant gives the word in the title of his first *Critique*. To be more precise, Kant may sometimes have the narrow sense in view when he mentions that title, but the pure reason there referred to usually covers pure understanding and often pure sensibility as well. That in the section on Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion pure reason is not intended 'promiscuously', as Kemp Smith puts it,[10] but in the sense of 'isolated reason', as Kant puts in in the note at CPR Bxix, is patent. For instance, in the first paragraph occurs the phrase 'Reason, like understanding' and of the former it is asserted that 'it contains within itself the source of certain concepts and principles, which it does not borrow either from the senses or from the understanding'. The same opposition of pure reason and pure understanding is manifest in CPR B359, B363, and B364–5.

Now according to Gueroult it is on account of the opposition just referred to that Kant holds antinomy to arise. He therefore insists that Hegel is distorting what Kant says in attributing to him the view that antinomy or contradiction is internal to reason. We could still say on Hegel's behalf that on Kant's view antinomy or contradiction would be internal to reason in the indiscriminate sense. Hegel might not thank us for saying this. He would see in the first *Critique* a closer approximation to his own doctrine of reason if Kant could be found subscribing to the view that antinomy and contradiction are internal to reason in the narrow sense. He would prefer that we press the claim that it is reason in this sense that Kant entitles the seat of transcendental illusion. But it must now be said on Gueroult's behalf that a claim about the seat of transcendental illusion is not in itself a claim about the seat of antinomy. One may easily be led to think that it is because Kant sometimes calls the illusion dialectical and it would be natural to take this to imply that the illusion has to do with a conflict between two points of view. This is to misconstrue what Kant means by dialectical illusion. For him dialectical illusion is an invalidity of inference where a logical requirement of reason is treated as an ontological requirement, a subreption where a canon of reason is purloined and misemployed as an organon of reason, a formal idea being misrepresented as material (CPR B85, B88). Now this dialectical illusion is operative not only in Rational Cosmology where antinomies do arise, but in Rational Psychology and Rational Theology where, Kant says, they do not (CPR B701). Furthermore, the antinomies which arise in Rational Cosmology are, Kant says, 'no real self-contradiction of reason' (CPR B768). 'There is, properly speaking, no polemic in the field of pure reason' (CPR B784). These words may seem to settle once and for all that Gueroult is justified in holding that Hegel exaggerates the extent to which Kant's antinomies anticipate his own doctrine that contradiction is internal to the Notion. In fact Kant's words say something with which Hegel would agree. For by 'contradiction' here Kant means contradiction according to the logic of the understanding,

[10] Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, London, 1923, 2.

and denying such contradiction in the field of pure reason, where reason is contrasted with the understanding, is compatible with there being a different, speculative, kind of contradiction which motivates the Notion. Of course this is not as positive an anticipation as Hegel believes he sees. The nearest Kant comes to a positive doctrine of unrest which motivates reason is his insistence that even when criticism has supplanted dogmatism and the sceptical 'euthanasia of reason' with the result that we recognize that dialectical illusion is intrinsic to human reason, momentary aberrations will repeatedly continue to occur (*CPR* B355, B450).

Although, as has been demonstrated, Kant maintains that this dialectical false consciousness is inherent in reason considered narrowly, he thereby leaves unexplained why and how reason should be induced to abuse a merely subjective logical maxim by treating it as though it were valid of something objective and real. Such an explanation would have been forthcoming if he had pursued the implications of the analogy he draws between transcendental illusion and illusions of sense. In connection with the latter he writes: 'Sensibility, when subordinated to understanding, as the object upon which the latter exercizes its function, is the source of real modes of knowledge. But the same sensibility, in so far as it influences the operation of understanding, and determines it to make judgements, is the ground of error' (*CPR* B351). If transcendental illusion had been attributed to reason in the inclusive interpretation of 'reason', that kind of illusion could have been accounted for as a result of the influence on reason of the sensibility, the understanding or the imagination, whose schemata, because of their equivocal nature as intermediaries, are liable *not only to be mistaken* for images but to have what Kant calls the logical schemata of reason mistaken for them (*CPR* B432, B693, B698, B702, B710). Instead, that 'isolated' reason is '*in itself* [*an sich*] dialectical' (*CPR* B805) is presented as a brute fact, no attempt being made to show its necessity whereby to earn what Gueroult calls Hegel's exaltation of Kant. And we have already observed that this brute fact about the seat of dialectical illusion should not be directly equated with a fact about the seat of dialectical contradiction. If Hegel does not make this equation, he at least omits to make the distinction when he writes of Kant that 'the general idea on which he based his expositions and which he vindicated, is the *objectivity of the illusion* and the *necessity of the contradiction* which belongs to the nature of thought determinations: . . . their nature is precisely what they are in reason and with reference to what is intrinsic or in itself' (*SL* 56). The distinction has to be made because while Kant does not invoke the understanding or sensibility to explain dialectical illusion, he must do so to explain dialectical contradiction: the antinomies arise because we confuse the spatio-temporal world with reality-in-itself. And, to repeat, there can be dialectical illusion, according to Kant, without dialectical contradiction and antinomy.

Nevertheless, if there cannot be dialectical contradiction without dialectical illusion, and the seat of the latter is pure reason interpreted strictly, reason thus interpreted could fairly be described as the seat of the former too by

someone who thought reason to be more fundamental and real than the concepts of understanding. Hegel does think this. On different grounds so too does Kant, and that thought may be in his mind when he adverts to 'a certain antinomy of reason which, inasmuch as it is founded on the very nature of reason [*eine gewisse Antinomie der Vernunft, die, da sie auf ihrer Natur beruht*]' (CPR B772). In any case, when judging the assessments Hegel makes of the contributions made by his forerunners to the history of philosophy, his reader must have in mind Hegel's own contribution to the philosophical understanding of what it is to have something in mind. In the *History of Philosophy*, referring to Kant's assertion that the antinomies are unavoidable, Hegel writes that 'The most important point involved in this assertion of Kant's is, however, contrary to his intention [*gegen seine Intention*]' (*LHP* iii 450).[11] Did Kant have in mind implicitly the more important point involved in this assertion even though it was contrary to his explicit intention? Again in *Faith and Knowledge* a similar remark is made in relation to Kant's assertion that whereas the solution of the mathematical antinomies has the purely negative corollary that reason is powerless to decide in favour of the thesis or the antithesis, the solution of the dynamic antinomies, because their topic is existents, but not uniquely existents in space and time, permits affirmation of the absolute separation of the intelligible and sensible worlds. This affirmation of their absolute separation has the virtue, Hegel says, of being a move in the direction of an affirmation of their absolute identity. 'But', he then adds, 'this was not what Kant intended when he separated them so sharply... What is positive in these antinomies, their middle, is not recognized' (FK 42). Does the doctrine of the identity of contradictory opposites, which Hegel seems to have been wrong to attribute to the author of the *Sophist* imply that an author who meant (*voulait dire?*) what he said also meant the opposite of what he said, its *Gegenteil*, what was *gegen seine Intention?*

It is by no means unusual to find in Hegel 'exaltations' of authors deemed to have had his own insights without fully realizing they were having them.[12] In this paper we have been concerned with Hegel's statement that the insight which enables Kant 'to unfold from its deeply concealed sources in human reason' (CPR B366) the Antinomy of Pure Reason, namely 'the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of the determinations of thought... grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual life' (*SL* 56). That Hegel should state this will not surprise anyone who recalls this other statement in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (a work which, if it is an exposition of the science of the experience of consciousness, is also an exposition of the

[11] Though the translators are inaccurate in saying 'unintentional'.

[12] See Gadamer, op.cit., 'Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers', and Guy Planty-Bonjour, 'Hegel et la dialectique selon les Grecs', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1982, 139–40.

science of the experience of the unconscious): 'We learn by experience that we meant something other than we meant to mean; and that this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to go back to the statement, and understand it in some other way' (*Phen.* 39). But the last word may be left to the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention. (*CPR* B370)[13]

[13] I thank those who commented on an earlier version of this essay read to the Hegel Society of Great Britain at Oxford in 1983, the year of the 70th Birthday of W. H. Walsh, to whom I am especially indebted for the advice and encouragement he gave in this and other work of mine, and to whose memory this essay is dedicated.

CHAPTER 5

SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN KANT AND HEGEL

STEPHEN PRIEST

Is Hegel right to call Kant's philosophy 'subjective idealism'? In deciding this, I want to show that Kant and Hegel have opposed solutions to a cluster of problems common and essential to their respective epistemologies. This is: saying what the subjective–objective distinction is, how it is possible, and whether it is genuine. After distinguishing different senses of 'subjective' and 'objective' I shall try to show that one of these approaches is adequate and the other redundant.

After acknowledging that Kant invented the subjective–objective distinction in its modern form, Hegel distinguishes (*LL* 68 z) three senses of each term. These distinctions are not very sharp and within them 'subjective' and 'objective' do not stand in direct semantic contrast. I shall try to make them sharper and point out some opposites. 'Objective 1' means *außerlich Vorhandene* (*SW* ix 127) 'what has external existence' (*LL* 68 z). This is not clear because of an equivocation on 'external'. Hegel does not make the spatial metaphor literal but 'external' is either intended to mark a 'self–not self' distinction or a 'my mind–not my mind' distinction. I should say then that it is a sufficient but not a necessary condition of some statements being objective 1 that its truth or falsity is not determined by any state of the person who says it, that is, the subject.[1] There is still a difficulty here because of the (prima-facie) distinction between mental and physical states. As one's body is part of *Nature* for Hegel, I think it is best to confine objective 1 to being a principle excluding only claims about mental states of the subject made (indexically) by that subject. If a claim is rendered or can be rendered true or false by anything else, including physical states of the subject and the mental states of others, then it is objective 1. Hegel contrasts this sort of objectivity with 'subjective', meaning 'what is only dreamed, supposed, etc.' (*LL* 68 z), (*Gementen, Ertraumten u.s.w.*, *SW* ix 127). This needs clarifying, but straight away I'll stipulate that a sentence is subjective 1 if and only if the proposition it expresses is rendered true or false solely by the existence of nature of at

[1] 'Utterer' is not adequate because not all linguistic behaviour consists in making speech acts. I shall call whoever writes, thinks, or otherwise intentionally produces a sentence he understands, the *subject* of that sentence. No confusion with 'grammatical subject' should accrue. So in all subjective 1 sentences the grammatical subject (the word) picks out the linguistic subject of that sentence.

least one mental state of the subject.[2] This makes subjective 1 and objective 1 opposites.

I think 'what is only supposed, dreamed, etc.' is not quite what Hegel intended if he wished to say something both unequivocal and true. If 'supposed' includes 'believed' then 'what is supposed' is a proposition just so long as suppositions, like beliefs, are propositional attitudes. Thus I may suppose that p, dream that p, etc. as I may believe that p. Analyzed this way the question may then be asked: are the contents of these attitudes subjective 1 or objective 1? It depends on their truth conditions and their grammatical person. If I dream that p or suppose that p then I might (perhaps) dream what is the case, depending on the truth value of 'p'. Hegel's use of 'only' (*nur*, SW ix 127) suggests a restriction to attitudes to propositions that are false. He is misled into this by a failure to distinguish between the mental state which is the attitude to the proposition and the propositional content of that attitude. So, the content of a propositional attitude will be objective 1 or subjective 1 quite irrespective of the psychological type to which the attitude belongs. If 'only' only implies 'not known to be true' then Hegel has isolated another purported sense of 'subjective'. I'll examine this possibility later under 'subjective 2'.

For both Kant and Hegel 'subject' means, roughly, 'that which experiences' and 'object', 'what experience is of'. They each have a problem about the relation between subjective and objective descriptions of what happens:

> Das Urteil, wenn die Trennung von Subjekt und Objekt gemacht ist. erscheint wieder gedoppelt im Subjektiven und im Objektiven, als ein Übergang von einem Objektiven zu einem anderen, die selbst wieder im Verhältnis eines Subjektiven und Objektiven gesetzt sind, und der Identität beider,—ebenso von einer subjektiven Erscheinung zu einer anderen. (W ii 311)

> Once subject and object have been separated, the judgement reappears doubled on the subjective and the objective side. On the objective side it appears as transition from one objective (fact) to another, these objectivities themselves being posited in the relation of subject and object, and in that of the identity of both and, (on the subjective side) it appears likewise as a transition from one subjective phenomenon to another. (FK 75)

One test of a theory of objectivity will be: does it provide criteria for distinguishing the two sorts of truth condition, those for subjective 1 propositions and those for objective 1 propositions? According to Hegel 'objectivity', 'secondly . . . has the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and

[2] I allow a class of claims which could be coherently characterized as both subjective 1 and objective 1 simultaneously. The truth conditions of any first person plural claims which are partly about the psychological state of the utterer will make them fall into this category. For an acute discussion of the role of the first person plural in Kant and Wittgenstein see Jonathan Lear's 'The Disappearing "We" ' in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume lviii, 1984, 219–42. Note especially Lear's remarks on Hegel (238–9) and the dilemma posed for modern philosophy if 'one loses faith in an absolute standpoint' (239).

necessary' (*LL* 68 2) (*des Allgemeinen und Notwendigen*, SW viii 127). This might mean 'a priori' because Kant says (KRV A2B4): 'Notwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind ... sichere Kennzeichen einer Erkenntnis *a priori*, und gehören auch unzertrennhch zu einander', 'Necessity and strict universality are ... sure criteria of *a priori* knowledge and are inseparable from one another' (CPR B4). The 'strict' could just be an omission—but a very careless one—on Hegel's part. I take it that Kant's view is that the necessity and strict universality of some knowledge are each singularly necessary but both jointly sufficient for that knowledge being a priori. Notoriously Kant speaks of judgements (*Urteile*), categories (*Kategorien*) and principles (*Grundsdtze*) as a priori, yet fails to amend 'a priori' to each use. I shall think of judgements as propositions, categories as non-empirical concepts, and principles as rules for the use of categories. So if a judgement is a priori it is straightforwardly knowable to be true or false independently of sense experience. If a category is a priori then it is cognitively imposed on the objects of experience in making them intelligible yet not abstracted from that experience. A priori principles cannot not be adopted by someone who thinks because they are constitutive of thinking. So no comparison is possible between the categories and their content. They are compulsory rules for making experience intelligible. We could imagine *empirical* rule following in contrast where, say, someone is deciding what something is. I take it that for Kant it is analytic (and a priori) that the categories and principles are a priori.

It is not quite right that 'a priori' has to mean 'objective' for Kant or at all. If 'objective' means 'universal and necessary' and if these two are 'criteria' for being a priori it does not logically follow that 'objective' and 'a priori' are synonyms. This is not just because of the varieties of sense of each of 'objective' and 'a priori' in Kant but also because from the fact that being *F* and being *G* is sufficient for being *H* it does not follow that being *H* means just the same as being '*F* and *G*' even if it entails it. Nor does it follow that 'being *H*' is synonymous with some term that means 'being both *F* and *G*'.

Suppose, though, that Hegel is trying to isolate a sense of 'objective' as just 'universal and necessary'; then a great deal of ambiguity still remains. Kant distinguishes 'universality' (*Allgemeinheit*) from 'strict universality' (*strenge Allgemeinheit*). I shall construe the distinction this way: a sentence expresses a universal proposition if it is a generalization which admits in principle of inductive falsification. A sentence expresses a strictly universal proposition if it is a generalization which does not admit even in principle of inductive falsification. We could call these 'objective' in the sense of 'generally true' in the first case and 'exceptionlessly true' in the second, but I see little point in such a stipulation.

'Necessity' (*Notwendigkeit*) has two related uses for Kant. Propositions are necessary if they could not have been false: for example if they are self-contradictory to deny. Categories are necessary in the sense of 'required for experience'. There is a prima-facie equivocation on 'experience' here between 'any experience' and 'experience of the sort we do have', but on an arguable

understanding of 'objective' this ambiguity is illusory.[3] Again, there is no need to call either sort of necessity 'objectivity'. Strictly universal propositions, though, will turn out to be necessary truths. (This is the force of Kant's *unzertrennlich zu einander*, KRV B4.) There is some motivation for calling these 'objective' because, purportedly, whatever our experience turned out to be like, it could never falsify such propositions. If classed as 'objective' though they fall squarely into objective 1 because they are not made true by the psychological states of the utterer, even though that he has the conceptual scheme he has is a necessary condition for their formulation.

Interestingly, Hegel distinguishes 'the universal and necessary' from 'the particular, subjective and occasional element which belongs to our sensations' (LL 68 z) ('dem unserer Empfindung angehörigen Zufälligen, Particulairen und Subjektiven', SW viii 127). He is still talking about Kant and I think he is referring either to what Kant calls 'the manifold' (*das Mannigfaltige*), or to sensation (*Empfindung*), or intuition (*Anschauung*), or phenomena (*Phenomena*) as opposed to the categories. These four terms are not synonyms but have it in common to feature in Kant's account of what is passively received through sense experience in contrast with what is actively imposed by the understanding. Hegel, rather annoyingly, has now presented us with a new subjectivity–objectivity distinction which, on the face of it, is in tension with that between objectivity 1 and subjectivity 1. I think the two distinctions can be shown to be quite consistent, but first we need to be clear what the second one is.

Hegel praises Kant (LL 67 z) for one subjectivity–objectivity distinction and so we can exclude one sense of 'subjective' in which Kant's epistemology might be called 'subjective idealism', because that phrase is used as a criticism by Hegel. Hegel says it is a pre-philosophical assumption that physical objects are 'objective' in the sense of 'independent and permanent existences' ('für sich Bestehende, Selbstständige', SW viii 127). I take this to be a case of objective 1—the intuition that sentences about the existence and nature of physical objects are not made true or false by the existence or nature of mental states of the subject. Hegel thinks this assumption is in one sense importantly false. An alleged corrolative ordinary language assumption is that 'thoughts' (*die Gedanken*) by contrast 'are unsubstantial and dependent on something else' (LL 67 z) ('Unselbstständige und von einem Andern Abhängige', SW viii 127). Hegel has not succeeded in making a clear semantic contrast with the claim that sentences about physical objects are objective 1. What he should have said is that first person present tense psychological ascriptions are subjective 1. Hegel's report on ordinary language I interpret to mean something like: there could not be thoughts unless there were, for example, physical objects. A claim that again—as ordinarily understood—is according to Hegel importantly false and this despite the identity of mental and physical in his own

[3] See Lear; see also *n.* 10 below.

expressivist theory. It is Kant's rejection of these two pre-philosophical intuitions that Hegel approves:

> Nun aber ist in der Tat das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare das eigentlich Unselbstständige und Sekundeire und die Gedanken sind dagegen das Wahrhaft Selbstständig und Privitive. In diesem Sinn hat Kant das Gedankenmäßige (das Allgemeine und Notwendige) das Objektive genannt und zwar mit vollem Recht. (SW viii 126)

> In fact, however, the perceptions of sense are the properly dependent and secondary feature, while the thoughts are really independent and primary. This being so, Kant gave the title 'objective' to the intellectual factor, to the universal and necessary: and he was quite justified in doing so. (LL 67 z)

Where I have used 'physical objects' Hegel uses 'objects of perception'. I take it the scope of this includes, but is not exhausted by, the class of all physical objects, and that the phrase is roughly equivalent to 'the set of all entities with which we may be acquainted through sense perception'. Hegel makes a severe mistake when he slides from 'objects of perception' to 'the perceptions of sense' of the last quotation. Evidently my sentences about the former will be objective 1. My claims about the latter (if mine) will be subjective 1. This blurs the distinction he is trying to credit Kant with, and, in any case, Hegel would not wish to be committed to the view that an object is my perception of it.

This slide enables Hegel to say 'Our sensations on the other hand are subjective' (LL 67 z) (*Subjektive*, SW viii 126). We can allow this if 'subjective' here means 'subjective 1' but much of the force of Kant's alleged repudiation of the pre-philosophical intuitions is thereby lost.

For the 'intellectual factor' which Hegel says Kant thinks is 'universal and necessary' I shall just read 'the categories'. For 'objects of perception' I shall read 'empirical objects'. We now have the claim that the categories are 'objective' and empirical objects 'subjective'. Hegel is aware of the prima-facie tension with the objectivity 1—subjectivity 1 distinction. Unless 'subjective' can be given a new sense then sentences about empirical objects will be both subjective and objective 1 and that is manifestly incoherent if 'subjective' means 'subjective 1' and subjective 1 is the opposite of objective 1. Also, unless categories can be excluded from psychology in the sense in which mental states are psychological, and unless 'objective' can be given a new sense, then the categories will be both objective and subjective 1 which, again, is manifestly incoherent if 'objective' here means 'objective 1' and objective 1 is the opposite of subjective 1. Subjective 1 and objective 1 are opposites: a given sentence cannot be objective 1 in the respect it is subjective 1 nor vice versa.[4] Despite this, the two distinctions can be made consistent. Straightaway we can say the categories are not mental states in the sense that Hegel's examples (LL 68 z) are of mental states. His examples were propositional attitudes, but

[4] This is quite consistent with the fact that there obtain two sorts of truth condition for first person plural sentences which entail first person singular psychological ascriptions.

I take it his classification is sufficiently broad to include occurrent and not merely dispositional mental states. We could call these 'experiences'. Although an a priori concept is a piece of intellectual equipment it is in no sense either an experience or a propositional attitude. On these grounds, sentences about categories—including first person present tense ones—are objective 1 not subjective 1. Next we can reinterpret 'subjective' and 'objective'.

Hegel says sensations are 'subjective' because 'they lack stability in their own nature' (*LL* 67 2) ('seinen Halt nicht in sich selbst hat', SW viii 126) while thought is 'objective' because it 'is permanent and self-persisting' (*LL* 67 2). Dropping 'sensation' because of its unfortunate assimilation to 'physical object' here by Hegel, we want a sense in which empirical objects might usefully and coherently be thought 'subjective'. As Hegel says, this thought flies in the face of common sense. But from the fact that *p*'s truth is inconsistent with some assumption of common sense, *q*, it does not follow that not-*p*. Two other possibilities are 'not-*q*' and 'neither p nor *q*'. Kant and Hegel are very broadly agreed on two senses in which empirical objects are 'subjective'. For both, the content of experience—what is experienced—changes. For both, the possession of categories determines the nature of the empirical world. For example, for Kant we know a priori that however our empirical experience may change, it will be as ordered by the categories: it will be of a world of causally interacting physical objects. If this is true at all I can see some point in calling it an 'objective' fact. This is not just because, if it is true, it is true whether or not we believe it, but because it is not a 'subjective *1*' sentence because it is not verifiable or falsifiable by reference to any mental state of the subject: I could not deduce its truth from the result of any inspection of my propositional attiudes or my occurrent experiences. So, the sense in which the categories are objective collapses into objective 1. A parallel collapse is not possible for 'subjectivity'. It is true, I think, that the content of our empirical experience changes but this really just amounts to the fact that we perceive different physical objects at different times. This is no ground at all for calling them 'subjective'. It might also be true that perceiving a physical object makes a difference to what it is or, more weakly, what it is for us. If this is so, then in explaining what a physical object is, and what makes it be what it is, some mention will have to be made of what is contributed to it by the subject: that which preceives it. Again though, this fact, if it is a fact, even if conjoined with the previous one does not provide sufficient warrant for calling empirical objects 'subjective'. If one wished to use 'subjective' in this way its sense would have to allow something thus subjective to be also objective 1. This is because, even if some sort of conceptual idealism is true, no empirical object is identical with any of my mental states. To deny this would be to assimilate Kant's idealism to Berkeley's.

Hegel's third and final distinction (*LL* 68 2) is between 'die vorher zuläßt erwahnte Bedeutung des gedachten An-sich, dessen was da ist, im Unterschied von dem nur durch uns Gedachten und somit noch von der Sache selbst oder an sich Unterschiedenen' (SW viii 126), 'the thought apprehended essence of

the existing thing in contradistinction from what is merely our thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in independent essence'. It is just in this latter sense that Kant's philosophy is supposed to be 'subjective idealism': it says knowledge of how the world really is, independently of our experience of it, is impossible: on the contrary we only know it as it appears to us through our particular forms of intuition and our a priori categorial framework. Hegel thinks this is the severest defect of Kant's philosophy, no matter in which other senses it might truly be called 'objective'.

Hegel sometimes makes the same point by saying Kant's philosophy does not contain knowledge, or does not rank as truth. Hegel's thinking here is that knowledge is necessarily of what is the case or, to put it another way, p's truth is a condition of p's being known. Hegel is correct in this thought, but he tends to neglect two other sorts of knowledge for which Kant leaves room. Firstly, there may be knowledge of what appears to be the case. Indeed, certain claims of the form 'x appears to me to be F' are sometimes thought to be incorrigible. Secondly, if x appears to me to be F, x might be F. The truth requirement for my knowing that x is F would then be met and, given that x does appear to me to be F, the evidential condition would be met also. There is at least one passage where Hegel comes close to allowing this: 'Ob nun schon die Kategorien (wie z.B. Einheit, Ursache und Wirkung u.s.w.) dem Denken als solchem zukommen, so folgt daraus doch keineswegs, das dieselben deshalb bloß ein Unsriges und nicht auch Bestimmungen der Gegenstände selbst waren' (SW viii 131), 'Though the categories such as unity or cause and effect are strictly the property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours merely and not also characteristics of objects' (LL 70). Hegel would not wish to formulate his own view in this way because he does not believe in things in themselves: he is trying to leave open an option for Kant he thinks Kant refuses. Hegel's considered view is: 'Dies soll nun aber nach Kants Auffassung der Fall sein und seine Philosophie ist subjektiver Idealismus' (SW viii 131), 'Kant however confined them (the categories) to the subject-mind, and his philosophy may be styled "subjective idealism" ' (LL 70).

I will now try to formulate Hegel's distinction more sharply. A sentence is objective 2 if it expresses a proposition about what is the case. A sentence is subjective 2 if it expresses a proposition about what appears to be the case. This leaves room for the possibility that what appears to be the case might be the case: that a sentence may be coherently characterized using both predicates. My formulation is also open to both an empirical and what Kant could call a 'transcendental' construal; Hegel has in mind only the 'transcendental' construal.

Is Kant, then, a 'subjective idealist'? I shall offer what I shall call a 'neutral monist' construal of Kant to defend him against the charge.[5] Two theses are

[5] This interpretation of Kant bears only a family resemblance to the familiar doctrines of James or Russell which go by that name. I think the obvious historical truth that Kant did not call his philosophy of mind 'neutral monism' is of no philosophical consequence.

included in Kant's neutral monism: one is a theory about things in themselves; the other is connected with what Strawson and Bennett have thought of as Kant's phenomenalism.[6] I'll take things in themselves first.

Hegel thinks Kant's distinction between phenomena and things in themselves is an ontological distinction. He thinks that for Kant there exist two qualitatively and numerically distinct sorts of entity, one sort variously called 'appearances' or 'phenomena' the other 'noumena' or 'things-in-themselves'. I agree there are passages that can be read this way but it is certainly not Kant's considered view. Realism about the existence of things in themselves is wholly at variance with the anti-metaphysical project of CPR and, in addition, unlikely to be true. I think Kant can be read as saying something consistent with the rest of his book, meaningful, and true if the phenomena–noumena relation is construed as identity. We can then say 'phenomena' and 'things-in-themselves' are two ways of specifying one and the same set of objects. These are phenomenal in so far as we experience them, noumenal in so far as they are merely thought, in particular in so far as they are thought of as existing independently of our experience of them. For example (CPR 230), he allows the possibility that he views 'all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves' ('. . . ich alle Dinge nicht als Phenomene, sondern als Dinge an sich betrachte . . .', KRV B252). And I take it the probition of any 'positive' use of 'noumenon' is precisely to legislate against the establishing of a new ontological sphere 'behind' or 'beyond' phenomena: 'Wenn wir unter Noumenon ein Ding verstehen, so fern es nicht Objekt unserer sinnlichen Anschauung ist, indem wir von unserer Anschauungsart dasselben abstrahieren; so ist dieses ein Noumenon im negativen Verstande' (KRV B307), 'If by "noumenon" we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term' (CPR 268). The positive conception is not self-contradictory (*gar nicht widersprechend*, KRV B310, CPR 271) but 'problematic' (*problematisch*, KRV B309, CPR 271). For 'problematic' here I prefer to read 'vacuous' or 'without a referent', although Kant might prefer 'without knowable referent'. So 'phenomena' and 'things-in-themselves' differ in sense but not in reference on my interpretation.

We could now, if we wished, call phenomena 'subjective' and noumena 'objective' but mean something different from Hegel. If an object is described as phenomenal it is described as it appears from the point of view of an observing subject. If it is described as noumenal, it is thought of as it is independently of the point of view of an observing subject. There is no ontological division into subjective and objective 'entities', claims about which might stand in need of being shown to be consistent. For the neutral monist Kant,

[6] The classic discussions of this issue are in P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, London, 1966, 240–50, and Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*, Cambridge, 1966, 33–45. For criticism of the 'traditional picture' of Kant's transcendental idealism see Graham Bird's, 'Kant's Transcendental Idealism' in G. Vesey (ed.), *Idealism Past and Present*, Cambridge, 1982. See especially 83–91 for the question of Kant's 'phenomenalism'.

the concept of a phenomenon is still logically prior to that of a noumenon; we could not use 'noumenon' unless we could use 'phenomenon'.

The other half of Kant's neutral monism includes his 'phenomenalism'. Whether Kant is in some sense a phenomenalist is a vexed and complex question but I think this much is clear. Kant is not a phenomenalist in the classic sense in which Mill and Ayer are phenomenalists. Kant nowhere says a sentence or set of sentences about physical objects can be translated into a sentence or set of sentences about actual or possible sense experiences, without loss of meaning. He does though think something close to this and this is designed to solve a problem about the relation between sentences that are subjective 1 and sentences that are objective 1. He uses the idea of rule-following to do his, and rule-following is itself to be understood as various sorts of public or intersubjective agreement.

The problem of the relation between sentences which are subjective 1 and those which are objective 1 I shall call 'the problem of objectivity'. On one interpretation it corresponds to the problem Hegel poses for Kant by calling him a 'subjective idealist'. The problem is: it seems no subjective 1 sentence entails an objective 1 sentence, or; from no set of propositions verifiable or falsifiable solely by reference to the existence or nature of mental states of the subject (utterer) can any further set of propositions be derived which are verifiable or falsifiable solely by reference to what is not a mental state of the subject (utterer). The 'problem of objectivity' could be construed as a transcendental issue or an empirical issue. The first part of Kant's neutral monism answers the first interpretation, the second the second. Transcendentally the question is: we know only phenomena, so how can we know, or know there are, any noumena? Empirically the question is: we know only our own experiences, so how can we know or know there are any physical objects? Kant's reply to the problem of objectivity takes up most of the 'Transcendental Deduction' in both editions as well as the 'Principles' chapter. However, the clearest and most concise statement is in the *Prolegomena*:

> ...objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object in itself, yet when we consider a judgement as universal, and hence necessary, we thereby understand it to have objective validity. (*P* 46 para. 19)

An equivalent passage in the *Critique* is: 'Wenn es (das Urteil) für jederman gültig ist, so fern er nur Vernunft hat, so ist der Grund desselben objektiv hinreichend...' (KRV B848), 'If the judgement is valid for everyone, provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is objectively sufficient' (CPR 645). Public rule following, or intersubjective agreement at the level of categories, allow phenomena to be thought of as either mental or physical, subjective or objective. Kant does not allocate them to either pole of either classification and this is because the concept of a phenomenon is primitive with regard to these other concepts. He is a monist about phenomena.

What sort of equivalence is Kant claiming for 'objective validity' and 'neces-

sary universality'? 'Objective' in 'objective validity' means 'objective 1'; if a judgement is 'objectively valid' it is a true claim about what exists independently of any mental state of the subject (judge). 'Necessary universality' is a property of the categories and is his name for the fact that all our experience must conform to them. I take 'equivalence' to be a loose way of claiming that these expressions are two methods of describing the same cognitive fact. Possession of the categories makes objective 1 judgements possible, making objective 1 judgements gives the categories their objective employment. In the *Prolegomena* passage there seems no embarrassment about the logically private intelligibility of experience. In the *Critique* passage, though, public agreement in judgements is required for them to count as objective 1. Even if this agreement is valid for everyone (*für jederman gültig* ist, KRV 8848), what sort of agreement is it? I think it is quite clear that Kant is not talking about empirical agreement. He does not subscribe to the view that its being publically agreed that *p* is a sufficient condition for the truth of p, for some empirical value of '*p*'. The agreement is transcendental (and this agreement is what makes possible empirical agreement and disagreement). Because we are equipped with the same categories we will make fundamentally the same judgements about what the world is like. There is room for empirical disagreements but not metaphysical disagreements, and its being transcendentally and intersubjectively agreed that the world is F is just what we mean by saying 'the world is F' is objective 1 or 'objectively valid'.[7]

Hegel wishes to drive a wedge between 'it is transcendentally agreed that the world is F' and 'the world is F'. In particular he thinks the second does not follow from the first. It is true. I think, that certain passages in Kant leave him vulnerable to this objection. For example, in the *Prolegomena* (46 para. 19), he makes it sound as though the existence and nature of physical objects as objective 1 entities is causally what makes communication possible: '. . . there would be no reason for the judgements of other men necessarily agreeing with mine if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another.' If this is intended as a causal account of intersubjectivity then Kant's case against Hegel is hopeless. It makes use of 'cause' illegitimately and smuggles in a notion of objectivity which begs our question. However, in one of his better moments Kant says: '. . . the objective validity of the judgement of

[7] As Wittgenstein puts it: 'So sagst du also, daß die Übereinstimmung der Menschen entscheide, was Richtig und was falsch ist?'—Richtig und falsch ist, was Menschen *sagen*, und in der *Sprache* stimmen die Menschen überein. Dies ist keine Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, sondern der Lebensform . . . Zur Verständigung durch die Sprache gehört nicht nur eine Übereinstimmung in den Definitionen, sondern (so seltsam dies klingen mag) eine Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen'. *Philosophische Untersuchungen* I (241–2). 'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?'—It is what human beings *say* that is true and false: and they agree in the language that they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life . . . If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements' *Philosophical Investigations* I (241–2).

experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universal validity' (*Prolegomena* 46 para. 18).

If we conjoin this doctrine with the identity theory about phenomena and noumena, then there just is not room for reality to be intelligibly held to be other than it is by us at the level of categories. Of course, as Kant allows, if we had different forms of intuition it would appear different to us. I still prefer to call his entire doctrine 'neutral monism' rather than 'phenomenalism' because central to it is the idea that 'phenomena' can be described as 'mental' or as 'physical', 'subjective' or as 'objective'. Kant's doctrine is that the intelligibility of objects is necessarily public—it requires rule-following, that is, intersubjective agreement at the level of categories. This social requirement is found in the later Wittgenstein but not in classic empiricism.

I turn now to Hegel's complaint that Kant's philosophy does not contain the truth and so is not knowledge. As is well known, Hegel claims the 'true is the whole'. I think it doubtful whether a *complete* account could be given of any phenomenon and especially not of reality as a whole. Despite this, 'completeness' might be an intelligible ideal within specific criteria. The question now is, does Kant have a theory of truth and if so, is it satisfactory? In answering these questions, I shall make use of the conclusions about objectivity and rule-following established so far. The test of 'satisfactory' will be: can it explain the possibility of objective 1 statements, not just subjective 1 statements? In particular we need to know whether Kant has a reply to this:

> Nach Kant die Gedanken, obschon allgemeine und notwendige Bestimmungen, doch nur unsere Gedanken und von dem, was Ding an sich ist, durch eine unübersteigbare Kluft unterschieden sind. Dagegen ist die wahre Objektivität des Denkens diese. daß die Gedanken nicht bloß unsere Gedanken, sondern zugleich das Ansich der Dinge und der Gegenständlichen überhaupt sind. (*SW* viii 126)

> Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary are *only* our thoughts—separated by an impassable gulf from the thing as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at tht same time be the real essence of things, and of whatever is an object to us. (*LL* 67–8 z)

Hegel is requiring transcendental realism of Kant, a doctrine he rejects for transcendental idealism and empirical realism. If transcendental realism is both coherent and true, and if Hegel believes it and Kant rejects it, then Hegel has solved the problem of objectivity in a way that Kant fails to do. Perhaps, though, Kant solved the problem of objectivity despite his rejection of transcendental realism.

Kant makes a distinction (CPR 645, KRV A820/B848) between 'persuasion' (*Überredung*) and 'conviction' (*Überzeugung*). These are each a sort of judgement (*Urteil*) but I shall have to take the scope of 'judgement' to include belief (*das Fürwahrhalten*) so that 'A judges x to be F' entails 'A believes x is F'. I shall also take it for granted that it is because beliefs are propositional attitudes they have truth values. Kant gives the criteria for some judgements

being persuasion as follows: 'Wenn es für jederman gültig ist, so fern er nur Vernunft hat, so ist der Grund desselben objektiv hinreichend, und das Fürwahrhalten heißt als denn Überzeugung' (KRV A820, B848), 'If the judgement is valid for everyone provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is objectively sufficient, and the holding it to be true is entitled *conviction*' (CPR 645). On the other hand, 'Hat es nur in der besonderen Beschaffenheit des Subjekts seinen Grund, so wird es Überredung genannt' (KRV A820, B848), 'If it has its ground only in the special character of the subject, it is entitled *persuasion*' (CPR 645).

It is not a sufficient condition of a belief's truth for Kant that it have 'subjective causes in the mind' (CPR 645) ('subjektive Ursachen im Gemute . . .', KRV ibid.); it must also 'rest on objective grounds' (CPR 645) ('auf objektiven Grunden beruhen', KRV ibid.). Part of what is claimed here is that from 'A believes that p' it does not follow that p, but I think there is an additional point. The distinction between conviction and persuasion is not just straightforwardly between what is just believed and what is both believed and also true. Kant is saying that for an attitude of mind to count as a belief—or as any psychological state which is a truth-value bearer—it must have genuine truth conditions. This is the force of his objektive *Grunden* (KRV ibid.). Here the 'objective ground' of a proposition is whatever makes it true or false and this is a requirement on a proposition whether it is objective 1 or subjective 1. Kant's view, though, is that subjective 1 propositions are only capable of truth or falsity because objective 1 ones are. He has several arguments for this, of which I shall consider just one. This is his argument that knowledge is necessarily public or communicable (KRV A821, B849, CPR 645). If this argument is valid, then Kant will have replied adequately to Hegel's charge of 'subjective idealism' and solved the problem of objectivity.

Kant thinks the possibility of logically private knowledge—that is knowledge which cannot in principle be communicated—is an illusion. Persuasion is precisely such purported knowledge: 'Überredung ist ein bloßer Schein, weil der Grund des Urteils, welcher lediglich im Subjekte liegt, für objektiv gehalten wird' (KRV ibid.), 'Persuasion is a mere illusion because the ground of the judgement, which lies solely in the subject, is regarded as objective' (CPR 645). What is wrong with persuasion is that 'Daher hat ein solches Urteil auch nur Privatgültigkeit, und das Fürwahrhalten läßt sich nicht mitteilen' (KRV ibid.), 'Such a judgement has only private validity, and the holding of it to be true does not allow of being communicated' (CPR 645).[8] Why is private knowledge impossible? Kant's answer is: 'Wahrheit . . . beruht auf der Übereinstimmung mit dem Objekte, in Ansehung dessen folglich die Urteile eines jeden Verstandes einstimmung sein müssen' (KRV ibid.), '. . . truth depends upon agreement with the object, and in respect of it the

[8] There is a close anticipation of the conclusion of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument here, and indeed, of many of the premisses. (Cf. L. Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*, especially paras. 243 ff.). I try to bring out the parallels in Stephen Priest, *The Critical Paradigm: Modern Philosophy's Kantian Assumptions* (forthcoming).

judgements of each and every understanding must therefore be in agreement with each other' (CPR 645). It is then a sufficient condition of p's truth that p be in 'agreement with the object', but it is also a necessary condition of p's truth that it be intersubjectively agreed that p 'agrees with the object' but this agreement obviously cannot be merely empirical; it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of some proposition's truth that you and I, or indeed anyone, believes it.[9] The agreement is at the level of categories or rules of the understanding, once again. This is a condition of there being any such thing as empirical truth (which I interpret Kant as explaining on a correspondence theory). Correspondence is only made possible by the existence of an object of judgement, this is constituted by categories common to 'all human reason' (KRV ibid., CPR 645), and this condition is itself possible only if knowledge is in principle communicable. The publicity of rules constitutes the objectivity of objects: 'Der Probierstein des Fürwahrhaltens, ob es Überzeugung oder bloße Überredung sei, ist also, außerlich, die Möglichkeit, dasselbe mitzuteilen und das Fürwahrhalten für jedes Menschen Vernunft gültig zu befinden' (KRV ibid.), 'The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore external, namely, the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason' (CPR 645).

I have given a 'transcendental' reading of these passages—one which tries to construe Kant as explaining how objective 1 claims are possible. I would not wish to exclude what I think is a complementary empirical reading, so long as it is maintained that the transcendental facts—the facts about public rule-following—make the empirical facts possible. If we construe this empirically: 'die Urteile eines jedcn Verstandes Einstimmung sein müssen' ('the judgements of each and every understanding must . . . be in agreement with each other') (KRV ibid., CPR ibid.), then Kant is making this negative point: if A judges that x if F and if B judges that in just that respect x is not F, then the judgements of A and B cannot both be true. If two or more claims are mutually inconsistent then that is a sufficient condition for a least one of them being false. We could call this the 'consistency rule' about truth. (It should not be confused with any attempt to explain what truth is in terms of consistency or coherence, because it presupposes we can use 'true'.)

We can also read the following as Kant's statement of his correspondence theory of truth: '. . . denn alsdenn ist wenigstens eine Vermutung, der Grund der Einstimmung aller Urteile, ungeachtet der Verschiedenheit der Subjekte unter einander, werde auf dem gemeinschaftlichen Grunde, nämlich dem Objekte, beruhen, mit welchem sie daher alle zusammenstimmen und dadurch die Wahrheit des Urteils beweisen werden' (KRV A821, B850), 'For there is then at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgements with each other notwithstanding the differing characters of the in-

[9] I allow a restricted class of exceptions. For example, if 'I possess at least one belief' is believed, then it is true. But if we accept Kant's account then such autobiographical ascriptions will be parasitic on the possibility of the utterer's making objective 1 claims.

dividuals, rests upon the common ground, namely, upon the object—the truth of the judgement being thereby proved' (CPR 645). Our empirical judgements agree because empirical realism is true, but for him we must remember transcendental idealism makes empirical realism possible.

Hegel offers an argument (LL 70) for the 'subjective idealism' charge. 'Seine Philosophie ist subjektiver Idealismus, insofern Ich (das erkennende Subjekt) sowohl die Form als auch den Staff des Erkennens liesere—jenen als denkend und diesen als empfindend' (SW viii 131), 'His philosophy may be styled "subjective idealism" for he holds both the form and the matter of knowledge are supplied by the Ego—or knowing subject—the form by the intellectual, the matter by our sentient Ego'. There is an equivocation here on 'supplied by'. Kant certainly thinks the understanding imposes the categories on the contents of experience. This is what makes experience possible and what makes it what it is. So if 'supplied by' refers to synthesis, then Hegel is right. It is not true in this sense though that the 'matter' of knowledge is the result of synthesis, if matter means 'content'. Quite the reverse. The matter of knowledge is passively received as a sensory input according to Kant and this process is really the opposite of 'supplied' in the intellectual sense. The understanding is active (a 'spontaneity' as he puts it) but the senses are passive ('receptivity'). 'Supplied by', though, might be an obscure way of saying 'made possible'. Hegel then might be reiterating his complaint that CPR contains some empiricism—for example the doctrine that no knowledge is possible of what is not a possible object of experience. If he does not mean this, then the remark would seem to reduce to the tautologous point that there could not be sense experience without senses. Although true, this does not in itself commit Kant to subjective idealism because it is an axiom of any theory of perception whatsoever.

Kant's theory of objective truth when joined with the neutral monist interpretation of the phenomena–things-in-themselves relation does not leave room for Hegel's requirement that there be knowledge of reality as it really is in itself. This phrase does not have any more meaning than Kant gives it and there is no additional world 'beyond' phenomena. There is no objectivity stronger than objectivity 1 and objectivity 1 makes subjectivity 1 possible.

It follows from this that there is no need at all for a dialectical synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity in Absolute Knowing. This is redundant if we accept that 'subject' and 'object' are each conceptual constructions out of phenomena. Nor is it true that Kant himself attempts any such synthesis. In order to show this I shall argue that the prime candidate for this Hegelian role—the transcendental unity of apperception—does not fulfil it.

The transcendental unity of apperception is a formal condition of experience. It is the requirement that the 'I think' be capable of accompanying any of my experiences. This means that the content of any of my thoughts must in principle allow of being prefaced by 'I think'. This is a necessary condition of their being episodes in the single unified consciousness that is mine. This unified consciousness is not something distinct from, or over and above, the

unity of the manifold. The monism of phenomena can be described subjectively using terms like 'intuition' (*Anschauung*), 'presentation' (*Vorstellung*) or 'appearance' (*Erscheinung*), or it can be described objectively using terms like 'object' (*Gegenstand*). There are just two vocabularies here, not two sorts of entity. One and the same world can be referred to as it appears to me or as I think of it existing independently of my perception of it. It is for this reason that Kant talks of an *original* synthetic unity ('ursprunglich synthetische Einheit', KRV B136). 'Original' here means 'primitive'. Unless there were phenomena there could be no subjectivity and no objectivity. I think in this passage Kant is describing two sides of one and the same process:

> Nun erfordert aber alle Vereinigung der Vorstellungen Einheit der Bewußtsein in der Synthesis derselben. Folglich ist die Einheit des Bewußtseins das jenige, was allein die Beziehung der Vorstellungen auf einen Gegenstand, mithin ihre objektive Gültigkeit folglich, daß sie Erkenntnisse werden, ausmacht, und worauf folglich selbst die Möglichkeit des Verstandes beruht. (KRV B137)

> Now all unification of (re)presentations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of (re)presentations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding. (*CPR* 156)

The unity of the manifold is the unity of consciousness. This makes the understanding with its dualism of understander and understood possible. *Geist* is a reification of the transcendental unity of apperception.

In Absolute Knowing, *Geist* has fully become what it really is: 'In this knowing, then, Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has shaped itself, in so far as this shaping was burdened with the difference of consciousness (i.e. of the latter from its object), a difference now overcome' (*Phen.* 490). This suggests that a bad model for understanding Hegel's synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity is to assume this difference could really exist without its being overcome (*aufgehoben*). *Geist* has posited its own otherness, its self-alienation, so in a way the differentiation into subject and object presupposes a prior unity, as in Kant. Hegel's metaphysical extravagance lies in making this prior unity *Geist*. Kant's neutral monism obviates the need to postulate a spirit or the unity of thought and being. In the last chapter of *Phen.* *Geist's* 'difference from itself' is removed: 'This is absolute knowing; it is Spirit that knows itself in the shape of Spirit' (*Phen.* 485), and this is 'the immediate unity of thought and being' (*Phen.* 488). I suggest that this is a reification of the transcendental unity of apperception on two grounds. Firstly the concept of self-consciousness is essential to explaining what each is. Secondly they each have the function of making subject–object dualism depend on its unity. Hegel invokes the world spirit because he makes the mistake of supposing there is some relation between subject and object not explicable either psychologically or physically. For Kant the difference between subjectivity and

objectivity is just a structure abstracted from, but explicable in terms of, the monism of phenomena.

The Hegel of 1802 was less speculatively ambitious than the Hegel of 1806–7, as these passages from *Glauben und Wissen* show. Hegel is approving the transcendental unity of apperception: 'Diese ursprungliche synthetische Einheit, d.h. eine Einheit die nicht als Produkt Entgegengesetzter begriffen werden muß, sondern als wahrhaft notwendigc, absolute, ursprungliche Identität Entgegengesetzter' (W ii 304). 'This original synthetic unity must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites' (FK 70). This is exactly right. The original synthetic unity makes experience possible although it does not seem that way in self-reflection. The monism of phenomena allows there to be judgement with its differentiation of judge and judged: the original unity—'... als Identität des Subjektiven und Objektiven in BewuBtsein als Urteil erscheint' (W ii 307); '... as identity of subjective and objective appears in consciousness as judgement' (FK 71). The young Hegel says 'Kant sagt sehr gut' (W ii 306) ('Kant puts it very well', FK 71). He should have let this be his considered view because really there is no such thing as Absolute Knowing and Geist does not exist.[10, 11]

[10] I have not discussed the roles of space and time in the truth conditions of objective 1 statements, for example, the issue of whether a possible world in which objective 1 statements may be formulated must necessarily be spatial. For the connection between space and objectivity see P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. London, 1959, Chapter 2. See also Gareth Evans's commentary in 'Things Without the Mind' in Zak van Straaten (ed.), *Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson*, Oxford, 1980, 76–116; also Strawson's 'Reply to Evans' (273–82). For some original comments on time and objectivity see Ralph Walker, *Kant*, London, 1979.

[11] This paper was read at a meeting of the University of East Anglia Philosophy Society and I am indebted to those present, particularly Timothy O'Hagan and Angus Ross, for an interesting discussion of some of the claims I make in it. Graham Bird and George MacDonald Ross each commented on different parts of an earlier draft, and I thank them for taking the time and trouble to do so.

CHAPTER 6

THE IDEA OF A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: KANT AND HEGEL

W. H. WALSH

I BEGIN by rehearsing a number of points which are familiar and uncontroversial but need to be mentioned as a background to what follows. As understood by Kant a 'critique of pure reason' is a critical examination of the powers of the intellect, considered as a source or putative source of knowledge on its own account. The method adopted is to reflect on actual cases, or what are taken to be actual cases, of pure intellectual knowledge with a view to determining what conditions have to be fulfilled if such knowledge is to be possible; the hope is that successful completion of this enquiry will put one in a position to determine definitively whether a special kind of knowledge through pure reason, namely metaphysical knowledge, is attainable by human beings. Kant pursues his aim by arguing first that discursive knowledge generally requires a combination of concepts and intuitions, second that the only intuitions men dispose of are sense-intuitions, finally that though both pure concepts and pure intuitions form part of our cognitive apparatus the first can be used only under a condition which restricts their application to the temporal sphere, whilst the second cannot be invoked effectively outside the sphere of mathematics. It follows that the ambition of metaphysics as traditionally understood, to arrive at truth about a reality thought to lie behind or beyond the appearances of the senses, cannot be fulfilled. It is possible to construct what commentators have called an immanent metaphysics of experience, a science setting out conditions to which whatever falls within experience must conform. But metaphysics as the supposed science of God, Freedom, and Immortality, entities or conditions we cannot hope to meet with in experience, is in no way facilitated by this success; when we think carefully about it we see that *knowledge* in this area must be ruled out. The best we can do is to cherish a number of metaphysical *convictions* which find their ground not in any theoretical arguments but in their connections with moral practice, and these are matters not of knowledge but of faith.

It is clear from this that the upshot of instituting a critique of pure reason is to set limits to men's cognitive aspirations: to demonstrate that certain kinds of thing could not be objects of human knowledge. Kant was not of course exclusively concerned with this point; as his thought developed he gave increasing attention to the positive task of determining the necessary conditions of scientific knowledge and vindicating such knowledge against sceptical

attacks. But for all its importance this interest was always subsidiary to the longer-standing preoccupation with showing the impossibility of metaphysics as traditionally conceived. If we ask why Kant was thus preoccupied the answer is that he thought it supremely important for moral purposes that men should retain certain metaphysical beliefs, above all in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and at the same time was convinced that the failure of metaphysicians to produce undisputed justifications of these must jeopardize their retention. The failure of Dogmatism in metaphysics inevitably led to Scepticism, and the only way to combat Scepticism effectively was to engage in a critical examination of the powers available to human beings, an examination which would establish definitively both what we can and what we cannot know. Once this task was complete the way would be clear for the position Kant himself wanted to advocate, that the pure intellect cannot know objects which lie beyond possible experience, but equally does not need to, since morality itself is sufficient sanction for the beliefs about them that are necessary.

In view of Hegel's very different position on the subject it is important to stress that the scepticism with which Kant was principally concerned was a limited scepticism, revolving round the possibility of metaphysical knowledge rather than that of knowledge generally.[1] We can see this by reflecting that the need for a critique of pure reason arose, for Kant, only in highly special circumstances. From a relatively early date in Greek history mathematics had been able to build up a body of knowledge without needing any warrant from philosophy; there was a point at which a radical change of method was introduced, but from then onwards the study was on the sure path of science. Enquirers into nature had been longer in finding the proper way to advance, but the problem was eventually solved with the introduction of the experimental method and the framing of questions in quantitative terms; thereafter natural philosophy became natural science. It was only in philosophy, and above all in metaphysics, with its protracted disputes to which no solution was in sight, that further operations must be discontinued until basic questions about the powers and functions of the human intellect had been answered. It is metaphysicians, not enquirers generally, who are solemnly and, as Kant adds, legally suspended from their business until they have satisfactorily answered the question, How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible? What makes the suspension legal is that in operating without benefit of criticism metaphysicians have got themselves into an impasse from which escape is impossible, as the existence of the Antinomy of Pure Reason demonstrates. What makes the suspension necessary is the sceptical sequel to the crisis inside metaphysics whose nature has already been explained.

[1] It may seem inconsistent to ascribe to Kant a limited scepticism and at the same time agree that he was concerned to vindicate scientific knowledge against sceptical attacks. In fact, however, Kant's defence simply consists in arguing that certain advantages we have, including a coherent consciousness and the ability to discriminate the real from the apparent, would not be explicable on Hume's principles. He does not consider a radical scepticism about science.

If the scepticism Kant considered was thus limited, so was the criticism he brought to its examination. 'Our age', wrote Kant, 'is in especial degree the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-making through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination' (CPR 9 footnote). But though religion and government thus have to toe the line, the same is not true of science, or at least of all forms of science. Chemistry comes under critical scrutiny in the preface to *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, as does psychology; the very possibility of an independent science of living things can be seen as the subject of the second half of the *Critique of Judgement*. There were no such doubts in Kant's mind about physics, mathematics, or logic, all of which he took as being broadly in order as they stood. Nor was Kant inclined to question the legitimacy of moral demands, or ready to agree that morality needed philosophical foundations. Philosophy could perform a service to morality, but it was not that of underwriting morality's claims. What it could do was rather make those claims clear by directing the moral agent's attention to what he already knows, without benefit of philosophy, to be the truth on these matters. Critique thus starts from mathematics, physics, and morals, and does not embrace them.

Kant notoriously expressed his conclusion in the *Critique* by saying that we know only appearances, not things as they are in themselves. The only objects open to us are phenomenal objects. The terminology of phenomena and noumena, first used by Kant in the *Dissertation*, of course derives from Plato. Now Plato argued that phenomena are not just different from noumena, but also defective in reality; they are copies of eternal Forms, but imperfect copies, in a medium that lacks the stability for accurate reproduction. Kant strove hard to avoid any pejorative implications in his talk of phenomena; he argued that space and time, though properly described as appearances from the point of view of transcendental philosophy, were for ordinary and scientific consciousness unquestionably real. It was perfectly possible to arrive at the truth, or at any rate some truths, about phenomena. But though this was so, Kant's very use of the term 'phenomena' in this connection suggested that behind them stood something else; truth about which, if only we could come by it, would be far more revealing. He did not ask how this bore on the nature of empirical truth; whether it made it not quite true after all, as Hegel was to argue.

I come now to the question whether Kant's project for a critique of pure reason is open to objections of principle. That it is, and in consequence must be radically transformed if it is to survive, was a recurrent theme in Hegel from his first published writings onwards, Hegel found Kant's whole attitude to metaphysics—his attempt to say that, in Hegelian language, there can be no such thing as knowledge of the Absolute—not only unacceptable but posi-

tively abhorrent, with the result that he is often unfair to Kant over points of detail. Nevertheless, the case he presents is a serious one which deserves altogether more consideration than it gets from Kantian commentators.[2]

Let me try to summarize Hegel's main contentions on this topic without reference to particular texts.[3] They can be put as follows:

1. Kant conceives of knowledge as an instrument which is to be used for a particular purpose, to grasp the true nature of things. He tells us that we must first examine the instrument to find out if it is adequate for the work. The analogy appeals because in the case of other instruments we have no difficulty in examining them when out of use. But we cannot examine cognition without bringing it back into play: a successful examination of knowledge itself requires an act of knowledge. There is thus a radical incoherence in the project for a critique of pure reason as put forward by Kant.

2. The assumption that knowledge is an instrument by means of which we are to grasp reality, or a medium through which we are to discern it, encourages the belief that we can know only appearances, that is reality as distorted by the instrument or the medium. But the whole idea of knowledge of appearances involves difficulties. Knowledge of its nature must be true or of the truth, but appearances are by definition what is not true. Appearances are less than real: how then can they be objects of knowledge?

3. Kant says that we can know only appearances, not things as they are in themselves. However, he makes no bones about admitting that there are things-in-themselves, and indeed often speaks as if commitment to appearances analytically carried with it commitment to the literal existence of things-in-themselves. But to claim that there are things-in-themselves about which we know nothing is openly self-contradictory.

4. Kant's aim is to pronounce on the powers and limits of reason. To fix the limits of a thing it is necessary to have gone beyond that thing, seeing it as it were from the other side. Thus to fix a limit is already to have transcended that limit. On Kant's assumptions fixing a limit to knowledge is impossible.

5. Kant was not wrong to demand that reason engage in self-criticism. Where he was wrong was (a) in limiting such self-criticism to reason as operative in philosophy, leaving non-philosophical reason free from examination; (b) in not seeing that reason must criticize itself as it proceeds and as part of its onward progress, thus making its criticism internal and continuous, rather than something undertaken as an external preliminary. Critique on Kantian

[2] For recent discussions of Hegel's arguments see Quentin Lauer, *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, New York, 1982; Richard Norman, *Hegel's Phenomenology, a Philosophical Introduction*, Sussex, 1976; David Lamb, *Hegel, from Foundation to System*, The Hague, 1980; also Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, London, 1972. The first three endorse Hegel's criticisms; Habermas is more critical but does not advocate a return to Kant. I know of no adequate discussion in English from the Kantian standpoint.

[3] As will be obvious the main source of my summary is the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, with the corresponding passages in the *Encyclopaedia*.

lines can never be complete, if only because it involves unexamined assumptions. Hence it can never provide an effective answer to scepticism.

The value of these arguments obviously varies. Some have a sophistical look, others appear to raise points of major importance. Some depend on admissions Kant need not have made. Thus the familiar objection that Kant allows the existence of things-in-themselves but inconsistently adds that they are entirely unknown to us is certainly valid as it stands, but holds against a position Kant took up carelessly and inadvertently, one he might well have avoided. I mentioned above that it was in the *Dissertation* that Kant revived the Platonic contrast of phenomena and noumena, thinking of the first as objects of senses (or of the senses and the intellect working in co-operation), of the second as known in their main character through pure intellectual concepts. Kant was already prepared to concede that intellectual intuition is ruled out for human beings, but had not yet seen that this throws doubt on the whole possibility of knowledge of things intelligible (perhaps because he still clung to the belief that God's existence can be proved a priori). Further reflection on the role of concepts, and particularly of pure concepts, led him to abandon his belief that we possess descriptive knowledge of a *mundus intelligibilis*, but not, unfortunately, to doubt its literal existence. The position he should have taken from this point on is that things of this kind are possible, but cannot be known to be actual; he should have retained the concept of the thing-in-itself, without committing himself to the proposition that the concept has application. In the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena in the second edition of the *Critique*, where he produces his more careful thought on the subject, he argues that all he needs to ground his main contentions is the thought of the (or a) noumenon conceived in negative terms, as something which is 'not an object of our sensible intuition' (B307). Kant says that it is quite different if we take the term 'noumenon' in a positive way and understand by it 'an object of a non-sensible intuition', since 'we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely the intellectual, which is not that which we possess and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility' (B307). But this rests on the assumption that 'object of a non-sensible intuition' must itself be understood positively for the phrase to convey meaning, when the indications are that a negative, or largely negative, definition will suffice. Despite Kant's declaration that we cannot even comprehend the possibility of intellectual intuition, he succeeds very well in elucidating the idea at various points in his writings. And it seems to me that he must invoke it if he is to equate noumena with things-in-themselves. Speaking in a misleading way from the point of view of discursive consciousness, we can say that things-in-themselves are the objects we should encounter were our understanding to be intuitive. But we can make this claim without asserting that any understanding is intuitive and hence without commitment to the view that things-in-themselves exist.

Had Kant been content to work with the *idea* of an independent thing in itself, leaving open the question whether anything corresponds to it, he could

have stood by all his main conclusions without being exposed to the charge of inconsistency. Given the concept of an intuitive understanding as one which differs from ours at a crucial point but in ways we can grasp only in outline, he could have established the requirements for knowledge in the case of human beings and could have made clear a way in which such knowledge is limited, in that it cannot extend to a certain sort of possible object. If metaphysics is thought of as the supposed science of things intelligible, as it was in the *Dissertation* and generally in Kant's thought, metaphysics could then be declared to be impossible without the slightest embarrassment. To describe objects of the senses as 'appearances' might in these circumstances be uninformative, since they would qualify for this description simply by not figuring in the thinking of an intuitive understanding. But this would not prejudice the success of any further arguments Kant might offer in support of their phenomenal character, nor affect his contention that only what fell within, or was connected with, the sense-given could be known to human beings. The further claim that God, Freedom, and Immortality cannot be subjects of knowledge but, at most, of a peculiar sort of faith could stand on this view without fear of attack on the grounds of consistency. It might of course be assailed on quite other grounds, as might the rest of Kant's theory, but that is not to the point now.

One way to put the conclusion just argued for is to say that despite Hegel it is possible to fix a limit without going beyond it: I can fix a limit not just by directing my mind to something actual which lies beyond my reach, but also by thinking of something hypothetical which is similarly beyond me. To determine the limits of a geographical territory I have to know that there is another side, if not what is on the other side; to determine the limits of my cognitive powers I need do no more than think of possible objects on or around which they might be exercised and ask myself whether they can. Thus I can see that my intellectual capacities are limited by reflecting that, whatever turns up in my experience, any description I give of it must necessarily be in general terms, such that it does not capture the situation in its full individuality. I can conceive, in a negative way at any rate, of an intelligence whose powers were quite different, one which in the very act of thinking would come to apprehend something individual. For such an intelligence universals and particulars as we know them would be fused, descriptions appropriate to each unique occasion instead of transferable to similar cases. My thinking falls short of this because I have an understanding which is not intuitive but discursive, with a sharp contrast of concepts and intuitions as a consequence. The concrete grasp of what Hegel called 'universalized particulars' clearly lies beyond me. But to arrive at this result I do not have to suppose that such objects actually exist, as part of a reality which is unfortunately unknown. I do not even have to suppose that there really are beings possessed of intuitive understandings: the bare thought of such a possible intelligence suffices for my purposes.

If Hegel's claim about fixing a limit being already to be beyond it means

that I cannot in consistency maintain that human abilities are circumscribed, it is false in the way just shown. There is, however, a more interesting way of taking it. Hegel was opposed above all to the tendency he saw in Kant and other pious persons (Locke would be another example) to acquiesce in finitude: he wanted to argue that men can overcome their limitations and have a capacity for self-improvement which is without bounds. To recognize a deficiency is the first step towards overcoming that deficiency, just as to formulate a problem clearly is often to be on the way to its solution. Thus the Absolute may after all be within our grasp; to think of ourselves as cut off from it in principle is certainly not legitimate. One can sympathize with the general idea here without being prepared to accept the full argument. Sitting down in quiet contentment that we know all we need to know is less attractive than it was; the notion that there might be areas which are best not trusted to the uncertainties of human reason now has little appeal. Hegel with his demand that thought be free to range unchecked wherever it chooses expresses, here as elsewhere, a characteristically modern view. Yet after all it is a question not just of what we *want* to do but also of what we *can* do, and here the considerations adduced by Kant are surely relevant. It may be true that recognizing a limit in some cases is a step on the way to its removal; in others, however, no such result ensues. To revert to my previous example, suppose I reflect on the differences between merely thinking of something in the abstract and grasping it in its particularity, thus becoming aware that thought in itself cannot produce knowledge of the individual: does consciousness of the limitation do anything to remove it? Or, to take a different example, suppose I observe that my cognitive powers are limited by my incapacity to hold all parts or aspects of the universe, here, there, and elsewhere, now, past, or future, before my mind at once: does the incapacity disappear when the limitation is realized? I may perhaps improve my ability to hold a plurality of views before my mind at any one time, yet I can hardly hope to overcome this particular form of finitude altogether. In the other case, the predicament of my possessing a discursive intellect, there is not even room for improvement. I do not see how Hegel could deny these claims, or how he could be taken seriously if he did.

It is true that someone who has acquired a clear consciousness of the powers (and hence the limitations) of the human intellect is in a better position to advance knowledge than a mere dogmatist who tackles questions of every sort in the naïve confidence that he will be able to answer them. The dogmatist lands himself in a muddle, and knowing what we can and cannot do is certainly better than that. But this is not of course to claim that when one sees one's limitations one already knows how to overcome them. Hegel perhaps never said anything quite so strong as that, but he did imply that a person in that position must have at least a dim idea of a condition better than his own, and further must have a real chance of attaining that improved condition for himself. Without such assumptions there would be no substance in the notion of a dialectical progression to the truth. A point of major difference between

Hegel and his opponents is that whereas the latter tend to separate criticism and first-order thought, taking the first to belong to a reflective level more familiar to philosophers than scientists, Hegel fuses the two in a single ongoing activity which is at once self-critical and self-improving. Hegel will have nothing to do with the idea that studies like mathematics and physics can be said to be in order as they are, wholly unbeholden to philosophy. In his view there is no clear contrast between philosophical and unphilosophical thought: all thought is philosophical in some degree, and accordingly philosophical insight is not an idle addendum to the results achieved in a direct search for truth, but rather something bearing immediately on the success of that project. Kant thinks of the critical philosopher as like a policeman who directs the public away from areas whose cultivation is decreed as unprofitable and indicates others that are more promising; he does not himself make discoveries at the basic level, but helps forward the search for truth in a way which is essentially negative. In principle, first-order enquiries could proceed without benefit of philosophy; in practice they need the protection philosophy affords, but only because the siren-song of metaphysics rings so loud in the human ear. Hegel's view is entirely different. Critical philosophy, for him, is continuous with the investigation of relations of ideas and matters of fact (which are also not separate from one another). Problems arise in all such investigations, and in order to deal with them thought must not only be supple and innovative but also reflective: it must be ready to bring its assumptions to consciousness, and where necessary to amend, transform or even abandon them. Clearly reflection of this sort plays a direct part in the advance to greater understanding. And there would be sense in saying of this sort of reflection that, for it, limitations are obstacles to be overcome, not barriers to be noted and respected in all future endeavour.

The stand to be taken on this complex issue affects much more than the question about the limits of knowledge from which we started. In outlining Hegelian objections to a critique of pure reason conceived as an essential preliminary to further enquiry into the true being of things I mentioned the argument that the project is incoherent because, in Hegel's own words, 'the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge' (*LL* §10). On this view Kant bids us suspend the use of our cognitive powers, only to institute an enquiry that demands that those same powers be brought back into play. Kant might reply first that he is not calling for a general suspension of first-order investigation, only of metaphysical enquiry, then that there is nothing *inconsistent* in refraining from first-order investigation with a view to engaging in reflective activity: the reason that functions in the second is very different from the reason involved in the first. But this of course presumes that a sharp distinction can be drawn, contrary to Hegel's belief, between what goes on when one tackles a problem in some first-order study such as mathematics or physics and what happens when one engages in reflective philosophical activity directed on such first-order studies, actual or potential. It also presumes that Kant can give a satisfactory account of the

knowledge involved in critical philosophy. The fact is, of course, that he did not offer any clear account of this subject, but rather confused the issue by failing to distinguish decisively between the principles critique purports to establish and the basic truths on which it rests. The former are synthetic a priori, the latter[4] could well be contingent and empirical, or arise from assertions having that character. I take it Hegel thought they too must be synthetic and necessary, come by through a species of intellectual insight which is denied to the metaphysician; it is easy to see why he believed that the critical philosophy was openly inconsistent at this point. My own view is that it is not, though I have to admit that Kant gives little help in establishing the point, and indeed mostly speaks as if the problem did not exist.

Another topic affected by the controversy about the function of critical philosophy concerns what the latter may properly take for granted. Kant as we saw took mathematics and physics, once they had each hit on the sure path of science, to be in order as they stood; he was not seriously exercised about the question whether they contain examples of genuine knowledge. In the *Prolegomena*, metaphysics is judged by its success or failure in meeting requirements which mathematics and physics were known to have met successfully; in the *Critique* the argument proceeds differently, but the contention that we actually possess examples of synthetic a priori truths in mathematics and pure physics functions as an unargued postulate there too. As already noted, scepticism on this account is allowed only limited scope, as is philosophy. Hegel saw philosophy and scepticism alike as altogether more pervasive, indeed as embracing or threatening to embrace all human thought. The notion that philosophy should accept mathematics or physics, or for that matter any other departmental study or activity, as wholly respectable on its own account, would have struck him as perverse and wrong-headed. And his argument in support of this view would turn on the claims about philosophical criticism briefly noticed above.

What then are we to say about these claims? It seems to me that both Kant and Hegel could be correct in part of what they assert. For first there is surely nothing extravagant in the contention that first-order enquirers—physicists, historians, economists, for example—regularly engage in a species of reflective thought, in the course of which they lay bare their assumptions and if necessary rethink them, with a view to improving their knowledge of the world. The critical activity Hegel describes is a reality, whether or not it is philosophical; if it were not, successful first-order enquiry would be difficult, if not impossible. It is correct to say of this sort of critical activity that it is internal to the pursuit of knowledge generally, arises naturally out of everyday thought and sees limits as obstacles to be overcome. Yet all this could be true without ruling out a different kind of reflective study, of the type Kant

[4] For example, the dictum that 'thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts are blind'. See the discussions in my book *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics*, Edinburgh, 1975, §42, and in my paper *Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique*, Kant-Studien, 1966.

had in mind. That reason can be reflective in direct connection with what goes on at the first-order level does not preclude its also being reflective in a different way. What Kant proposed was an examination of the powers of reason to be conducted with a degree of abstraction hardly likely to appeal to the working scientist, one whose benefits would accrue not in particular cognitive situations but, perhaps, to cognition as a whole. Such an enquiry into the conditions of knowledge would indeed indicate profitable and unprofitable fields for future investigation, but with a generality that might well disappoint those keen to make new discoveries. For its conclusions would concern what could and what could not be known as a matter of principle, and here there would be no question of transcending the limits set, no matter what ingenuity was shown.

On the face of things it looks as if Kant's type of claim contradicts Hegel's, but this need not be so. The self-criticism Hegel describes could be part and parcel of the direct search for knowledge; it would then go along with a prudent scepticism which regards no first-order issue as settled beyond possibility of reconsideration. The self-criticism Kant advocates would come up for different reasons and at a different level, as part not so much of the discovery of fresh truths as of the acquirement of an understanding of the human condition. Kant's interests would be philosophical in a broad sense of that term, one that has to do with the relating of different sides of human experience; Hegel's interests as so far considered need not be philosophical at all. Now we know, of course, that Hegel in fact made very substantial claims for philosophy, looking on it as a study that reveals ultimate truth about the world, and accordingly is in a position to authenticate or, where necessary, correct the results of the special sciences; he would not agree that it has only the restricted functions recent philosophers have assigned to it. Nor would he be prepared to acquiesce in any such study of the conditions of knowledge as was undertaken by Kant and his empiricist predecessors, if only because they proceed on the assumption that we possess actual examples of knowledge and can use them to set up a standard by which to judge other cognitive claims. Critical philosophy as practised by Kant failed in Hegel's eyes to take scepticism with the seriousness it deserved.

How seriously scepticism should be taken is a subject much discussed in reeent philosophy, about which what needs to be said now is that opinion is more favourable to a restricted scepticism than it was. Hegel stands in the tradition of the ancient sceptics and the professions, if not the performance, of Descartes in holding that no proposition can escape philosophical doubt; his aim is to show that scepticism can be countered, but only at the level of absolute knowledge. The *Phenomenology* professes to demonstrate the cognitive shortcomings of many attitudes to experience, including those of science and common sense. It does not dismiss these attitudes altogether, but views them as stages on the road to truth rather than as touchstones by which claims to truth are to be assessed. For Hegel, Kant's faith in physics as a repository of certain knowledge was merely naïve. But though Kant was cer-

tainly wrong in his judgement of the finality of the achievements of Euclid and Newton, it is less clear that he was in error in taking mathematics and physics to be generally in order as they stand. I take this to mean that students of these sciences know in principle what to do to solve the problems that confront them, and have pursued the solution of their problems to the point where those qualified to pronounce agree that they have achieved success. Scientific opinion may of course be mistaken in individual cases, with the result that there is no absurdity in extending doubt to any particular scientific conclusion, however widely accepted. But though on this view it is not absurd to question any particular scientific 'truth', it would be absurd to wonder whether physics or mathematics contains any truth whatsoever. A scepticism extending as far as this abolishes the basis of certainty on which, as Wittgenstein and others have argued, fruitful doubt can alone proceed. This is thus a case for what I previously called prudent scepticism within science, but no case at all for an unlimited scepticism about science.

If we judge them by their *ex cathedra* utterances, Hegel goes too far in the direction of unlimited scepticism, taking an attitude to the established sciences which is altogether too cavalier, whilst Kant is so impressed by the achievements of Euclid and Newton that he turns out to be lacking in prudent scepticism. I suggest, however, that we read Hegel as in fact advocating a healthy scepticism in the actual pursuit of knowledge, thus extending prudent scepticism to the maximum degree, and Kant as insisting on the sound philosophical conclusion that scepticism must come to an end somewhere. Kant saw that an unlimited external scepticism is indefensible, Hegel that without a continuing internal scepticism knowledge will never advance. As for Hegel's commitment to philosophy as the ultimate arbiter in these matters, we cannot accept that as it stands if we are to make good the reconciliation here attempted. If Kant is right in principle about physics and mathematics, Hegel's claims for philosophy will not stand up. Yet it may be possible to re-state the central point in the Hegelian position in a way that makes it more palatable. Those who work in the various special sciences are immediately concerned with difficulties in particular areas; their first object is to discover *truths* rather than *the truth*. It would all the same be highly eccentric in such an investigator to announce that the question how the truths he discovered related to those claimed in other disciplines left him cold. At the very least we should expect him to acknowledge the need for overall consistency not only in his own results, but also between them and whatever else was to count as knowledge, in each and every field. And we might find in practice that he was interested in something more than consistency, in fact, in finding a single theory in terms of which his own conclusions could positively connect and harmonize with those of others. The Logical Positivists had a project for what they called 'Unified Science'; they used the phrase to refer to a proposed integration of the results of the different scientific disciplines, whether natural or social, in a single study ranging over the whole field of human cognition. They insisted that Unified Science would be totally different from philosophy.

What I am suggesting is that Unified Science was a secular counterpart of philosophy as Hegel conceived it, that sense can be made of Hegel's proposals if we think of his ideas on these lines, and that so taken the central views of Hegel about philosophical criticism can be rendered consistent with those of Kant.

I proceed now to some further Hegelian objections to what Kant tried to do. One concerns Kant's supposed conception of knowledge as an instrument or a medium, by means of which or through which we seek to get hold of reality. In the opening paragraphs of the *Phenomenology* Hegel ridicules these notions, arguing that they lead to the absurdity of thinking that truth must for ever elude us, a proposition which itself purports to be true. He also urges that the comparison between knowledge and an instrument breaks down because we cannot in this case take the instrument out of use for examination without at once bringing it back to do the examining. Hegel does not mention Kant by name in this passage, but clearly thinks of him as a prominent victim of this bit of picture thinking. Is the charge justified? The fact that Kant does not speak of knowledge as an instrument is not important, first because philosophers who are captivated by a picture of this sort are typically not aware of what they are assuming, second because it is notorious that Kant does use the language of cognitive faculties or powers (*Erkenntnisvermögen*), and it is natural to think of a cognitive faculty as suitable for a particular purpose and hence as a kind of instrument. Kant asks in the *Critique* what reason can and cannot do when working by itself, which amounts to an enquiry into its proper function. The conclusion we are meant to draw is that reason should be employed for this purpose and not employed for that because it is suited to the first but not the second. In this respect reason is indeed thought of as a tool or a device.

What exactly is wrong with thinking of reason or, to use Hegel's barbarism, 'knowledge' as a tool or instrument? Hegel criticizes the idea on two distinct grounds. The first, which we have already discussed at length, is that to think of knowledge in this way is to embrace the incoherent belief that you can investigate your cognitive capacities without bringing cognition into play. If knowledge is an instrument, it is one used by a knowing subject. Hegel's second objection is that, if knowledge is an instrument, it may well be expected to offer an obstacle to the discovery of truth rather than a means to it, since on this account it will stand between the investigator and the object of its investigation, distorting the reality it seeks to descry. Instead of finding out the truth we shall thus be inexorably cut off from it. And though those who argue in this way, Kant in particular, console themselves with the thought that some knowledge is available to human beings, namely knowledge of appearances, they leave the question what this can amount to without serious examination. If knowledge is of what is the case, and the apparent diverges from the real, it is hard to see how 'knowledge of appearances' is knowledge at all.

I hope it will not be necessary to add very much to my previous comments on Hegel's first objection. The subject of knowledge spoken of above is a being possessed of certain abilities, among them the ability to examine its other powers and establish the conditions of their functioning. That human beings have reflective as well as directly investigative powers is a familiar fact; that they can use them to determine the limits of knowledge is shown by the very existence of works like the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Such a critique is not to be thought of, as Hegel misleadingly suggests, as an essential preliminary to any use of reason. It becomes possible only when some studies have attained the sure path of science, it becomes necessary only in special circumstances, those in fact in which human reason, seeking to solve those problems for whose solution 'the mathematician would gladly exchange the whole of his science' (B491/A463), 'precipitates itself into darkness and contradictions' (CPR 7). A critique of pure reason can determine what is required for a certain sort of first-order enquiry to succeed; it cannot simultaneously determine its own limitations, since it cannot at once conduct an investigation into something else and attend to itself. Hegel's repudiation of the idea that knowledge is an instrument trades on the phenomenon Gilbert Ryle called 'the systematic elusiveness of "I" ': the fact that, however much I try to make myself an object of my own consciousness, there is always something that escapes my attention, namely my present attending. But as Ryle argued the phenomenon need cause no special metaphysical excitement, since though my present attending cannot be the object of my present attention, it can be the object of my subsequent attention. Bradley anticipated Ryle on the point when he said in *Appearance and Reality* that though the self necessarily presented itself as subject and object, no part of it intrinsically belonged to either. Whatever stood on the side of the subject could be transferred to the side of the object, and *vice versa*. If this is correct Hegel's objection, which revolves round the idea that the subject is something absolute and ineliminable, falls to the ground.

Must an instrument distort what it is used to descry? It seems strange to say that it must, even though it is true that some instruments introduce special distortions of their own. An instrument of the kind we are discussing, however, is essentially a device to improve our perceptions, and does not deserve the name unless it achieves this result in some degree. It looks as if Hegel put in his remarks about an instrument distorting partly because he objected to the epistemological picture he thought went with it, that of an enquiring mind on the one side and an independent reality enquired into on the other, partly because Kant had in effect argued that our cognitive apparatus does distort. Much of the plausibility of the opening arguments of the *Phenomenology* comes from the fact that Kant professed to know not only that our perception of reality is distorted by our cognitive equipment, but also precisely what form the distortion takes. The Kantian claim that we know only appearances, true reality being unknown, is impossible to defend as it stands. To make Kant coherent a first step is to drop the idea that things-in-themselves

are literally existent and replace it with an account that makes them internal objects of a possible intuitive understanding, as argued before. But to get the story right it is necessary to add that pure forms of intuition and pure concepts are not, as Kant implied, barriers that stand in the way of our apprehending reality, but rather vehicles for the acquisition of truth. Kant saw this in so far as he offered an account of empirical truth and reality: he realized that the categories, taken in relation to the forms of time and space, define what shall count as empirically real, and are hence the best clues we have to the true nature of the experienced world. Unfortunately his description of the same apparatus as 'subjective' when he spoke from the point of view of transcendental philosophy opened the way to criticisms of the Hegelian kind.

This brings me to my final topic, Hegel's charge that the whole concept of knowledge of appearances requires critical scrutiny. As so often, Hegel makes his point in an apparently sophistical way by arguing that, since the Absolute alone is true, knowledge of what falls short of that will be knowledge of the untrue, and therefore not true knowledge. But there is a serious point behind this verbal juggling, the contention that knowledge of appearances should not be seen as a wholly correct grasp of an object that diverges from reality, but should be interpreted instead as an apprehension, in part correct, in part incorrect, of reality itself. 'Knowledge of appearances', so called, cannot be accepted as it stands, but needs to be clarified, supplemented and in part replaced if anything like the truth of things is to emerge. Now it is worth observing that an account of the matter very much on these lines was given by philosophers of the Rationalist school, notably Descartes and Leibniz with their distinction of what is clear and distinct on the one hand and what is obscure and confused on the other. We know from the *Dissertation* (Diss) and the *Critique* (CPR) why Kant found himself unable to accept this proposal: intuitions are wholly distinct from concepts, for human beings at least, and there are no circumstances in which either could be substituted for the other. Mathematical thinking requires a certain resort to sense, but is not the less clear because of that. I have no wish to challenge at any rate the first of these, whose importance Hegel perhaps never fully appreciated. But I think it worth stressing that Kant himself accepted the Rationalist programme in an attenuated form in so far as he distinguished appearance and reality at the empirical level. The empirically real differs from the empirically apparent in that the first is what we arrive at when our judgements are governed by the precisely defined and systematically connected concepts of science, while the second represents the upshot of common sense and everyday thought. Kant saw that our ordinary perceptual judgements do not entirely misrepresent the truth of the experienced world, but equally do not give the whole of it, that task being reserved for the judgements of science. What he did not see, or did not appear to see, is that a special problem is created when the transition is made to the transcendental level, and we learn that all knowledge of the space–time world, scientific as well as commonsensical, can rank only as knowledge of appearances. It is natural in such circumstances to think that there

must be some way of improving on 'knowledge' of that sort; Hegel's logical writings purport to open up the way, by offering sets of concepts that are said to be better fitted to grasp the truth of things than those endorsed by Kant. In so far as Hegel accepted the idea of absorbing intuitions into concepts, if indeed he did, Kant could properly refuse to have anything to do with this proposal. But were Hegel to confine himself to the point that there may in principle be ways of thinking about what falls within experience which are superior to those set out in the Transcendental Analytic, Kant can hardly refuse to consider the suggestion, the more so since he half considered it himself in his account of teleological judgements. Kant would no doubt have found the idea that the experienced world is the self-expression of Spirit extravagant and unconvincing; what is less clear is that he could dismiss it as absurd. Or if he did, on the mistaken ground that Hegel was postulating entities beyond possible experience, he would be under obligation to explain what he could mean by describing our knowledge of things empirical as all phenomenal. If it is the case that our actual intellectual equipment suffices for achieving an understanding of the world of experience which is fully satisfactory at its own level, why must such understanding be written down by being said to be only of appearances? Will not Kant have to agree that when he says things in space and time are at best only appearances he uses that term in a very misleading way? The contrast of appearance and reality here is not that of less and more real; the relation is rather between the reality we arrive at when we judge as best we can and the reality we might arrive at were our cognitive faculties wholly different from what they are. The suggestion that there is a reality beyond the veil of sense whose nature we cannot spell out, though we know it is different from that of things in space and time, is a fraud; if we know nothing of things-in-themselves, we know nothing of them. To say as some have that Kant remained a crypto-Leibnizian, believing that material things are really clusters of souls, will not help; it was not open to Kant to entertain any such ideas. It looks then as if his contention that empirical knowledge is all of appearances amounts to no more than that it is confined to possible experience. But if it is, that is hardly a lucid or candid way of putting the point.

CHAPTER 7

ON HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

TIMOTHY O'HAGAN

HEGEL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF THE KANTIAN SYSTEM IN SUMMARY

JUST as modern epistemology is inaugurated by the Cartesian *cogito*, so modern moral and political theory is inaugurated by the Hobbesian conception of the individual human being's 'endeavour', transformed by deliberation into his will, as the source of all social practice.[1] Hegel remarks approvingly that Hobbes 'sought to derive the bond which holds the state together, that which gives the state its power, from principles which lie within us, which we recognize as our own' (*LHP* iii 316). For Hegel, the *Leviathan* marks a radical break from the theocentric past to the anthropocentric present (*LHP* iii 313).[2] Subsequent political theory, from this perspective, particularly in the idiom of natural law, is to be understood as a series of attempts to elucidate our conception of the will, as the practical correlate of the theoretical *cogito*.

In his essay on *Natural Law* (*NL*), Hegel periodizes modern natural law doctrine into the empiricist stage of Hobbes, Grotius and Locke and the formal stage of Rousseau, followed by Kant and Fichte. Hegel's dissatisfaction with both variants has already been meticulously analyzed.[3] He criticizes the former in the same terms used by Rousseau in the critique of Hobbes,[4] for their illicit eternalization and universalization of contingent features of given societies. They 'abstracted singular aspects, e.g. the drive for self-preservation . . . gave them the form of unified concepts and elevated them to the rank of fundamental principles' (*NL* 60–1). But Hegel takes Rousseau's critique further. For Hegel, the empiricists lack the necessary vision of reason, developing historically and finding social embodiment, and so fail to give a

[1] See Hobbes's *Leviathan* Ch. 6 and Ch. 21. For commentary on Hobbes's concepts of endeavour, will, and freedom, see J. Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas*, London, 1973, Ch. 7.

[2] On the importance of Hobbes for Hegel, see M. Riedel, *Between Tradition and Revolution: the Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy*, trans. W. Wright, Cambridge, 1984, 59 ff.

[3] See Riedel, Ch. 4.

[4] 'Hobbes's mistake was not that he established the state of war between men who were independent and became sociable, but that he assumed this state to be natural to the species and made it the cause of vices of which it is in fact the effect.' (J-J. Rousseau, First Version of the *Social Contract*, *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1964, t. 3. 288.

satisfactory picture of society as a structured relational system founded upon rational principle: the confusion of essential and contingent, of a priori and a posteriori, is itself a function of the absence of the requisite concepts of reason, development, and actualization.

For Hegel in 1802–3, the great advance of the formal over the empiricist variant of natural law doctrine is that it elaborates a normative, rather than merely descriptive, conception of self-consciousness, in which 'the essence of right and duty and the essence of the thinking and willing subject are one and the same' (NL 83). This union of 'thinking and willing' is theorized by Kant in the concept of the categorical imperative, according to which a rational being endorses a universal principle of consistency to govern his practical as much as his theoretical life, an endorsement which is activated by the pure will. This, for Hegel, is both the summit and the limit of formalism: the summit, in that it develops to its fullest extent the concept of the autonomous, self-conscious will; the limit, in that it is infected by the vices of abstraction (emptiness) and dualism.

KANT'S DEONTOLOGY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

In order to assess Hegel's charges, we must start with a schematic exposition of Kant's own account of practical reason and the categorical imperative. For Kant a human being is rational, but only partly rational, a bundle of reason and desires: to be free is not to be without desires, but to have reason in control of those desires. In Rousseau's formula: 'the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which one has prescribed to oneself is freedom.'[5] According to Kant's moral psychology, practical reason, in the form of the pure autonomous will, can 'determine' actions. It is an 'inscrutable faculty', in which 'the concept of causality is already contained . . . in relation to the moral law which determines its reality' (CPrR 49, 57–8). Practical reasoning has an autonomy which theoretical reasoning can never attain, since the latter has 'as its given basis the form of intuition (space and time) which does not lie in reason itself but which rather has to be taken over from sensibility.' Whereas in the former 'the practical concepts a priori in relation to the supreme principle of freedom immediately become cognitions, not needing to wait upon intuitions in order to acquire a meaning . . . they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer' (CPrR 68). This then is the positive element in formalism, the 'unity of thinking and willing' which Hegel praises, indeed the identity of the two: 'Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason' (G 80).

Kant's deontology is radical in its purity. According to it, the moral worth of an action is derived from the fact that it is performed 'from duty' (*aus Pflicht*). Kant bids us distinguish first between the duty to perform an action and the inclination to do so and second between the duty to perform an action and the 'purpose to be attained by' it (G 66–8). Now the imprecision of

[5] J-J. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, I. 8.

Kant's language (and perhaps of his thought on this issue) has tempted commentators, including Hegel, to misinterpret one or both of these distinctions. Hegel takes the first distinction to imply that only behaviour adopted from duty and counter to inclinations is moral, thus 'the harmony of the sensuous and the rational... abrogates morality; for that consists in this very opposition of reason to the sensuous.' (LHP iii 463)[6] We shall return to this point later, but for the moment it is enough to note that in this first distinction Kant is not advocating the opposition (quite the contrary), but is maintaining that if a person is to act morally he must follow duty on principle, not merely contingently, and he must do so even where the demand of duty conflicts with that of desire. The second distinction is equally open to misinterpretation, by one who would read it as ordering the moral agent to act irresponsibly, ignoring the consequences of his actions. Despite suggestions to the contrary, Kant is here opposing 'eudaemonism' or utilitarianism of a kind which would undermine the validity of any general moral principles. In Paton's words, 'If Kant had said merely that we must not allow our desires for particular consequences to determine our judgement of what our duty is, he would have avoided a great deal of misunderstanding.'[7]

In combination with his austere deontology Kant constructs a system of moral psychology. His programme is to characterize a particular kind of behaviour, namely moral behaviour, in terms of its specific form of subjective motivation as well as its objective standard of conformity to the moral law. Kant finds that the real and authentic motivation (*Triebfeder*) lies in the law itself, for which the moral agent feels respect (*Achtung*). Instead of happiness (*Glückseligkeit*), Kant bids us cultivate a more stoical psychological state, the not wholly attractive sounding 'self-contentment' (*Selbstzufriedenheit*) or 'satisfaction in one's own existence'. Reverence for the moral law is inspired not only by its majestic universality, but also by the realization that its source of legitimation is the moral subject himself: 'although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling *received* through outside influence, but one self-produced by a

[6] Hegel's point had been put more wittily by Schiller in a little dialogue between the ordinary man, who says: 'Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person'; and the philosopher who replies: 'Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, and then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.' (Quoted by T. C. Williams, *The Concept of the Categorical Imperative*, Oxford, 1968, 60.)

[7] H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, quoted by Williams, 63. While Kant's comments on happiness are somewhat equivocal, they should not, as Williams shows, be interpreted as 'misanthropy': '... this distinction of the principle of happiness from that of morality is not for this reason an opposition between them, and pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce the claims to happiness; it requires only that we take no account of them whenever duty is in question. It can even be a duty in certain respects to provide for one's happiness, in part because ... it contains means to the fulfilment of one's duty and in part because the lack of it... contains temptations to transgress against duty' (CPrR 96). In the pithier epigram of the Groundwork: 'To assure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for discontent with one's state, in a press of cares and amid unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great *temptation* to the *transgression* of duty' (G 67).

rational concept' ('durch einen Vernunftbegriff selbstgewirktes Gefühl').[8] Thus objective and subjective factors are united in the principle of moral autonomy: 'there is nothing left able to determine the will except objectively the *law* and subjectively *pure reverence* for this practical law and therefore the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations' (G 68–9).

This law itself, the law of morality, is founded by Kant on a particular type of imperative, which 'represents an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end'. All other imperatives are hypothetical, in that they 'declare an action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills: their object is "good for some purposes" ' (G 82). If we display the typology of imperatives in tabular form, this primary distinction is represented by the broad vertical line. The narrow vertical line, within the domain of hypothetical imperatives between possible and actual goods, is secondary in Kant's schema. Hegel does not address either distinction directly, but his counter-model to Kantian *Moralität*, that of embodied *Sittlichkeit*, can be understood in part as an attempt to re-draw these vertical lines. He will maintain the legitimating function of the pure autonomous will, lying to the right of the broad line, but will revalue the components of the left of that line and in so doing will put in question the sharp separation between possible and actual goods and between the resulting terms separated by the narrow vertical line.

In thus re-drawing the lines, Hegel recuperates two elements of Aristotle's moral and political thought which had been eclipsed by Kant's dualisms. First, Aristotle had held that a combination of intellectual and moral virtues is necessary for the citizens of a civilized community. These include the practical intellectual virtue of prudence (*phronesis*), relating to 'ultimate particular things', a form of educated perception both of one's own interests and of those of one's fellows, and the ethical virtue of temperance (*sophrosyne*), which regulates the individual's enjoyments, promoting 'such pleasures as conduce to health and fitness ... in a moderate and right degree.' Second, for Aristotle, there was no sharp division between the sciences and the virtues of the individual, on the one hand, and those of the community, on the other: 'Prudence is ... the same quality of mind as political science, though differently conceived.' Hegel's project in political philosophy can be understood, in part, as an attempt to revive the Aristotelian idea of the political community as an embodiment, a form of expression and flourishing of both intellectual and moral virtues, while at the same time making space for the wholly modern division between public and private spheres and the valorization of the latter at the professional as well as the familial level.[9]

[8] While the first source of awe may seem somewhat remote, this second one must strike a chord in readers of Sartre's descriptions of the anguish experienced by the agent at the realization of his own absolute freedom.

[9] Quotations from Aristotle are from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham, London, 1936, 6.8, 3.11, 6.7. These comments follow closely J. Ritter, *Hegel and the French Revolution*, trans. W. D. Winfield, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, p. 164 ff.

1) TYPES OF IMPERATIVE:	hypothetical imperatives		categorical imperative
2) RELATE TO CERTAIN CLASSES OF OBJECTS, THOSE THAT ARE:	good for some purpose: possible good	actual good	good in itself
3) THESE IMPERATIVES FOUND TYPES OF PRINCIPLE:	problematic practical principles	assertoric practical principles	apodeictic practical principles
4) WHICH ARE MEDIATED BY:	skill: ability in attaining arbitrary end	prudence: ability in attaining one's happiness	no mediations: the principle enjoins the conduct immediately
5) THUS THE TWO-FOLD TYPOLOGY OF (1) CAN BE RE-PHRASED AS A THREE-FOLD TYPOLOGY OF IMPERATIVES:	technical imperatives	pragmatic imperatives	moral imperatives
6) WHICH CAN BE GENERALIZED INTO NORMS WITH DIFFERENT DEGREES OF NECESSITATION:	rules of skill	counsels of prudence	commands or laws of morality
7) WHOSE OBJECTS IN TURN ARE:	art (*Kunst*)	well-being (*Wohlfahrt*)	free conduct as such, i.e. with morality (*Sitten*)

Of the different formulations of the categorical imperative in the *Groundwork* we shall consider only two:[10]

[10] For a detailed presentation and analysis of the formulations, see Williams. Williams argues that for Kant morality presupposes the categorical imperative and the categorical imperative presupposes autonomy. This looks to be correct, but the details of his argument lie beyond our concerns here.

First formulation: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.' (*G* 88)
Second formulation: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.' (*G* 96)

Kant applies these two formulations to the same set of four examples: (1) suicide, (2) promise-breaking, (3) failure to develop one's own talents, (4) failure to help others in misfortune.

FIRST FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF IT

'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'

Kant uses the first formulation to show that the forms of behaviour (1)–(4) are flawed by inconsistency.

(1) Since the desire to commit suicide is held to be a form of self-love, when that desire is universalized, 'It is seen at once that a system of nature by whose law the very same feeling whose function is to stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy life would contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature' (*G* 89).

(2) Promise-breaking is proscribed on similar grounds: 'the universality of a law that everyone believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make promising and the very purpose of promising itself impossible' (*G* 90). Kant uses a similar example in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where he proscribes the 'maxim to increase my property by every safe means'. Acting on that maxim, I 'make the law that every man is allowed to deny that a deposit has been made when no one can prove the contrary. I immediately realize that taking such a principle as a law would annihilate itself, because its result would be that no one would make a deposit' (*CPrR* 27).

Hegel criticizes this version of the example as a case of the 'emptiness' or lack of 'content' of the categorical imperative. According to Hegel, the standard of non-contradiction can be applied only when a given institution or practice (in this case private property) is presupposed: 'there is no contradiction involved in theft; if there is no such thing as property, then it is not respected' (*LHP* iii 460–1).[11] The standard of non-contradiction is 'empty' for Hegel because it is compatible with a range of different social arrangements and does not enjoin one rather than another. The 'content' for him is imported more or less accidentally from a given social order. A Kantian reply to this charge would be that the presupposition of an institution or practice does not devalue the moral injunction thereby presupposed. Thus the injunction: 'You should not cheat at cards' applies only within a 'culture' of card-playing to

[11] This is an enduring theme of Hegel's critique, from *NL* 76–8, through *PR* §§ 134–5 to the *LHP* cited here.

those who themselves play. But that particular injunction embodies a higher injunction: 'You should not cheat', which in turn may stand as an end point of moral injunctions or may embody a higher one still. It is in those terms that the promise-breaking version of the example is defensible. The Kantian reply would be that any social order deprived of all trust and commitment would be untenable. The proscription of promise-breaking would thus figure nearer the source of all moral injunctions.

Thus while the general form of the Hegelian criticism of illicit presupposition is not valid, it nonetheless highlights Kant's failure to integrate systematically many of his particular examples. Thus the 'content' of the suicide example does indeed seem to be imported from some external functionalist account of the human condition, whether theological or biological in character. That criticism would apply yet more strongly to the third and fourth examples.

(3) Of failure to develop one's talents, Kant admits that 'a system of nature could indeed subsist under such a universal law', yet one 'could not possibly *will* that it should become a universal law of nature or should be implanted in us as such a law of nature by instinct. For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his powers should be developed, since they serve him and are given him for all sorts of possible ends' (*G* 90).

(4) Equally, failure to help others in misfortune, practised as a universal law, is compatible with the survival of mankind, yet it would be impossible for a rational being to will such an attitude as a universal law, since he may himself one day need 'love and sympathy from others' (*G* 91). This looks dangerously like the principle of avoiding *quod tibi non vis fieri*, which Kant later excludes on the grounds that it appeals only to selfish inclinations, not to duty (*G* 97). The rationale of the example depends, in other words, on facts about empirical psychology.

A POSSIBLE KANTIAN REPLY TO HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF THE FIRST FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

While admitting then that many of Kant's examples are vulnerable to Hegel's criticism of 'abstraction' and 'emptiness', can we develop a defence of his general approach beyond the points already established about the innocence of the use of 'presuppositions', in cases where those 'presuppositions' are not alien imports but are themselves capable of validation within Kant's own system? As a starting point to an answer, let us return to H. L. A. Hart's distinction between two components of 'the idea of justice':

> There is a certain complexity in the structure of the idea of justice.... It consists of two parts: a uniform or constant feature, summarized in the precept 'Treat like cases alike' and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or different.... [I]t is plain that the law itself cannot now determine what resemblances and differences among individuals the law must recognize if its rules are to treat like cases alike and so be just. Here accordingly

there is much room for doubt and dispute. Fundamental differences, in general moral and political outlook, may lead to irreconcilable differences and disagreement as to what characteristics of human beings are to be taken as relevant for the criticism of law as unjust.[12]

For Hart, the law has no resources within itself to decide which resemblances and differences are relevant to substantive questions of justice. For Hegel, Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative is equally lacking in resources and enjoins only the first formal procedural requirement of consistency.

One might reply to this charge that even the bare requirement of consistency enjoined by the first formulation (minus any functionalist accretions) implies two strong exclusion clauses: a refusal to privilege yourself or exempt yourself from commands you apply to others and a refusal to apply arbitrary standards of inclusion or exclusion. In applying the formulation thus understood the Kantian would argue that he is entitled to exclude certain classes of social, political, and economic arrangement in the same way that the Hegelian is. Once again the Hegelian might seize, *ad hominem*, on the blatant set of exclusion clauses, reactionary even in their own day, operated by Kant in the *Rechtslehre*, to deprive women of most legal rights,[13] as well as of participation in politics, and wage-earners of the suffrage.[14] Now the Kantian might counter that it is a strength rather than a weakness of the first formulation that it acknowledges that choice between different social arrangements is underdetermined by reason. It simply demands a rigorous consistency in the operation of any particular arrangement within the irreducible diversity of types of possible arrangement.

But that is at best a cautious, defensive position. If the Kantian must restrict himself to the first formulation, then it is the only position he can adopt and it is still open to the Hegelian charge of 'emptiness' and 'abstraction'. On its own, the first formulation does not entail the reactionary exclusion clauses of the *Rechtslehre*, but it leaves space for them.

THE SECOND FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

The radical Kantian can escape the Hegelian charge only if he moves on to the second formulation of the categorical imperative:

[12] H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, London, 1961, 156–7.

[13] Kant, *Rechtslehre*, § 25. For a summary account of this part of the *Rechtslehre*, see T. O'Hagan, *The End of Law?*, Oxford, 1984. Ch. 2. For more detail, see G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, London, 1965 (first published 1920); G. Vlachos, *La Pensée Politique de Kant*, Paris, 1962; B. Edelman, 'Transitions in the Metaphysical Elements of Justice' in *Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory of Law*, trans. E. Kingdom, London, 1979. Remaining *ad hominem*, it should be noted that Hegel is hardly in a strong position for criticizing Kant's position on women: see O'Hagan, 'Hegel and the subjection of women', forthcoming in the *Hegel-Jahrbuch*.

[14] Kant, *Rechtslehre*, §30. Kant is here following a tradition of franchise restriction familiar in the English literature from Harrington and Locke. See C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, Oxford, 1962.

'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.'

He must be allowed to develop the idea of acting and treating persons as ends rather than means into a standard of legitimate social organization.[15] He would thus attribute legitimacy only to those social organizations whose members operate as autonomous agents in determining the course of their lives within structures of rules which they themselves have formulated and endorsed. In the words of the Essay *On Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795, only two years before the *Rechtslehre*:

> A *republican constitution* is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle of *freedom* for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of the *dependence* of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal *equality* for everyone (as citizens).... [M]y external and rightful *freedom* should be defined as a warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I have been able to give my own consent. Similarly, external and rightful *equality* within a state is that relationship among the citizens whereby no-one can put anyone else under a legal obligation without submitting simultaneously to a law which requires that he can himself be put under the same kind of obligation by the other person. (KPW 99–100)

From this perspective different societies can correspond more or less closely to the standard of legitimacy. Applying to political theory the *Groundwork* formula that 'Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power' (G 84–5), we can say that he who wills the form of legitimate social organization specified in the second formulation wills the institutional and material conditions necessary for its realization. The nature of the necessity is left open. But the Kantian conception of approximation to an ideal type, expressed as an *als ob*, derided in the Hegelian and Marxist traditions as an illicit abstraction, is indispensable to this approach.[16] It would be beyond the scope of this paper to itemize in detail the kinds of condition that might be necessary. I have suggested elsewhere, in a less Kantian idiom, that they would include the principle of constitutionality, a fuller development of Kant's own principle of 'republican government', allowing for fair adjudica-

[15] Modern approaches to legitimacy inspired by Kant include J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, London, 1972; 'Kantian constructivism in moral theory' in *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 77, 1980; J. Habermas, 'Towards a theory of communicative competence' and 'On systematically distorted communication' in *Inquiry*, vol. 13, 1970; O. O'Neill, 'The public use of reason' (MS.). For a comprehensive critique of both Rawls and Habermas, see S. Benhabib, 'The methodological illusions of modern political theory: the case of Rawls and Habermas' in *Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, B. 21.

[16] Cf. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, §62, quoted in KPW, 174: 'Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not or whether we are not perhaps mistaken in our theoretical judgment if we assume that it is. On the contrary, we must simply act as if it could really come about (which is perhaps impossible) and turn our efforts towards realizing it and establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose . . .'

tion between citizen and citizen and between citizen and government,[17] and the principle of equality, which includes not only political and legal equality (universal franchise and equality before the law) but also that level of economic and institutional equality which allows each to have a genuine, rather than a sham, engagement in the processes which determine his or her life.[18] Kant endorses, at least formally, both those principles. But perhaps his most original contribution is the principle of peace. Without it all the components of the civilized *Rechtsstaat* are at risk, both from without, in the sense that all institutions are threatened by armed invasion and *a fortiori* by annihilation, and from within, in the sense that, under threat of war, all claims to the rights guaranteed by a *Rechtsstaat* (individual freedoms, pluralism, privacy, freedom of information, etc.) can be overridden on grounds of *raison d'état*. We shall return to Kant's important insight into the need for perpetual peace and Hegel's hostility to it later. But for the moment it is enough to register it as one of the conditions of true 'republican government'.[19]

While the second formulation is thus more concrete than the first, the Hegelian critic might still object that it is still merely negative, in that it excludes certain social arrangements without positively enjoining a specific institutional embodiment of itself. So, Hegel might argue, even this formulation is neutral with respect to forms of property. To this, the radical Kantian response should be that the approach may be called negative, but not neutral. On the contrary, it can be used as a powerful critical tool for excluding forms of property which would reduce persons to the status of means to others' ends. On that ground it would exclude forms which Hegel too excludes for their 'irrationality',[20] in particular slavery and feudalism, in which the worker's status as a means receives legal expression. But it could be given a more radical reading, so as to exclude also forms of property in which a worker, though legally free, was yet reduced to being a mere 'living appendage'[21] of the machine to which he is economically enslaved. If Marx's account of the role of the proletariat under capitalism has any force, then Kant's second formulation excludes capitalist property relations and, by elimination,

[17] See O'Hagan. op. cit., 136–7, where this is labelled 'Locke's condition'. Hegel's hostility to this principle, based on the fear that it would dilute the unity of the State, is present from the essay on 'The German Constitution' (1799–1802) (HPW 153), through the *System of Ethical Life* (1802–3, SEL 165), to the *Philosophy of Right* (PR §273). It is connected to his hostility to contractarian theories of political legitimacy, to which we shall return later.

[18] See O'Hagan, 136, labelled 'Rousseau's Condition', Kant takes over this idea of Rousseau's in the definition of 'republican government' quoted above, though he restricts it more closely to relations of *legal* reciprocity than Rousseau does. Rousseau extends it to include economic equality.

[19] I am grateful to Paul Hirst for pointing out to me the importance of what we can call 'Kant's Condition', that of peace. Carl Friedrich has emphasized the continuing relevance of Kant's insight in a number of works. See, for example, 'L'Essai sur la paix: sa position centrale dans la philosophie morale de Kant' in *Annales de la Philosophie Politique*, t. 4, 1961.

[20] See PR §§ 62–7 and O'Hagan, 36–7.

[21] K. Marx, *Capital*, vol. i, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, London, 1970, 422.

points the way to, even if it does not positively enjoin, an alternative distribution of power relations in society, whereby all of its members could operate as autonomous ends in themselves.[22]

The words 'never simply . . . but always at the same time' in the second formulation leave a convenient loophole through which the 'right Kantian' can escape. He can argue that capitalist property relations are compatible with that formulation in that they presuppose the institution of legal–political equality and freedom of citizens as ends in themselves, while 'at the same time' allowing those same citizens to be used as economic means in the production process. The 'left Kantian' reply is that the second formulation sets a standard for comparing different social orders as more or less successful approximations to the goal of maximizing human autonomy: while no order can wholly eliminate means/ends relationships between individuals and groups, some can come closer than others in all spheres, legal, political, economic, familial, to embodying the kingdom of ends.

APPLICATION OF THE SECOND FORMULATION TO PROMISE-BREAKING

While some new features of all four of Kant's examples emerge when they are subjected to the second formulation, it is the second, that of promise-breaking, that most clearly demonstrates the increased critical power of that formulation. Viewed in its light, the person who makes a false promise 'is intending to make use of another man *merely as a means* to an end which he does not share', since the latter 'cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him and so cannot himself share the end of the action' (G 97). Kant is suggesting that a legitimate social order is one which embodies ends which can rationally be shared by its members and this is an important component of much of our subsequent thinking on the necessary conditions of a rational consensus. Hegel's charge that Kant imports the content of his examples from institutions legitimated elsewhere may be sustained in other cases, but not here, where form and content are united in the principle of treating all persons as ends in themselves. Promise-keeping is a necessary instantiation of that principle.

DUALISM

Let us start, as we did before, with Hegel's distribution of praise and criticism in the *Natural Law* Essay of 1802–3. First the praise, for 'the great element in the philosophy of Kant and Fichte', namely the 'aspect under which the essence of right and duty, and the essence of the thinking and willing subject, are one and the same.' Then the criticism: 'But that philosophy has not

[22] Once again it must be stressed that we are addressing the principles of the Groundwork, ignoring the gross reduction of women's and workers' (in particular 'servants' ') autonomy in the *Rechtslehre*.

remained true to this oneness; by recognizing this oneness as the essence and the absolute, it posits the separation into the one and the many just as absolutely, and places one beside the other as equals' (*NL* 83).

Dualism and the division of intellectual labour

Hegel scourges Kantian dualism at all levels, of which we shall investigate only a few. Here, in the *Natural Law* Essay, he criticizes the unbridgeable dualism of modes of being, the being of the moral subject on the one hand, and the being of the legal subject on the other, not only separate, but 'downright opposed to one another in the relation of being mutually conditioned', with the result that each can then 'ground a special science—one dealing with the unity of the pure concept and the subjects, or the morality of actions, the other with their non-unity, or legality . . .' (*NL* 84). This idea, of the division of the 'sciences' of moral philosophy and jurisprudence and of the corresponding division of intellectual labour, is expressed most clearly in Kant's late work *The Conflict of the Faculties* (CF), a political pamphlet remarkable for its mixture of caution and boldness. Kant follows the traditional division of the University Faculties into three higher Faculties and one lower Faculty, while noting that 'this nomenclature [was] adopted with reference to the government rather than to the learned professions.' Thus the three higher Faculties of theology, law, and medicine train 'the *businessmen* (*Geschäftsleute*) or technicians of learning . . . tools of government,' whereas 'the faculty whose function is only to look after the interests of science is called lower because it may use its own judgment about what it teaches' (CF 25). Kant's manifesto for the right to intellectual freedom on the part of this Faculty needs to be repeated by each generation of intellectuals:

> It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university also contain a faculty that is independent of the government's command with regard to its teachings; one that having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly. For without a faculty of this kind, the truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government's own detriment); but reason is by its nature free and admits of no command to hold something as true (no imperative 'Believe!' not only a free 'I believe'). (CF 27–9)

The philosopher, guardian of the lower Faculty, is entitled to seek answers in the legal and political domain to questions *quid iuris?* The jurist, in the higher Faculty of law, must restrict himself to questions *quid ius?*:

> . . . [A]s an authority on the text, [he] does not look to his reason for the laws that secure the *Mine* and *Thine*, but to the code of laws that has been publicly promulgated and sanctioned by the highest authority (if, as he should, he acts as a civil servant). To require him to prove the truth of these laws and their conformity with right, or to defend them against reason's objections, would be unfair. (CF 37–8)

For Hegel, any such division of labour must be suspect. In his texts, and particularly in the *Philosophy of Right*, as reason's systematic embodiment in

institutions is unfolded for the reader, the opposition between the critical (*quid iuris?*) and descriptive (*quid ius?*) moments is allegedly transcended. But as we shall see later, within Hegel's own work that transcendence tends increasingly to blur the legitimate distinction between the two moments, making space for the notorious right-Hegelian normative endorsement of the status quo.

Dualism: perfected morality as a 'Beyond'

We noted at the outset Hegel's knockdown argument that the project of Kantian morality presupposes its own impossibility, that 'the harmony of the sensuous and the rational ... abrogates morality' (*LHP* iii 463). Numerous commentators have pointed out that Hegel's argument, as it stands, is poor.[23] It is true that for Kant 'perfected morality must remain a Beyond' (*LHP* iii 461, Gmn. 369: 'Die vollendete Moralität muss ein Jenseits bleiben'), because human beings are finite and imperfect. But it does not follow that Kant is hostile to the attempt to bring about the realm of perfection in which that opposition would be overcome. Hegel is wrong in attributing that inference to Kant, just as he was wrong in attributing to him the view that 'the principle of morality' and 'the principle of happiness' are not only distinct but also opposed.

Sir Malcolm Knox argued that Kant's model of the Kingdom of Ends, ruled by the holy will, 'whose maxims necessarily accord with the laws of autonomy' (*G* 107), is closer to Hegel's model of embodied *Sittlichkeit* than Hegel himself recognizes, both being ideal types drawn from religion.[24] While heeding Knox's reminder not to lose sight of the deep continuity between the two positions, we can yet see Hegel's critique of the Beyond as marking a decisive shift in the *Gestalt* of practical philosophy, a re-arrangement of the foreground and background of that discipline. This re-arrangement has a double effect on the Kantian problematic. First, it displaces *Moralität*, the individual's action performed from duty, from being the centre into being a moment of the whole, alongside abstract right. *Moralität* 'throughout portrays the real aspect of the concept of freedom' (*PR* § 106), but cannot embody that concept completely. Limited to *Moralität*, Kant's principles of action ... make the standpoint of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) completely impossible, in fact they explicitly nullify it and spurn it' (*PR* § 33). Second, it brings into relief elements of the Kantian system which previously lay in the background: the 'postulates' of the immortality of the soul, of the existence of God, and, most fundamentally, of 'freedom affirmatively regarded (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world)' (*CPrR* 137). A 'postulate' of pure practical reason is defined as 'a theoretical proposition which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law' (*CPrR* 127).

[23] See for example W. H. Walsh, *Hegelian Ethics*, London, 1969, 34.

[24] T. M. Knox, 'Hegel's attitude to Kant's ethics' in *Kant-Studien*, B. 49, 1957.

Kant applies that cumbersome definition to each of the three 'postulates' in turn and each receives explicit criticism from Hegel in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* and elsewhere.

In support of the first 'postulate', Kant argues that we are bound to strive for the goal of holiness, 'complete fitness of the will to the moral law', which 'our knowledge of ourselves' shows to be unattainable by mortal men: 'only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible to a rational but finite being' (CPrR 127). Since the attainment of the goal is 'necessary' for our existence as moral beings, then, if the goal is impossible, it follows that our existence as moral beings is impossible. But our existence as moral beings is possible. Therefore the attainment of the goal too is possible. But it is not possible in this finite existence. Therefore it is possible beyond it. Thus the goal is attainable only in the immortality of the soul. Hegel endorses the Kantian argument up to and including the penultimate step. While he does not deny the immortality of the soul, he finds the domain of the true infinite, true perfection, here on earth, in *Sittlichkeit*: 'It is the will whose potentialities have become fully explicit which is truly infinite, because its object is itself and so is not in its eyes an "other" or barrier . . .' (PR § 22).

God's existence is postulated in an equally *ad hoc* fashion:

> . . . [T]here is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and proportionate happiness of a being which belongs to the world as one of its parts and as thus dependent on it. . . . Nevertheless, in the practical task of pure reason, i.e., in the necessary endeavor after the highest good, such a connection is postulated as necessary: we should seek to further the highest good (which therefore must be at least possible). Therefore also the existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality. (CPrR 129)

Kant concludes that it is 'morally necessary to assume the existence of God', but that 'this moral necessity is subjective, i.e., a need, and not objective, i.e., duty itself' (CPrR 130). Now there is an interesting move in the argument from the premiss that if we are obliged to attempt to further the highest good, then that highest good must be possible, to the conclusion that the existence of a being must be postulated which makes that highest good not only possible but actual: 'the exact concidence of happiness with morality'. Hegel comments unkindly that, 'The actuality of the God who produces harmony is of such a character that it does not enter into consciousness at all; it is accepted by consciousness for the sake of harmony, just as children make some kind of scarecrow, and then agree with each other to pretend to be afraid of it' (LHP iii 463).

In re-arranging the *Gestalt*, Hegel thus highlights the problematic status of the religious doctrines postulated by Kant *ad hoc*. Like Love, they emerge as 'an indispensable complement (*Ergänzungstück*)[25] to the imperfection of

[25] Kant, 'The End of All Things' (1794), KOH 82 (Gmn. *Kants Werke* viii. 338): quoted by Knox, 77.

human nature', rather than as an integral part of the whole.[26]

The dualism of phenomena and noumena

Underlying these dualisms in Kant are two yet deeper ones: an ontological dualism of phenomenal and noumenal and a methodological dualism of descriptive and normative.

The significance of the phenomenal/noumenal dualism, established in the First *Critique*, emerges fully only in the *Second*. In the latter, the noumenal comes into the inheritance bequeathed it in the Antinomies. In particular, it realizes the legacy of the Third Antinomy, the claim that, alongside the causal laws of nature, 'there is also another causality, that of freedom' (CPR A445, B473). As we have already seen, Hegel applauds the primacy accorded to practical reason by Kant, for whom the moral law 'determines its reality' and contains its own 'concept of causality'. For Kant, the causality of freedom is an 'inscrutable' (*unerforschlich*) faculty (CPrR 49, Gmn. 56); it marks the limit of the intelligible. Every specification of it is negative. It is 'not self-contradictory to regard all [the agent's] actions as physically conditioned so far as they are appearances, and yet at the same time to regard their causality as physically unconditioned so far as the acting being is regarded as a being of the understanding' (CPrR 50). It is not self-contradictory, but it remains as 'inscrutable' as it was in 1643, when Descartes wrote to Princess Elizabeth that 'the human mind is incapable of conceiving distinctly at one and the same time both the distinction between the body and the soul and their union', even though 'everyone constantly experiences the union of body and soul within him without philosophizing, i.e. he knows that he is a single person who has a body and thought together . . .'[27]

Hegel attempts to revive Descartes' 'pre-philosophical' intuition and to build

[26] Hegel also finds incoherence in the relation between moral autonomy and religion in Kant: '. . . The ground on which God is accepted—that by the conception of a holy law-giver the moral law may acquire additional reverence—contradicts the fact that morality really consists in reverence for the law simply for its own sake' (LHP iii 463). But Kant is careful to mark off autonomy from *any* heteronomous principles, even 'rational' (as opposed to 'empirical') ones, in particular from 'the theological concept which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will' (G 110). No such *derivation* is allowed. The existence of God is postulated both in order to found the conception of harmonization of ends discussed above and in order to introduce an imperative *additional* to the moral imperative: 'Religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a foreign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such. Even as such, they must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being because we can hope for the highest good (to strive for which is our duty under the moral law) only from a morally perfect (holy and beneficent) and omnipotent will; and, therefore, we can hope to attain it only through harmony with this will.' (CPrR 134). There is thus no contradiction in Kant's position, though arguably there is a radical failure to integrate the moral and religious imperatives. For a detailed treatment of Kant's 'moral theology' see W. H. Walsh, *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics*, Edinburgh, 1975, especially §39, 'The moral proof of God's existence' and §40, 'Meaning and truth in moral belief'. For an interesting Hegelian–Marxist reading of the same texts see L. Goldmann, *Introduction à la Philosophie de Kant*, Paris, 1967 (1948), Ch. 4 ('Qu'ai-je le droit d'espérer?')

[27] R. Descartes, *Oeuvres Philosophiques*, ed. F. Alquié, Paris, 1973, t. 3, 46–7.

that intuition into a philosophy of mind which blocks the way to the path leading to Cartesian and ultimately Kantian dualism. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to assess the success of that attempt fully. In brief, Hegel proceeds with his characteristic combination of negative, critical moves, identifying incoherences and strains within different variants of dualism, on the one hand, and positive, phenomenological–descriptive moves, making concrete Kant's idea of the 'causality . . . of freedom', on the other. In the latter, Hegel depicts an individual who finds himself in practices of different kinds: creative work, in which he expresses, embodies the spiritual in material artefacts; physical danger, in which he realizes himself as a unity of the mortal/physical and the conscious, a biological individual who can nonetheless step back from, reflect on and even sacrifice his own finite life; the family, where he lives as a part of a biological system of related human beings, always already given and indispensable, but which he, as a particular member, can within limits transform; and at the other diverse and not fully integrated levels of modern life at which an individual finds himself as an 'embodied consciousness'.[28] It is not Hegel's style to offer many technical philosophical arguments for this rival conception. In the *Phenomenology* in particular he offers instead a phenomenological description of the process of formation (*Bildung*) of the 'single person' within a public, material/spiritual world which that person makes increasingly his own. Central to that formation is the development of self-consciousness: hence the importance of the dialectic of lordship and bondage of *Phenomenology* Ch. 4, which exemplifies novel Hegelian features of form and content. Formally, it is a striking instance of phenomenological descrip-

[28] Hegel develops what we would call his philosophy of mind in the 'Anthropology' section of Part 3 of the *Encyclopaedia*. Against Cartesian dualism he argues that 'the standpoint which separates them is not to be regarded as final, as absolutely true. On the contrary, the separation of the material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both' (*Enc.* §389, *Zusatz*). To undo the damage wrought by modern dualism, Hegel returns to Aristotle: '... The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books' (*Enc.* § 378). But Aristotle's idea of the 'ensouled body' (*empsychon soma*) (see D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London, 1971, 131–5) is only a rough anticipation of Hegel's version of monism, which is essentially *expressivist*: 'The Soul, when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own, finds itself there a single subject: and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate, in being related to which, it is related to itself. This externality, in other words, represents not itself, but the soul, of which it is the sign. In this identity of interior and exterior, the latter subject to the former, the soul is *actual*: in its corporeity it has its free shape, in which it *feels itself* and makes itself *felt* ... Under the head of human expression are included, for example, the upright figure in general, and the formation of the limbs, especially the hand, as the absolute instrument, of the mouth—laughter, weeping, etc., and the note of mentality diffused over the whole, which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature....' (*Enc.* § 411). An interesting discussion of this approach is A. MacIntyre, 'Hegel on faces and skulls' in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Notre Dame, 1976. Hegel's promissory notes are honoured by modern phenomenologists, in particularly Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. As they develop Hegel's

tion taking the place of traditional normative epistemology. Its content is the play of recognition and power between individuals, a play always mediated through the finite physical bodies of those participants. Only creatures who are already embodied consciousnesses can engage in such play and go on to construct the social forms which allow that potential to be actualized.[29] Ontological dualism is not directly refuted by Hegel. The opposition's piece is not taken. Instead, the space it would occupy on the board, on which dualism can be constructed, is blocked by Hegel's moves. Hegel now crowds that space with his pieces and makes it his own, perhaps definitively. But his command of other sections of the board is less assured.

Methodological dualism of descriptive and normative

It is time now to bring into focus a theme already touched on, what might be called Hegel's 'methodological monism': his opposition to the search for foundations of either knowledge or institutions in norms which are 'external' to their formation.[30] The standard (*Massstab*) for evaluating any cultural form (*Gestalt*), whether it is epistemological, aesthetic, social, etc., must emerge from within the formation of that form itself. The classic exposition of the Hegelian method is the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*:

> ... [W]e do not need to import criteria or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of our inquiry; it is precisely when we leave that aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is *in and for itself* ... since what consciousness examines is its own self, all that is left for us to do is simply to look on (*das reine Zusehen*) ... (*Phen.* 54, Gmn. 71–2)

insights, it emerges that the new phenomenology of the body is hardly less problematic than the traditional philosophies of dualism, materialism, etc. Sartre contorts grammar to assert that consciousness '*exists* its body ... Thus *my* body is a conscious structure of my consciousness.' (J.-P. Sartre, *L'Etre et le Néant*, Paris, 1943, 394.) Whereas for Merleau-Ponty, 'The experience of our own body ... reveals to us an ambiguous mode of existence ... the body is not an object ... my awareness of it is not a thought, that is to say, I cannot take it to pieces and reform it to make a clear idea. Its unity is always implicit and vague .... Whether it is a question of another's body or my own, I have no means of knowing the human body other than that of living it, which means taking up on my own account the drama which is being played out in it, and losing myself in it. I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' subject, a provisional sketch of my total being ...' (M. Merleau-Ponty. *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith, London, 1962, 198). For an excellent recent commentary, see J.-P. Boulé, 'Le corps dans *L'Etre et le Néant*' (forthcoming).

[29] For a fascinating account of this 'formation', see J. M. Bernstein. 'From self-consciousness to community: act and recognition in the master–slave relationship' in Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.). *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*. Cambridge, 1984.

[30] There is an immense literature on this theme. Of particular interest are the following: M. Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, trans. J. Glenn Gray, F. D. Wieck, New York, 1970; K. R. Dove, 'Hegel's phenomenological method' in W. E. Steinkraus (ed.), *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*, New York, 1971; J. E. Smith, 'Hegel's critique of Kant' in J. J. O'Malley, K. W. Algozin. F. G. Weiss (eds.), *Hegel and the History of Philosophy*, The Hague, 1974; J. Habermas, 'Hegel's critique of Kant: radicalisation or abolition of the theory of knowledge' in Habermas (1978).

Within *das reine Zusehen* lies space for left and right Hegelianism alike. In bidding the philosopher 'look at' the thing itself, Hegel allows him a complex interventionist role in bringing out the truth: '... philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as mere happening' (SL 588). But he also allows him the notoriously passive role which accrues to him at critical moments of political theory:

> ... [T]his dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically. This development of the Idea is the proper activity of its rationality, and *thinking, as something subjective, merely looks on at it without for its part adding to it any ingredient of its own.* To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason to bear on the object from the outside and so to tamper with it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account... (*PR* §31. Italics added.)

Left and right Hegelians can be seen as struggling to occupy the space marked by *Zusehen*. The right Hegelian presents a mere 'narration of happenings' with the normative gloss of 'a cognition of what is true in them'. He blocks off spaces opened up by eighteenth-century natural law theorists by proscribing the oppositions which were the vehicle of their radical criticism: 'At one time the opposition between morals and politics and the demand that the latter should conform to the former were much canvassed . . .' (*PR* § 337) The shift to full-scale right Hegelianism in the *Philosophy of Right* is marked by the definitive replacement of dualistic oppositions by 'dialectical' triplets. But the direction is already set in the earliest texts, where Hegel identifies social contract theory and 'abstract' constitutionalism as the characteristic errors of formalist natural law theory. In that tradition a model was explicitly taken over from the civil law to test the legitimacy of political institutions: a model of rights and duties stemming from a hypothetical contract. For Hegel, this application of the categories of abstract right to the highest level of *Sittlichkeit* involves categorial confusion between private and public norms.[31] It 'reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to something based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion and their capriciously given express consent...' (*PR* §258). To us this looks like a bizarre misreading of Rousseau since the wills of the signatories of his social contract are anything but arbitrary or capricious. Those wills are normatively characterized by reference to the specific terms of the contract itemized in *Social Contract* I. 6. While particular goals may be willed by particular persons under particular circumstances (arbitrarily, capriciously), only a society ordered according to the social contract is worth willing by any rational person at any place or time.

Hegel is in fact using the charge of arbitrariness and capriciousness to

[31] On this question, see the excellent paper of S. Benhabib, 'Obligation, contract and exchange: on the significance of Hegel's abstract right' in Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.), *op.cit.*

attack the nerve of constitutionalism as a political programme based on social contract theory, which 'consists in rights against the state' (HPW 153). Kant's model of a 'republican constitution', 'allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the others' (CPR A316/B373), would provide a typical basis for making claims of 'rights against the state'. In 'The German Constitution' (1799–1802), Hegel maintains that such claims are merely abstract in the context of a fragmented Germany, in which it is questionable whether 'a power still accrues to the state in virtue of which it really is a state'. But is it still abstract in 1831? By then Hegel's stance appears purely reactionary when he marginalizes the problem of constructing a rational constitution with little more than a Kantian *als ob*:

> ... [I]t is absolutely essential that the constitution should not be regarded as something made, even though it has come into being in time. It must be treated rather as something simply existent in and by itself, as divine therefore, and constant, and so as exalted above the sphere of things that are made. (PR § 273)

SITTLICHKEIT AND THE PEOPLE

The foreground of Hegel's social and political philosophy is occupied by *Sittlichkeit*. It is at the level of *Sittlichkeit* that he poses the double question: What set of relationships should be willed in order to construct a rational legitimate social order? What set of relationships can allow such rational willing? In his early work Hegel envisages 'the people' (*das Volk*) as the key to the answer. The idea is already present in the Essay on *Natural Law* of 1802–3: 'the absolute ethical totality ... is nothing other than a people ... the absolute ethical element ... [is] membership in a people' (NL 92–3).

The idea is more fully developed in the *System of Ethical Life* of 1802–3 and the *First Philosophy of Spirit* of 1803–4. In the first of these texts, *Sittlichkeit*, the level at which an individual lives an objective ethical life, consisting of laws and customs, is embodied in a people: 'the intuition of ethical life, the form in which it appears in its particular aspect, is the people' (SEL 146). Hegel's vision of the people is not straightforwardly empirical ('A people is not a disconnected mass, a mere plurality'), but normative, since a people, properly speaking, exists only when there is a lived organic connexion between public standards and particular aspirations and also, paradoxically, when there is 'absolute indifference', 'a living indifference', in the sense that 'all natural difference is nullified, the individual intuits himself as himself in every other individual; he reaches supreme subject–objectivity'.[32] Thus 'the people as an organic totality is the absolute identity of all the specific characteristics of practical and ethical life'.

In the lectures of the following year *First Philosophy of Spirit* (FPS), Hegel mitigates the holistic, organic terminology of the *System of*

[32] This is strikingly reminiscent of Rousseau, *Social Contract* ii. 3. iii. 15, iv. 1.

Ethical Life in highlighting work and language as the forms in which a people passes from 'a disconnected mass, a mere plurality' to a genuine unity.[33] Some of Hegel's most subtle and original thought is contained in these sketches. In them, by example rather than by direct criticism, he demonstrates the concreteness of his analysis, compared with the abstraction of his predecessors, as he addresses the phenomenological descriptive question: 'What is it to create a community with shared values?' Through work, a people finds its identity in the objects which it produces, both for the present and as its patrimony for future generations. Thus it is work that produces a people's past, its traditions, as its members '. . . come to be themselves outside of themselves in it, but this outward being is their deed, it is only what they have made it, it is themselves as active but superseded; and in this outwardness of themselves . . . they intuit themselves as one people' (FPS 243).

Like work, language plays both a synchronic and a diachronic role. Synchronically, it is the essentially public form in which the individual encounters a given meaning set objectively, as a 'dead other', and at the same time masters it, makes it his own and transforms it. Diachronically, it is through language, the system of shared meanings, that the cultural patrimony is transmitted from generation to generation.

Let us pause for a moment to reflect on Hegel's conception of language (*Sprache*) here. On a literal reading, he might be asserting that a people must be united by a natural language (German, English, etc.). Indeed that may well be the correct reading of the First *Philosophy of Spirit*. It is however possible to put together the central insight of that text with the earlier more pluralist comments in the 'German Constitution' (1799–1802), where Hegel explicitly dissociates himself from any commitment to a shared natural language, arguing that

> In our day the tie between members of a state in respect of manners, education, language may be rather loose or even non-existent. Identity in these matters, once the foundation of a people's union, is now to be reckoned amongst the accidents whose character does not hinder a mass from constituting a public authority... Difference in language and dialect (the latter exacerbates separation even more than complete unintelligibility does), and difference in manners and education in the separate estates, which makes men known to one another in hardly anything but outward appearance—such heterogeneous and at the same time most powerful factors the preponderating weight of the Roman Empire's power (once it had become great) was able to overcome and hold together, just as in modern states the same result is produced by the spirit and art of political institutions. (*HPW* 158)

[33] Riedel shows how rapidly Hegel's thought was changing during this period. He traces a radical break from Fichte, an emphasis on the objective character of *Sittlichkeit* coupled to a return to Aristotelian models of teleology and 'the people' in 1803–4. followed by a revival of Fichtean conceptions of intelligence, will, and self-recognition in 1805–6 (Riedel. 81–8). While 'the people' does not again play the central role that it did in the early texts, it remains an irreducible component of Hegel's political philosophy through to the *Philosophy of Right*.

From that he concludes: 'Thus dissimilarity in culture and manners is a necessary product as well as a necessary condition of the stability of modern states.' What needs to be shared, in this picture, is a set of meanings which exist and are transmitted publicly, which may or may not be identical with a natural language. Paradigmatic would be the shared religious language of medieval Europe or the envisaged shared language of the constitutional *Rechtsstaat*.[34]

THE 'PEOPLE' AND PEACE

From the 'German Constitution' to the *Philosophy of Right*,[35] Hegel returns repeatedly to lampoon Kant's idea of perpetual peace and his project for 'a great federation' from which 'every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights'. ('Idea for a Universal History', KPW 47.) There is a certain ambivalence in Hegel's hostility to Kant's idea. For Kant, the increasing complexity of international relations, the fact that 'the mutual relations between states are already so sophisticated', establishes the prudential basis upon which perpetual peace might be established (KPW 50). Hegel is equally aware of this complexity, but derives from it the opposite lesson from Kant, namely that such a tangled web is irreducible to reason:

> It is as particular entities that states enter into relations with one another. Hence their relations are on the largest scale a maelstrom of external contingency and the inner particularity of passions, private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices, force, and wrong. All these whirl together, and in their vortex the ethical whole itself, the autonomy of the state is exposed to contingency. The principles of the national minds are wholly restricted on account of their particularity. for it is in this particularity that, as existent individuals, they have their objective actuality and their self-consciousness. (*PR* § 340)

But why should that be? What stands in the way of realizing Kant's ideal of 'the highest purpose of nature, a universal *cosmopolitan existence*'? (KPW 51). For Hegel, the obstacle is not purely technical. Rather he envisages, from the earliest manuscripts onwards, that war has a positive function in the

[34] The imposition of a dominant natural language was. of course, characteristic of the formation of many nation states. But commitment to the norms of a constitutional *Rechtsstaat* is compatible with the maintenance of a multi-lingual culture, as in Switzerland and elsewhere. It is interesting that Ronald Dworkin's most recent work in jurisprudence, in particular 'The forum of principle' (*New York University Law Review*, vol. 56, 1981; '"Natural" law revisited' (*University of Florida Law Review*, vol. 34, 1982); 'Law as interpretation' (*Texas Law Review*, vol. 60, 1982, and *Critical Inquiry*, 1982) is increasingly indebted to work in hermeneutics which in turn has Hegelian origins. The affinity between the concerns of Dworkin and those of the young Hegel of 1802–4, in particular the idea of the people as the bearer of a shared meaning set, is striking, and not, I think, previously noticed. I had assumed from the title of his paper ('The Laws of Change: the cunning of reason in moral and legal history' in *Journal of Legal Studies*, 1980) that Charles Fried had also identified the 'Hegelian connexion', but he is more interested in tying Dworkin to Kant than to Hegel.

[35] See 'The German Constitution', HPW 208 ff.; SEL 147; NL 92–3; PR §§ 324–37.

formation of the two ultimate poles of the social whole, the single person on the one hand, and the people on the other. The characteristically Hegelian insight is that as an individual, whether a particular human being, a philosophical school or a people, defines itself in relation to another individual, it asserts its difference from that other by 'negating' it. But the form that that negation takes is open, not predetermined. Within society, the physical struggle to the death of *Phenomenology* Ch. 4 is rapidly superseded by socially legitimated forms in which individualism can be asserted. Hegel is at pains to point that out in the *Encyclopaedia*:

> To prevent any possible misunderstandings with regard to the standpoint just outlined, we must here remark that the fight for recognition pushed to the extreme here indicated can only occur in the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate individuals; but it is absent in civil society and the State because here the recognition for which the combatants fought already exists. For although the State may originate in violence, it does not rest on it; violence, in producing the State, has brought into existence only what is justified in and for itself, namely, laws and a constitution. What dominates in the State is the spirit of the people, custom, and law. There man is recognized and treated as a *rational* being, as free, as a person; and the individual, on his side, makes himself worthy of this recognition by overcoming the natural state of his self-consciousness and obeying a universal, the will that is in essence and actuality will, the law; he behaves, therefore, towards others in a manner that is universally valid, recognizing them—as he wishes others to recognize him—as free, as persons. In the State, the citizen derives his honour from the post he fills, from the trade he follows, and from any other kind of working activity. His honour thereby has a content that is substantial, universal, objective, and no longer dependent on an empty subjectivity; honour of this kind is still lacking in the natural state where individuals, whatever they may be and whatever they may do, want to compel others to recognize them. (*Enc. Zusatz* to § 432)

Yet Hegel proceeds to justify war in terms of a very specific and literal version of negation.[36] At the one pole, 'the individual proves his unity with the people unmistakeably through the danger of death alone' (NL 93). At the other pole, that of the people as a whole, he begins by using the term 'negation' in its open, general sense: 'the state is an individual and individuality essentially implies negation.' But the conclusion which he derives from that premiss makes use of a specific sense of 'negation', denoting hostility and conflict: 'Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy' (PR *Zusatz* to § 324). Some hazy anthropology underlies the *Natural Law* version of that argument:

> ... [W]ar preserves the ethical health of peoples in their indifference to specific institutions, preserves it from habituation to such institutions and their hardening.

[36] Charles Taylor has identified other points where Hegel slides between two conceptions of negation, particularly in the dialectic of *Dasein* in the *Science of Logic*: see C. Taylor. Hegel, Cambridge, 1975, 236.

Just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would result from a continual calm, so also corruption would result for peoples under continual or indeed 'perpetual' peace. (NL 93)

One might want to dismiss those speculations while maintaining the more interesting thought that it is only in response to an outside threat that individuals find themselves as mutually recognizing members of a whole to which they belong.[37] Documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the US Declaration of Independence, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, documents which embody the great ideological languages of modern times, were all forged during or in the aftermath of struggle against an oppressive political order or alien occupation. It is self-evident that such struggle is a powerful source of social bonding. But is it the only possible source?[38] Hegel shows that within society it is possible to transform the struggle to the death between brute human beings into a socially mediated form of reciprocal recognition between citizens. He gives no reason why the logic of that account should not be extended to international relations. Kant anticipates that extension in his idea of 'representing an otherwise planless *aggregate* (*Aggregat*) of human actions as conforming, at least when considered as a whole, to a *system* (*System*)' (KPW 52 *Kleinere Schriften* 18). In Hegel's own terms, a system would consist of a set of individuals, each the bearer of its own legal persona (abstract right) and moral autonomy (*Moralität*), connected within a sustaining set of relationships (*Sittlichkeit*), which alone would give expression to the aspirations of the first two moments and provide the conditions under which genuine, non-coercive interaction would be possible. The passage from vendetta to rule of law marks the advent of a certain level of reason within society. Is the passage to the rule of law between states not equally possible? Only the crucial ambivalence in Hegel's phenomenological descriptive procedure leaves space for an irreducible particularity and contingency at the point where reason is most urgently required.

[37] The 'socialization' of the struggle to the death is given a macabre illustration in PR § 328: 'The principle of the modern world—thought and the universal—has given courage a higher form, because its display now seems to be mechanical, the act not of this particular person, but of a member of a whole. Moreover, it seems to be turned not against single persons, but against a hostile group, and hence personal bravery appears impersonal. It is for this reason that thought has invented the gun, and the invention of this weapon, which has changed the purely personal form of bravery into a more abstract one, is no accident'.

[38] This question exercised Sartre in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, where he saw a threat as involved in the formation and maintenance of all groups, either an external threat in the case of the 'group in fusion' or an internal threat in the case of the 'sworn group'. (See P. Caws, *Sartre*, London, 1979, Ch. 10.) In the interviews given to Benny Levy in his old age he propounded the more optimistic view that human beings were linked by a primary relationship of 'fraternity', which could provide the basis of unity without the bond of a shared enemy. But it was too late for him to develop this idea. (*Nouvel Observateur*, 17 March 1980.)

A PROVISIONAL BALANCE SHEET

The immediacy of Kant and Hegel stems from their reflective, self-conscious awareness of modernity, inaugurated in political theory by Hobbes's break with theologically-based natural law and by Rousseau's elaboration of the concept of endorsement by the autonomous human will as the ultimate ground of legitimacy. Kant attempts, albeit hesitantly and obliquely, to articulate that endorsement to components of a social order, within which alone it would be meaningful: these components would include peace and the republican constitution. For Hegel, that point of articulation (*Sittlichkeit*) becomes the central concern of political theory. But, as it comes into the foreground, so too does the problematic nature of the modern social order. Hegel's work marks the first clear recognition and thematization of the problems which would occupy nineteenth- and twentieth-century social theory up to Durkheim and Tönnies: secularization, atomization, alienation, and loss of traditional *Gemeinschaften*. It is no anachronism to see Hegel's work as posing a central problem of modernity: is it possible to integrate society and produce a 'people' with shared values, when the dominant values are themselves individualistic, pluralistic, and centrifugal? Because that alarming and possibly insoluble problem is so clearly identified by Hegel, it is not surprising that his philosophy marks a degree of 'retreat' or 'reaction' relative to Kant's. As his thought develops, Hegel comes increasingly to hold that the survival of a community fragmented, as all modern communities must be, into the domains of public and private, depends on the neutralization of the critical edge of formalist natural law theory, on the containment of its dualisms within a dialectical whole of which traditional oppositions would become integrated members.

Against this right-Hegelian reaction it is possible to defend and extend the values of the constitutional *Rechtsstaat* in left-Hegelian terms, asserting the irreducible critical function of the Kantian dualisms, which are to be embodied institutionally in a genuine division of powers. The left-Hegelian can also develop the insight into the historical specificity both of the *Rechtsstaat* as the typically modern form of legitimate order and of the autonomous will as the key to legitimation.[39] The most complex problem is to develop a left-Hegelian model of a pluralist community, a comprehensive but loose set of shared values and commitments within which particular more closely integrated 'experiments of living' may flourish. If the young Hegelian idea of a shared language can serve the values of a pluralist *Rechtsstaat* and, *a fortiori*, those of the Kantian 'cosmopolitan existence', then individuals, communities, and peoples must learn to be bilingual or even multilingual between different

[39] In the words of Hegel's ironic *alter ego* Nietzsche, 'To breed an animal with the right to make promises ('ein Tier heranzüchten, das *versprechen darf*...'), that is the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man.' (F. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, ii. 1, trans. W. Kaufmann, R. J. Hollingdale, New York, 1967, 57; (German) Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke* iii, K. Schlechta (ed.), Frankfurt/M, 1976, 245.)

cultural languages. More specifically, it must be possible to speak both a language of a particular *Gemeinschaft*, one of solidarity, loyalty, and comradeship, as well as a language of a more or less universal *Gesellschaft*, one of rights, duties, and constitutionality. Hegel discounts such a possibility, at least at the level of international relations, on the grounds both that it is a utopian dream and that it would prevent a 'people' from achieving identity through self-recognition in conflict. The multilingual 'peoples' of the left-Hegelian model may lack the strong sense of identity generated by a shared foe. But a more complex, less fully integrated identity is not therefore unimaginable.

If it is true that 'in moral affairs the limits of the possible are less narrow than we think',[40] then reflexion on the immediacy of Hegel's debate with Kant may serve to expand the limits of our imagination.[41]

[40] Rousseau, *Social Contract*, iii. 12. The most important text for my understanding of Kant's relation to Rousseau and of the intellectual climate of their work is still E. Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe*, trans. J. Gutmann, P. O. Kristeller, J. H. Randall, Jr., New York, 1963.

[41] Thanks to the generosity of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, I was invited to attend a Conference on Critical Theory at Ludwigsburg in December 1984. It was in the light of discussions held at that conference that I was able to focus the arguments of the present paper. My thanks are also due to J. M. Bernstein for pointing out a number of errors which I have been able to correct. In this paper as in all my writing on topics in the history of philosophy I am indebted to Quentin Skinner's 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', in *History and Theory*, vol. 8, 1969.

CHAPTER 8

KANT AND HEGEL ON AESTHETICS

PATRICK GARDINER

OVER a long period, and not least in recent years, the aesthetic doctrines of both Kant and Hegel have attracted considerable attention from philosophers concerned with the arts. Nor is this surprising. For each of them can be said to have played a central role in laying the foundations of the philosophy of art as we now know it and to have initiated lines of enquiry which subsequent writers, albeit in very different ways, have found it profitable to extend or explore. Nevertheless, there has been a tendency to treat their respective contributions to the subject in relative isolation, not much consideration being given to the possibility of there being significant connections or points of contact between them. One reason for this may be that, whereas in such areas as those of epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, Hegel singled out certain key Kantian theses for elaborate discussion and criticism, his references to Kant in his lectures on *Aesthetics* (HA) are fairly brief and cursory, being largely confined to a few pages of the Introduction to that massive compilation. Moreover, what he says there is bland in tone; the polemical note which he so frequently struck when examining other aspects of the Kantian philosophy is in the present case noticeably in abeyance. Thus it might be tempting to suppose that, whatever the position elsewhere, Hegel believed that so far as aesthetics was concerned his predecessor's ideas were of only marginal interest and that they demanded no more than a nod of recognition before he went on to pursue his own more important and substantial objectives. And such a supposition might at first sight appear to be supported by reflection on the character of the main body of the lectures themselves. For these are to a great extent taken up with providing a detailed and richly illustrated discussion of particular forms of art which finds no parallel in the scanty and somewhat schematic sections that Kant devoted to artistic achievement in his *Critique of Judgement*. While Hegel's extended analysis affords incontrovertible evidence of his having possessed a wide-ranging and deeply appreciative acquaintance with art and its history, the same can scarcely be said of anything that Kant wrote on the subject.

That Kant and Hegel manifest striking divergences of approach in their treatment of aesthetic matters is undeniable. Even so, I think that it would be wrong to assume that Hegel's own position can be fully understood without reference to some of the claims Kant had made and the questions they raised.

From what he said in other writings—notably in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* and in parts of his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* —it is transparently clear that Hegel had in fact a good deal of respect for Kant's third *Critique*, valuing it as being suggestive of ideas that he himself had gone on to develop in his own philosophical system. Furthermore, in his (admittedly summary) allusions to it in his *Aesthetics* he speaks of it as constituting 'the starting point for the true comprehension of the beauty of art', while at the same time maintaining that it exhibits 'deficiencies' which must be overcome if a proper grasp of what is at issue is to be attained. With such considerations in mind it may be worth trying, first, to locate those respects in which Hegel's views may be seen to reflect his appreciation of what he felt to be acceptable in the Kantian account and, secondly, to identify—at least in broad outline—features of that account which seemed to him to be unsatisfactory and to stand in need of correction or revision. In doing this, however, I shall necessarily have to confine myself to adopting a highly selective procedure. As is well known, both the works under discussion are structurally complex, frequently obscure, and notoriously susceptible to wide varieties of interpretation. Moreover, in Hegel's case, the work as presented was not in a form which he himself had prepared for publication; based on transcripts from his lectures it inevitably betrays faults of repetition and occasional inconsistency, as well as defects of organization and exposition.

Let me begin by specifying those elements which Hegel in the Introduction to his *Aesthetics* picked out as being essential to the Kantian position and which he chiefly culled from the first part of Kant's *Critique*, the section entitled 'Analytic of the Beautiful'. In general terms Hegel here interprets Kant as insisting that aesthetic judgements are non-cognitive in character; they do not involve the subsumption of what is given to us in experience under determinate concepts but rather relate to the satisfaction we feel when confronted by certain phenomena: it is this that makes them judgements of taste rather than objective claims about how things stand in the empirical world. All the same, the satisfaction in question is of a special sort; it is not of a purely sensuous type but proceeds rather from the harmony or 'free play' between our 'faculties of knowledge'—the conceptualizing understanding and the sensuously-orientated imagination—that is occasioned in us by things of the kind of which we are disposed to ascribe beauty. In elaborating further upon the conditions to which he believed aesthetic judgements to be subject, Kant is said to have made a number of connected points. In the first place, he emphasized the essential disinterestedness of such judgements; they were not determined by considerations like those of personal need or utility, nor was aesthetic attention to something compatible with treating it as an object to be possessed or consumed; in Hegel's words, 'the aesthetic judgement lets the external existent subsist free and independent'. Secondly, Kant stressed the fact that aesthetic appraisals were put forward with an implicit demand upon general acceptance; despite their differing from both cognitive and moral judgements in not involving the application of determinate concepts, they

were nonetheless logically comparable to the latter in that they entailed a claim to universal validity. (Hegel might have added that in this respect Kant distinguished them sharply from mere expressions of subjective liking or gratification, where no such claim was present.) Thirdly, Hegel refers to Kant's famous conception of 'finality without any end'; to be beautiful objects must be apprehended as having 'the form of purposiveness in so far as the purposiveness is perceived in the object without any presentation of a purpose.' Hegel sees this as essentially making the point that 'the beautiful . . . exists as purposeful in itself, without means and end showing themselves separated as different aspects of it' (*HA* 59). The latter formulation may strike one as a somewhat condensed way of characterizing Kant's thesis, according to which the experienced beauty of an object depended upon its manifesting a self-subsistent coherence or design that was apprehended neither as serving a further end or function nor as conforming to some prior conception of what the object was supposed or intended to be; it was, indeed, the presence of purely formal features in this sense that he tended to treat as giving rise to the harmony between our faculties which was distinctive of the aesthetic response. In any event, and as Hegel is subsequently at pains to point out, the formal coherence alluded to was not a matter of instantiating a mere 'regularity' of the kind that might be produced by following an abstract rule or category of the understanding; on the contrary, it must be perceived as 'immanent' in what was sensuously presented in a manner that made it appear wholly free from the imposition of specific conceptual constraints. Thus Hegel finally interprets Kant as propounding a theory according to which the appreciation of beauty in both nature and art involved a 'reconciliation' or 'interpenetration' of the intellectual and the sensuous, such a reconciliation being peculiar to the aesthetic consciousness and finding no counterpart in other areas of our experience, whether cognitive or practical.

Now there are certainly numerous passages, both in the Introduction to the *Aesthetics* and also in the main body of the lectures, where Hegel seems to echo some of the contentions which, with reasonable accuracy, he attributed to Kant. He is insistent, for example, that previous theorists who treated aesthetic taste as if it involved no more than sensuous 'feelings' typically enjoyed in the presence of certain objects degraded what was at issue by presenting it as something intrinsically contingent and superficial, variable between different individuals and unrelated to universally shared powers of comprehension and insight. Such attempts to reduce aesthetic appreciation to the experience of vaguely indicated sensations of pleasure were in his view characteristic of eighteenth-century thinkers who had approached the subject from the standpoint of an outdated empiricist psychology. They amounted to a mockery of the phenomenon they sought to elucidate; and he implied that it was to Kant's credit that he had firmly resisted the suggestion that the beautiful was merely a species of the 'agreeable', largely if not wholly devoid of intellectual significance and standing in no determinate relation to the

differing ways in which things could be attended to or appraised (HA 107–8).[1]

If, however, he was dismissive of so-called 'sensationalist' theories, Hegel did not think that we should try instead to interpret the aesthetic consciousness in terms drawn either from the sphere of practical interest or from that of rational enquiry. In a fashion that again recalls Kant, he stresses the importance of drawing a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the standpoint of aesthetic contemplation and, on the other, the outlooks respectively typified by 'practical desire' and theoretical 'intelligence'. In the case of the practical stance, the individual is engaged in what Hegel refers to as an 'appetitive relation to the external world'. Here he regards the objects that confront him as instruments for satisfying either his immediate wants or else his long-term purposes, viewing them as entities to be consumed or used in a manner that cancels 'the independence and freedom of external things' (HA 36). But such utilitarian thoughts are held to be totally foreign to the disinterested attitude characteristic of aesthetic appraisal; there by contrast objects are apprehended 'without desire' and are treated as things to be respected and valued in their own right. As Hegel expresses it at another point, 'the contemplation of beauty is of a liberal kind; it leaves objects alone as being inherently free and infinite; there is no wish to possess them or take advantage of them as useful for fulfilling finite needs and intentions' (HA 114). (It is almost as if he saw here a parallel between the disinterestedness ascribable to the aesthetic outlook and Kant's insistence in his moral philosophy that we should treat other persons as ends in themselves—a parallel that may indeed partly underlie the latter's own well-known if cryptic assertion that, despite the evident differences between moral and aesthetic judgements, beauty may nonetheless be regarded as the 'symbol of morality'.) So far as the standpoint of rational or scientific enquiry is concerned, it is true that what Hegel calls the 'theoretical interest' does not—unlike its practical counterpart—seek to appropriate objects for its own satisfaction, nor does it conceive of them merely as means to the furtherance of particular aims: its province is 'the universal' and its objective is the impersonal advancement of knowledge and understanding. Thus the condition of disinterestedness is in this case apparently met. The attention of theoretical investigation, however, is not focussed upon individual phenomena as such or for their own sake, but only in so far as they can be seen to exemplify general laws or concepts through the medium of which the perceptible world can be comprehended in purely abstract terms: 'out of something sensuously concrete', Hegel writes, 'it makes an abstraction, something thought, and so something essentially other than what that same object was in its sensuous appearance' (HA 37). Hence there is after all a contrast to be drawn with the aesthetic point of view; for the latter essentially 'cherishes an interest in the object in its individual existence' and will not permit its 'sensuous presence' to be

[1] For Hegel's general strictures on eighteenth-century theories of taste see, for example, HA 15–16 and 33–4.

sacrificed to the requirements of abstract categorization and generalization. And here, too, we may be reminded of Kant; in particular of the contention, reiterated continually throughout the first part of the *Critique of Judgement*, that the application of determinate concepts to a sensuous manifold 'restricts' or 'encumbers' the 'free play' of the imagination in the 'contemplation of the outward form' and that aesthetic pleasure is 'immediately coupled with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought)' (*CJ* 72–3). Once again Hegel, following Kant, appears to be intent upon vindicating the autonomy of the aesthetic consciousness.

This may indeed be so: but now a striking divergence of approach must also be noted. While there can be no doubt that Hegel did not wish to dispute the crucial part played by sensuous presentation in aesthetic experience, it is important to be clear about what he typically had in mind when he referred to the objects of such experience. There are certainly times when he seems to be specifically alluding to products of nature and there are others when the reader is left somewhat unsure as to whether it is these or human artefacts that are primarily meant; such indeterminacy occasionally arouses the suspicion that a crossing of categories may be involved and puts difficulties in the way of arriving at a consistent interpretation. Yet in general there can be no question whatever that his fundamental concern was not with natural objects but with works of art. This is made abundantly evident at the outset. Thus on the very first page of his Introduction he unequivocally asserts that 'the proper expression for our science is the *Philosophy of Art*'; 'by adopting this expression', he goes on, 'we at once exclude the beauty of nature', adding that, to those who would put natural and artistic beauty on a par, it may immediately be retorted that 'the beauty of art is *higher* than nature'. The tone of such uncompromising pronouncements appears, however, to conflict sharply with the predominant impression conveyed by the Kantian account. Throughout much of the *Critique of Judgement*, and especially in its earlier sections, it is products of nature rather than those of art that seem to be the preferred candidates for what Kant termed 'pure' judgements of taste. Moreover, Kant makes it pretty clear that he has no hesitation in rating the appreciation of natural beauty above the appreciation of artistic excellence, ascribing qualities of character to lovers of nature which he is conspicuously, if curiously, loath to accord to those with a knowledge of and attachment to the arts. What was the significance of Hegel's apparent opposition to this aspect of Kant's thought?

To give a fully adequate answer would require a more comprehensive review of Hegel's overall theory of art and its development than can be attempted here. Even so, I think that certain points regarding his conception of nature and its relation to artistic practice may be picked out which not only throw light on the particular disagreement mentioned but also have wider implications for what he believed to be serious shortcomings in his predecessor's approach.

Hegel had, of course, no desire to deny that there is a legitimate sense in

which nature is described as beautiful. He agrees that we find it entirely natural to speak of the beauty of landscapes, animals, flowers, and so forth; moreover, the same may be said of particular colours, shapes, and musical notes which strike the eye or ear and are found to be pleasing either in themselves or else as combining to constitute a satisfying arrangement or harmony. Nonetheless, he goes out of his way to complain about the 'vague sphere' to which these appraisals belong, referring to the absence of a 'criterion' by which they can be systematically assessed and compared; as he puts it at a later stage, 'the above-mentioned lack of a criterion for the endless forms of nature leaves us, so far as the choice of objects and their beauty and ugliness are concerned, with mere subjective taste as the last word, and such taste will not be bound by rules, and is not open to dispute' (HA 44). In such passages there is no suggestion that judgements of natural beauty can be granted the universal validity that Kant was prepared to ascribe to them on the basis of a postulated free accord between our mental faculties; on the contrary, Hegel here seems disposed to treat them as largely 'capricious' responses to what is presented which have no justifiable claim, empirical or otherwise, to general agreement—from the point of view in question 'all spheres of natural objects stand open to us, and none of them is likely to lack an admirer' (HA 44). And these considerations, in turn, appear to have been connected by him with a further theme, one to which he constantly reverts in the lectures and which concerns the essential externality or 'otherness' of nature as experienced by the ordinary unreflective consciousness. Whatever transient pleasures the contemplation of nature may afford, it is not something that the casual observer feels able to identify himself with; thus it can be said that what confronts him under this aspect 'is an alien world, something outside him and in the offing, on which he depends, without his having made this foreign world for himself and therefore without being at home in it by himself as in something his own' (HA 98). As Hegel suggests elsewhere, to the extent that we cannot 'find ourselves' in what is objectively presented to us, the natural world takes on the appearance of a 'limitation' or a 'barrier'. So conceived, it may certainly be dispassionately enjoyed in a way that precludes our regarding it as something to be used or consumed; yet its aesthetic appeal will nevertheless be a purely external one, only contingently related to the scenes and objects that attract us or hold our attention.

What, though, of art? It was Hegel's contention that artistic appreciation belonged to a quite different level of experience. Thus it was not enough merely to say that the beauty of art stood 'higher' than that of nature, since to do so was to imply that both could be portrayed as existing 'side by side in the space of the imagination' and as differing only in some 'quantitative' or 'relative' manner. But this was to misconstrue the situation, the superiority of art to nature being one not of degree but of kind. Art, in Hegel's terminology, was an affair of the 'spirit'. Artistic works, unlike natural objects, must be apprehended as the creation of minds like our own; they represented, in other words, embodiments of thought and imagination to which we could directly

respond and which made demands upon our powers of understanding that had no parallel in the case of the passive appreciation of natural beauty. Hence, although Hegel was insistent upon the fashion in which works of art appeal to us as sensuous particulars, he maintained that this by no means exhausted the nature of their interest and significance. To quote his own account of what was involved,

> ... [T]he sensuous aspect of a work of art, in comparison with the immediate existence of things in nature, is elevated to a pure appearance, and the work of art stands in the *middle* between immediate sensuousness and ideal thought. It is *not yet* pure thought, but, despite its sensuousness, is *no longer* a purely material existent either, like stones, plants, and organic life; on the contrary, the sensuous in the work of art is itself something ideal, but which, not being ideal as thought is ideal, is still at the same time there externally as a thing ... Thus art on its sensuous side deliberately produces only a shadow-world of shapes, sounds, and sights; and it is quite out of the question to maintain that, in calling works of art into existence, it is from mere impotence and because of his limitations that man produces no more than a surface of the sensuous, mere *schemata*. These sensuous shapes and sounds appear in art not merely for the sake of themselves ... but with the aim ... of affording satisfaction to higher spiritual interests, since they have the power to call forth from all the depths of consciousness a sound and an echo in the spirit. In this way the sensuous aspect of art is *spiritualized*, since the spirit appears in art as made *sensuous*. (HA 38–9, Hegel's italics)

In portraying art as an activity or mode of expression in which thought and sensuousness were inseparably united or 'fused', Hegel had (I think) a number of distinguishable targets in view. His stress upon the role of understanding in artistic appreciation certainly amplified his objections to 'sensationalist' models of taste which, by resting everything on 'immediate feeling', failed to do justice to the 'deeper effects' produced by works of art. At the same time, he wished to repudiate two prominent approaches in aesthetics, both of which exemplified cardinal errors. On the one hand, there were theories that treated artistic works as if they were no more than a means of communicating truths which could be equally well expressed in the form, for example, of 'an abstract proposition, prosaic reflection, or general doctrine'; this amounted to regarding the sensuous particularity essential to art as if it were a 'useless appendage', a superfluous adornment that was always dispensable in favour of more direct modes of conveying the same information or message. On the other hand, and at the opposite extreme from didactic accounts, there were mimetic theories according to which the sole function of art was the faithful reproduction or simulation of the sensuous forms of nature in a different medium; this was not only to trivialize artistic production by making it wholly parasitic upon natural appearances but had the further consequence that, if comparisons were made between art and nature, art must inevitably come off worse—'by mere imitation, art cannot stand in competition with nature, and, if it tries, it looks like a worm trying to crawl after an elephant' (HA 43). According to Hegel, however, artistic activity was no more reducible

to 'purely mechanical imitation' than it was merely a matter of 'providing abstract instruction' in a palatable 'pictorial' form—each of these opinions was based upon fundamental misconceptions about its character. But it did not follow that the value attributable to artistic creations was unconnected with any reference they might contain to the world of experience or with any contribution they might make to our comprehension of that world. On the contrary, Hegel explicitly claimed that art constituted 'a specific way of expressing and representing the true.' In other words, it had an indisputably cognitive dimension. And this brings us back to Kant.

Although in the opening sections of his *Critique of Judgement* Kant certainly tended to treat products of nature as the paradigm instances of what he called 'free' or 'pure' beauty, he did not wish to deny that some human artefacts might also qualify as objects of aesthetic appreciation in the particular sense he had in mind. What seems clearly to differentiate his account from Hegel's—at least at this stage—is his apparent desire to offer a unitary theory according to which natural and artistic beauty can be assessed in comparable terms. Thus in a number of passages it is suggested that both natural and human products can appeal to us in virtue of their formal characteristics alone, these characteristics being such as to promote the felt accord between our faculties that is intrinsic to the specific experience of aesthetic satisfaction. Moreover, the notion that the value of works of art is in some manner dependent upon their capacity to represent reality seems to be explicitly excluded. Thus Kant refers to certain abstract patterns as constituting 'free beauties' inasmuch as they have 'no intrinsic meaning' and 'represent nothing' (*CJ* 72); and elsewhere he unequivocally affirms that 'in painting, sculpture, and in fact all the formative arts, . . . so far as fine arts, the *design* is what is essential': it is, he writes, 'not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste' (*CJ* 67). His view appears in fact to have been that, regarded purely under this aspect and irrespective of certain special claims which an interest in natural beauty could be said to possess from a moral standpoint, natural objects and works of art did not significantly differ as candidates for aesthetic appreciation. Hence he was quite content to cite humming-birds and flowers, on the one hand, and designs *à la grecque* and musical fantasias, on the other, as equally deserving the title of 'self-subsistent beauties' which, in his words, pleased 'freely and on their own account'.

All of this may strike one as being far removed from Hegel's conception of what was at issue. The exclusive emphasis on form, the implicit assimilation of artistic to natural beauty, the apparent extrusion from the sphere of artistic value of anything savouring of the cognitive—to each of these features of the Kantian theory Hegel gives the impression of having been unreservedly opposed. Thus it might be concluded that, at any rate so far as the status of art was concerned, his standpoint involved a total rejection of his predecessor's position. I believe, however, that this would be too simple a conclusion to draw, and that there are at least two important strands in what Kant wrote

which can reasonably be thought to have contributed to Hegel's own treatment of the subject.

The first concerns a point to which, it will be remembered, Hegel explicitly referred when he was summarizing Kant's views in the Introduction to his *Aesthetics*. That was Kant's portrayal of the aesthetic consciousness as consisting of a 'reconciliation' between the intellectual and the sensuous. It was not a matter, as in ordinary cognition, of sensory particulars being subsumed under abstract concepts, but rather of there being—as Hegel put it elsewhere —a felt 'congruity between the free play of intuition or imagination and the uniformity of the understanding' (*LL* 113). And in this connection he commends Kant for having seen how certain dichotomies that tended to dominate other areas of his thought, such as that of sense and concept, could in the case of aesthetic experience be regarded as achieving a kind of resolution, an equilibrium or harmony between their component terms. Yet at the same time he complains that Kant's mode of presenting his point was marred by 'subjectivity'. By this I think he can be taken to have meant that Kant had not fully emancipated himself from the preconceptions of eighteenth-century 'sensationalist' aesthetics and that, despite his praiseworthy attempt to diagnose and correct some of its more obvious defects, he remained to a certain extent a victim of its preoccupation with questions of inner sentiment and psychological response. To Hegel, on the other hand, a more fruitful approach to Kant's seminal notion seemed to lie in applying it to the objective realm of works of art, these being regarded as publicly accessible entities which have been created for our attentive contemplation and understanding. For it could then be seen to articulate the characteristic manner in which such works manage to convey intelligible themes or insights in sensuous forms that are experienced as being at once perfectly suited to, and indissolubly united with, what they seek to communicate; in Hegel's words, they put 'before our eyes a content, not in its universality as such, but one whose universality has been absolutely individualized and sensuously particularized' (*HA* 51). Thought is, so to speak, *embodied* in what we see and hear; and that is not so much a matter of a work's exhibiting a certain satisfying design or graspable pattern as of its revealing ideas or truths whose import can only be adequately apprehended in terms of the sensuous medium through which they are given concrete expression.

At this juncture a further and more direct point of contact between Hegel's views and those of Kant can be identified. Up to now we have considered the latter's references to art only in the light of the formalistic conceptions which are so prominent in the earlier sections of the third *Critique*. As is well known, however, these by no means represent his sole contribution to the subject, and in a subsequent portion of the book which is devoted specifically to discussing the problems it raises another and seemingly very different account of artistic achievement makes an appearance. For here, and whatever he may have previously implied, Kant speaks as if it were essential to treating something as a work of art that it should be understood to have a representa-

tional aspect; and, although he makes it clear that he also regards 'pleasingness of form' to be a necessary element, he shows no inclination in the present context to play down the importance of representational considerations in evaluating the aesthetic quality of such a work. Moreover, in the light of what he goes on to say it seems reasonable to surmise that, when referring to artistic representation, Kant had more in view than simply the naturalistic simulation of appearances. For his discussion of the topic is closely linked to an account of the role of 'genius' in art, and genius is not only expressly contrasted with the 'spirit of imitation' but is further asserted to involve, as a crucial constituent, a capacity for producing what are called 'aesthetic ideas'. 'By an aesthetic idea', Kant writes, 'I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. *concept*, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible' (*CJ* 175–6); and, in the pages he subsequently devotes to enlarging upon this somewhat elusive notion, he suggests that through expressing or realizing such ideas in sensuous form the artist can be said to transform the material afforded by ordinary experience, as opposed to merely recording or reproducing it in an imitative fashion. Thus the imagination, here described as 'a productive faculty of cognition', he stated to be 'a powerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature', with the result that what is borrowed can be 'worked up . . . into something else, namely, what surpasses nature.' And Kant implies that, in the case of art, this is achieved through creative 'intuitions' or 'representations' which are 'inexponible' in purely conceptual terms but which are nonetheless capable of 'bodying forth to sense' pervasive features of our experience 'with a completeness of which nature affords no parallel' (*CJ* 176–7).

In reading such passages it is hard not to be struck by their similarity to many of Hegel's characteristic observations on the theme of the relation of art to nature. Hegel, too, speaks as if the role of art is not blankly to copy natural appearances but to transmute or 'purify' them, thereby illuminating aspects of our experience to which we have previously been blind or of whose deeper implications we have been unaware. And Hegel, too, is insistent upon the manner in which the content communicated by a particular work of art necessarily resists clear-cut or exhaustive formulation in alternative terms; what it sensuously shows or reveals is not something that can be abstractly stated or defined without essential loss or distortion. It was with this in mind that he referred to the way in which works of classical art presented a certain vision of humanity and its situation; the vision was one that the Greek sculptors and poets in question could 'work out *only* in this form of art and poetry'—it was not a matter of adorning in verse or imagery preconceived general 'propositions and categories' (HA 102). Claims like these are sufficiently reminiscent of some of Kant's contentions when discussing both the workings of genius and the nature of its products to lead one to expect

Hegel to allude at some point to the Kantian doctrine of aesthetic ideas. Yet no explicit reference to it is to be found in his lectures. It is true that such a reference occurs in the first part of his *Encyclopaedia*, but in a context where Hegel's concern is with the relevance of the doctrine to the development of his own metaphysics rather than with any consequences it might have for his philosophy of art.

In any event, and whatever may have been Hegel's reasons for silence on the matter, the particular similarity mentioned should not perhaps be allowed to obscure the more fundamental differences which divided the two philosophers. Hegel might well have felt that Kant, despite the suggestiveness of his treatment of the subject, never accorded to art the significance which he himself ascribed to it. Kant's standpoint (he might have claimed) ultimately involved giving paramount importance to the position of the aesthetic spectator and hence presented the role of art, like that of nature, as being primarily one of affording pleasurable or satisfying experiences: even if artistic works sometimes had the further advantage of enlarging the understanding or providing a stimulus to the imagination, they only did so in a limited sense and in a way that failed to touch our deepest concerns and aspirations as human beings. By contrast, Hegel conceived art to be one of the fundamental modes of consciousness whereby we come to terms, actively and creatively, both with ourselves and with the world in which we live. Art was not a dispensable luxury or merely ornamental feature of our existence, nor had it played a purely peripheral part in the development of the human mind; on the contrary, the various forms that it had assumed at different periods of history had been expressive of changing visions of reality and changing conceptions of ourselves as participants in that reality. Art has its origin, according to Hegel, in the fact that man as a self-conscious being 'draws out of himself and puts *before himself* what he is and whatever else is'; by continually unfolding and giving concrete embodiment to fresh perspectives within which to comprehend the world, it has helped to shape and order our responses to experience and has allowed us to view existence, whether regarded externally or in our own persons, under more tractable and hospitable aspects than would otherwise have been the case. It was partly with this in mind that Hegel spoke of art as answering man's need to 'strip the external world of its inflexible foreignness' and to 'lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in which he recognizes again his own self' (HA 31). I say 'partly' because I think that it is clear that Hegel also meant more than this: his theory of art cannot be finally understood without reference to the idealist ontology in which it is embedded and which lends to the words quoted a further and more far-reaching significance. However, these are matters that lie beyond my present scope.

CHAPTER 9

TELEOLOGY: KANT AND HEGEL

DAVID LAMB

TELEOLOGY is about purposiveness. In so far as it is about human purpose it invokes an ethical dimension, but its essentially human nature was not realized until Kant and Hegel undertook the examination of teleology. Classical philosophy saw purpose in nature and asserted the authority of God to vouch for it. Reacting against the concept of Divine purpose the mechanistic materialists of the seventeenth century emphasized material causality at the expense of teleology. The latter, they held, was subjective, primitive, and unscientific. 'A *final cause*', said Hobbes, 'has no place but in such things as have sense and will; and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an efficient cause.'[1] To this day it is widely held that maturity in science accompanies a rejection of teleological explanations. In this way a rigid gap between efficient and final causes is presupposed, with a consequent striving to reduce teleological explanations to mechanistic statements.

In classical German philosophy the discussion of teleology was reintroduced by Kant. Although, as Lukács has demonstrated, his treatment of the problem of teleology is wholly different from Hegel's, the latter's task 'was undoubtedly influenced indirectly or at least made easier by the fact that the entire complex of questions had been raised and was very much in the air.'[2] Thus in the chapter on Teleology in *The Science of Logic* Hegel's point of departure is Kant's treatment of teleology: 'One of Kant's great merits in philosophy is, that he established a distinction between relative or external, and internal, adequacy to an end. In the latter he has opened up the notion of Life, or the Idea, and thereby positively raised philosophy above the determinations of reflection ... though only negatively, incompletely, and in a very crooked fashion' (SoL 377). So one of the 'great merits' which Hegel saw in Kant's work was his notion of an 'internal teleology' which he contrasted with the external teleologies of classical philosophy and theology, according to which the world and its inhabitants serve the purpose of an 'extra-mundane understanding'—a theory 'favoured by piety so much that it seemed to be removed from the true investigation of nature'[3] (SoL 375).

[1] Hobbes, *De Corpore*, English Works, vol. i, edited by Molesworth, London, 1839, 132.

[2] G. Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, London, 1975, 340.

[3] It is important to note that Hegel's rejection of external teleologies also rules out the theory, often attributed to him, of an external cosmic spirit which manipulates human destiny.

Nevertheless, like Hobbes and the seventeenth-century materialists, Kant saw no place for teleology in explanations of the phenomenal world. Purpose entered into his reflections on human activity only in his moral philosophy where the concept of an internal teleology was introduced to advance the view that man is an end in himself and should not, under any circumstances, be used as a means for another end. Hegel duly praised this development but was critical of what he saw as an abstract formulation of the relationships between ends and means. (See *SoL* 377.) For whilst Kant had drawn attention to certain facts about human beings, which were ignored by the mechanistic materialists, and thus restored human dignity to the forefront of philosophical discourse, his approach nevertheless reiterates their assumption of an unbridgeable gulf between causality and teleology. On the one hand Kant presented a natural world, purposeless and subject to 'blind causality', wherein 'All production of material things is possible on mere mechanistic laws' (*CJ* para. 387). On the other hand he presented a moral agent, purposive, free, and responsible. Hegel was duly critical of Kant's phenomena–noumena distinction and the battery of dichotomies that surrounded it, and his excellence lies in his acceptance of what is important in Kant—the concept of internal teleology and restoration of human dignity—and in his ability to go beyond Kant in the application of teleological concepts to the analysis of human labour. The earliest example of Hegel's interest in this subject is found in the *Jena Lectures* of 1805–6. Since they illustrate the direction Hegel was to take in the *Science of Logic* they are worth quoting at length:

> In tools or in the cultivated, fertilized field I possess a *possibility*, *content*, as *something general*. For this reason tools, the means, are to be preferred to the end or purpose of desire, which is more individual; the tools comprehend all the individualities.
>
> But a tool does not yet have activity in itself. It is inert matter, it does not turn back in itself. I must still work with it. I have interposed *cunning* between myself and external objects, so as to spare myself and to shield my determinacy and let it wear itself out. The Ego remains the soul of this syllogism, in reference to it, to activity. However, I only spare myself in terms of quantity, since I still get blisters. Making myself into a thing is still unavoidable; the activity of the impulse is not yet in the thing. It is important also to make the tool generate its own activity, to make is self-activating. This should be achieved (a) by contriving it so that its line, its thread, its double edge or whatever, is used to reverse its direction, to turn it upon itself. Its passivity must be transformed into activity, into a cohesive movement. (b) In general nature's own activity, the elasticity of a watch-spring, water, wind, etc., are employed to do things they would not have done if left to themselves, so that their blind action is made purposive, the opposite of itself: the rational behaviour of nature, *laws*, in its external existence. Nothing happens to *nature* itself; the *individual purposes* of *natural existence* become universal. Here impulse departs from labour. It allows nature to act on itself, simply looks on and controls it with a light touch: *cunning*. The broadside of force is assailed by the fine point of cunning. The *point d'honneur* of cunning in its struggle with force is to seize it on its blind side so

that it is directed against itself, to take a firm grip on it, to be active against it or to turn it as movement back on itself, so that it annuls itself . . .[4]

Hegel's point here is simple to grasp. The teleology–mechanism dichotomy can be transcended by locating conscious human purpose *within* the causal network, without destroying it, or going beyond it. Hegel's insight is echoed in Marx's location of purpose within material causality:

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own action starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adopted to its own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.[5]

Despite numerous claims that Marx had completely divested himself of Hegelianism by the time he wrote *Capital*, the above remarks could easily have been written by Hegel. Both hold that whilst causal relationships are exploited to fulfil human purpose the latter is constantly modified and, indeed, transformed in the process. Hegel's treatment of teleology in the *Science of Logic* can be read as a detailed account of such a transformation. For Hegel, like Marx, the relationship between human needs and the instruments of labour is dialectical: the labour process is rooted in human needs, and science and technology rest upon a social base which in turn engenders further causal relationships. In work one penetrates even deeper into the causal processes of the natural world. The limits of human knowledge are not transcendentally drawn, but are the functions of the purposes men set for themselves in the work process. Whilst human labour can never go beyond the limits of causality new developments consist in discovering hitherto concealed causal relationships which are introduced into the labour process. Hobbes was correct in his contention that final causes are conditioned by efficient causes but he failed to grasp that a greater understanding of efficient causes may be generated by finality, and in turn extend the freedom and scope of human purposiveness. In this way Hegel depicts the labour process as a means of extending our understanding of the natural world and as the means for a further extension of freedom from causal determinism. Engels was fully aware that Hegel had solved the problem of the relationship between freedom and necessity when he wrote in *Anti-Dühring* that

Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. 'Necessity is *blind* only *in so far as it is not understood*.' Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends . . . Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it

[4] Hegel's *Jena Lectures*, cited by Lukács, 344–5.
[5] K. Marx, *Capital*, vol. i, Moscow, 1961, 177.

is therefore a product of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom. On the threshold of human history stands the discovery that mechanical motion can be transformed into heat: the production of fire by friction; at the close of the development so far gone through stands the discovery that heat can be transformed into mechanical motion: the steam engine.[6]

The social dynamic nature of the labour process is dramatized in Hegel's presentation of the 'Master–Servant' dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*Phen.* 111–19), where freedom for the slave is not merely freedom from the master but from what is considered to be the natural limit of freedom—the hardness of the physical world.

In the *Science of Logic* the insights of the Jena period are presented in a more systematic form. But the discussion of teleology remains one of the most obscure passages in his work. How is one to approach it? When reading Hegel one must be like a detective and search for clues, for Hegel does not leave the reader without any familiar objects.[7] In fact he gives three: a watch, a house, and a plough. These three objects symbolize his intentions and are the clues by means of which a complex argument can be unravelled. The watch is important because time is necessary for human purpose; a conscious end accomplished within a specific time at a particular period in history. The house symbolizes the human desire to make the world habitable, to be at home in the world, to be free. Finally, the plough, an instrument of labour, represents human destiny. It is the key to the dialectic of history, symbolic of the relationship between man and nature.

But what has all of this to do with logic? For many of Hegel's predecessors, and contemporary philosophers, logic is concerned only with a formal system of a priori rules which constitute an external standard for the validation of thought and language. But logic, according to Hegel, embraces both the symbol and the object. For this reason Hegel goes to great lengths in both the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia* to show that the 'Law of Identity' and the 'Law of Contradiction' in themselves say nothing. A table, he says, is not self-identical with itself, but with the value bestowed upon it by a purposeful human being. Both words and commodities take their meaning from social intercourse and cannot be apprehended abstractly. A logical contradiction, such as 'I am sad and I am not sad' or 'It is a plant and it is not a plant', appears as such only if we deliberately ignore its manifold richness and accept the dull interpretation of the logician. According to Hegel, laws expressing tautology and contradiction cannot serve as the foundational laws of reason. When formally presented, they merely reflect frozen thought-

[6] F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1962, 157.

[7] On the significance of Hegel's 'clues'—the watch, the house, and the plough—I am deeply indebted to Jacques D'Hondt's 'Teleology and Praxis in Hegel's Logic', in *Hegel et la Pensée Moderne*, Paris, 1970. References to this work are from an unpublished translation by A. R. Manser, University of Southampton.

determinations. This is why Hegel describes formal logic as 'abstract', 'lifeless', and even 'boring'. He offers, by way of contrast, a logic manifesting a richness of content which surpasses anything that had previously been considered within the scope of logical inquiry. Naturally aware that his reader, schooled in the formal tradition, will have difficulty in comprehending such a conception of logic, Hegel offers a justification of this approach: 'The idea of life is concerned with a subject matter so concrete and, if you will, so real that with it we may seem to have over-stepped the domain of logic as it is commonly conceived' (SoL 401).

It is not only the domain of logic that Hegel oversteps. His manipulation of teleological concepts and traditional distinctions results in a state where they become virtually unrecognizable. In order to simplify matters we can, without any significant loss of meaning, substitute some of the key terms in Hegel's analysis of teleology. We can replace the term 'end' with 'skilled worker', since the latter represents a living end. Further simplification can be achieved if we replace 'syllogism' with 'purposive action', since Hegel's syllogisms represent a unity of thought and action in a reciprocal relationship between man and nature and between man and man. Hegelian syllogisms have three terms: a middle term (the means, instrument, or slave) which mediates the two extremes; an end (skilled worker or master), and an object (the raw material from which desires are satisfied). These relationships are far from static and at any given moment all three may interchange, with ends becoming means and the object becoming the end. We should also remember that, for Hegel, philosophy reflects on a dynamically changing environment and social life and that his concept of teleology will itself reflect on the dramatic changes taking place in his world. Hegel is the philosopher of the Industrial Revolution. Foremost in his mind is the transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one and this in turn necessitates a different philosophical outlook. Hegel's philosophy contemplates a world no longer cut off from man, but a world man conquers as his knowledge develops. Consider how he speaks of the violent relationship between man and his environment: 'The means is an object . . . it is powerless against the end as it is against some other immediate object' (SoL 385). We can appreciate this remark if we see that the tool, or plough, is an object employed by the skilled worker against other objects which are powerless against it. Whilst objects may resist the power of man, they are powerless against other objects which are employed by human intelligence. Hegel has an image of a violent interaction between man and the world, whereby man captures part of the mechanical world in order to use it against itself: 'Thus as against the end the object has the character of importance and subservience; the end is its subjectivity or soul which has its external side in the object' (SoL 385–6). On the other hand the means has definite power over the external object. For it is the means which transforms the object in accord with the end desired by the skilled worker—the farmer's satisfaction is mediated by the plough. But the means, or instrument, has an immediate relationship to both extremes; to

the farmer and to the land, the end and the external object. Against the farmer the plough is powerless, against the land it is powerful and violent SoL 386–7). This is not merely because it obeys causal laws but because it is operated by a human purpose. Says Hegel: 'In this relation its process is no other than the mechanical or chemical process . . . but . . . these processes pass back, through themselves, into the end' (SoL 387). The image of violence suggests that this means-end relationship can be allied to human intercourse. For example: 'The way in which the end (the master) makes an object into the means (slave) may be considered violent' (SoL 387). Here we find the logical structure of the master–servant dialectic outlined in the *Phenomenology*. After a struggle which stops short of death the master uses the slave as a means for his own ends. just as the plough mediates between the farmer and the harvest, so the master slides the slave between himself and the things he desires. He desires food without having to work for it. So he desires slavery and the means become an object of desire. The cotton plantation owners go to war for the defence of slavery. But the master becomes degraded and trapped in enjoyment, whilst the slave learns how to dominate the world and, in turn, how to dominate the master through the weakness of his desires. Thus it is ultimately through his attachment to things that the master loses his freedom. At this point Hegel manifests greater foresight than Marx, for the Marxist desire for the universality of things need not lead to freedom, but to even greater enslavement. Slavery to the means of production may exist in the midst of undreamed of riches.

Now Kant objected to treating people as means, arguing that man exists as an end in himself. This is not entirely wrong but, as Hegel observed, in the real world such clear-cut distinctions are impossible to draw. Hegel could have been thinking of the French Revolution here. The third estate, or middle term, was only a means for the *ancien régime* and, like the slave, sought to become everything. But events were to change and the means became the end and other groups were to emerge who saw it as a further means, and again ends became means and means became ends, until it became impossible to disentangle the multiple relationships and alliances in terms of the abstract dichotomies of Kantian philosophy. In human relationships the question 'Who is using whom?' is often too difficult to determine. Does the teacher use the student or the student use the teacher? Does the publisher use the author or the latter use the publisher? Or does the bookseller use them both? Is this immoral? Clearly not. In the real world it is impossible to draw a rigid distinction between instrument and end.

The question 'Who is using whom?' is raised by Hegel in the initial stages of the master–servant dialectic. He depicts two self-consciousnesses seeing each other as objects but refusing to grant mutual recognition as free autonomous persons. This theme has been developed by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* where he considers the experience of being an object for the other's look, and by R. D. Laing and the existential psychiatrists[8]. In the writings of the latter,

[8] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. Barnes, London, 1972.

slave rebellion is a rejection of 'thinghood', a demand for recognition as free autonomous agents. But this is only part of what Hegel has to say and should not be seen as his explanation of how the slave overturns the power relationship. For whilst it may be essentially human to rebel against thinghood it is equally human to treat others as things and on certain occasions to expect to be treated as things. One cannot simply distinguish between a human being and a technical object and leave it at that. On numerous occasions it is of fundamental importance to exist as a thing. Human interaction in a gynaecological examination, for example, is primarily objective and technical in order to preserve the personal feelings and self-respect of the patient. 'As for exposure and manipulation of the patient's body', says Joan P. Emerson in an account of gynaecological examination, 'it would be a shocking and degrading invasion of privacy were the patient not defined as a technical object.'[9] Earlier in the same article she says: 'The staff want it understood their gazes take in only medically pertinent facts, so they are not concerned with an aesthetic inspection of a patient's body.'[10] Under the appropriate conditions 'thinghood' is essential to the maintenance of personality. But whilst it may be essential for medical activities to proceed it still constitutes an indignity at another level of reality. 'This', says Emerson, 'can be cancelled . . . by simultaneously acknowledging the patient as a person.'[11] Thus a finely balanced alternation between seeing the patient as a person and a thing expresses a multiple definition of reality which is only self-contradictory if one remains anchored to a logical gulf between things and personalities.

In the same way Hegel recognizes that in human relationships the means ends distinction can never be arrested; that human understanding often requires an alternation between being a means for others and an end for oneself. In fact, the fluidity of teleological concepts, like the reality they reflect, can be seen in a wide range of human relationships. But Hegel focuses his attention upon relationships arising out of the work process. So, returning to Hegel's account of the relationship between man and nature, we find that the farmer desirous of the harvest also desires a ploughed field. From this rather obvious point Hegel constructs his account of the unity between finality and causality, contrasting his own position with Kant, for whom all 'production of material things takes place according to merely mechanical laws'. This, says Hegel, does not reflect the reality of human labour where desires and nature's causality mutually affect each other. Furthermore, this interpenetration illustrates the progress of history through the various modes of production. Knowledge, political consciousness, and the scope for freedom, are internally linked to the development of the productive forces, which are in turn reciprocally linked to human needs. Hegel's teleology is therefore progressive. One

[9] Joan P. Emerson, 'Behaviour in Private Places: Sustained Definition of Reality in Gynaecological Examinations', in *Recent Sociology* No. 2, edited by Hans Peter Dreitzel, New York, 1970, 79.

[10] Emerson, 78.

[11] Emerson, 80.

may begin with immediate ends, but these generate a new realm of ends and means, leading in turn to a broader and deeper understanding of nature: not simply a monotonous repetition of infinite progress but a 'constant self-reproduction of human society at a higher level'.[12] Rigid polarities between ends and means therefore collapse into a dialectical totality, and Hegel's teleology thus manifests a break with older teleologies and several contemporary strands of Marxism where ends are given undue significance and means sacrificed for either Divine purpose or statist objectives.

Hegel often characterizes purposiveness in terms of cunning. In work the machine actualizes desire and the skilled worker employs his cunning when he allows nature to work itself out for him. He 'exposes it [the tool] as an object, allows it to exhaust itself, and surrendering it to attrition shields himself behind it from mechanical force'. (SoL 387) But if the machine takes on the role of a mechanical slave, what does the man do? He takes a rest. Occasionally he looks at his watch. Like the plough it too operates according to natural laws which do not cease to function when he is unconcerned with them. Sometimes Hegel has the man sitting in his house, having employed his knowledge of gravity to secure the roof, and his knowledge of fire to keep out the cold weather.[13] Through cunning the man slides himself between the forces of nature. In *Phil.*, Hegel extends this line of thought to draw an analogy between the natural and the social world.

> The building of a house is, in the first instance, a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as means, the several substances required for the work—iron, wood, stones. The elements are made use of in working up this material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set the wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood, etc. The result is, that the wind, which has helped to build the house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of rains and floods, and the destructive powers of fire, so far as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity—press downward—and so high walls are carried up. Thus the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature, and yet to cooperate for a product, by which their operation is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified; they develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the edifice of human society; thus fortifying a position for right and order *against themselves*. (27)

Nature's mechanism is utilized for human finality. The wind wears itself out in strengthening our defences against it. On its own nature has no goals, but man, not God, puts them there. As Marx says in a paraphrase of Hegel: 'An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of things, which the labourer interposes between himself and the subject of his labour'.[14] There can be little doubt that Hegel must have thought of the following verses from Sophocles' *Antigone* when formulating his account of the 'cunning' of man:

[13] Lukács, op. cit., 348.
[13] See D'Hondt, op. cit.
[14] Marx, *Capital*, vol. i, 197.

Wonders are many on earth, and the greatest of these
Is man, who rides the ocean and takes his way
Through the deeps, through wind-swept valleys of perilous seas
That surge and sway.

He is master of ageless Earth, to his own will bending
The immortal master of gods by the sweat of his brow,
As year succeeds to year, with toil'd unending
Of mule and plough.

He is the lord of all things living; birds of the air,
Beasts of the field, all creatures of sea and land
He taketh cunning to capture and ensnare
With sleight of hand;

The use of language, the wind-swift motion of his brain
He learnt; found out the laws of living together
In cities, building him shelter against the rain
And wintry weather.

There is nothing beyond his power. His subtlety
Meeteth all chance, all danger conquereth.
For every ill he hath found its remedy,
Save only death.[15]

(*Antigone*, 340–70, trans. Watling)

The power of man, reflected in his employment of language, his cunning, reflected in the employment of natural forces to shield himself from nature's violence, are all developed in Hegel's dialectic. And Hegel, like Sophocles and Marx, was unsatisfied with a static picture of the relationship between man and nature, so he therefore characterizes a dramatic reversal. Although finality is essentially human, mechanism can nevertheless frustrate or, at least, divert human desire. The machine, too, has ends. Diamonds might be used to cut diamonds, robots might be used to make, mend, or control, robots, according to human desires, but this can be reversed. Just as the slave can become master, so the machine comes to impose its ends on man. Says Hegel:

In so far as the means is higher than the finite ends of external usefulness: the plough is more honourable than are immediately those enjoyments which are procured by it, and are ends. The instrument is preserved whilst the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external nature, even though, according to his ends, he frequently is subjected to it. (SoL 388)

Just as the slave achieves universality at the master's expense, so the plough becomes more important than the harvest—the instrument becomes the end. To make ploughs one needs factories and industry. In making even better tools the process of industrialization is generated. This process is the outcome

[15] See Hegel's remarks towards the end of the 'Master-Servant' dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where it is argued that essential to the development of the slave's consciousness is 'the fear of death, the sovereign master'.

of human desires working in accord with nature's mechanism, but it develops according to its own logic. The controller becomes controlled by his own desires. The machine imposes its pattern and demands upon social life. Society is organized according to the needs of factory production. The skilled worker becomes a prisoner of the causal processes of production. It is easy to see how close all of this is to the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of the young Marx in 1844. Such dramatic reversals reflect on those curious ironies of history which Hegel describes as the 'cunning of reason'; the process by which the intentional actions of human beings reveal a purpose other than that which was consciously intended. This doctrine has been severely criticized by Hegel's friends and foes alike. According to Lukács it weakens Hegel's account of freedom, and contributes to his 'mystification of the historical process, his hypostatization of a "spirit" which acts as a conscious principle in which it is grounded'.[16] On these terms Hegel is saying that we are free only in so far as we act in accord with this cosmic spirit. But as Parkinson points out, Lukács is using the wrong model. The world mind is not external to the actions of human beings.[17] We are not subjected to its powers as a falling stone is subject to the laws of gravity, or a stick caught up in a river. We might say that the current and the stick are externally related. But the world-mind is not distinct from the actions of individuals. On the contrary, Hegel's commitment to an internal teleology suggests that in so far as an individual acts he is part of the world-mind, and that the latter cannot be said to push individuals about.

Marx is often credited for debunking the Hegelian concept of a world-mind by showing that the powers attributed to God are really reified human powers. Without going too deeply into Hegel's theology it is worth drawing attention to the fact that his reference to the absolute mind (*der absolut Geist*) 'does not carry any existential implication; the definite article is attached to any abstract noun'.[18] To see Hegel's cunning of reason as an internal teleology is to call into question the view that history is stage-managed by some cosmic force. In an important respect Hegel's world mind is the sum total of unintended consequences and purposive action as seen through the eyes of the historian. To put it another way: we might say that the history of any civilization has a meaning which differs from the individual intentions of its constituent members. No matter how many consequences of an act may be forseeable, any action or institution will have an indefinite number of side effects. And even if *every* consequence were predictable, all would not be. We can draw an analogy here with numbers: whilst we can count every whole number we cannot count all whole numbers. J. O. Wisdom has drawn attention to this point in another context, adding that 'unintended consequences may be *distributively* predictable but are not *collectively* pre-

[16] Lukács, 357.

[17] G. H. T. Parkinson, 'Hegel's Concept of Freedom', Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, *Reason and Reality*, London, 1972, 189.

[18] A. R. Manser, 'Critical Notice', *Mind*, vol. lxxxvii, No. 345, 1978, 122.

dictable: All of which is just a logical way of bring out the point that whatever effort we make to foresee unintended consequences and however successful we are, there must logically always be some we shall have failed to foresee'.[19] Unintended consequences that are not foreseen are logically similar to those which are foreseen, and do not have to stem from mysterious origins; they have the same origins as foreseen consequences, and may produce an overall state of affairs which no one in particular has intended. It is simply the result of the collective intentions of individuals and institutions in history upon which historians impose intelligibility. As Hegel says in *Reason in History*: 'The realm of spirit consists in what is produced by man. One may have all sorts of ideas about the kingdom of God; but it is always a realm of spirit to be realized and brought about in man' (20). And just as the internal relation between means and ends; between spirit and man; between the absolute and method, eschews an external agency, so the standard of rationality is internal to the various stages of historical development. In this sense, Hegel's slogan 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' is not a plea for intellectual subservience to God or the temporal authorities, but a reference to the fact that the rationality of history is internally related to observations of the processes at work in history. Hegel's insistence that men obtain their notions of reason from their observations of the actual world is a rejection of both classical idealism and materialism.

Lukács is, of course, aware of Hegel's references to the 'cunning of man' and he draws attention to Hegel's remarks on government in this context. 'The cunning of government *is to* allow free reign to the self-interest of others—the right, the understanding of the merchant tells him what counts in the world: utility—the government must turn its utility to account and ensure that it return back into the world.'[20] All of this suggests that the master–servant dialectic need not be tied exclusively to the triumph of the underdog. A government can retain its power by giving free reign to those subordinate to it. But in another sense the cunning is not merely the government's cunning, just as it is not merely the slave's or the cunning of some cosmic spirit: it is the rationality imminent in the conscious activity of the particular actions of the various social groups. Despite the obscureness of many of his arguments Hegel is as down to earth as Wittgenstein. The point of stressing the internality between the world mind and the facts of history is to avoid the abstract distinction between the world as it is and the world as we know it. Distinctions between what we know and what we do not know fall within the world we can know—not in any transcendental sphere. There is no need to postulate another world independent of us, and there is no external absolute in the sense of an ultimate goal or cosmic purpose.

[19] J. O. Wisdom, 'Situational Individualism and the Emergence of Group Properties' in *Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences*, edited by R. Borger and F. Cioffi, Cambridge, 1970.

[20] Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie* ii, edited by J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig, 1931–2, 251, cited by Lukács, 355.

What does Hegel accomplish with this concept of teleology? In the first place it provides an understanding of objective reality which calls into question all external divisions between subject and object drawn by classical idealists and empiricists alike. For Hegel's account of reality is that of process and change which we come to understand as desire satisfying agents of change. He expressed this in logical terms, in 'syllogisms' and 'contradictions', but his approach must not be confused with formal logic or its alleged opposite, irrational emotionalism. It is a logic which expresses its content, and its content is to be found in the dialectic of labour, of purposive production. As Lukács says: 'Hegel's concrete analysis of the human labour process shows that the antinomy of causality and teleology is in reality a dialectical contradiction in which the laws governing a complex pattern of objective reality become manifest in motion, in the process of its own constant reproduction'.[21] To this end Hegel questions abstract distinctions between man and nature and is able to give an account of their relationship in progressive terms without lapsing into a romantic version of the lost harmony between man and nature and the consequent rejection of industrialism. In Hegel's concept of teleology one finds an alternative to the distinction between mechanist and purposive models of social explanation which has bewitched the social sciences for over a century. But of equal importance is his abolition of external distinctions between theory and practice, a distinction which he contrasts with a conception of reality that is internally linked to human labour. Finally, we have his novel reformulation of the relationship between freedom and necessity, where freedom is not abstract freedom from nature's causality but is determined by the ability to penetrate and exploit nature for a definite human purpose.

[21] Lukács, 346.

CHAPTER 10

PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY IN KANT AND HEGEL

LEON POMPA

THE concept of philosophical history, as satisfying a demand to understand the meaning of history as a whole, has been strongly influenced by the Christian eschatological tradition. It is not surprising, therefore, that it often contains a combination of apologetic and redemptive elements, in which the evil or folly exhibited in individual human actions is at least counterbalanced by a process of improvement—in whatever terms the latter is understood—to be discerned in the development of humanity as a whole. This is certainly true both of Kant's and of Hegel's conceptions of philosophical history. There are, of course, differences between them. In Kant's case it is a sense of the folly and aimlessness of the past[1] which philosophical history, if it is possible, can help us to overcome.[2] For Hegel, on the other hand, it is human misery and suffering which is uppermost in his mind, and for which philosophical history will provide some sort of justification.[3] In both cases, however, there is a clear sense in which it is suggested that a philosophical view of history will help to assuage the feelings of disgust or sorrow to which purely empirical, non-philosophical accounts must give rise. In what follows, I shall seek to establish the differences in the way in which the two thinkers sought to support this suggestion and to ask whether either succeeded in doing so.

Although I do not intend to discuss how far Hegel was directly affected by Kant in his account of philosophical history, it is plausible to see his view as a development of Kantian themes, if only via Kant's general influence on German thought. It will therefore be convenient to commence with Kant and,

[1] 'One cannot but suppress a certain indignation when one sees men's actions on the great world-stage and finds behind the wisdom that appears here and there among individuals, everything in the large woven together from folly, childish vanity, even from childish malice and destructiveness,' *Idea For A Universal History From A Cosmopolitan Point of View*, translated by Lewis White Beck (KoH 12). Cf. Kant's *Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View*, translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell, revised and edited by Hans. H. Rudnick, Illinois, 1978, 241, where Kant asserts that the individual has a natural inclination knowingly to desire the unlawful.

[2] '[Philosophical history] can serve not only for clarifying the confused play of things human ... but for giving a consoling view of the future ... in which there will be exhibited in the distance how the human race finally achieves the condition in which all the seeds implanted in it by Nature can fully develop and in which the destiny of the human race can be fulfilled here on earth' (KoH 25).

[3] 'But even as we look upon history as an altar on which the happiness of nations, the wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals are slaughtered, our thoughts inevitably impel us to ask: to whom or to *what ultimate end* have these monstrous sacrifices been made?' (WH 69).

in particular, with two theses, with both of which, in a certain sense, Hegel would have agreed: that there can be macrocosmic change in history and that this change is intelligible only if viewed teleologically.

The claim that it is at least possible to view history macroscopically is stated explicitly in the opening sentences of the *Idea For A Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View*. Kant points out that human actions, in so far as they are appearances of the human will, are, like all other natural events, determined by universal laws. He proceeds on the basis of this fact, to express the hope that 'if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it and that what seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen, from the standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and progressive though slow evolution of its original endowment' (KoH 11). By way of supporting this possibility, he points to the fact that the annual statistics of birth, marriage, and death show that they occur in accordance with relatively stable laws, despite the fact that, as events influenced by free will, they appear to be subject to no rule by which to predict their incidence. The suggestion so far, then, is that it is at least possible to look at history macroscopically and that by so doing there may be a gain in intelligibility. Since it is entirely understandable that we should seek for as much intelligibility as we can find in history, as in everything else, I shall leave this point undiscussed.

The issue which now faces Kant is that of the sort of intelligibility in question. It cannot be that which is provided when we see things as the successful outcome of human forethought for, as he points out in connection with the relatively stable laws of birth, marriage, and death, individuals give no thought to such matters when making their contribution to them. Nevertheless, both individuals and nations work towards a natural end 'as if following a guiding thread' (KoH 12) although the latter is unknown to them. This suggests the main idea of the *Idea For A Universal History*: the search for an a priori 'clue' to such a history which, Kant maintains, will consist in a 'natural purpose in this idiotic course of things human' (KoH 24).

Two points call for comment. The first concerns the question why Kant should look for an a priori rather than an empirical clue. The answer to this lies partly in the fact that he does not think that empirical history has so far provided evidence of much large-scale progressive evolution. If we are to think profitably in such terms, the purpose of the evolution must lie in the future. But this also means that any evidence provided by the past can provide only a very weak inductive basis for a theory involving expectations about the future. The 'clue' must therefore be grounded a priori rather than empirically.

The second point concerns Kant's insistence that the clue will provide insight into a *natural* purpose in human history. A natural purpose, one would normally think, is one that exists in nature and which is therefore to be established by empirical rather than a priori reasoning. This explains why

Kant is careful to insist that the clue provides only hypothetical necessity: it is 'an idea of how the world must be if it is to lead to certain rational ends' (KoH 25). This is also why, when acknowledging the a priori status of the Idea, he insists that it is only 'to some extent based upon an *a priori* principle' and is meant to provide a philosophically orientated aid to the work of the practising historian rather than to displace the latter (KoH 25). Nevertheless, it is an important clue since, if we do not accept such a 'philosophical' point of view, 'the notorious complexity of a history of our time must lead to serious doubt as to how our descendants will begin to grasp the burden of the history we shall leave them after a few centuries (KoH 25).

The suggestion that on a macrocosmic scale history should be considered teleologically must be taken within the wider context of the critical philosophy, throughout the entire period of which teleology posed problems for Kant. The *Critique of Pure Reason* produced the conclusion that the only legitimate scientific knowledge consists in that of the causal laws of mechanics. Teleological notions were purely regulative, encouraging scientists to conduct their enquiries *as if* the laws of science were the product of a non-human intelligence, in the hope of discovering that empirical laws formed a unified system.

In the *Critique of Teleological Judgement*, Kant advanced beyond this position by distinguishing between internal and external teleology. The first arises from his recognition of the limits of causal explanation. He accepts that in the case of organisms in nature, whatever the case with regard to the theoretical possibility of explaining them causally, in practice there is no hope of doing so. Accordingly, he claims, such things must be viewed *as if* there were an inner purposiveness in virtue of which the parts were related to the whole and to each other.[4] Nevertheless, the principle remains regulative: it will help us to gain insight into the relationships within an organism, but the latter are not to be explained teleologically. Kant's second principle, that of extrinsic purpose, is basically a more detailed version of that advanced in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is the principle that 'everything in the world is good for something or other: nothing in it is vain' (CJ part ii 28). But this again is a regulative principle and 'all that we gain from it is a clue to guide us in the study of natural things' (CJ part ii 28).

The 'clue' which Kant seeks in the *Idea* For A *Universal History* is that which will allow us to use the notion of external purposiveness: the 'confused play of things human' can be clarified if, instead of concentrating on the doings of individuals, we regard human history as though, at a macrocosmic level, what occurs is organized on behalf of some ultimate end of nature.

As it stands this suggestion is insufficient even for its limited task. What is required is some idea of what the end might be and in his various writings Kant makes a number of different suggestions about it, all of which involve reference to man as a moral being, and all of which founder precisely because of Kant's conception of the non-natural nature of morality.

[4] See *Kant's Concept of Teleology*, by J. D. McFarland, Edinburgh. 1970, 98–106.

In the *Idea For A Universal History*, for example, the end is said to be certain related conditions—a perfect civil state and a corresponding set of external relations between nations—which will prevent the obstruction of moral action. But since it is basic to Kant's conception of moral action that one is always free to act morally—the freedom is inalienable because it pertains to the noumenal and not to the phenomenal self—it is clear that no external conditions can obstruct moral action and hence, *a fortiori*, no external conditions, such as those in a perfect civil state, can prevent the obstruction of moral action. Such an end would therefore be internally incoherent, given Kant's conception of morality as basically noumenal, and an internally incoherent idea cannot serve as a basis even for regulative procedures. In *The Critique of Judgement* Kant advances the stronger claim that the end is man as a moral agent, on the grounds that only man as a moral agent does not exist to further some other end (*CJ* 100). But this proposal suffers from precisely the same defect. If it is in the nature of moral action that it arises from the rational self-determination of the noumenal self, nothing that goes on in Nature, including nothing that affects the phenomenal self, can have any effect whatsoever upon this. Accordingly, again, it cannot be coherent to suggest that the historical investigation of Nature, or of that part which is man, should be pursued as though Nature had, as its end, a moral purpose, since the latter is incompatible with Kant's conception of Nature.

A more promising suggestion might be that the end is that of creating those educational and political conditions which best promote one's inclinations to do one's duty. But, while it is true that Kant never denies that there are such conditions, this is again of little help. For, although it is true that Kant never denies that there are such conditions, these can only amount to conditions under which we are more inclined to entertain certain maxims of action. Whether one advances from entertaining these to moral action depends entirely upon one's freely determining oneself to act on one of these on grounds of *reason*. It thus involves a free, autonomous, rational decision, and were it to be otherwise the outcome would not be a moral action. In a strict sense, no conditions can assist one to be moral. It is accordingly incoherent to suggest that we adopt as a regulative principle of history the idea that conditions can improve in this respect.

The above difficulties in the coherence of the end arise from Kant's account of morality, that the will be wholly free from external or phenomenal influence. A different way of designating the end is, however, implied in some of his other remarks. For, while he denies that an externally motivated will can ever be the source of morality, he never denies that a morally motivated will can affect external circumstances. Thus it might seem that it is rational to think that a certain end will come about if men have a moral duty to bring about that end. This, in fact, is what Kant at one point suggests and offers as a reason why he is entitled to assume that the human species is making constant moral progress.[5] But this argument is invalid as it stands, since it

[5] See the quotation from 'Das Mag in der Theorie, u.s.w.' in *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by T. K. Abbott, London, 1927, 326, footnote 1.

does not follow from the fact that we have a duty to act morally that we shall do so, either now or in the future. It is true that Kant attempts to support this point by claiming that we are entitled to infer from the evidence of moral improvement in the past to greater improvement in the future. But, apart from the obvious difficulty of establishing the fact of moral improvement in the past, this does nothing to improve the situation, since, given Kant's view of the unconditioned nature of moral decision, it remains an entirely open question whether we shall act morally in the future, even if we do have a duty to do so.

The final possibility left for Kant is if it were legitimate to think in terms of the self-development of practical reason. But it is difficult to see how this can be possible. For practical reason is an aspect of the noumenal self which exists neither in space nor time. It thus transcends the conditions necessary for the tracing of change and in such circumstances it would be impossible to apply even the notion of development, let alone that of self-development, to it.[6]

It would seem, then, that Kant's difficulties over the teleological conception of history arise from the unresolved contradiction in his thought, whereby we are required to think of man both as noumenon and phenomenon and to use insupportable claims about the one to regulate our view of the other. Since the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is so basic in Kant's thought, it is not surprising that similar difficulties arise for his account of how we should view the means from this perspective.

According to the thesis of man's unsocial sociability, we both need a social setting in which to develop our capacities—in particular the capacity to reason—and yet our basically vicious nature constantly threatens the destruction of that setting. The solution to this dilemma requires three things: 'the correct concept of a possible constitution, great experience in many paths of life, and—far beyond these—a good will to accept such a constitution' (KoH 18). Once again, it must be noted, one requirement is that of a good will. But if a good will is a free autonomous will, how can it be rational for us to have any expectations about whether it will exercise itself? Kant is to some extent aware of this problem and in *Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point Of View*, where he suggests that it can be resolved by adopting the idea of a cosmopolitan society as a regulative idea, he claims that we have grounds for supposing that people possess a natural inclination to exercise their autonomous will, and that these grounds are reasonable. These suggestions are meant to go together, for it would be unreasonable to direct our activities towards a certain, albeit unattainable, end if we had no grounds for thinking that things either were going or would go in that direction. But a natural inclination is something which occurs in the phenomenal world. As such it can arise in one of two ways: as the result of the operation of blind causation alone or as the result of a consistent operation of the moral will. However, as

[6] Yirmiahu Yovel mentions this difficulty in his *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, Princeton, 1980, 21–2.

we have seen, Kant himself denies the first alternative, while I have argued that it is in the nature of Kant's conception of the moral will that we can have no rational expectations about its future exercise. I conclude from this that it is not possible for Kant, within the framework of the critical philosophy, to show that it is reasonable to think of history in terms of a macrocosmic progress towards a 'better' state of affairs.

When we turn to Hegel's attempt to redeem the past, the prospect seems altogether more promising. Although he shares many of Kant's aims, the radically different framework of conceptions involved in his thought means that these are developed in a different way. Since, for reasons of space, I cannot deal with all of these, I shall concentrate upon what follows from his claim that, in a teleological account of history, reason must be treated, to put it in Kantian terms, as 'constitutive' and not 'regulative' and thus be intrinsically knowable.

There is little need to dwell long upon the claim itself. Quite early in the Introduction to *LHP*, Hegel introduces his position by mentioning, with considerable reservations, two anticipatory conceptions. The first is ascribed to Anaxagoras, who held that 'the world is governed by a "noûs", i.e., by reason or understanding in general', (WH 34), meaning by this that it was governed by unalterable objective laws. But Anaxagoras is criticized on two counts. First, the principle applied only to the natural world and *noûs* was not, therefore, thought of as a self-conscious reason or spirit. Secondly, the principle was abstract, that is, it applied only to kinds of things and not to what exists in its concrete detail and particularity. The second anticipatory conception which Hegel mentions is that of providence, which is thought of as a 'wisdom, coupled with infinite power, which realizes its ends, i.e., the absolute and rational design of the world; and reason is truly self-determining thought, or what the Greeks called "noûs".' (WH 35) But Hegel criticizes this conception also, on the grounds that, like that of Anaxagoras, it has been understood as an indeterminate principle, that it has not been applied to the world of history, and that the latter has therefore been left to be explained by external or contingent causation. So, although the providential conception appeals to a plan, it treats the latter as transcendent and unknowable. For Hegel, on the other hand, reason governs the world *internally*, that is, as its inner causation, for '[r]eason is self-sufficient and contains its end in itself and carries itself into effect'. This, as he goes on to explain, means not only that reason is a self-sufficient, self-determining whole, which modifies itself, through itself, in the light of an end which is intrinsic to it, but that we, as rational conscious beings, can know it in its entirety. It follows that Hegel must, and does, reject Kant's characterization of the noumenal as unknowable and the phenomenal as knowable. He does not, of course, want to suggest that we can dispense with the notion of reality as such, but he does want to dispense with it in any transcendent and unknowable sense (WH 44, 66–7).

For history, the idea of a process of rational self-development towards an inner end is crucial but obscure. The end itself is not difficult to specify or

to understand. Hegel repeatedly tells us that it is spirit's consciousness of its own freedom. He is not, of course, referring to our becoming conscious of some abstract principle, but to the actualization of a state of a form which can be willed by the individual because he is conscious that through it his interests are identical with those of the other members of the state. The content of the end is not, therefore, difficult to grasp. What is much more obscure is how this end can be *internal* to the self-development of spirit, that is, to the process whereby it is actualized.

I shall approach this difficulty by considering three possible ways of thinking of an end and its relation to a means. The first is that which dominated most of Kant's thinking about teleology, that is, the case of an agent consciously adopting a plan and regulating his activities so as to achieve it. This seemed comprehensible to Kant because to have an end would be to be in a particular mental state, which would then figure in the causal process whereby the end was achieved. It was precisely because he realized that this conception transgressed the limits of what is knowable if applied to nature as a whole that Kant advocated that it only have a regulative use there and in history. Plainly, however, this is not Hegel's conception since although this sort of end is part of the process by which it is actualized, it is only contingently related to the outcome and, hence, may fail to be actualized as a result of factors external to it, whereas spirit's end cannot fail to be actualized.

The second possibility is that in which the need to satisfy a certain requirement explains the relationships between the parts of a thing and the parts and the whole. This is the sort of 'end in nature' which Kant thought appropriate to organisms, even though he still found it so mysterious that he classified it also as regulative. Despite Kant's difficulties, this sort of end can be rendered intelligible if one takes into account the wider context in which the organism exists and uses this to explain certain features which the organism must have if it is to exist and operate in certain ways. Thus in evolutionary theory, for example, the wider context sets objective constraints upon what can exist and the theory of random variation accounts for the initial existence of organisms with features which satisfy these constraints.

There are, however, a number of reasons why Hegel could not avail himself of this notion even were it, as it could be, understood in a constitutive rather than in a regulative sense. One is that the process is 'blind', in so far as there is no necessity for a directive purposiveness to operate in it. More importantly, it is accidental, for there is no reason why random variations must occur nor, should any take place, why they should include anything which is appropriate to a given context. Hegel insists that reason is not so powerless as not to be able actualize its end (WH 44, 66–7), but any attempt to explain its development by applying this model to the activities of historical agents, be they individual or communal, must allow that it would be just a matter of accident that it developed in whatever direction it did. To

[7] See, for example, LL 180–1, where Kant's concept of the noumenon is castigated as an empty abstraction.

describe this as the actualization of an end would trivialize the claim. Finally, however, it must be noted that this model remains causal. Despite the role of random variation, the context within which the organism exists provides objective causal constraints upon the sorts of organizational patterns which can grow and develop in the organism. There is no sense, therefore, in which the developmental process can be thought of as wholly autonomous, that is, as providing, from within its own resources, all the elements necessary for its development, thereby making the process of development one of self-development.

What Hegel requires, then, if he is to substantiate the view that spirit cannot fail to achieve its end, is a conception in which the end is not only intrinsic to spirit but to the means by which it is to actualize itself. This is a difficult conception. It is useful, therefore, to approach it via certain features of Hegel's conception of action, in a version recently developed by Charles Taylor, which he terms the 'qualitative' or 'expressive' conception. 'Actions', Taylor writes, 'are in a sense inhabited by the purposes which direct them, so that action and purpose are ontologically inseparable.'[8] As Taylor develops this view, three claims are involved. First, action is seen both as primitive and as essentially purposive, although not necessarily conscious. Secondly, consciousness of purpose is a 'reflection' of action, which we come to achieve by making articulate the purposiveness or directedness of what we are doing.[9] Thirdly, spirit can come to consciousness of itself when the actions of an agent express a purpose which requires an understanding of himself, the community with which he identifies himself and their relation to the divine.[10] This wholly non-causal notion of the relation of purpose to action is plainly very different from those discussed earlier and goes well beyond any Kantian conception of teleology. Nevertheless, it faces serious difficulties when we try to apply it to history.

It will be noted that Taylor's account shows how actions can be expressive of the purposes of different kinds of agents, that is, of the individual as such, or of the community, or of the divine, that is spirit, each of which requires a certain mode of understanding of the individual vis-à-vis certain wholes of which he is a part. This is helpful, for it offers, in effect, a non-causal way of understanding the purposiveness inherent in certain phases of the historical development of spirit, such as, for example, in the actions of the oriental despot and those of the Germanic peoples. If, for convenience, we confine ourselves to these two, we could say that it offers an account of the purposiveness inherent in the termini. What it does not offer, however, is a way of understanding how these different purposive termini are themselves properly —indeed necessarily—to be thought of as teleologically related. We can understand, in other words, a purposiveness *expressed in* the actions of the

[8] Charles Taylor 'Hegel and the Philosophy of Action', in *Hegel's Philosophy of Action*, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich and David Lamb, 1983, 2.

[9] Taylor, 10–13.

[10] Taylor, 17.

oriental despot and those of the Germanic peoples, but we lack a way of understanding how the latter can be the *goal* of the former (WH 208). What is required in addition, and what Hegel plainly intends, is a purposiveness inherent in the historical process itself.

For reasons already given, such a purposiveness cannot be explained in the two ways so far discussed. One wonders, however, whether Taylor's concept of expressiveness can be applied to the teleological structure of history itself. This would mean that every phase of the historical process be seen as expressive of a *self-generating* purpose. The problem here, however, is to give an account of the kind of self-generation in question. Since mechanical self-generation must be ruled out, the most promising possibility is one which involves the dialectical self-generation of reason. Thus, in keeping with Hegel's intentions, mechanical causation would be replaced by rational causation as the primary explanatory notion in philosophical history.

Major problems arise, however, for this suggestion, because of the difficulty of understanding how such different things as the dialectic and macrocosmic purposive action can relate to each other. The dialectic is an account of the self-development of an idea which, Hegel constantly insists, must be understood as a basic reality in the historical world of human activity. But the self-development involved in the dialectic involves a sequence of conceptual relations and it is difficult to see how it is possible for this, as it must, to exist and work itself out concretely.

One possibility would be to treat the dialectic as a sequence of ideas which develops by inspiring human activities—albeit often unconsciously. But this suggestion is certainly too weak if the connection between the ideas and the activities is held to be contingent. For then we should lack any explanation why history *must* develop to its final goal, since this would be contingent upon the agents and communities in question actually being inspired by the contradictory phases of the dialectic. Spirit certainly cannot guarantee to secure its own end if contingency is so centrally located in the process whereby it does so.

Another possibility is that the dialectic provide the logic of the purposiveness which, in our adaptation of Taylor's suggestion, expresses itself in human history. But this possibility is susceptible of different interpretations. One is that the dialectic is identical with that purposiveness. This would mean that the purposiveness be understood in terms of phases of the dialectic. But this is too weak for, unless we had an independent reason for accepting the account of purposive history, we would have no reason for accepting the account of purposive history into which the dialectic is written. It seems necessary, then, if philosophical history is not to be arbitrary history, to accept that, even if the dialectic can exist only in and through human history, it is nevertheless autonomous and self-determining within that condition. This would allow that, although the dialectic be actualized in the purposiveness of human history, it has such character of its own as is required to provide the logical ground of the movement and direction of that pur-

posiveness. But for this to be possible, we have to understand the dialectic as a purely logical process of self-development. And in this case, as with Kant, we are left with no way of understanding how a non-temporal aspect of reality—even if it can exist only in temporal activity—can develop in and through its own resources. Thus Hegel is either unable to defend himself against the charge that his account of the goal of purposive history is ungrounded and hence arbitrary, or, if he tries to ground it in the dialectical self-development of reason, he is forced to treat the latter conceptually and thus in a way which makes the notion of self-development inapplicable to it.

It was mentioned at the start that the concept of teleological history has been, at least to some degree, influenced by a desire to redeem the past. It is worth noting, in conclusion, that it is not at all clear that, even were Kant's and Hegel's accounts acceptable, they would succeed in doing so. Acts of folly or cruelty, be they performed by individuals or communities, are not made any the more palatable in themselves by being seen in a larger, more beneficial, perspective. Nor, indeed, is it all that obvious that the human past need present quite so grim a scene as Kant and Hegel describe when looked on at a more microcosmic level. Christianity does, indeed, tell us that individual man is fallen and vicious and, if one accepts this, one will have to look at history in some other way if one is to explain the good which, it seems agreed, arises in its course. History cannot be written without presuppositions, of course, but perhaps the correct antidote to an over-pessimistic view of the past is to subject the Christian view of individual man to philosophical scrutiny, rather than to accept it as obvious and unchallengeable and shape one's history in accordance with it.

CHAPTER 11

POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN KANT AND HEGEL

HOWARD WILLIAMS

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.[1] (Kari Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*)

OF all the points of contact between Kant and Hegel perhaps their view of the relation between philosophy and politics appears to be the least discussed. The comparisons and contrasts between their views on epistemology, morality, religion, logic, and history have been well aired, but the marked and interesting contrast in their views of the role of the philosophy in political life have for the most part been ignored. If I might hazard a guess as to why this is so, I would suggest that it is because Kant—whose general philosophical reputation is second to none—is not on the whole regarded as a major political philosopher. Oddly enough, the situation seems to be somewhat reversed with Hegel: in the Anglo-Saxon world his stock is high as a political philosopher whereas his standing as a philosopher in general, perhaps undeservedly, flags.

Kant's lowly position as a political philosopher was not always so. Hegel saw things differently. Kant's major writings on politics were in the main published in the 1790s when Hegel was in his early twenties and engaged as a private tutor in Berne and Frankfurt. In those days Kant's comments on all subjects, especially politics, were avidly awaited. In particular the German public awaited Kant's considered response to the French Revolution, and when this finally appeared in 1797 in the first volume of the *Metaphysics of Morals* in the doctrine of law, it aroused considerable controversy. A similar controversy had been aroused earlier by his publication of his essay on *Perpetual Peace* in 1795.[2] These controversies can scarcely have escaped Hegel's attention. Rosenkranz in his famous biography speaks of having in his possession a detailed commentary by Hegel on Kant's doctrine of law in the first part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, composed in the year of its pub-

[1] *Writings of the young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, ed. & trans. by L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat, New York, 1967, 402.

[2] Something of the controversy which surrounded Kant's expression of his political views can be gleaned from L. W. Beck's essay 'Kant and the Right of Revolution', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 32 (1971), 411–22. Kant's publication of 'Perpetual Peace' drew an almost immediate response from Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel, and Joseph Görres, who each published pamphlets on the topic. See Z. Batscha & R. Saage, *Friedensutopien, Kant, Fichte, Schlegel, Görres*, Frankfurt, 1979, 7–32.

lication.[3] Hegel's deep interest in Kant's moral and political philosophy is apparent in all his early writings. There can be little doubt that when Hegel came to write his *Philosophy of Right* when he became Professor of Philosophy at Berlin in 1818, one of the most formidable figures in the discipline was Immanuel Kant. This is reflected in the attention that Hegel gives to Kant's thinking in the work. T. M. Knox in his translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* records in its index thirteen references to Kant, as opposed to three and four respectively for Montesquieu and Rousseau. Plato, with eleven mentions, is the only figure to receive comparable attention (*PR* 379–81).

Hegel's approach to political theory is redolent with Kantian ideas. The emphasis Hegel gives to the will, to morality in the modified form of *Sittlichkeit*, to property and the family—all these topics, as they are treated in the *Philosophy of Right* bear upon them the mark of Kant's doctrine of right. But Hegel, of course, diverges markedly from Kant both in his starting point and in his conclusions. It is on this tension in their approach to political philosophy that much of the drama of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is built.

A brief year after the publication of *Perpetual Peace* in 1795 Kant brought out a new enlarged edition. To this new edition Kant appended a 'secret article' dealing with the role of the philosopher in politics. The secret article enjoins that 'the maxims of philosophers concerning the conditions under which public peace is possible should be consulted by states which are armed for war' (*We* xi 227). Kant grants that to append a secret article to a document dealing with public right might appear contradictory, but his objective in doing so is to avoid any offence to rulers, whose dignity might be offended by the suggestion that they take advice from any of their subjects. But whatever the possible injury to pride rulers should, Kant thinks, give ear to the recommendations of philosophers.

Kant does not envisage that this advice will take a direct form or have the same priority as that of jurists. What Kant requires for political philosophy is the right of publicity. As Habermas points out, the principle of publicity is a key one for Kant.[4] With the acceptance of this principle Kant not only wants to encourage the freedom of expression but a full debate, and, ultimately, a meeting of minds on crucial political issues. In Kant's view, political leaders ought always to air the motives that lie behind their policies, so both that they might be subject to criticism and to impose upon leaders a discipline of adopting only those maxims that can be made public. For Kant the test of whether or not a maxim can be made public is not merely the passive one—which any tyrant might pass—that the maxim can be openly expressed, but

[3] Unfortunately, all trace of this fascinating document has since been lost. K. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, Berlin, 1844, 87–9. Cf. G. Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, trans. R. Livingstone, London, 1975, 147 and H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Towards the Sunlight*, Oxford, 1972, KPW, 115, GS, 369.

[4] See my *Kant's Political Philosophy*, Oxford, 1983, 149–57; J. Habermas, 'Publizität als Prinzip der Vermittlung von Politik und Moral', *Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosophie*, ed. Z. Batscha, Frankfurt, 1976, 177.

also the active one that the ruler can show that these policies are what the public calls for. Given the active and considered approach of their subjects rulers can, in Kant's view, hope for greater success in the pursuit of their policies.

Kant looks to the political leader to adopt peaceful policies, both internally and externally. He believes open and public debate conducted by philosophers, and heeded both by the public and rulers can contribute to this process. Unlike Plato, though, Kant has no desire to go so far as to amalgamate the roles of philosopher and ruler. Kant counters Plato's famous suggestion: 'There will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed ... of humanity itself, till philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy come into the same hands,'[5] with: 'That kings philosophize or philosophers should become kings is not to be expected, nor also is it to be desired; because the possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgement of reason' (*We* xi 227). Plato takes the view that it is over-involvement with the economic affairs of the city which leads to the corruption of its leaders. For this reason he advocates that the Guardian class of philosopher–rulers (he recommends govern the city) should be deprived of their property. Plato goes so far as to suggest that the philosopher–rulers should not even be allowed spouses or children of their own because this would encourage private interest to the detriment of the public good. Kant takes the view that none of these measures would suffice to ensure that the philosopher–rulers should govern only in the public good, because it is not merely the possession of private economic interests that corrupts but also the possession of power itself. No one, in Kant's view, should be entrusted with absolute power because even the best-informed and well-meaning of persons will be subverted by power. This is why Kant is such a firm advocate of the separation of power in the modern state, especially the separation of the power to make the laws (legislative) and the power to enforce the laws (executive).[6] The actions of the executive should always be subject to the scrutiny of the public because, at best, no leader is infallible and, at worst, no leader can escape the puli of radical evil which is part of the make-up of even the best of individuals.

We cannot always look to leaders, therefore, to weigh up their actions in a disinterested light. When they are leaders—despite Plato's hopes to the contrary—they are not also philosophers. And here lies the reason for Kant's advocating so strongly that philosophers should pay heed to the views of professional philosophers. Although as leaders they are not capable of being philosophers they, none the less, require the insights of philosophy. Philosophers are, in Kant's view, by their very nature devoted to disinterested inquiry. They have a professional commitment to truth for its own sake and

[5] *Republic*, Part seven, Harmondsworth, 1955, 233.

[6] See my *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 174–6, 216–18, 276–8; *We* xi, 206–7; KPW, 101; GS viii, 352.

are, as a consequence, always opposed to deception, sophistry, and propaganda. Their very lack of involvement in affairs of power allows philosophers to shed a new and, sometimes, illuminating light on the vital issues of the day. As Habermas remarks, Kant takes the Enlightenment view of the role of the philosopher as a moral catalyst, educator, and promoter of reform.[7] Direct involvement in government would, according to this view, destroy the independence of the philosopher as theorist. It is his theoretical insight into the nature of the human individual and society which makes the philosopher such a reliable advocate of reform and a sound source of advice for the government of the day.

I have considerable doubts about Kant's Enlightenment view of the role of the philosopher in politics. These doubts do not, though, lead me to reject his view entirely but to suggest that his optimistic approach be widened and rid of its damaging theory/practice dichotomy. At one level Kant paints too rosy a picture of the philosopher. The goal of philosophy may indeed be disinterested enquiry but does that inevitably imply a lack of direct involvement in political activity? After all, most of the respected figures in the history of political philosophy, such as Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau show a marked disinclination to limiting their activities solely to the academic study. I am conscious that this is not to say a great deal. Philosophers have to inhabit the same world as everyone else and cannot help but be drawn into its controversies. But Kant seems to suggest that philosophers enjoy a superior insight primarily because they detach themselves from the interests involved in political affairs. Clearly this is not so. If philosophers enjoy a superior insight into political affairs this is not because of their detachment from the battle, but because they are better trained intellectually than most political leaders. If there is one claim philosophers must unavoidably make, it is that their thinking is more systematic and comprehensive than the ordinary person's. It is from sharing in this that the ruler and the society as a whole can perhaps profit. In this respect, though, I am more taken by the Platonic view than the Kantian view: it is, as Plato suggests, in the judicious combination of learning and practical life that the greatest insight into human affairs may be gained. However, both Plato and Kant are too elitist: everyone can benefit and contribute something by greater involvement in both philosophy and politics. Although commendably egalitarian in his approach to philosophy Kant would limit politics to the independent, propertied few. Plato, notoriously, would limit both politics and philosophy to the able few.

Because the philosopher both can and should inform public debate on political issues Kant thinks that the role of political philosophy is one of both illumination and advocacy. In his *Metaphysical Elements of Justice* Kant tries to demonstrate why legal relations take on the form they do, and to suggest according to what principles they might be modified and improved.[8]

[7] Habermas, 'Publizität als Prinzip der Vermittlung', 177.

[8] See *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 52–69.

At the more directly political level Kant advocates a (representative) republican form of government based on property relations which encourage the independence of the citizen. And in keeping with the educative and reforming role of political philosophy he argues that the prosperity and harmony of a state cannot be seen in isolation from the prosperity and harmony of other states. Kant is at his most reforming and interventionist as a political philosopher in his international theory.[9] In sum, Kant sees political philosophy as working hand in glove with the progressive tendencies of the age.

This is a view Hegel rejects. Philosophy, in his view, cannot teach the world how it ought to be. Hegel puts this argument most strongly in his Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*. There are two principal reasons why he believes the philosopher must play a passive role in political life. First, Hegel believes that for the philosopher to offer advice to the politician on the conduct of his affairs implies too abstract an approach to the subject matter of political philosophy. The philosopher, if he takes a strictly objective (*wissenschaftliche*) approach, will not wish to impose criteria on the subject matter of his study but will, rather, try always to take criteria (or points of reference) from the subject matter itself. Secondly, Hegel thinks that any advice a philosopher might anyway give always comes too late. A society cannot be properly comprehended until it has finally come into being, thus the philosopher can know the truth about it only a posteriori and not a priori.

This a posteriori view of political philosophy is, as we can see, diametrically opposed to that of Kant. Kant believes it is the task of the political philosopher to outline those a priori ideas which make a settled, civil society possible. Kant argues we cannot infer solely from our experience those rules which allow civil property relations to flourish. There is an unavoidable normative element to the functioning of those rules whose rationale cannot be discovered empirically but can be derived only through reason a priori.[10]

Hegel shares the view that moral and political philosophy are inevitably intertwined and that there is, therefore, an inherently normative element to law. However, whereas Kant believes that pure moral philosophy must set the scene for the philosophy of right, Hegel sees the relationship the other way round. In Hegel's view political philosophy or the philosophy of right sets the parameters for moral philosophy and the doctrine of virtue. Hegel argues that 'the truth about right, ethics and the state is as old as its public recognition and formulation in the law of the land, in the morality of everyday life, and in religion.' Hegel accepts Montesquieu's view, expressed in the *Spirit of the Laws*, that a nation's laws reflect both its history and geographical situation.[11] Each nation possesses those laws and systems of morality

[9] *Kant's Political Philosophy*, Ch. 10.

[10] *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 88; Cf. *We* vii; *Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, trans. J. Ladd, New York, 1965, 60; *GS* vi, 253.

[11] Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans. T. Nugent, New York, 1949, Book I, 3, 6: 'Better is to say that the government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in whose favour it is established.'

which are appropriate to its level of development. 'The proposal to give a constitution ... to a nation *a priori*', Hegel says, is an 'inspiration which overlooks precisely that moment of a constitution through which it is something more than a figment of thought (*Gedankending*). Hence every nation has the constitution appropriate to and suitable for it' (PR para. 274; W vii 440). For Hegel the manner in which a society is governed cannot be legislated or improved on a priori. To know how the citizens of a society ought to act the philosopher need do no more, in Hegel's view, than look closely at that society and the rules that govern it.

In taking this view Hegel does not see himself driven on by mere conservative inclination. For him this is (the) scientific procedure which philosophy itself requires. In the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* he observes that 'so far as nature is concerned it is granted that philosophy must come to comprehend it as it is, that ... nature in itself is rational and that knowledge has to grasp this actual reason present in it' (PR 4, W vii 15). However, when it comes to the study of society it is paradoxically assumed that rationality does not lie within the object but has to be extraneously introduced to it. Hegel no doubt regards Kant as adopting such a procedure in seeking to derive the parameters of the rule of law from the categorical imperative in the *Metaphysics of Morals*.[12] The appropriate rules for a society cannot, in Hegel's view, be derived from such abstract a priori criteria as Kant's categorical imperative but have, rather, to be derived from an analysis of the particular circumstances of a society.

It is difficult to decide here whether it is Hegel or Kant who makes the more heroic assumption. Is it Kant who believes we should make the world comply with a priori rules, or Hegel, who assumes the world already observes rational rules of its own? Whereas I am, on the one hand, at one with Hegel in thinking that the truth about society can be gained only from a detailed and concrete analysis of its own laws, customs, and morality, I believe, on the other hand, he takes one step too far when he presumes that those laws, mores, and customs are for the most part the right ones for that society. To make this presumption acceptable Hegel relies on the further presumption that social and political development takes on a teleological form. For Hegel there is no difficulty about the appropriateness of laws to a given society, because he assumes that they are the laws that the evolution of world spirit has willed. In contrast with this startling assumption I find Kant's notion of bringing some external or a priori measure to our considerations on society attractive. The political philosopher must be in a position to pass a critical judgement on what he observes, and this judgement cannot be hampered by what is considered appropriate for the time. Of course, Hegel is right to insist that Kant's invocation of the categorical imperative respresents too abstract an approach to the analysis of society, but the inappropriateness of an absolute measure of human perfection to the study of human society does not rule out all such measures. Political philosophy in my view derives much

[12] *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 59–63.

of its worth from having an eye (always) to the improvement of society.

Hegel decisively rejects such an activist view of political philosophy in the *Philosophy of Right*. He takes the fate of his contemporary j. F. Fries (who was suspended from his duties as Professor of Philosophy at Jena for his involvement with the liberal Wartburg festival) as an example of the pitfalls of an activist style of political philosophy. By involving himself directly in this festival Fries, in Hegel's view, had brought philosophy into disrepute (*PR* 6–7; *W* iii 18–20). In answer to the romantic, democratic yearnings of Fries, Hegel is quite prepared to declare his loyalty to the existing state, saying in justification, 'philosophy with us is not, as it was with the Greeks for instance, pursued in private like an art, but has an existence in the open, in contact with the public, and chiefly or only in public service (*Staatsdienste*)' (*PR* 7, *W* vii 21).

This conclusion runs wholly counter to the point of the appeal which Kant makes in one of his final publications, *The Contest of the Faculties*, that philosophy unlike the higher faculties medicine, theology and law, should be 'free to pursue scholarship and judge the teaching of other faculties without interference from government.'[13] It is true that Hegel does not recommend positive interference by the state in the teaching of philosophy, but he does imply that the state may justifiably have a veto on the use of certain teachings. The crux of the issue is that Hegel does not see philosophy as playing the same reforming and improving role that Kant advocates for it. The theme of Hegel's political philosophy is, on the contrary, resignation before the facts of the present.

Hegel comes to this dispiriting conclusion because of his weddedness to a totally concrete procedure for political philosophy. Since, he says, 'philosophy is the exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the apprehension of the present and real, not the creation of a beyond, supposed to exist, God knows where' (*PR* 10, *W* vii 24), Hegel thinks this applies to the work of even the greatest of political philosophers. In his view, Plato's *Republic* does not represent an ideal of the perfect polity but is, rather, the rational expression of Greek ethical life in his time. Those aspects of Plato's 'ideal' we now deplore, such as its rigid censorship and inflexible caste system respresent no more than Plato's despairing attempts to hold together a society which was already in the process of dissolution.

Hegel believes himself to be joining both common sense and scientific procedure in arguing that 'what is *rational* is real; and what is real is rational' (*PR* 10, *W* vii 24). This famous epigram brings out both the strengths and weaknesses of Hegel's approach to political philosophy. The strength of his approach is its thorough objectivity, but its weakness is its excessive passivity. The starting point for political philosophy is, he suggests, the rational which has already come into existence, and is to be discovered in the established institutions of the society. The object of political philosophy must be to demonstrate the essential rationality of these institutions. That they persist

[13] *We* xi, 291; *KPW*, 176; *GS* vii, 28–9.

and function is for Hegel evidence of their rationality. Indeed for Hegel the universe as a whole is inherently rational and 'the great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present.' (PR 10, W vii 25) But the philosopher can speak only of what he has experienced and knows. 'So far as it concerns the individual each one is without doubt a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts' (PR 11, W vii 26). Any attempt to go beyond one's time and erect a future ideal society can end only in delusion and dismay. In Hegel's view, the necessary materials for comprehending future society are never available.

As with many other commentators I find these comments of Hegel extremely perceptive. They seem to me to lead to the kind of theory of ideology advanced by Marx and Engels and sociologists of knowledge such as Karl Mannheim.[14] As these thinkers suggests, we have always to be concsious of the way in which our thinking about society (and our thinking in general) is a product of the society in which we live. As Hegel implies, to suppose we can elevate ourselves above society through a feat of imagination or a retreat to pure thought is thoroughly to mislead ourselves. But must we conclude with Hegel, however, that political philosophy can give no practical advice as to how we might best order our affairs because the future is for the most part uncertain and unknown?

What Hegel offers the thinking person in his political philosophy is an insight into why things are as they are. He grants that the morally sensitive individual will (and this is greatly to his credit) be perturbed by what he learns of his society through its philosophical analysis. However, 'to recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this rational insight is the reconciliation with reality that philosophy affords' (PR 12, W vii 26–7). As to Kant's well-meaning attempts in his political writings, such as *Perpetual Peace*, to provide enlightenment 'as to what the world ought to be', philosophy, Hegel says, 'in any case always comes too late on the scene to give it'. 'As the thought of the world it appears only at the time that reality has fully completed its process of development and made itself ready' (PR 12, W vii 28).

Thus the ideal form of a society becomes apparent, in Hegel's view, only when a society has fully matured. But then the die is cast. The progressive development of society is already complete, there is no more that the philosopher can do. From an ethical standpoint the best the philosopher can do is to help the thinking and morally upright citizen come to terms with his fate. This equally applies to societies which have not yet reached their maturity and to societies which are past their point of maturity. The philosopher cannot help when he is not able to show what the line of improvement is: 'When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a form of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only comprehended. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk' (PR 13,

[14] *Ideology and Utopia*, London, 1976, 49–87.

W vii 28). Through philosophy we may well become conscious of the defects of present society but we cannot, in Hegel's view, also gain an insight into the remedies which may be offered by future society to those ills.

Here Hegel and Kant's teleological views of history clash. Kant believes we can through philosophy gain an insight into the path of the development of universal history in its development from the 'worse' to the 'better' and, thus, philosophy might act as midwife to future society.[15] Kant looks to the moral politician and the good citizen to put into practice his plans for perpetual peace, taking advantage of the natural antagonism among individuals and nations to create an ever-enlarging federation of republican states. Hegel, however, expresses no such moral optimism about the path of world history:

> Justice and virtue, wrongdoing, power and vice, talents and their achievements, passions strong and weak, guilt and innocence, grandeur in individual and national life, autonomy, fortune and misfortune of states and individuals, all these have their significance and worth ... World history, however, is above the point of view from which these things matter. (*PR* 217, W vii 345)

Hegel sees world history not as the result of the combined activities of all individuals and nations but as the product of world spirit (*Weltgeist*) which only gradually reveals itself to us. The individual actors and states are but the unconscious agents of this *Weltgeist*. No actor is fully conscious of the purpose of world spirit, as its true purpose only becomes known when it has completed its work. Thus with Hegel there is no question of the individual, armed with a full insight into the process of history, intervening to hasten its progressive development. The sole purpose the philosophical study of history and society can serve is to allow the individual to come to terms with spirit in his time.

Hegel suggests that in Kant's political philosophy the owl of Minerva takes flight prematurely, in that Kant recommends the direct use of philosophical insight to change society for the better. Hegel also questions Kant's ability to anticipate the full development of the society he describes. But if, with Kant, philosophy (metaphorically speaking) leaves its perch too early, with Hegel, by taking flight only when a society is fully mature, it leaves too late. Marx's final thesis on Feuerbach—with which this essay begins—is his attempt to get the timing once and for all right.

[15] *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 22.

CHAPTER 12

KANT AS SEEN BY HEGEL

W. H. WALSH

FEW major philosophers show evidence of having studied the works of their predecessors with special care, even in cases where they were subject to particular influences which they were ready to acknowledge. Hume knew that he was working in the tradition of 'some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing'—'Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, &c.' But there is not much sign in the *Treatise* or elsewhere in Hume's writings of any close acquaintance with the works of these authors; the presumption must be that he had read them at some time and extracted the main ideas, but was not in the habit of returning to their texts.[1] He had something more important to do, namely to work at philosophical problems of his own. Similarly Kant, though he said that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was not meant to be 'a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general', had clearly felt the impact of the thought of some important past philosophers, but equally had never spent much time in finding out just what these philosophers had to say. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume all get fairly frequent mention in his pages. But Kant takes his knowledge of Plato and Aristotle from J. J. Brucker's Historia *critica philosophiae*, a six-volume compilation which first appeared in 1742, or from doubtful sources such as Mendelssohn's doctored translation of the *Phaedo*, and though he doubtless knew the more recent authors at first hand clearly felt no need to study them in any depth. This was true even of writers to whom he attributed a particular importance, such as Leibniz and Hume. The references to Hume in the *Critique* and *Prolegomena* are all disappointingly general, and though the summmary of Leibniz's philosophy in the section called 'The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' has a certain force, it is not documented with references to Leibnizian texts. Kant knows that there is a difference between the views of the historical Leibniz and those which constituted the 'Leibnizian–Wolffian system' of his successors. But he is not very curious about the difference, or inclined to explore it.

It was different, or at any rate partly different, with Hegel, though Hegel too was capable of behaving as if his predecessors did not matter, indeed as if they did not exist. (Kant is referred to three times in the *Phenomenology*,

[1] He obviously read Malebranche more carefully, and must have studied Hobbes, who is mentioned only once in the *Treatise* and not at all in the first *Enquiry*.

Plato twice, Aristotle and Descartes once each; Hume doesn't get a mention.) There is plenty of evidence to show that Hegel repeatedly read Kant in particular. Leaving aside the early writings, which might be said to constitute a continuing *Auseinandersetzung* with Kant on topics bearing on morals and religion, there are at least three places in his works as we have them now where Hegel undertakes a full review and criticism of the Kantian philosophy: in the essay *Glauben und Wissen* of 1802, in the introductory section which formally leads into the part on Logic in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and which mostly dates from the second edition of 1827, and finally in the posthumously published *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. There are also repeated references to and discussions of particular Kantian doctrines in Hegel's most elaborate and most important work on theoretical philosophy, the *Science of Logic* (1812–16). What makes these passages remarkable when we compare them with their counterparts in Kant himself or in Hume is the detailed knowledge they reveal on Hegel's part of the doctrines under discussion. In *Glauben und Wissen* Hegel not only quotes Kant's actual words (or at any rate something quite like them) in examining particular doctrines; he also refers to individual arguments of his author in a way which shows that he had grasped not just the main thesis being put forward, but also how Kant tried to work it out. There is, for example, in this essay considerable emphasis on Kant's doctrine of the productive imagination and the 'figurative' as opposed to the 'intellectual' synthesis spoken of in §24 of the second edition Deduction. There is also a full and accurate account of what Kant had to say in the *Critique of Judgment* about intellectual intuition, with a correct indication of the grounds on which Kant concluded that intuition of this sort is not available to human beings. The treatment of Kant in the *Encyclopaedia* passage is more general if also more trenchant, but not so general that Hegel loses sight of the particular points Kant wanted to establish. In both works, and again in the more lengthy (though also of course less authentic) discussions in the *History of Philosophy* lectures, Hegel pays particular attention to what might be called the unity of the Kantian philosophy: the fact that its author produced three Critiques and not one only, and intended the conclusions established in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be complemented or supplemented by those argued for in the two later works. Hegel was particularly sensitive to the importance of the *Critique of Judgment*, and saw, as some modern critics (including myself) have not, that it was not intended to be simply a series of appendices to the other two Critiques, but to advance Kant's argument by showing that the gulf between Nature and Freedom may well be less absolute than at first sight appeared. He was also alive, in this again differing from many later students of the Critical philosophy, to the crucial part played in Kant's thinking by the doctrine of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason, which he presented as being central to Kant's ethics, rather than an eccentric appendix to it. That the main ambition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith was a dictum not lost on this author.

But it is one thing to grasp a philosophical system correctly, another to agree with it, and the fact of the matter is, of course, that Hegel disagreed with Kant in all sorts of important ways. Not only did he reject Kant's denial of the possibility of *metaphysical* knowledge, with its corollary that we never know reality as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us; he rejected the whole idea of a critical examination of the powers of pure reason, supposed to be conducted in advance of any first-order enquiries. It was certainly a proper demand (cf. LL §41, *Zusatz*) to require that the forms of thought be subjected to examination, but 'what we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the *action of the forms of thought* with a criticism of them'. The examination, in other words, has to be internal, not external; reason must criticize itself in the course of its operations, which are essentially concerned with the attaining of truth, that is, knowledge of reality.[2] The project to suspend metaphysicians from their office until they have satisfactorily answered the question, 'How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?' is accordingly absurd. To say that we know only appearances is to say that we know nothing. And to add that it does not matter because as regards what really concerns us, namely God, Freedom, and Immortality, we can always fall back on pure rational faith is not only to comfort ourselves with a theory that will not bear serious examination, but more important to re-erect the barrier to free thought set up in the darkness of the Middle Ages. The Kantian philosophy ends in a denial of the rights of reason, and as such can never be accepted by modern man.

'People in the present day', wrote Hegel on the page following the last quotation,

> have got over Kant and his philosophy: everybody wants to get further. But there are two ways of going further—a backward and a forward. The light of criticism soon shows that many of our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of the old metaphysical method, an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove determined by the natural bent of each man's mind.

It appears from this that for all its shortcomings Kant's philosophy performed an essential service, and indeed Hegel never denied that it did. Hegel's picture of pre-Kantian metaphysics, discussed under the heading 'First Attitude to Objectivity' in the *Encyclopaedia*, is not exactly like Kant's, since Hegel presents its exponents as having made a naïve attempt to grasp reality with inadequate and unexamined resources rather than as aiming at the impossible goal of knowledge of what transcends experience. But Hegel follows Kant in describing these thinkers as 'dogmatists', and takes that term to mean that they were insufficiently sceptical about their own intellectual equipment. They embarked on their enquiries into the Soul, the World, and God without asking themselves just what these subjects were and whether they could be

[2] I do not discuss these objections here but have done so in pages 184–207 of the present volume.

properly spoken of in the sharply defined terms—finite, infinite, etc.—which naturally occurred. Kant's philosophy had in this respect the useful, if unintended, consequence of showing that this form of metaphysics was essentially a metaphysics of the understanding, and hence of clearing the way for speculative truth, which holds opposing formulae 'in union as a totality, whereas Dogmatism invests them in their isolation with a title to fixity and truth' (*Enc.* §32, *Zusatz*).

What Hegel is insisting on here is the element of sccpticism which he regards as indispensable to successful philosophical thought, the feature which provokes the ruthless and continuing self-examination and self-criticism which give rise to and constitute dialectical thinking. Puzzled Kantians may well wonder why their hero should be credited with the invention, or the fostering, of dialectic, seeing that one of Kant's explicit aims was to combat scepticism and in view of the fact that much of his philosophy rests on the acceptance of forms of thinking as being in order as they are, in mathematics, in natural science, and in dealing with the moral life. Hegel's answer is to point to features of Kant's text which foreshadow his own larger conceptions: the passing remark added in the second edition of the first Critique that 'the number of the categories is always the same, namely three', the third category arising 'from the combination of the second category with the first' (B110), the discovery, partial and incomplete as it was, of the Antinomies and thus of the antinomial nature of thought. Hegel would certainly not have denied that there is much in Kant which is dogmatic or, as he put it in his early works, 'unphilosophical'; he sees Kant's official attitude to science, mathematics, and comomn moral conceptions as complacent and uncritical. Philosophy cannot properly take for granted that any branch of enquiry or area of human activity is in order as it is, without need of unfettered examination. But he also believes that Kant's practice is sometimes better than his professions might lead one to expect (an interesting example is the 'construction of matter from powers and activities' in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, praised by Hegel in his *Lectures* (LHP iii 456) as having been 'of great service' to the incipient philosophy of nature despite the restrictions within which Kant worked). And he claims that though Kant remained at heart a philosopher of the Understanding and in consequence had a quite inadequate grasp of Reason and its Ideas, he was not entirely unaware of the other ways of thinking about the cognitive situation, nor wholly unwilling to grant them authenticity. This comes out particularly in the *Critique of Judgment* where, as the point was put in *Glauben und Wissen* (FK 91),

> Kant himself recognized in the beautiful an intuition other than the sensuous. He characterized the substratum of nature as intelligible, recognized it to be rational and identical with all Reason, and knew that the cognition in which concept and intuition are separated was subjective, finite cognition, a phenomenal cognition.

Hegel grants that for Kant there was no going beyond such finite cognition: the most human beings could do was form the Idea of an intuitive understanding, not use it as a standard in judging claims to knowledge. He thinks even so that the presence of such thoughts shows that Kant's philosophy has a 'truly speculative aspect', and that this constitutes its central interest.

I shall return to this topic. But first I must consider a feature of Hegel's system which connects with Kant more obviously and less controversially, his idealism. The most striking aspect of Kant's analysis of experience when we compare it with that of his predecessors is the emphasis he puts on the subject of knowledge. Any item in experience which lays claim to objectivity must be connectible according to universal rules with other such items in a consciousness recognized or recognizable as one; whatever is real must relate to the same unitary point, the continuing unity of apperception. Experience is all experience for a subject, the world exists only so far as it is constituted in judgement. Through judgement the mind imposes necessary and universal form on the material of the senses and thus in a way 'makes' nature, though only from the formal point of view. Kant's idealism, which carries the corollary that we know only phenomena, consists in his theses that what there is exists for a subject, and that that subject imposes form on whatever comes into consciousness. Now Hegel had many reservations about this whole line of argument. He denied absolutely the Kantian conclusion that we know only appearances, he complained that Kant had given no account worth serious consideration of how the categories proceed from the unity of apperception, how the latter as it were expresses itself in them, he laid special stress on the heterogeneity Kant saw between understanding, the source of form, and sensation, the provider of matter, and asked how in this scheme of things knowledge was possible at all. Was it not a standing miracle that I turn out to be able to unite the whole manifold of sense in a single consciousness? And is not the result Kant argues for, that the world exists only so far as I constitute it, with universality and necessity belonging only to the knowing mind, no part of things as they are in themselves, paradoxical in the extreme? An idealism of this kind must be described as 'subjective', for all Kant's preoccupation with objectivity. Hegel even stoops sometimes to the accusation that the mind which makes nature in Kant should be understood as that of some particular person, thus rendering the whole structure arbitrary and absurd, though elsewhere he acknowledges that 'it is not the mere act of our personal self-consciousness, which introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense' (*Enc.* §42, *Zusatz*). As I have argued elsewhere, it is the impersonal subject of judgment, something which is or should be the same in all of us, that Kant has in mind.

These criticisms notwithstanding, 'It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Notion is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of selfconsciousness' (*SL* 584). The unity which constitutes the nature of the Notion is for Hegel a

unity which belongs to things as much as to thoughts, since the Notion (the peculiar Hegelian *Begriff*) has what might be called an inbuilt tendency to express itself in particulars rather than to stand over against them in isolation as do the concepts of the understanding. We see here how, for all his complaints against Kant, the Kantian unity of apperception is the germ of Hegel's doctrine of Spirit. The unity of apperception might be said at a pinch to subdue or appropriate the manifold of sense by forcing the latter to enter into relations with itself; Hegelian Spirit similarly appropriates and subdues whatever presents itself as its opposite, ending up not so much with a world it has made as with one in which it is writ large. The differences are first that while Kant is posing his question at a fairly modest level, asking how we can make judgements which state what is the case as opposed to what merely seems to be so, Hegel is concerned with the larger problem of the intelligibility of the universe as such, which he thinks can be solved only by seeing it as the self-expression of Spirit; second and perhaps more immediately important, that Kant sets up his structure on the supposition that the manifold of sense is initially alien to the intelligence which informs it, whereas Hegel says (FK 70) that the 'original, synthetic unity must be conceived ... as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites'. I take these cryptic words to mean that the dualism of sense and thought found within ordinary experience is not to be taken as absolute, but must be seen as itself the product of mind or Spirit. As Fichte had first argued, the original 'I' posits itself as something not itself which it subsequently works on and exhibits as its own.

In a celebrated 'open letter' published in 1799 Kant dismissed the *Wissenschaftslehre* (without of course having read it) as 'a totally indefensible system'[3]; there is no reason to believe that his declared attitude to Hegel would have been any different. Hegel's obsession with the production and reconciliation of opposites, which underlies his whole conception of dialectical thinking and manifests itself in every part of his philosophy, would without doubt have struck him as far fetched. Yet we know that Kant himself took steps to reduce the sharpness of some of the oppositions in his own thought, for example by making transcendental schemata function as intermediaries between pure concepts of the understanding and the empirically given, and it is a fact that in his last years he was himself preoccupied with the problem of the gap between pure and empirical physics, and toyed with the idea of 'positing' as a way of filling it. If he never quite reached the full Fichte/Hegel standpoint he came quite close to it.[4] And even if we neglect the fragments of the Opus *Postumum* as products of Kant's dotage we are still left with his insistence in the *Critique* itself on the original, that is ultimate character of pure apperception, on its synthesizing function and on its spontaneity. The development from Kant to Hegel on this point would certainly not have been to the liking of the Kant of 1781, but could not all the same be described as

[3] Zweig, *Kant's Philosophical Correspondence* (Chicago, 1967), 253–4.
[4] Vleeschwauwer, *l'Evolution de la Pensée Kantienne* (Paris, 1939), 197–217.

wholly unnatural. It is arguable that the restricted idealism Kant presented in the *Critique* had within itself the seeds of something more ambitious. Hegel and others (Fichte and J. S. Beck among those personally known to Kant) cultivated these seeds and so were in a position to claim to have taken Kant's thought to its logical conclusion.[5]

Before proceeding let me attempt to summarize how Hegel saw Kant's idealism. He described it as 'subjective' in contrast to his own 'absolute' idealism, and meant by 'subjective' that it restricted itself to the imposition of form on the matter of experience, eschewing the very idea of grasping reality as it is in itself. Kant offered as the sole object of knowledge an artificial world constituted or contaminated by human thought; that this should be taken as objective, for all Kant's elaborate story about synthesis, was to Hegel quite incredible. A true idealism must not stop half way but, as it were, go over into things; Hegel's absolute idealism, in which Spirit took over from the mere unity of apperception, professed to show how this could be done. Further, Hegel maintained that Kant's idealism was unsatisfactory because of the empirical elements it contained. It proffered a doctrine of categories and explained their general function, but made little attempt to discover which concepts answered the description or how they were interconnected. 'Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in discovering the categories' (*Enc.* §42): he simply relied on the supposedly complete table of judgement forms in formal logic in drawing his own list up. Hegel's complaint is formally incorrect, for we know now from Kant's papers that he hunted hard and long for a satisfactory 'clue' to the categories and rejected other candidates before finally settling for the table of forms of judgement (see Vleeschauwer, 85 ff.). Yet it has to be agreed that Kant knew or suspected that some concepts were categories before he even tried to draw up a full list; he 'picked them up as they came his way', to use the phrase he himself used of Aristotle (B107/A81). And he certainly had no thought of speculating in the Hegelian manner on the relations of one category to another; the whole idea of categories cancelling or superseding one another was foreign to his thought. It is, however, arguable that his treatment in the Analogies suggests that the three categories of Relation are not as separate as his theory required, and that the antinomy of mechanism and teleology in the *Critique of Judgment* conceals a conflict between rival sets of categories, though that is not of course how Kant presents it. If Kant did not think about this problem, perhaps he should have done.

Had he done so, might he have come somewhere near Hegel's conception of absolute idealism? He could not have done that without radically changing two central doctrines in his philosophy, that we know only appearances and that there is an absolute gulf between concepts and intuitions, in human experience at least. Hegel has interesting, though not necessarily convincing, things to say about both of these. As regards Kant's confining knowledge to

[5] For a discussion of this issue see my paper 'Subjective and Objective Idealism', published in the proceedings of the Hegel Congress at Stuttgart, 1981.

appearances he appears to say that this conflicts with his all-important doctrine of the synthetic a priori. Kant, we read in *Glauben und Wissen* (*FK* 69), reproached Hume for not envisaging the problem of the synthetic a priori in its full universality, but himself 'stopped at the subjective and external meaning of this question'.

Hegel goes on:

> How are synthetic judgements *a priori* possible? This problem expresses nothing else but the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgement are identical in the *a priori* way. That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which is the particular and in he form of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical. It is Reason alone that is the possibility of this positing, for Reason is nothing else but the identity of heterogeneous elements of this kind.

I am not sure what this means, nor can I get much out of a parallel passage in the *Lectures* (*LHP* iii 430) in which Hegel said that

> Synthetic judgements *a priori* are nothing else than a connection of opposites through themselves, or the absolute Notion, i.e. the relations of different determinations such as those of cause and effect, given not through experience but through thought.

But one point he may be making in the first passage at any rate is the general one that judgement in its fundamental form ascribes a predicate to a particular which is experienced as real, and to that extent can be seen as claiming to state truth about the world, not about some unreal appearance. As Bradley argued, judgement is the ascription of an ideal content to a reality experienced though not articulated in feeling, and owes what grip it has on fact to that. If Hegel is making this point he is saying something important which may well be relevant to the question whether true knowledge is possible, even if it has little to do with the special problem of the synthetic a priori. But we should notice that to grant him this point would not in Hegel's view dispose of the problem of appearances. For to arrive at truth we need to have not just a point of contact with reality, but also an intellectual apparatus which is adequate for its proper characterization. One of Hegel's most insistent criticisms both of Kant and of his predecessors is that they employ concepts without sufficient reflection: they fail to ask themselves whether the terms in which they frame their questions are appropriate to the subject-matter. This explains why when the terms turn out not to be appropriate, for example in the area of rational psychology, the tendency is to put the blame on the things, instead of devising fresh ways of thinking better fitted to capture their real nature. 'Criticism of the forms of the understanding', wrote Hegel in the introduction to his (*SL* 46), 'has had the result that these forms do not apply to things-in-themselves. This can have no other meaning than that these forms are in themselves something untrue.' To proceed from appearance to reality we do not need, as Kant apparently thought, to

exchange our human discursive consciousness for another form of apprehension; we need to improve our categories. Kant had already seen that the world is nothing apart from thought. But it does not follow that reality can be specified in terms of the first thoughts which occur to us. The chances are rather that our first thoughts on the subject will be inappropriate, incoherent or both. We can arrive at truth about reality only when we learn to reject all one-sided views, and in fact to characterize the world in terms of the Hegelian Idea.

But suppose we do proceed to the Idea: are we not still faced with the possibility that our thoughts may not be true of reality? I said just now that for Kant, the world is nothing apart from thought, referring here of course to what Kant called the phenomenal world. Kant himself would have insisted that this was at best an exaggeration: there would be no (phenomenal) world apart from thought, but equally there would be none apart from intuition. 'Thoughts without content', that is without application, 'are empty'; they must be brought to bear on intuitions if they are to have full significance. But (and this is the crucial point) in the case of human beings concepts and intuitions originate in sources which are apparently quite distinct, concepts in the understanding, intuitions in the sensibility. No intuition is available to us but sense-intuition, and though we can form the idea of an understanding which produced intuitions of itself, an intuitive understanding as Kant calls it, it is evident that such an understanding must be entirely different from our own. We can see this by reflecting that, were there to be such an intelligence, it would diverge from ours not only in the nature of its intuitions, but also in its concepts: as Kant put the point in the *Critique of Judgement*, they would be synthetic, not analytic, universals, concepts possession of which would at once give access to their instances. Such concepts would in fact be self-specifying, as ours most evidently are not. Indeed, the whole contrast between actuality and possibility which is so distinctive a feature of human experience would not be found in the experience of an intuitive understanding: in thinking something as possible it would automatically know it as real.

It is not surprising that Hegel was continuously preoccupied with issues arising out of the Kantian dichotomy between concepts and intuitions. At the beginning of his philosophical career he wrote a passage in *Glauben und Wissen* (FK 68) which makes clear what he thought Kant got right and what he got wrong:

> The Kantian philosophy has the merit of being idealism because it does show that neither the concept in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; that intuition by itself is blind and that the concept by itself is empty; and that what is called experience, i.e. the finite identity of the two in consciousness is not a rational cognition either. But the Kantian philosophy declares this finite cognition to be all that is possible. It turns this negative, abstractly idealistic side into that which is in itself, into the positive. It turns just this empty concept into absolute Reason, both theoretical and practical. In so doing, it falls back into

absolute finitide and subjectivity, and the whole task and content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the absolute, but the cognition of this subjectivity.

Kant is just a latter-day Locke, a miserable epistemologist when he should have been a serious metaphysician. But what should Kant have done to avoid this fate? Hegel's answer is that he should have re-thought his fundamental distinction along Hegelian lines. He should have recognized that the abstract concepts of the understanding are not the only concepts; there is also what translators call 'the Notion', the *Begriff par excellence*. The third book of the *Science of Logic* is devoted, in Hegel's own words (SL 591), to 'the exposition of how the Notion builds up in and from itself the reality that has vanished from it'. It may be useful to quote his further remarks at some length.

It has therefore been freely admitted that the cognition that stops short at the Notion purely as such, is still incomplete and has only as yet arrived at abstract truth. But its incompleteness does not lie in its lack of that presumptive reality given in feeling and intuition but rather in the fact that the Notion has not yet given itself a reality of its own, a reality produced from its own resources. The demonstrated absoluteness of the Notion relatively to the material of experience and, more exactly, to the categories and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this material as it appears apart from and prior to the Notion has no truth; this it has solely in its ideality or its identity with the Notion. The derivation of the real from it, if we want to call it derivation, consists in the first place essentially in this, that the Notion in its formal abstraction reveals itself as incomplete and through its own immanent dialectic passes over into reality; but it does not fall back again on to a ready-made reality confronting it and take refuge in something which has shown itself to be the unessential element of Appearance because, having looked around for something better, it has failed to find it; on the contrary, it produces the reality from its own resources.

The Notion is thus at any rate similar to the self-specifying concept Kant dismissed as unreal for human beings. What is more, its functioning was virtually recognized by Kant himself. In *Glauben und Wissen* (FK 69–70) Hegel adduces the productive imagination and the figurative synthesis in support of this claim, saying that this 'shows that the Kantian forms of intuition and the forms of thought cannot be kept apart at all as the particular, isolated faculties they are usually represented as. One and the same synthetic unity . . . is the principle of intuition and the intellect'. In the *Lectures* (LHP iii 441) schematism is portrayed as a means whereby 'pure sensuousness and pure understanding, which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites, are now united'. Hegel adds that this process involves an intuitive understanding or an intellectual intuition, though Kant regrettably failed to see the point. But it is in his references to the *Critique of Judgement* that Hegel is most insistent on Kant's being his forerunner. 'The Reflective Power of Judgment', he declares without qualification in the *Encyclopaedia* (§ 55),

is invested by Kant with the function of an Intuitive Understanding. That is to say, whereas the particulars had hitherto appeared, so far as the universal or

abstract identity was concerned, adventitious and incapable of being deduced from it, the intuitive understanding apprehends the particulars as moulded and formed by the universal itself. Experience presents such universalized particulars in the products of art and of organic nature.

This is why, in a passage already quoted from *Glauben und Wissen* (FK 91), Hegel could say that 'Kant himself recognized in the beautiful an intuition other than the sensuous'. Of course he did nothing of the kind, and Hegel knew that he did not. Kant said we have to judge beautiful natural objects and living things according to special principles which are not objectively valid in the way the principles of the understanding are objectively valid; we have to look at them as if they were designed when we have no reason to think that they are. When something is designed it is produced according to a concept in a sense; the concept determines what shall come into existence and what relations its different parts shall have one to another. In so far as we make reference to design in judging beauties of nature or living things it might be said that we apprehend particulars 'as moulded and formed' by some universal. But it is not true, of course, that the design itself conjures the particulars into existence—it might remain unexecuted—and in any case Kant insists that it is only a question of thinking *as if* design were involved; we have no right to say that it is.

Kant's caution about design in the third Critique was certainly not to Hegel's taste; as Hegel saw it Kant had grasped the truth in this area, only to turn away from it in an almost arbitrary way. And the same thing was broadly true of the discussion of the idea of an intuitive understanding to be found in §76–7 of the *Critique of Judgement*. 'It will always stand out as a marvel', wrote Hegel in the *Science of Logic* (*SL* 592),

how the Kantian philosophy recognized the relation of thought to sensuous reality, beyond which it did not advance, as only a relative relation of mere Appearance, and perfectly well recognized and enunciated a higher unity of both in the Idea in general and, for example, in the Idea of an intuitive understanding, and yet stopped short at this relative relation and the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separate from reality—fhus asserting as truth what is declared to be finite cognition, and denouncing as an justified extravagance and a figment of thought what is recgnized as truth and of which it established the specific notion.

According to *Glauben und Wissen* (FK 89) Kant admitted that we are 'necessarily driven' to the Idea of 'an archetypal intuitive intellect', but nevertheless refused it reality. He preferred to rely on 'experience and empirical psychology' for his conclusion that 'the human cognitive faculty essentially consists in the way it appears, namely in this process from the universal to the particular or back again from the particular to the universal'. As if, Hegel adds, he had no counter-experience in his own grasp of the idea of an intuitive understanding. 'He himself shows that his cognitive faculty is aware not only of the appearance and of the separation of the possible and actual in it, but also of Reason and the In-itself.' Both thoughts were present to his

mind, that of an intuitive and that of a discursive understanding, but 'his nature despised the necessity of thinking the Rational . . . and decided without reservation for appearance'.

This argument as it stands is so embarrassingly bad that it demands further consideration. It begins, presumably, from Kant's frequent description of the human intelligence as 'discursive', meaning in the first place that it operates on material supplied to it from without. If we are to understand the notion of a discursive intellect we must have some idea of what it would be for an intellect not to be discursive, and that perhaps is all that is involved in the necessity of the idea of an intuitive understanding. Kant sometimes says (e.g. B139) that we cannot 'form the least conception' of an understanding of that sort; he may mean by this that we cannot characterize its knowing in any positive way, but only in negative terms, by contrast with our own. It seems to be such a conception that is put forward in §76–7 of the *Critique of Judgement*. Now Hegel says nothing about the antithesis suggested here between a negative and a positive idea of an intuitive understanding, just as Descartes in the third Meditation made no distinction between a positive and a negative conception of the idea of God which he said he found within himself. Descartes argued that the 'objective reality' of this idea was such that it could have been caused by nothing else than an actually existent God; his argument is weakened, if not destroyed, if we have to define the content of the idea in negative terms ('intelligent, but not subject to the limitations of human intelligence; active, but free of the obstacles which obstruct human activity', etc.). Hegel of course produced no such crude inference from effect to cause. But it looks as if Kant's choice of discursive consciousness as setting the standard by which philosophical theories are to be judged, a choice so much derided by Hegel, may well have had something to do with his belief that the alternative remained shadowy and indeterminate, like its counterpart the noumenon in the positive sense of the term (B307). Hegel would have disagreed with this characterization, but it is not clear that the view he presents is couched in a truly positive way.

Had, however, Kant been questioned about his choice he would certainly have said that he made it primarily because experience shows that ours is a discursive consciousness: we do make a distinction between possibility and actuality, and we do think that no amount of reflection on concepts will show in what particular situations they apply. Concepts and intuitions are different in kind, even if it is only when they co-operate that we have the chance of attaining knowledge. Hegel does not deny that Kant is right as far as the appearances are concerned. But he maintains, in effect, that a philosophical theory such as Kant is putting forward cannot be authenticated by a simple appeal to fact in this way. Philosophy, as opposed to the special sciences, is not subject to judgement by appeal to fact, since facts reflect theories and hidden presuppositions, and can stand only if these can survive critical examination. To authenticate a philosophy you have to compare it with rival theories, subject it and them to careful internal criticism, and see if your

view survives unscathed. Hegel would not have allowed that the theories which lie behind our ordinary consciousness of the world and our everyday experience of ourselves can survive such critical scrutiny, and the elaborate story he tells in the *Phenomenology* and elsewhere is intended to show both why we naturally adopt such views and why and how they must be superseded.

What this comes to, perhaps, is that it is unfair to judge Hegel on the assumptions of his opponents, seeing that he explicitly dissents from these assumptions. We cannot properly reproach him with confusing the concept of what he called (*Science of Logic*, *SL* 789) 'the self-producing Notion' with the actuality of something answering that description, since he did not accept the implied distinction between concepts as mere possibilities and intuitions as actualities. We can, however, ask him to clarify his own account of the relationships between thoughts and things on the one hand, and thought and sensation on the other. The quotations given above already show that this is not an easy subject. They present the picture, particularly apparent in the long quotation from the *Science of Logic* on page 103, of a thinking which is not complete in itself but positively demands embodiment in the concrete; they also suggest that it is a mistake to think of such thought as exercising itself on a material which has an independent nature of its own. The antithesis between subject and object is one formed within an original unity, not something we have to accept as valid as it stands. This view disposes of subjective idealism, since it shows that the mind which makes nature cannot be the finite mind of everyday experience. But does it explain why reality takes the particular form it does? To answer that we must consider what Hegel made of sensation and in what way he supposed that it contributed to knowledge. Let us be clear from the start that he never claimed that sensation was an eliminable factor in human knowledge, however refined that knowledge became. Leibniz presented sensation as confused thinking; for him the content of every sense judgement could ideally be re-expressed in terms which were purely intellectual. Hegel by contrast associated sensation with the immediate element in knowledge, and argued that there could be no knowledge at all unless and until it was there. Sensation had to do with the sensibility, and the sensibility connected with the senses, the sense-organs, and in general the body. The knowledge in which Hegel was interested was knowledge obtained by a mind which was essentially embodied, and sensation could not be dismissed without forgetting the embodiment. Those who think of Hegel as an arch-rationalist should read the section on 'the Soul' in the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* and notice what Hegel has to say not only about the physical basis of feelings but also about the corporeal expressions of inner states.

But though sensation can thus no more be left out of account in the Hegelian scheme of things than can the body, that still says nothing of its actual part in knowledge. Plainly Hegel cannot think of it as a source of fully formed data in itself, as some modern philosophers have done. To do

that would be to make it wholly independent of thought, and in so doing revive the possibility that thought cannot get at reality. But if it is neither reducible to thought nor independent of it, what is it? The Hegelian answer must be that it is what thought naturally makes articulate, something which thought presupposes and develops but which cannot be described at its own level. Sensation or feeling is an indispensable element in sense-perception, and indeed in knowledge generally; without it concrete grasp of what is individually real would not be possible. But it is not experienced in isolation: we become aware of it only as we make its content explicit in judgement. Sense-perception is, as Kant said, a process in which concepts are brought to bear on intuitions. But it is not true, as he seemed to suggest, that concepts and intuitions, though significant only in combination, nevertheless *exist* in isolation, each with a nature of its own.

This view that the relationship of sense and thought is not one of outright opposition but rather of complementary development seems to me to deserve independent attention. It has the advantage of allowing us to say that not just concepts but percepts too have no real existence apart from judgements; it goes along with the view that the world is everything that is the case, the totality of facts not of things. But of course those who subscribe to these doctrines rarely have much to say about 'the self-producing Notion' and tend to regard talk about intuitive elements in the human understanding with deep suspicion. Is this simply prejudice on their part?

It must be confessed that Hegel's own position on this subject appears to involve an important ambiguity. On the one hand he argues, as we have just seen, for the indispensability of sensation, which he sees as the immediate component in knowledge. But at the same time he opposes the Kantian view that the human intellect is purely discursive, suggests that this is true, if at all, only of the abstract thinking of the understanding and holds out the prospect of a superior form of thinking, revealed by and exemplified in philosophical thought, which will 'pass over into' or 'produce' reality from 'its own resources'. That Hegel took Kant's idea of an intuitive understanding as embodying an ideal for human thought and not just a sketch of what might be involved in the workings of a divine mind is apparent from his numerous critical comments. Yet intuitive understanding as described by Kant was a form of experience in which mediacy and immediacy, to use Hegel's language, were inextricably intertwined, so much so that in it no distribution could be drawn between merely possible thoughts and actual situations answering to them. Whatever such an understanding might think would *ipso facto* be actual, just as whatever Midas touched turned to gold. It is hard to see how on these terms Hegel could say that thought finds sensation indispensable. It perhaps needs it to get started on the road to knowledge, but once it is in its stride simply swallows it up.

Hegel is consistently scornful of the Kantian idea that the ideal of pure reason, to cast the results of our first-order enquiries into fully systematic form, has a purely regulative force; to speak in this manner is, he thinks, to

be content with a mere 'ought to be' and leads on naturally to faith in the transcendent (the ideal is not realized in the world we know, but in another world which lies beyond this one and is not accessible to reason). Yet in practice he comes near accepting something like the Kantian notion himself, in so far as he takes the results of the sciences and tries not to replace them but to find sense in them. He hopes to rethink these results and represent them in the light of the resources of philosophy, but has no thought of producing new facts from the depths of his own consciousness. The Nation as he operates with it certainly strives to 'understand the world, to appropriate it and subdue it' to itself, to use phrases quoted earlier from the *Encyclopaedia*; it does its very best to 'idealize' phenomena, to employ another Hegelian term. But how much it can achieve depends upon something more than mere ingenuity or depth of thinking; it depends also on the nature of the material on which the philosopher brings his thought to bear. Hegel is quite clear that he cannot as philosopher take any liberties he pleases with material of this sort. And it is interesting to observe that, for all his criticisms of empiricist philosophies, he expressed in one of his early essays a strong respect for what he called 'pure' empiricism, which insisted against philosophers of the understanding on attention to concrete facts. Empiricism is here the standpoint of common sense, and it is important to make clear that Hegel thought of himself as in a way its champion, certainly not as an opponent pledged to its destruction (see *The Scientific Ways of Treating Law*,[6] 69–70).

Yet if we allow Hegel to appear on the scene in this moderate guise it is difficult to see any difference of principle between his philosophy and Kant's. There are of course many differences of detail, some of them of very considerable importance. Kant thought that the categories were fixed for all time; so far as he was concerned there was no question of deepening our understanding of the experienced world, except by acquiring more facts or establishing more empirical connections. Hegel by contrast argued that categorial thinking was of its nature endlessly self-critical; history had shown that there were many sets of terms in which to take the world, and philosophy could do something to put them in anu order of adequacy. The categorial apparatus proffered by Hegel is altogether richer than Kant's, who after all put forward only five principles of the understanding (six if we count the general principle of the Analogies), together with a small group of regulative principles of reason and reflective judgement. Although, as Hegel saw, Kant laid the foundations for philosophy of nature (and philosophy of history as well) he did so almost with reluctance, laying constant emphasis on how little way philosophy could go in these matters. Hegel had no such reservations: he was confident in his pure philosophy and extraordinarily bold in its application. He also had, as it happened, a wealth of empirical knowledge, especially of the social world, considerably greater than Kant's. He sometimes, no doubt, talked nonsense, as Kant rarely did, but he also produced applied philosophy

[6] Translated by T. M. Knox, Philadelphia, 1975.

of a brilliance which exceeds anything in Kant. We do not find in the latter's writings anything to match the perceptive analysis of the *Philosophy of Right*, or even the discussions of the *Philosophy of World History*. Yet it must be insisted that there is nothing in these works which could not in principle have been produced by Kant, had his interests been different and his imagination wider. The pretence Hegel makes in his logical writings to have laid bare a way of thinking which Kant glimpsed dimly but then turned away from altogether is not made good when we turn to other parts of his work. Hegel had an endless love/hate relationship with Kant. He admired him and at the same time he despised him. Perhaps he should have asked himself whether the shortcomings he saw in Kant were not necessarily features of his own thought as well.

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